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 In this dissertation, I examine the everyday and organized ways in which Dhimal, a 
historically marginalized indigenous people from Nepal’s easternmost lowlands, enact locally 
embedded and globally influenced indigenous activism to assert their distinct history, territorial 
belonging, and political autonomy as they participate in the processes of crafting new directions 
for the making of a ‘New Nepal’ in the post-April 2006 period.  Taking ‘place’ as a central 
analytic in the study of indigenous politics, I investigate how issues of land and landlessness 
shape Dhimals’ sense of indigeneity, ethnic history, territorial belonging, and their envisioning 
of the future as ādivāsi in Nepal.  In doing so, my ethnography provides new insights for 
approaching the relationship between Tarai ādivāsi and the land by focusing on the interplay 
among land, labor, power relations, state-led geographical imaginings, and the role of malaria 
in mediating relations among ādivāsi, the state, and other social groups, and shaping 
Dhimals’ historical agency in resisting the extractive Hindu state.   
 Based on 18 months of ethnographic fieldwork conducted between 2007 and 2009 in 
Kathmandu, the capital city of Nepal, and Morang district, this dissertation moves beyond the 
conventional emphasis on the organized and contentious struggles in the study of indigenous 
politics by focusing on how community-making practices related with marriage, village rituals, 
and place-making become constitutive practices of Dhimal indigenous activism.  By 
demonstrating the centrality of everyday practices in indigenous politics, this 
dissertation shows how people, located in specific historical-political contexts, transform 
the global-national discourses of indigeneity and indigenous rights into locally meaningful and 
relevant political projects through their embedded everyday practices.  This analytical focus on 
locally embedded practices has important implications for understanding how indigenous 
activism becomes embodied moral practice enacted by people out of their felt sense of 






A Political Rally and A Wedding Ritual: Spaces of Indigenous Activism 
!
 I woke up to a boisterous sound and realized that I had fallen asleep, maybe for one hour, 
on the plastic chair that had faithfully borne my body weight for the last eight hours in the hall 
where I was observing a political meeting of Dhimal youths since the evening before.  It was 
already three in the morning, but the spirited Dhimal youths, about two hundred or more who 
had gathered in this meeting hall around 6 pm that previous evening, were still actively engaged 
in a group discussion focused on the proposed constitution and the declaration of the first 
national convention of Dhimal Sanghiya Swayatta Parishad (Dhimal Federal Autonomous 
Council, hereafter Sanghiya Parishad).   
 These participants, some of them high school students, all affiliated with Sanghiya 
Parishad, had a shared political conviction that the present day nation-state of Nepal should be 
restructured into autonomous federal states based on ethnic identity, history and territory, with a 
‘right to self-determination’ so that “all social groups, classes, genders and regions would be 
inclusively and proportionately represented and recognized in the national polity” (The 
Constitution Preamble, DSWP, 2009).  In other words, they were gathered there in order to 
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discuss how they could mobilize their organization in solidarity with other like-minded political 
groups to realize their political vision of “Naya Nepal” or ‘New Nepal.’1 
 Seated on plastic chairs and divided into several smaller groups across the hall, these 
Dhimal discussants would periodically stand up and loudly chant their political slogans, raising 
one hand, with fist tightly closed, high into the air.  Their collective roaring filled the room and 
the surrounding spaces with echoes of their political presence and expression of their bodily 
resistance to fatigue, sleep, as well as to the Nepali nation-state that they wanted to reform 
through their political movement.  After six more hours of deliberations, they adopted the 
proposed constitution of the Sanghiya Parishad, elected its members for the central executive 
committee and other various organizational units, and formally ended the two day long national 
convention around 9 o’clock in the morning of December 18, 2009.   
 These Dhimal youths had actually begun this political event a day earlier with a public 
inaugural event organized in a huge open ground located in front of the Radhika High School in 
Urlabari Bazar of Morang district.  Hundreds of Dhimal and non-Dhimal from villages in Jhapa 
and Morang had come there to participate in the rally.  Dhimal women, young and old, some 
carrying their infant babies, had come dressed in bohna, their traditional ethnic dress.  It was also 
the first public event in which the cadre male volunteers of the Limbuwan-Dhimal Volunteer 
(L.D.V.), a special organizational unit of the Sanghiya Parishad, had come wearing their olive 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1!Following the peoples’ movement of April 2006, the idea of “Naya Nepal” was popularly used to refer to the 
political process of transforming Nepal’s two century old utterly centralized and exclusionary Hindu state system 
into an inclusive secular and federal republic (see Hangen, 2007; Bhattachan, 2009; Lawoti, 2007).  Popularly 
known as the second jān āndolan (that of 1990 being the first the one), the April 2006 movement, participated by 
the unprecedented number of people of all strata toppled the monarchical rule, helped to end the decade long of 
Maoist’ “people’s war”, and paved the political ways out for the restoring loktantra (people’s democracy) and 
provided mandate for a fundamental and radical restructuring of Nepal for an inclusive republic.  See Hachhethu 
(2008) for an overview of the post April, 2006 peoples’ movement and its impacts on peoples’ sense of citizenry and 





drab uniforms.  The imprint on the back of their uniform read: afËfO {  sdf08, L.V.D. (Bangāi 
Command L.V.D.) suggesting that they belonged to a special youth wing, akin to a combat unit.  
Bāngai is a legendary commander who is believed to have led the Dhimal army, which together 
with the Limbu army, bravely fought against the invading Gorkhali force when it attacked their 
ancestral territories in eastern Nepal in the late 18th century.  So for these Dhimal activists, 
Bāngai represents the Dhimal’s political history of resistance against the “Gorkhali imperial 
expansion” (Regmi, 1999) as well as their historic alliance with the Limbu, the indigenous group 
from the eastern hills who, many Dhimal believe, are their “ancestral brothers” (Diwas, 1979).2  
In wearing the special uniform imprinted with ‘Bāngai Command’ (Figure 1), these LDV youth 
commemorate past political actors even as they also carry the Dhimal history of resistance on 
their contemporary bodies.  Thus do the past and present coalesce in the struggle for a better 
future; the legendary ancestors such as Bāngai Dhimal, when remembered in political 






Figure 1: LDV volunteer in a political conference (2009), Morang.  All photos by the author 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2!At the end of the 18th century, the king of Gorkha, a small Hindu principality in the present day district of Gorkha, 
Prithivi Narayan Shah (1723-1775) began a military campaign of conquest through which he annexed many other 
principalities and their territories into a new Hindu kingdom that evolved into the present day state of Nepal.  As 
such, P.N. Shah’s territorial expansion is depicted as “unification” in the official historiography while indigenous 
activists consider it to be a form of “colonization.”  On Gorkhali imperialism, see Regmi (1999) and Tamang, 
(2008).  !
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 The crowd clapped and whistled when the LDVs, lined up in two rows (by gender) and 
proudly marched along the ground, many of them holding high the Sanghiya Parishad’s flag.  As 
they moved forward pounding the dry ground with their feet, thick clouds of dust rose up and 
rolled forward with the marching bodies.  
 
  
 Thus from the distant corner of the ground where I was standing, the LDV’s entrance 
seemed like a whirling wave of bodies quaking the ground.  Around noon, hundreds of people 
rallied around the Urlabari Bazar and occupied about a mile of the east-west highway, bringing 
the traffic to a complete halt for about an hour.  During the rally, these Dhimal and other 
participants were demanding that the federal restructuring of Nepal − a political process then 
underway in the Constitutional Assembly (2008-2011) of the time – should be based on ethnic 
identity, history and territory (see Bhattachan, 2009).  Claiming their indigenous rights to 
territorial-political autonomy, the rallying Dhimal youths demanded that their ancestral 
territories, the present day districts of Sunsari, Morang and Jhapa, should be federated as a 
Figure 2: The Sanghiya Parishad Rally, December 17, 2009 
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‘Dhimal autonomous state’ within the ‘Limbuwan autonomous state’ in the federal restructuring 
of Nepal.  They were also demanding the implementation of the International Labor 
Organization Convention No 169 (hereafter ILO 169) that Nepal had ratified in 2007.   
 The rally was unique in that it also symbolized the political alliance between Dhimals and 
Limbus, the two indigenous groups, one from the hills and the other from the lowland plains, 
who have consolidated their political solidarity by forming a single political party- the Federal 
Limbuwan State Council (FLSC)- of which Dhimal Sanghiya Parishad is one of its constitutive 
political councils.3 Thus this political event also symbolized a concrete practice of inter-
indigenous group solidarity for a collective political mobilization in Nepal.  Through this 
political rally, Dhimal asserted their collective subjectivity and claimed their rights as ādivāsi in 
a language that merged the national politics of federalism with broader global discourses of 
indigenous rights, as for example in the use of ILO 169.4   
 Since the late 1980s, ethnic activists in Nepal used the category of janajāti to “denote 
communities that are outside of the four field of the Hindu caste system and…. that have their 
own distinct language, religion or culture” (Hangen, 2010:50).  The English translation of janjāti 
as ‘nationalities’ is significant as it emphasizes these communities as ‘nations’, hence it 
challenges the unitary and monolithic construction of Nepal as a Hindu nation and also resonates 
with the notion of the distinct and collective peoplehood emphasized by the category of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3!The FLSC is an affiliate political state council of the umbrella national political party of various ethnic groups, 
officially registered as a single political party called Federal Democratic National Forum (FDNF) that contested the 
national election for the Constituent Assembly in 2008.  On the relationship between indigenous political movement 
and ethnic party formation in Nepal, see Hangen (2010). 
!
4!According to Nepal Federation of Indigenous Nationalities (NEFIN), the national representative organization of 
Nepal’s indigenous peoples, ādivāsi janajāti are: (a) first settlers prior to the formation of Gorkha and Nepal state, 
(b) dominated group with no representations in the state organs, (c) non Hindu caste groups, (d) those who have the 
own language, culture and religion different from the rulers, and (d) those listed by Nepalese government Indigenous 
Act 2002 (see http: //www.nefin.org.np/list/Definition-of-Indigenous/5/0/4, accessed April 17, 2013). The 
government of Nepal has identified 62 groups as ādivāsi janajāti - hence the term “indigenous peoples” is a legal and 
political category in Nepal.  The term ‘Ādivāsi Janajāti’ is also translated as ‘indigenous nationalities.’  
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‘indigenous peoples.’5  In Nepal, the categories of janajāti and ādivāsi are synonymously used in 
the sense of ‘indigenous peoples.’  These two terms are now increasingly used together as 
‘ādivāsi janjāti’ to emphasize the idea of ‘indigenous peoples’ used in the international 
discourses of indigeneity and indigenous peoples’ rights.   
 With the ratifications of the ILO 169 and endorsement of the UNDRIP by the Nepali 
state, the two most important international instruments dealing with the human rights of 
indigenous peoples, the category of ‘indigenous peoples’ have further become politically salient 
and important for the historically marginalized groups such as the Dhimal.  Hence the political 
event that I have introduced here represents an example of a locally grounded indigenous 
activism that aimed to make an impact both at the local and the national levels.  By claiming 
their territorial identity within their ancestral lands, these Dhimal also demanded their right to 
political autonomy as ‘indigenous peoples’ or ādivāsi janajāti, the category of peoplehood 
enshrined in those very international instruments of human rights endorsed and ratified by Nepal, 
an expression of its moral commitment and accountability.   
 The brief ethnographic account of the political event with which I introduce this 
dissertation provides an apt example of indigenous activism.  It shows the dedication and 
commitment of Dhimal youths, a majority of them high school and college students, who 
articulated a collective subjectivity and claimed their rights as ādivāsi in a language that 
mediated national politics with the global discourses of indigenous rights.  By demanding their 
rights to political autonomy through a federal state of their own, they also underlined the 
significance of the politics of “indigenous territoriality” (Liffman, 2011) by asserting that 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5!!Some senior indigenous leaders who were involved in the earlier processes of the formation of the Nepal Janajati 
Mahasang (Nepal Federations of Nationalities), now called Nepal Janajati Mahasang or Nepal Federation of 
Indigenous Nationalities told me that the translation of ‘janajati’ as ‘nationalities’ was influenced by the Marxist-
Leninist notion of “nationalities” and Lenin emphasis on the rights of nationalities for self-determination.  !
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Dhimal as ‘indigenous peoples’ have inalienable rights to control their ancestral territories, 
resources, and the decision-making processes that affect their collective life (Bhattachan, 2009: 
46).6   
 The anthropologist Paul Liffman reminds us that ‘place’ is the “basic element of territory 
from the point of view of the people who inhabit it” (Liffman, 2011: 19).   These Dhimal youth, 
by demanding a ‘Dhimal autonomous state’, are also enacting an indigenous politics of place-
making.  The active participation of Dhimal women and their assuming leadership positions in 
the Sanghiya Parishad indicate how young Dhimal women are challenging their lack of 
representation within their ethnic organizations even as it also shows them asserting political 
agency through indigenous activism.  Finally, their wearing of their ethnic dress also signals the 
importance of traditional dress as a political language in indigenous politics (Allman, 2004). 
 The event I described here is a motif that scholars of social movements will find 
paralleled within contemporary organized indigenous mobilizations throughout the world.  
However, I also chose it as an introduction in order to highlight my argument that, if taken as the 
representative motif for indigenous activism, it may mask many other constitutive facets of 
Dhimal indigenous politics.  Political mobilization of this kind, while unquestionably very 
influential in consolidating Dhimal’ political power, is only one of the many ways in which 
Dhimal from all walks of life and all generations become involved in indigenous activism.  If we 
limit our analysis of indigenous political movement only to overtly organized and contentious 
mobilizations of this kind, then we will miss how people engage in and enact indigenous 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6!!According to Krishna B. Bhattachan, one of Nepal’s most important indigenous activist leaders and renown 
sociologists, “The global indigenous movements clearly substantiates that the ultimate goal of indigenous peoples is 
the right to self-determination or to have control, ownership and utilization of their collective life and over forest, 
water, mineral and other natural resources and ancestral territories.  This is the indigenism. …There are multiple 
means to achieve these ends for exercising indigenous rights.  When we analyze Nepal’s past and the present day 
conditions, ethnic autonomy based on federal structure is the most useful political means” (Bhattachan, 2009:46, my 
translation). 
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activism through the everyday politics of community making.  The following ethnographic 
example of how one Dhimal friend of mine, an active member of the Sanghiya Parishad, was 
required to redo his wedding engagement illustrates how an apparently local affair can also 
become a constitutive practice of Dhimal indigenous activism. 
 A few days after the political event that I described earlier (December, 2009), my Dhimal 
friend, whom I will call Kewale, the central level member of the Sanghiya Parishad and a 
journalist by profession, followed an unconventional path to making a marriage proposal to the 
Dhimal girl who now is his wife.  Dhimal marriage engagement is negotiated and mediated by 
the village representatives of the prospective families of the bride and groom.  In the early 1990s, 
the Dhimal Jati Bikas Kendra (hereafter the Kendra), Dhimal’s national level indigenous 
organization or ‘jāti sansthā’ as they commonly call it, had sanctioned a set of social rules in 
order to standardize and regulate Dhimal marriage rituals in accordance with Dhimal riti-tithi or 
customary practices.  In the case of Kewale I was told, because of urgency and lack of time, his 
marriage engagement was mediated by a group of his close friends affiliated with Sanghiya 
Parishad.  In fact, Kewale and his friends are aware of and support the implementation of the 
Kendra’s social rules governing Dhimal customary practices.  However, they seemed to have 
undermined the legitimacy of the Kendra’s social rules when it came to their own convenience.  
But Kewale’s parents, the village heads, and senior community members from the two sides 
disapproved of the earlier engagement process.  They persuaded Kewale to redo the engagement 
ceremony, but this time in accordance with Dhimal riti-tithi.   
 The village elders and Kewale’s parents reinforced what they believe to be the 
indispensible customary practices that define and re-create Dhimal sociality, culture and ethnic 
identity – an important agenda that Kewale and his friends bring out emotionally in their 
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indigenous activism.  For instance, in the political convention that I described earlier, one of the 
participants, Kewale’s friend, a twenty-two year old college student, gave a an emotional speech 
in which he said, “Dhimal without their culture are like a kite disconnected from its string or like 
a stream that has lost its source.  If we forget our culture, we will be like the ghoiya sāp (a 
species of non-poisonous snake)” (Field note, December 18, 2009).  As people do not fear a non-
poisonous snake like the ghoiya, Kewale’s friend asserted that no one would take Dhimal 
seriously if they forget their ethnic identity and culture.  Invoking the idea of what defines 
Dhimal personhood, he emphasized they cannot claim their political subjectivity as Dhimal 
without being grounded in their culture and collective identity.  Hence by making Kewale follow 
Dhimal customary practices, his parents and village elders helped him reconstitute the string of 
social relationships that exist between the two villages because without this connection, he would 
be “like a kite disconnected from its string or like a stream that has lost its source.”  Kewale’s 
adherence to customary practice not only conformed to his cultural “roots,” but the demands of 
his parents and village elders accorded crucial moral and social legitimacy to the Kendra.  This 
double outcome ratified the enormous sense of belonging and collective ownership accorded by 
Dhimal youth to their own umbrella indigenous organization.   
 The anthropologist Joanne Rappaport reminds us that a defining attribute of indigenous 
activists is that “they remain conscious of their ethnic identity… and it is through their identity as 
members of a collective that they function as intellectuals” (Rappaport, 2004: 116-117).  Hence, 
just like Kewale and his Dhimal friends who wear a special uniform to mark themselves as 
‘volunteers’ during certain political functions, their parents and village elders, as I discuss in 
subsequent chapters, are also important ‘indigenous activists’ among Dhimal.  Their emphasis on 
following Dhimal customary practices informs us of how Dhimal understand activism as moral 
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practice.  At the same time, as a practice of cultural revival, its grounded historical analysis helps 
us to understand how Dhimal customary practices surrounding marriage, ritual, and customary 
institutions such as the village head and the ritual priests, continue to mediate the power 
relationships both within their community and among Dhimal, the Nepali state, and the such 
historically dominant social groups as the hill “high” caste Hindus. 
 Marriage is an important collective practice through which Dhimal work to socially 
reconstitute their community and establish its social relationships based on Dhimal customary 
social organizations.  Anthropology as a discipline is well furnished with theoretical and 
ethnographic examples which emphasize the importance of marriage to social reproduction of a 
community and its social relationships.  But the ways in which marriage becomes a contested 
communal space for indigenous activism – a space in which people engage other pertinent issues 
such as ethnic identity, customary institutions, governance, cultural autonomy, and similar 
concerns that Dhimal also bring out and discuss in their indigenous political movements – have 
not to my knowledge received the same level of analytical focus and scholarly attention brought, 
for example, to “global indigenism” (Niezen, 2003) and “neoliberalism” (Li, 2000; Pastero, 
2007)  in the study of indigenous politics.  As exemplified by the case of Kewale, it is through 
engagement in cultural practices such as marriage and ritual – the realm of locally embedded 
everyday practices and their underlying values and ethical orientations that Dhimal consider 
indispensible to their sense of personhood, morality, history, and their understanding of what 
makes them Dhimal – that activists and their organizations such as the Kendra derive their moral 
authority and social legitimacy as ‘indigenous activists’ in their community.  Hence a cultural 
practice such as marriage is equally a constitutive practice of Dhimal indigenous activism. 
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 The perceived insignificance of everyday cultural practices such as marriage as a site of 
indigenous political mobilization was expressed by one prominent non-Dhimal indigenous 
activist and a professor at Nepal’s premiere university when I mentioned to him that I was 
focusing on marriage and village ritual practices as way of understanding Dhimal’s indigenous 
activism.  He politely asked me: “How can Dhimal concerns with their customary practices of 
marriage help them achieve their political agendas of ethnic federalism” This is an important 
question that informs the central focus of this dissertation. 
 This dissertation is an ethnographic study of the indigenous political activism of the 
Dhimal, a historically marginalized ādivāsi or indigenous people from Nepal’s easternmost Tarai 
(Nep.  lowland plains).  In this dissertation, I examine the quotidian and organized ways in which 
Dhimal enact locally embedded cultural politics and globally influenced indigenous activism to 
assert their distinct history, territorial belonging and political autonomy as they participate in the 
process of remaking Nepal into an inclusive federal republic nation-state.  More specifically, my 
study investigates how Dhimal cultural practices related to marriage, communal rituals and 
place-making become the constitutive practices of their political mobilization for territorial and 
political autonomy.  In order to understand what is at stake in discussing Dhimal indigenous 
political activism, a brief sketch of the ethno-historical context is necessary. 
 Dhimal, who speak a Tibeto-Burman language (King, 2008; Hodgson, 1849) they call 
Dhimali, are one of the aboriginal inhabitants of the easternmost lowland plains (the Tarai) in the 
present day districts of Sunsari, Morang and Jhapa.  Predominately a subsistence farming 
community of twenty-five thousand or more people, they live in ninety-seven Dhimal villages 
(Dhimal S.  et al. 2010) scattered in twenty Village Development Committee (VDCs) in the 
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districts of Sunsari, Morang and Jhapa where they comprise less than ten percent of the total 





  Until the early 20th century, the Tarai region, the Dhimals’ ancestral territory in 
particular, was thinly populated and thickly covered with dense, malarial forests.  The Nepali 
state and its rulers had long made efforts to colonize the Tarai for land reclamation but the 
endemic prevalence of malaria and the perceived belief that the Tarai’s hāvāpani (Nep.  literally 
air and water) was lethal for hill peoples had discouraged settlement.  However, with the 
‘eradication’ of malaria in the early 1950s, the Tarai became the most sought-after destination 
for land-seeking migrants from the hills and elsewhere.  Implementation of the state-led land 
reform of 1964, the land settlement projects of the 1960s to 1970s, the construction of the East-
West highway (early 1970s), and the resulting expansion of infrastructure like roads, schools, 
markets, electricity, and hospitals, drew more and more people into the Tarai.  This “frontier 
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settlement” (Shrestha, 1989) in the Tarai progressively dispossessed Dhimal from their ancestral 
territories and further marginalized them politically, economically, and culturally.  
Contemporary indigenous activism is one of many organized ways by which Dhimal are working 
to subvert their political, economic and cultural marginality in Nepal.   
-
Research Questions and Central Arguments 
!
 There is now general consensus among scholars that social movements must be seen 
equally and inseparably as struggles over meaning as well as material conditions (Escobar, 1998: 
69).  Melucci (1989) emphasizes that contemporary social movements need to be understood as 
collective actions that challenge the dominant symbols of the system.  When movements deploy 
alternative conceptions of gender, nature, race, economy, people, culture rights, democracy, and 
citizenship, they unsettle dominant cultural meanings and enact cultural politics (Alvarez, 
Dagnino and Escobar, 1998).  Indigenous peoples are asserting alternative meanings of 
belonging in their nation-states by challenging the dominant notions and practices of citizenship, 
rights, territoriality, and sovereignty.   
 In what ways do the national-global discourses of ‘indigeneity’ and ‘indigenous rights’ 
enact new social meanings at the local level in its specific historic-political contexts? This was 
the major research question with which I began the fieldwork for this dissertation.  As I pursued 
my research, the emergent political transformations in Nepal that coincided with the period of 
my fieldwork and the ways in which Dhimal acted on these political processes both through 
organized indigenous activism and by intertwining their everyday community making practices 
such as rituals, marriage, and place-making activities influenced and reshaped my research foci.  
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Over the period of my research, two overarching themes shaped the major issues that I address in 
this dissertation, and the structures of my ethnographic analysis presented herein. 
 First, the centrality of the issues of land, landlessness, and sense of territorial belongings 
permeated Dhimal narratives about who they are, what had happened to them in the past, and 
what is happening to them now as Dhimal, and their vision of the future as ādivāsi.  One could 
attribute this Dhimal heightened “sense of place” (Feld and Basso, 1996) and territorial-historical 
consciousness as both a ‘local’ expression and indigenous articulation of the ethnic federalism 
and territorial autonomy that had became a major national political agenda at that period.  But to 
rely on such an explanation would be to deny Dhimal their political agency and to depict them as 
simply responding to what was happening ‘out there’ in the global-national space.  But Dhimal 
expressions of their landlessness and its history do far more than appropriate existing global 
discourses of indigeneity or what others have called the “indigenous slot” (see Karlsson, 2003; 
Li, 2000).  They are, rather, the expression of a history which all Dhimal who are older than fifty 
have experienced and witnessed since the 1950s.  This emphasis on land and landlessness 
crystallizes their concrete subjective experience of the Nepali state.   
 Moreover, their sense of territorial belonging was deeply concerned with this history of 
ecological belonging in the Tarai environment, a belonging which further shapes their 
understanding of their relationships with the places where they live or had lived in the past, and 
of their religious practices, social organization, and inter-ethnic relationships.  These historical 
narratives about land, landlessness, and territorial belonging inform the explanations offered by 
senior Dhimal activists’ for why they become involved in indigenous activism, and why they 
emphasize place-making practices in order to reclaim Dhimal ethnic history, culture and their 
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collective future.  Hence the relationships among place, history, ethnic identity, and politics 
emerged as the overarching theme for my dissertation research.   
 Second, as I explained by way of the two examples in the beginning of this chapter, Dhimal 
emphasis on their communal cultural practices such as marriage and village ritual as spaces of 
cultural reform and preservation motivated me to focus on these locally embedded practices as 
important spaces of indigenous activism.  Revival of indigenous cultural practices is closely 
associated with the resurgence of indigenous political movements in many places around the 
world (Warren, 1998; Hodgson, 2005; Charles, 1999; Ginsburg, 1994; Linnekin and Poyer, 
1990; Handler, 1988).  In the case of Dhimal, these efforts at reform had continued since the 
early 1950s when their local social worlds became increasingly multiethnic and the Nepali state 
imposed assimilative cultural policies in the name of ‘modernization,’ bikās  (Nep.  
development), and ‘national integration.’ Dhimal often use the Nepali terms kuriti and bikriti to 
refer to what they consider  “bad” and deviated cultural practices in need of collective 
intervention in order to reform them.  Not only the indigenous activists affiliated with the Kendra 
but all Dhimal -- men and women, young and old -- were involved in this cultural politics of 
reform.  I was interested in exploring why they emphasize certain cultural practices such as 
marriage, village ritual, and traditional dress as sites of reform and preservation.   
 I argue that Dhimal explanations about kuriti and bikriti help us to uncover the interplay 
of history, the state, inter-ethnic relations, and changing social and political-economic conditions 
in shaping Dhimal’s reflexive evaluation of their cultural practices.  My study demonstrates the 
centrality of cultural politics in Dhimal indigenous activism, for example, those related to 
marriage, communal rituals, traditional dress, and place-making practices.  By demonstrating 
how marriage, village ritual and place-making practices can become contested spaces of 
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indigenous politics, my ethnography makes an important contribution in foregrounding locally 
embedded cultural practices such marriage, rituals, and place-making as constitutive practices of 
indigenous activism.  I argue that analytical focus on locally embedded cultural politics helps us 
to discern how people located in specific histories and lived circumstances transform the global-
national discourses of indigeneity and indigenous rights into locally meaningful and relevant 
political projects.  Furthermore, my study also demonstrates that such ethnographic focus on 
people’s everyday lives also helps us to understand how people mediate the conflicts and 
contradictions which emerge in their social movements in terms of gender, age, class positions, 
political ideologies, and other realities of difference among activists and people involved in the 
activism. 
 
A Place-based Approach to Indigenous Activism  
!
My fieldwork coincided with the period of radical political transformations in the aftermath 
of the April 2006 peoples’ movement in Nepal during which the demands of indigenous peoples 
for federalism based on ethnic identity, history and territory (see Bhattachan, 2005, 2009; 
Hangen, 2007, 2010; Lawoti, 2013) had heightened a distinct sense of “geographical 
imagination” (Harvey, 2005:212) among indigenous communities (Tamang, 2009).   
The fundamental feature of ādivāsi identity is the inalienable relationship they have with 
their land and territories (Gray, 1995; Castree, 2004).  In Nepal, since the early 1990s, peoples’ 
claims of ādivāsi identity and the state recognition of the ādivāsi janjāti have underlined the 
historical relationship between indigenous peoples and their territories (Bhattachan, 2008).  
Nepal’s indigenous peoples and their movements advanced the notion of ādivāsi as a powerful 
political category of collective rights, including the right to political autonomy in their ancestral 
territories in the emerging political transformation to remake Nepal into an inclusive federal 
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state, particularly with the ratification and endorsement of the ILO 169 and the United Nation’s 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (hereafter UNDRIP) by the Nepali state in 2007 
(see Bhattachan, 2009). 
 At the community level, people’s sense of place, their locally embedded practices of place-
making such as rituals and place-names, and peoples’ understanding of their historical 
relationships with their territories acquired new political significance.  In this changed political 
context, Dhimals’ experiences of landlessness after the 1950s and their embedded belonging in 
their ancestral places, hence their understanding of indigeneity, became an important political 
project which they enacted by integrating it with their village ritual, history writing, and other 
place-making practices.  Hence the timing of my fieldwork (2007-2009) was important because 
it offered me grounded ethnographic sites within which to understand Dhimal indigenous 
activism through focus on the dialogical interplay among global-national discourses of 
indigeneity, political transformation, and peoples’ everyday practices.   
In order to foreground my ethnographic analysis in these political-historical contexts, I use 
theories of place and place-making to investigate the Dhimal indigenous political movement.  I 
draw on recent approaches to ‘place’ as an analytical category in anthropology which consider 
place to be more than a physical location or “the setting for action, the stage on to which things 
happen” (Rodman, 1992: 643).  Rather, like kinship and religion, place mediates social 
relationships and shapes our experiences of being in the world (Feld and Basso, 1996).7  In 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7!I argue that the emerging anthropology of place can also be read as a critique of the critiques of place in 
anthropology which scholars such as Appadurai (1988), Malkki (1992), Augé, (1995), and Gupta and Ferguson 
(1997) have advanced since the late 1980s to argue against the ideas of the bounded and territorialized notion of 
culture, anthropological ideas of fieldwork, representations of places with certain images, and homelands.  In these 
important debates about “culture,” “fields,” “voices” and “representations,” the concept of ‘place’ is used to critique 
the earlier approaches to understand these problems, although their focus is not on the theoretical and conceptual 
debates on ‘place’ as an analytical concept (Feld and Basso, 1996).  See Escobar (2001) for an important critique of 
such critiques of place.   
!
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particular, I draw on the emerging scholarship in the anthropology of place that combines the 
phenomenological approach of “being in place” (Casey, 1996; Basso, 1996) and the political-
economic approach (Harvey, 1996) that emphasizes how place is socially produced and 
experienced.   
This new approach to place that combines phenomenological and political-economic 
perspectives (see Kirsch, 2001, 2006; Escobar, 2001; Myers, 2002) offers a useful analytical 
framework to account for the ways in which peoples’ sense of place is shaped and transformed 
by the political-economic contexts of their emplacements (e.g. capitalism, colonialism, state-
making, etc.).  In other words, this approach helps us understand that the practices of place-
making and the experiences of place are always socially and politically organized (Myers, 2002).  
I contend that place-making is inherently a political project for indigenous peoples’ movements 
for the right to self-determination over their collective life, territories, lands and resources (see 
Muehlebach, 2003).8  
By place-making, I mean the collective practices of individuals and groups to reclaim their 
historical and lived relationships with places by inscribing new meanings and “structures of 
feeling” (Williams, 1977; Ahearn, 2001) into their lived geographies.  The claim of the ‘right to 
self-determination’ (see Muehlebach, 2003 for an innovative discussion; also Bhattachan, 2012 
for Nepalese context), based on an indigeneity defined as a collective self with inalienable 
relations to land (Gray, 1995), is the defining global political agenda of indigenous political 
movements, as indeed it is for Nepal’s ādivāsi janjāti movement (Bhattachan, 2009, 2012).  
However, this indigenous claim of indigenous territoriality is also one of the most contested 
points of disagreement between indigenous activists and the state concerning the rights of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8!Here I draw on the ILO 169 and UNDRIP when I am referring to indigenous peoples’ rights to self-determination.  
The concept of ‘rights to self-determination’ is neither the analytical nor substantive focus of my dissertation.  See 
Bhattachan, 2009 and 2012 for how the concept of indigenous right to self-determination applies in Nepal. 
! 19!
indigenous peoples (see Muehlebach, 2003).9 
 Scholars as well as state representatives have criticized the indigenous claim of territorial 
autonomy in the legal language of right to self-determination on the grounds that such a claim 
entails an ontology of a bounded and territorialized community that does not exist in the real 
world.  They also argue that an indigenous right to self-determination not only undermines the 
state’s territorial sovereignty but also engenders ethnic violence and segregation by depriving 
other non-indigenous groups living within the indigenous territories of their rights (Malkki, 
1997; Kuper, 2003).  While these are important and critical concerns, however, they fail to 
recognize the fundamental moral claims indigenous peoples such as Dhimal are making when 
they claim their territorial and political autonomy.  Based on her ethnographic study of the 
indigenous activists who were involved in the transnational advocacy and negotiations in 
drafting the United Nation’s declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples, the anthropologist 
Andrea Muehlebach (2003: 261) succinctly argues that:  
The “self” indigenous activists consistently advocate is a collective, cultural “self” whose 
existence and rights cannot be reduced to those already existing in international law for either 
individuals or so-called nation-states….  The “self” in self-determination relies on notions of 
culture as collective and territorialized practice, a move that is having repercussions in the way 
in which state violations of local collective rights to natural resources are being understood in 
international law. 
 
 In other words, indigenous peoples are asserting their rights based on a notion of self and 
personhood different from the liberal notion of autonomous self, one moreover that is an idea of 
personhood substantiated by cross-cultural anthropological studies and one cherished by 
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9!A major scholarly concern and critique of indigenous peoples’ claim of rights to political autonomy based on their 
historical relationship with their ancestral territory has to do with the ontology of isomorphism among people, place, 
culture, and history and the fear of geographical exclusion (Harvey, 1996) that other non-indigenous communities’ 




anthropologists as an alternative to the western notion of self and personhood (Mauss, 1985; 
Strathern, 1988; Carsten, 1995).  Hence, my emphasis on place-making as the essence of 
indigenous struggle recognizes the moral politics embedded therein.  It thus calls for a more 
empathetic ethnographic sensibility that focuses on the locally embedded practices of peoples 
without losing the weight of the global-national discourses of indigeneity in our analytical 
framework.  Informed by indigenous peoples’ experiences, the focus on place and place-making, 
therefore makes an important theoretical contribution to the anthropology of the state in basing 
its analytical framework on the dialogical relationships among land, labor, history, and power.  I 
will return to the anthropology of the state later in this discussion. 
  In this regard, the work of the political geographer Noel Castree (2004) is relevant to this 
study.  Responding to the writings of influential geographers such as David Harvey, Michael 
Watts, and Doreen Massey who reject indigenous peoples’ claim of territorialized identity, hence 
their political rights based on indigeneity, Castree (2004) empathetically calls for a more supple 
understanding of indigenous claims of differential geographies as a political project of control 
over their territories (landed property), resources (cultural and material), and informational 
knowledge which continue to be colonized, appropriated and extracted by the regimes of 
capitalism (see Escobar, 2001; Sawyer, 2004, Kirsch, 2006, 2008).  He argues that indigenous 
peoples are “agitating to reverse long histories and geographies of dispossession” (Castree, 2004: 
136).  By claiming indigenous rights, they want to “make their own places rather than have them 
made for them” (p: 161).  The ability to make their own places entails political possibilities for 
the continued social production of collectivities possessing their own values, forms of 
personhood, and history (Turner, 1999; Holmberg, 2011). 
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 Drawing from these theoretical perspectives, I argue that a place-based approach is 
necessary to account ethnographically for the variegated ways in which people enact a cultural 
politics of making and claiming the differential geography of belonging.  It offers greater scope 
to understand indigenous activism by centering on how people, place, history, and politics are 
produced in mutually dialectical relationships (Feeley-Harnik, 1991; Leach, 2003; Kirsch, 2006; 
Kahn, 2011).  Since land is a central analytic in studying the relationship between the state and 
indigenous peoples, I argue that the focus on place as the analytical framework for understanding 
indigenous politics can have important implications for rethinking the concept of  “state” in 
anthropology.   
 
 
Indigenous Peoples’ Movements and the State 
!
A subaltern social movement mobilized on the notion of ‘indigeneity’ needs to be seen “as 
principle and practice ultimately concerned with reshaping the structure of indigenous people-
state relations in the hope of crafting a legitimate political order where innovative patterns for 
belonging can be explored” (Maaka and Fleras, 2000: 91).10  Maaka and Fleras’ emphasis 
indigeneity as transforming practices of the state-indigenous peoples relations asks us to 
historicize the structural relations of power between the state and its indigenous peoples.  In his 
seminal paper, the sociologist Phillip Abrams (1988[1977]) suggests that we should demystify 
the reality of the state by historicizing how, by whom, and for what purposes the state becomes 
objectified in a specific historical context.  In the biographies of nation-states, dispossession and 
colonization of indigenous territories are, to follow Walter Benjamin, “not the state of exception 
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10!I use subaltern social movement to emphasize that not all social movements are necessarily enacted by 
historically marginalized groups in order to transform the system of domination.  The dominant groups or the state 
may also enact various forms of social movements to maintain the status quo (see Bowie, 2005.).   
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but the rule” (Benjamin, 1955: 259).  Nepal provides an excellent example of this state-led 
colonization where the project of nation-state formation that began in the mid 18th century with 
the territorial conquest and annexation of indigenous territories established the Hindu King as 
Bhupati or the husband/owner of the land, and the state as the sovereign landlord (see Burghart, 
1984; Regmi, 1971).   
The rise of the centralized extractive Hindu state controlled by the hill “high” caste groups, 
on the one hand, led to the political-economic marginalization of the subjugated indigenous 
communities through dispossession of their traditional control over their territories, hence their 
political autonomy (Caplan, 1970; Regmi, 1999; Tamang, 2008).  On the other hand, the 
assimilative policies of Hinduization, imposition of Hindu caste hierarchy through state 
institutions, and the promotion of the hill Hindu nationalism led to the cultural marginalization of 
the indigenous communities since the early 19th century (Hofer, 1979; Gurung, 1997).   
Since the turn of the 19th century, the Nepali state and its hill Hindu rulers had transformed 
the Tarai, the lowland plains, into a geography of colonization for land, labor, revenue and 
political control.  While the rulers relied on the resources of the Tarai to sustain their governance 
and consolidate their political domination, the region was designated as “Kala Banjar” (Nep.  
black barren place), an inhabitable place potentially polluting to the heartland of the Hindu 
rulers, the capital city, Kathmandu, and the west-central hill regions (see Regmi, 1995: 14-17 ).  
So for many years, people of Tarai origin, though many of them are also Hindus, were 
considered to be liable and held under suspicion (Lal, 2001: 100-101) by their hill rulers.  They 
were considered only as sources of labor, rents, and means for reclaiming the Tarai land for the 
state and its rulers (ibid).  This politics of regionalism (Gaige, 1975) and land colonization in the 
Tarai had far reaching consequences for the Tarai indigenous peoples such as Dhimal.  As a 
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result of the nature of these state formation processes Dhimal experiences of the Nepali state in 
the last two centuries have been about “losing ground” (McDonaugh, 1997: 280), which involves 
the collective loss of their land, culture, and traditional hold on local political and administrative 
power.   
This collective experience of losing ground is well captured when Dhimal ask themselves 
and others, “Why are we ādivāsi Dhimal now sukumbāsi (Nep.  landless squatters)?”  I contend 
that this question “what does it mean to be ādivāsi when one is landless or nearly landless in 
one’s own ancestral territories?” demands that we understand the category of ‘sukumbāsi’ not 
simply as a narrow econo-centric condition of landlessness but also as an objective condition of 
dispossession from the material and cultural habitus (Bourdieu, 1986) that enables them to 
socially produce themselves as precisely Dhimal against a generic Nepali identity (Holmberg, 
2012).  When historically marginalized people such as Dhimal deploy the collective identity of 
ādivāsi in their political mobilization, even when the notion of ‘indigenous peoples’ is a political 
category in the making (Barnes, 1995: 1), they are fundamentally redefining their relationship 
with the Nepali state by foregrounding how state-led structural exclusion and marginality have 
disempowered or restricted their ability to produce themselves as Dhimal.   
The anthropologist Terence Turner (1999: 133) persuasively reminds us that the essence of 
an indigenous peoples’ movement is “the struggle for the continued production of collective life, 
the self-production of the social group, with its values and forms of personhood.  This is a 
struggle for social production in the broadest sense” (Turner, 1999: 132).  Since indigenous 
peoples’ relationships to land and territory, as it is encompassed “in its relation to a social 
context in all its complex totality” (Mauss and Beuchat, 1904: 21), is indispensible to create and 
recreate their forms of personhood and community at large (see Caplan, 1970 for an 
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ethnographic example from Nepal), I assert that the indigenous struggle to assert political 
autonomy over their ancestral territories must first be conceptualized as their struggle for the 
continued production of collective self.  Such a political struggle for Dhimal is contained in the 
process of place-making.  Then how do we conceptualize the category of “the state” informed by 
indigenous experiences and their political envisioning? 
New theories of the state argue that earlier approaches “naturalize” the boundary between 
state and society (Mitchell, 1981; Ferguson and Gupta 2002), infuse the state with institutional 
concreteness (Trouillot, 2001), and make it the central institution of power (Foucault, 1990 
[1978]).  Such approaches simultaneously de-emphasize the role of “culture” (Geertz, 1980, 
Steinmetz, 1999, Corrigan and Sayer, 1985; Bourdieu, 1999) and everyday practices of state 
formation and maintenance (Sharma and Gupta, 2006).11  Interestingly many scholars, 
particularly those informed by the transnational framework of the state (Appadurai, 1996b, 2003; 
Trouillot, 2001; Gupta and Ferguson, 2001) and Foucault’s works on governmentality (Foucault, 
2003 [1976]; 1990 [1978], see Gordon, 1991 and Rose, 1996 for illustration), agree in their de-
emphasis and rejection of the issues of land, territory and territorial sovereignty as central 
analytical entries to an understanding of state dynamics. 
I argue that indigenous claims for a collective self as a people have major implications for 
the rethinking of a theory of the state theory based on Foucault’s idea of governmentality.  
Foucault defines ‘government’ in general as meaning a “conduct of conduct”: a form of activity 
aiming to shape, guide or affect the conduct of some person or persons (Gordon, 1991: 2).  This 
conduct of conduct is embedded in power relations and on specific forms of rationality to justify 
this activity.  Foucault (1991) argues for an historical shift from the notion of government as 
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11!On the new scholarships on the state in anthropology, see Das and Poole, 2004; Hansen and Steppuart, 2001, and 
Sharma and Gupta, 2006.  
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“conduct of self” as pertaining to individuals to the realm of the government of the state.  In this 
shift of locus, the state began to rule over its subjects not by external coercion but by deploying a 
specific political rationality and various tactics of government that not only regulate the 
behaviors from the outside but, more importantly, create self-regulating individuals.  Thus the 
state, Foucault argues, can be understood only on the basis of general tactics of governmentality 
(Foucault, 1991: 103).  As scholars of social movements and transnational activism make clear, 
Foucault’s notion of governmentality offers a useful framework to understand how different state 
regimes rule through indirect regulatory and control mechanisms (Rose, 1996) by deploying 
various governing technologies and inciting such varied terms of discourse as ‘democracy’ and 
‘participation’ (see Paley, 2001 for an excellent ethnographic case).   
From the indigenous perspective, the major problem that I see in Foucault’s notion of 
governmentality is his rejection of ‘sovereignty’ as an analytical site for analysis of the modern 
state.  The judicial model of sovereignty, he argues, fails to provide a “concrete analysis for 
power relations” (Foucault, 2003 [1976]: 44), and thus he emphasizes that we “cut off the head 
of the king” (ibid) in thought and in political analysis to approach the state.  Foucault’s concept 
of modern state power is the “biopower,” which is exercised through various disciplinary 
techniques over individual bodies (Foucault, 1990 [1978]: 135-145).  It implies that the modern 
form of politics is biopolitics.   
I see two related problems.  First, Foucault’s analogy is an eccentrically Eurocentric notion; 
Foucault’s modern Europe is “Europe without its colonial history.”  The erasure of colonial 
history from his analysis also ignores the territorial power of the state and a colonial expansion 
that was based on control over territories, labor, and resources in its colonies (Wolf, 1992; 
Feeley-Harnik, 1991; Frank, 1998).  Second, Foucault’s assigning centrality to ‘biopower’ is 
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problematic for an indigenous theory of rights.  Foucault’s concept of the body is a ‘liberal self’ 
devoid of its constitutive embeddedness within place and territory, and is thus less useful for 
arguing the kind of collective self that indigenous peoples advance in claiming their rights.  His 
focus on space seeks to understand the spatial power of the state (Foucault, 1976, 1975), 
especially its power over populations.  While Foucault wants the analyst to “cut off the king’s 
head” so that the ways in which modern state power works can be discerned, indigenous activists 
want to bring the issue of ‘sovereignty’ back into political analysis for an innovative 
transformation of the practice of sovereignty.   
Suzana Sawyer’s (2004) ethnography of indigenous politics against the multinational oil 
industry is a welcome approach.  She shows how multinational corporations can exploit 
indigenous territories through state power not only by deploying biopolitical techniques (like 
managing bodies through development, health clinics, and so on) but also through deploying 
tactics of territoriality.  The “time-space compression” (Harvey, 1990: 240) effects of global 
capitalism and the rise of new forms of “empire” (Hardt and Negri, 2000) may have weakened 
and shrunk the spaces of state territorial sovereignty, but it is through “accumulation by 
dispossession,” as Harvey (2003) himself has demonstrated, that the new regimes of capitalist 
exploitation work.  Nevertheless it is important to recognize, as grounded ethnographic studies 
have shown (Sawyer, 2004; Kirsch, 2006), that one common strategy deployed by neoliberal 
capitalism is to leverage the state’s territorial power to colonize indigenous territories in the 
name of development and modernization.  I contend that we need to consider indigenous politics 
on the ground and in transnational political space first and foremost as a subversive politics that 
challenges the geo-power of the various governmental regimes.  This is not to imply that other 
issues are secondary.  But an anthropology of the state informed by indigenous political 
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movement needs to center on the dialectical relationship among geography, labor, history, and 
power (Coronil, 1997; Mueggler, 2001).  My ethnography of Dhimal indigenous activism makes 
a contribution to this. 
 
Ethnography, Activism, and Friendship 
!
 In early August 2007, I contacted the Kendra chairperson and requested a meeting with 
him so that I could formally contact the Dhimal’s representative indigenous organization and ask 
its permission for my fieldwork.  He asked me to come to the Kendra’s office the next afternoon.  
I got there a few hours earlier on the arranged day in order to explore the area before the 
meeting.  At our meeting, after the ritual of greeting and introduction, I also disclosed to the 
chairperson my affiliation with Tribhuvan University (TU) where I am a tenured faculty member 
of the department of anthropology in Tri-Chandra College in Kathmandu.  Upon hearing this, the 
chairperson expressed a long list of complaints against scholars and students from TU who had 
earlier sought the Kendra’s help in facilitating their research projects in Dhimal villages but who 
had never shared their research findings with the Kendra.  “Does not TU need to do something 
about it?” he asked me, underlining his dissatisfaction over how we scholars and students often 
breach the basic yet important ethics of reciprocity that characterize Dhimal sociality when we 
use Dhimal only as “respondents” and research facilitators.   
 The chairperson asked me to write a formal application, stating the purpose of my 
research.  And given that my research focus on their indigenous activism would include studying 
the Kendra’s activities, he also asked me to express my commitment that my research work 
would not misrepresent the Dhimal jāti and their political movements, and that I would 
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periodically share my research findings with them. 12  I happily wrote the application and stated 
my commitment that my work would in no way misrepresent and negatively affect their political 
movement and the Dhimal community at large.  Even more than the approval of the Institutional 
Research Review (IRB) of my graduate school, this application to the Kendra was very 
meaningful and self-rewarding.  It became for me an ethnographic moment which symbolized 
Dhimal agency through the critical questioning of outside researchers and their research ethics.  
It was also indicative of the effectiveness of those larger indigenous political movements through 
which Dhimal and others are demanding that the state and others recognize and implement their 
rights to “Free, Prior, and Informed Consent” (see Bhattachan, 2012 for an illustration).  The 
question of how our ethnographic work can be of use to Dhimal is important because it brings 
out the moral and political commitments we, as scholars, bring to the people and communities 
with whom we engage in relationships of exchange and reciprocity as we mutually produce the 
knowledge that becomes our ethnography (Fricke 2006; Kirsch, 2002).  Mentioning this incident 
offers me a way to indicate that I share with my Dhimal interlocutors the conviction that 
ethnographic research is also a moral practice with political implications.   
 I believe that ethnography is a form of activism (Kirsch, 2002).  This is particularly so 
because what I came to understand about the Dhimal activism I came to study very much 
depended on my friendships with Dhimal (Fricke, 2006) and on my political positioning in 
relation to their indigenous political movement.  I should make it explicit here that my ethnic 
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12!My use of the category of jāti reflects how Dhimal themselves use the term.  I use ‘jāti’ in order to reflect how 
Dhimal refer to themselves as a collective people in the sense of an ethnic group, not as a “caste” Hindu group.  
Dhimal emphasis on the jāti signifies the importance of the distinct collective as an ethnic group. The English word 
‘community’, ‘society’ or even ‘ethnic group’ does not adequately capture this felt sense of collective 
embeddedness.  In everyday usage and understanding, people use the term ‘jāt’ (which is translated as caste) to 




background as “Rai,” one of the indigenous groups from Nepal’s eastern hills adjacent to Dhimal 
ancestral territories, and my own involvement in activism as an indigenous scholar, shaped my 
relationship with Dhimal and the research processes for this study.  Here I need to explain that 
my social identity as a ‘Rai,’ the self-awareness of my collective identity since the indigenous 
resurgence of the early 1990s, my participation in the indigenous activism both as a scholar and 
as a member of an indigenous community have intersected with the strong social expectations 
that weigh on all scholars from indigenous communities.  Because individuals from indigenous 
community are still a minority in the academy, we are seen to have a moral duty to use our 
scholarship and our positions as contributions to the collective voices of our communities.  This 
background has powerfully shaped my research project and its methodology.   
 Throughout my fieldwork period, I also became involved in ongoing indigenous political 
movements on many occasions.  I worked as a scholar with the Nepal Federation of Indigenous 
Nationalities (NEFIN), the representative advocacy organization of Nepal indigenous people, the 
National Foundation for the Development of Indigenous Nationalities (NFDIN), the autonomous 
foundation formed by the government in 2002, and other various advocacy organizations.  
Similarly I was involved as a resource person for the NFDIN’s project for preparing 
ethnographic profiles of various indigenous communities in 2009-2010.  For this project, I 
worked closely with Mr. Som Bahadur Dhimal, who was one of the vice-chairpersons of the 
Kendra as well as a scholar and a journalist who prepared the ethnographic profile of Dhimal.  It 
was a crucial learning experience for me that, while I was conducting fieldwork with them, 
Dhimal were themselves writing their own ‘ethnography’ for reasons that went beyond the 
production of another document.   They studied and wrote, too, as a way to advance pointedly 
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political concerns, as for example in detailing their collective relationship with their ancestral 
territories as a means to engage with ongoing political transformations in Nepal. 
 Scholars have argued against the fixity of the categories of “native” versus “non-native” 
in terms of “local” and “foreign” anthropologists (see Narayan, 1993), but such distinctions 
become important in real world contexts where people and communities have differential 
understanding and experience in working with outside researchers, both Nepali and foreigners in 
the case of Nepal.  For instance, in the case of Nepal’s Dhimal, all foreign scholars with one 
exception have focused exclusively on language and grammar (Cooper, 1999; King, 1994, 2001, 
2009) without any contextualization within the broader political economy and history of Tarai 
colonization.  In the Indian subcontinent, Dhimal have been described as an “unknown tribe” as 
late as 2008 (see Biswas, 2008) without a word about their political struggle for the recognition 
of their distinct identity on the ground (Hindustan Times of India, April 16, 2006).13  All of these 
foreign scholars, mostly students (graduate and undergraduate), had undertaken their fieldwork 
after 1990s, during the period in which Dhimal were intensely active in their indigenous political 
movements including their claim of linguistic rights.  Yet these linguistic studies remain 
indifferent to such everyday Dhimal political concerns. 
 In contrast, earlier Nepali scholars who studied Dhimal during the 1970s and 1980s 
focused on general ethnographic descriptions of their culture and society in the tradition of a 
folklorist studies that ratified evolutionary schemas depicting Dhimal whereby Dhimal as 
“backward” (Regmi, 1985, 1991; Dahal, 1979) or examples the more “primitive” societies of 
Nepal (see Panta, 1984).  Since these earlier scholars belong to the dominant social groups, the 
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13!Dhimal are one of the smallest “tribal communities” (less than one thousand people) in India.  They have been 
organizing their community to demand that they be recognized as a “tribe” and threatened to boycott the state 
election in West Bengal in 2006.  See http: //www.highbeam.com/doc/1P3-1021667391.html, accessed April 30, 
2013.  On the politics of tribal recognition related to communities who live both in Nepal and India, see 
Shneiderman, 2009; Middleton and Shneiderman, 2008). 
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hill “high” caste group, it can be argued that the ideologies of caste hierarchy and its attendant 
unequal power relations influenced their ethnographic representations.  Such representations may 
also have their source in a lack of critical sophistication on issues of representation within the 
early years of disciplinary formation in in Nepal, where anthropology only began its academic 
institutionalization in early 1980s. 
            Since the 1990s, particularly with the resurgence of indigenous movements, there has 
been unprecedented growth in the scholarly focus on ethnic and identity politics in Nepal (see 
Mishra, 2005 for the trend).  Among disciplinary practitioners, sociologists and anthropologists, 
particularly those belonging to indigenous communities themselves, emerged as strong advocates 
and indigenous activists, thus blurring the boundary between “academic” and “engaged” 
anthropology that is often invoked in North American anthropology (see Lamphere, 2003).  This 
particular academic orientation of engaged anthropology that had shaped my earlier training in 
anthropology informed this dissertation research and the ways in which I combined ethnographic 
fieldwork with political activism for broader and deeper understanding of the issues that I have 
addressed herein. 
 
Fieldwork: Time, Places, and Methods 
!
 The primary ethnographic fieldwork for this study was conducted for a period of eighteen 
months from mid-2007 to 2009 in Kathmandu, Nepal’s capital city, and in Dhimal villages in 
Morang and Jhapa districts in the eastern parts of the country.  In between 2009 and early 2010, I 
also periodically visited my field sites for updating my data as well as for strengthening my 
friendship with the Dhimal.  The primary data for this study was collected by combining 
traditional ethnographic participation observation with in-depth interviews, and group 
discussions. 
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 In Kathmandu, where it is estimated that about one thousand Dhimal individuals reside, 
the participation of Dhimal in the then ongoing national indigenous movement was limited 
during the early period of my fieldwork, particularly during 2007.  It subsequently increased over 
the years.  In the capital city, I participated and observed the ongoing national indigenous 
political movement, participated in many workshops, interaction programs and political protests, 
and held discussions with various indigenous leaders and activists.  In particular, I also 
befriended Dhimal living in the Kathmandu valley, which helped me to understand their life in 
the city, and how they organized the diasporic Dhimal as a community through networks of 
kinship, village origins, and through ethnic associations related with political parties, and their 
national indigenous organization, the Kendra.   
 My primary field sites were however in the Damak area of Jhapa and in Morang, which 
are located about 330 miles east of the capital, equivalent to a day’s bus ride or an hour flight 
from Kathmandu.  I worked closely with Dhimal indigenous leaders and activists affiliated with 
the Kendra.  I interviewed over thirty different Dhimal activists of three generations, and 
recorded life histories of six senior Dhimal indigenous activists in order to understand the history 
of Dhimal ethnic activism.  Similarly, I interviewed and held discussions with many Dhimal 
from different walks of life and gender.   
 The Kendra was a major ethnographic site of my fieldwork, and I tried to participate, as 
much as possible, in all the major events and programs organized by the Kendra during 2007 and 
early 2010.  These events included their collective ritual performance in a place called Raja Rani, 
and the ending of this ritual at the Kendra, periodic political interactions, meetings, and 
conventions held by the Kendra and other ethnic groups of Dhimal on the premises of the 
Kendra.  The Dhimal youths, to whom I alluded in the beginning of this chapter, emerged as 
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important political forces during the period of my fieldwork, and hence I also closely worked 
with these activists and followed their activism.  In other words, I followed these various 
indigenous activists and their ethnic organizations in different locations in Morang, Jhapa and in 
Kathmandu.   
 In order to ground my observations in the contexts of peoples’ everyday life, I stayed in 
the Karikoshi village of Morang, which became my “ethnographic village,” where I was able to 
connect with local social relationships of the village by living with a Dhimal family for a period 
of three months.  This village-based observation was important and instrumental in helping me to 
understand Dhimal social life, the importance of Dhimal’s notion of the village, and the practices 
of their customary institutions such as the village head and the village ritual priests.  My 
participation in and observations of multiple Dhimal weddings and marriage rituals, their village 
rituals and fairs, and village level indigenous activism and party politics were the major 
ethnographic sites through which I collected my ethnographic data relating to the cultural politics 
of reform. 
 
Chapter Organization  
!
 This dissertation is organized into seven chapters; six of them draw on my primary 
ethnographic data while one is a historical-anthropological analysis of the political economy of 
Tarai land colonization.   
 The first chapter provides the general outlines the general introduction of this dissertation 
by discussing the major research questions and the theoretical-conceptual frameworks used for 
examining these research questions.  Similarly, I discuss the processes ethnographic fieldworks, 
the political contexts of my research period, and how my subjective positioning as an 
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ethnographer from an indigenous community and my social-academic backgrounds of working 
in Nepal influenced the undertaking of this dissertation.  
 In the second chapter, I examine the historical contexts within which Nepal’s Tarai 
region was transformed through the geography of state colonization for land, labor, revenue and 
political control at the turn of the 19th century.  This chapter illustrates how the particular history 
of state-led land colonization in the Tarai, the extractive land tenure relations based on the 
dominations of the hill Hindu groups in particular, and the interplay between the politics of 
regional geographical imaginations, caste hierarchy, Dhimals’ reliance on non-farming 
subsistence to adopt in the densely forested malarial ecology of the Tarai, and their different 
notions of land (without permanent individual or collective ownership) placed Dhimal at a 
distinct disadvantage in relations with the encroaching landlord Nepali state till the early 20th 
century such that large number of them later became landless in their own ancestral territories. 
With this focus on the issues of land and landlessness, this chapter emphasizes that an 
anthropology of the state informed by indigenous peoples’ politics must center on the dialogical 
relationship among geography, labor, history and power. 
In the third chapter, I expand the history of state-led colonization of the Tarai land by 
focusing on how Dhimal experienced the extractive landlord Hindu state before the 1950s.  
In this chapter, I examine on Dhimal experiences of ‘losing ground’ to discuss why land and 
landlessness become important issues for Dhimals to index their sense of who they are, what 
happened and continues to happen to them as Dhimal.  With a historical informed ethnographic 
analysis, I show how the malarial ecology of the Tarai in the past, and the aggressive land 
colonization and extractive revenue regimes discouraged Dhimal to become the tenant subjects 
of the state such that many of them preferred not to own any land under their tenurial rights.  
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Drawing on Dhimals’ claims that ‘owning land was so much of dukhā  (Nep. sorrow, painful) in 
the past’, I discuss how the historical encounters between the land colonizing state and the Tarai 
adivasi with different notion of land later led to increasingly landlessness among Dhimal in the 
later period.  Thus this chapter provides new insights to approach the relationship of Tarai 
ādivāsi with the land by focusing on the interplay between the territorial sovereignty of the state, 
the role of malaria in mediating relations between adivasi, the state, and other social groups, and 
Dhimals’ historical agency in resisting the extractive Hindu state.  In doing so, it also highlights 
the critical needs for historically informed social history of malaria to understand the changing 
relations between the state, indigenous groups and other social groups in Nepal’s Tarai.  
 In the chapter four, I discuss why Dhimal activists consider activism to be a morally 
embodied practice.  The primary goal of this chapter is to provide an understanding of Dhimal 
indigenous activism by focusing on the life experiences of the senior Dhimal activists whom I 
know and worked with for this study.  I draw on the life histories of these activists and locate 
them in the localized contexts of larger political and economic conditions to construct an 
overview of the history of Dhimal ethnic organizing.  I use the Dhimal activists as protagonist 
narrators of the history of their ethnic activism to understand what motivated them to become 
persistently engaged in indigenous organizing despite various challenges they faced.  Based on 
these data, I propose that indigenous activism needs to be approached as a moral practice that 
people enact out of their deeply felt embodied responsibility and duty to act on the structural 
conditions of their marginality so that they could continue the social production of their 
collective selves as Dhimal.  This chapter provides an alternative framework to the ‘spatial-
economic’ approach to indigenous activism, popular in the study of ethnic and identity politics in 
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South Asia and the Himalayan region, which depicts ‘ethnic activists’ as middle-class urban 
intellectuals.   
 The fifth and sixth chapters examine the relationship between Dhimal indigenous 
activism and the cultural politics of reforms centered on marriage, traditional dress, and village 
ritual.  In the chapter five, I focus on why Dhimal community elders and indigenous activists 
focus on marriage as arena for cultural reforms and preservation.   In order to elucidate why 
marriage and wedding practices become important in indigenous activism, I first discuss the 
Dhimal notion of ‘village’ centered on the centrality of the village shrine, the Gramthan.  Given 
their marginality and territorial dispossessions which have continued since the early 20th century, 
Dhimals’ struggle to continue their collective social life is closely tied with their ability to 
reconstitute ‘Dhimal village’ and its customary social relations emplaced in their lived ancestral 
places.  Then I show marriage and wedding ceremonials help to reconstitute Dhimal village and 
its customary institutions through concrete practices and how    
By showing the centrality of marriage (hence kinship) in indigenous activism, this chapter 
illustrates how the seemingly abstract concepts of indigenous politics such as ‘indigenous 
culture’, ‘traditional or customary institutions’, ‘cultural autonomy’ and so forth, emerge 
meaningfully in Dhimals’ “indigenous analysis” (Kirsch, 2006.) of their lived conditions, and in 
their practical actions for their community and its future.  The contentious and discursive nature 
of these reform politics, in which large numbers of Dhimal from of all social strata participate 
and debate about themselves and their ‘culture’, both in appreciation and in self-critical fashions, 
contribute in important ways to shaping the fundamental contents of Dhimal indigenous political 
activism.  It is through such locally embedded cultural politics Dhimal indigenous activists and 
Dhimal indigenous organizations such as the Kendra derive their moral authority and social 
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legitimacy to represent their community in the larger political mobilization.  Hence, this chapter 
illustrates how marriage-wedding ceremonials become important constitutive practices of 
Dhimal indigenous activism. 
In the chapter six, I focus on the making of Shrejat, Dhimals’ most important village ritual, 
as the collective national ritual of Dhimal jāti (Dhimal people).  By discerning how the Shrejat 
reconstitutes Dhimal village, its ritual and territorial boundaries, and the moral social worlds and 
the reciprocal relationships between the villagers, deities, and other beings living in the village 
ecology, I discuss the ways in which the collective organization of the Shrejat reconstitutes the 
customary institutions such as the village head, Majhi, the village priest, Dhami, and other 
ancestors.  Since these customary institutions and social actors associated with them are also the 
constituent actors and organizational bodies of the national Dhimal indigenous organization or 
the Kendra, this chapter shows how the making of Shrejat forges a collective sense of 
peoplehood by connecting all Dhimal villages to the Kendra through the collective organization 
of the ritual.  In doing so, they also confer the Kendra an important communal power to act as 
the Majhi (village head) of all the villages thereby strengthening its moral and political authority 
to act on behalf the Dhimal jāti. 
The seventh chapter further elaborates how Dhimal use locally embedded cultural practices 
in their indigenous political mobilization by focusing on the politics of place-making practices.  
In this chapter, I draw on “place” as an analytical concept in anthropology and the theoretical 
approaches that combine the phenomenological approach of “being in the place” (Casey, 1996; 
Basso, 1996) and the political-economic approach to place and production of place (Harvey, 
1996), exemplified by the works of Kirsch (2001, 2006), Escobar (2001) and Kahn (2011), in 
order to argue for the relevance and necessity of a place-based approach to indigenous activism.   
! 38!
 The ethnographic material for this chapter largely draws from my observations of 
Dhimals’ annual journey to their newly rediscovered historic place, now called Raja Rani (Nep. 
King and Queen) village, located on a hilltop nearby Letang bazar in Morang district. In the late 
1990s, Dhimal activists rediscovered that their ancestors used live in Raja Rani till the 1930s.  
After its rediscovery, Raja Rani has been transformed into a sacred place where Dhimal ethnic 
histories and ancestral spirits reside.  During the end of my fieldwork period (2009), the place 
entered into Dhimals’ territorial mapping of their demands for the ‘Dhimal autonomous state.’  
Now many Dhimals claim that Raja Rani is an abode of Dhimals’ ancestral kingdom.   
Why has this region, where no Dhimal currently lives, acquired such a heightened sense of 
place for Dhimals?   Using ethnographic accounts of Dhimals' collective ritual journey to Raja 
Rani and analyzing the narratives of the ritual participants and the organizers, I examine this 
particular place-making practice by locating it in the contexts of Dhimals’ experiences of the 
Nepali state in the past, Dhimal activists' search for their ethnic histories, and the contemporary 
indigenous articulation of federalism based on ethnic identity, history and territory in Nepal.  I 
discuss how Dhimal ritual performance in Raja Rani not only transforms the sacredness of the 
place for Dhimals and others, and how Dhimal activists creatively deploy their village ritual to 
forge a collective sense of peoplehood and territorial-historical consciousness which they 
interweave into their larger political movements for indigenous rights.  In particular, I show how 
ordinary individuals make and write history in the land by participating in the ritual and 
physically being in their ancestral places through seemingly mundane practices of chitchat and 
informal group discussions. Hence, this chapter adds new ethnographic insights to understand the 
practice of “topographic writing” (Santos-Garnero, 1998) i.e. how people inscribe histories in the 
land.  Furthermore, this chapter offers a grounded ethnographic example to illuminate the 
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dialogical interplay between global-national discourses of indigeneity, political transformations, 
and peoples’ everyday practices by showing how ordinary people imbue a place with historical 
significance and how such history making can become powerful sources for indigenous 
articulation of territorial claims in their specific political struggles, for examples, in the 
movements for ‘Dhimal autonomous state.’   
The chapter eight provides a concluding summary of the dissertation by highlighting its 
major contribution to the anthropology of indigenous movement, and in the study of indigenous 





Ādivāsi and the Landlord State: Tarai as the Geography of Colonization 
 
 
Geographical Imaginations: “Hills contain the soul of Nepal” 
   
 During my elementary school days (the late 1970s) in Nepal, students were required to 
sing their grade-specific national songs.  Although in fragments, some of these songs still vividly 
echo in my mind.  One such song was about the nation’s geography, which was perhaps used to 
instill in us a strong sense of pride in being citizens of the beautiful country called Nepal.  Like 
other national songs that eulogized either the geography or the crown, or both, but not the 
diversity of Nepali people and their cultures, this song focuses on how beautiful Nepal looks.  
One of its stanzas goes like this:  
Look at the Tarai! 
How beautiful it is!  
Because it has the green forest 
Look at the hills! 
They are more beautiful!  
Because the rhododendron blooms there14  
 
The song introduces the dominant regional geographical imageries to school students, that 
their nation comprises high hills (Pahad) and lowlands (Tarai), each with its own beauty.  Per 
the song, the Tarai owes its beauty to the green forest, a popular image of the region, though in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14!The stanza in Nepali: ‘Tarai hera kati ramro, hariyo ban hunale ; Pahad hera jhanai ramro, gurans fulnale’ 
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reality that forest has mostly disappeared by now.  But, interestingly, the hill region is depicted 
to be more beautiful than the Tarai by its association with the rhododendron, Nepal’s national 
flower, found only in the hills and mountains.  The hills where the national flower blossoms 
make the region, hence Nepal, even more beautiful.  The national song, which I myself sang 
countless times growing up, is a concrete illustration of the way in which the Nepali state 
naturalizes and produces a hill-centric nationalism through everyday practices of the school 
system.   
 David Harvey (2005: 220-221) has eloquently argued that “nation-state formation was 
and is still dependent upon the creation of certain kinds of geographical understandings 
(everything from mapping boundaries to the cultivation of some sense of national identity within 
those boundaries), and the more a state (and its rulers) can mobilize this geographical imaginary, 
the more they could ground their legitimacy and power.”  The reference to the national song 
attests to such politics of “geographical imagination”!(Harvey, 2005:212), which is reflective of 
the two-century long history of state-led colonization of the Tarai and the making of Nepal as a 
hill-Hindu nation.15 
In this chapter, I will examine the historical contexts within which Nepal’s Tarai region 
was transformed through the geography of state colonization for land, labor, revenue and 
political control at the turn of the 19th century.  The overall objective of this chapter is to provide 
a brief historical analysis of Nepal’s political history and the power relationships between the 
dominant hill Hindu rulers and their subjects (see Gaige, 1975; Yadav, 2006; Gurung, 1997, 
2003) by focusing on state-led colonization of the Tarai in reference to the history of the state 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15!According to David Harvey, geographical imagination enables the individual " to recognize the role of space and 
place in his own biography, to relate to the spaces he sees around him, and to recognize how transactions between 
individuals and between organizations are affected by the space that separates them" (Harvey, 2005: 212).  !
!
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formation in Nepal.  For the historical data on the land tenure system, this chapter draws heavily 
on the works of Nepal’s pioneering economic historian Mahesh Chandra Regmi (1929-2003). 
Regmi’s characterization of the late 18th and the mid-19th century state of Nepal as an empire in 
the making (Regmi, 1999) is insightful in examining the indigenous peoples’ experiences of the 
Nepali state as a form of colonization (see Tamang, 2008).  My focus in this chapter is to offer a 
regional political-economic history of state-led production of the Tarai as a “state space” (Scott, 
2009: 40-63). 
“State space,” according to James Scott, is an ideal space for appropriation in order to 
ensure a reliable supply of labor, revenue, rents, food, tradable goods and other means for the 
state and its rulers.  Scott’s historical analysis substantiates that geography powerfully 
constrained the state-making processes in the pre-colonial period in Southeast Asia.  Since these 
states depended heavily on taxes or rents (foodstuffs, corvée labor, soldiers, tribute, tradable 
goods, species), they sought “state-spaces” (or created them through colonization) in order to 
guarantee a reliable supply of labor and food at a low cost (Scott, 2009: 40-63).   
The state’s control over land, the primary means of livelihood for the majority of the 
people, was one of the major governing principles and techniques by which Nepal’s rulers 
appropriated land, labor and wealth, and subjugated their subjects (see Regmi, 1971, 1978).  
Scott’s spatial category of  “state space” is a useful analytic to examine how the Tarai region 
became an important geography of state-extraction in Nepal during the 19th and 20th centuries.  
This particular history of extractive political economy and state-led colonization of the Tarai for 
land, labor, revenue, and political control and the marginalization of people of Tarai origin is 
pivotal to the understanding of Dhimal experiences of territorial dispossession and landlessness.  
However, the concept is inadequate to understanding the overarching moral and political 
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rationalities that Nepal rulers’ envisioned and used to legitimatize their sovereignty over the 
people and territories they claimed to govern.  I argue that the making of the Tarai as a ‘state 
space’ needs to be examined both in terms of the political-economic needs of land and labor for 
the colonizer (the landlord state and its rulers) and the politics of “geo-body” (Thongchai 1994) 
they used to govern the relationship among rulers, land, subjects and territories during the 19th 
and early 20th centuries. 
We know that the imperial model of territorial appropriation through conquest was the 
normative state-making practice in the South Asian-Himalayan region during the 18th century 
(Regmi, 1999; Michael, 2012).  But governing the conquered territories and its subject 
population was also legitimized by the cultural logic that the Hindu rulers of Nepal used to 
rationalize and justify the extractive political economy and the colonization of the Tarai.  In this 
regard, the rise of the House of Gorkha as a Hindu kingdom in the late 18th century and the ways 
in which its hill Hindu rulers envisioned their kingdom and its territorial possessions as a moral 
universe in which various social groups lived, occupying distinct ecological-cultural niches or 
what I have called, drawing from Thongchai (1994), the making of a “geo-body” of their 
kingdom is equally important to frame the historical analysis of the state’s control of land in 
Nepal. 
 Since state control of land and territory is the central focus of my analysis here, and these 
are equally the fundamental concerns for Dhimal and other indigenous peoples, it is important to 
consider how the Nepali state and its rulers institutionalized the praxis of territorial sovereignty.  
I draw on Thongchai’s (1994) notion of “geo-body” that he compellingly uses to discuss how the 
kingdom of Siam with its overlapping and multiple indigenous territorial sovereignties was 
transformed into the modern nation of Thailand as a natural and stable territorial entity during 
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the 19th century.  Thongchai’s primary focus is to show the emergence of this new territorial 
entity by examining the influence of modern mapping techniques on Thai conceptions of 
nationhood.  As such, the concept of “geo-body” describes the “operations of the technology of 
territoriality that created nationhood” (p.  16) and “the geo-body of nation is a man-made 
territorial definition which create effects-by classifying, communicating, and enforcement – on 
people, things, and relationships” (p: 17).  Though mapping is the primary technology for 
creating the nation’s geo-body in his analytical framework, Thongchai argues that the term geo-
body does not merely signify space or territory.  He explains:  
It (geo-body) is a component of the life a nation.  It is the source of pride, loyalty, love, 
passion, bias, hatred, reason and unreason.  It also generates many other conceptions and 
practices about nationhood as it combines with other components of nationhood 
(Thongchai1994: 17). 
 
 In this chapter, I use the notion of geo-body to underline how Nepal’s 19th-century rulers 
imagined their kingdom as a ‘pure land of Hindus,’ and hence my emphasis is on the production 
of the nation’s geo-body through discursive cultural practices rather than through the 
cartographic technique of mapping.  A focus on the geographical imagination that Nepal’s Hindu 
rulers envisioned to delineate the boundaries of their territorial possessions and ritual realms 
(Burghart, 1984), as well as to define their distinct identity vis-à-vis their subject populations and 
other rulers in the region, helps us to understand the convergence of the politics of geo-body and 
the political-economy of resource extraction in the Tarai.   
A detailed synthesis of the two-century long  (18th-20th centuries) history of land 
colonization in the Tarai is beyond the scope of this chapter.  I will broadly divide the historical 
period into the Gorkhali empire (1740s-1816) and the Rana regime (1846-1951) in order to 
highlight three major arguments.  First, I argue that the rise of the present-day state of Nepal as a 
Hindu kingdom at the end of the 18th century fundamentally transformed the proprietorial 
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concept of ‘land’ by making the state sovereign ‘mālik’ (Nep: master/owner) of territories under 
its possession or the ‘muluk’ (Nep.  country or the entire possessions, Burghart, 1984).  I will 
expand on Richard Burghart’s (1984) insightful analysis of the concept of the Hindu kingdom 
used by Nepali rulers at the turn of the 19th century.  In particular, I examine the idea of the king 
as Bhupati (Nep: master/husband of the land), a fundamental governing principle used by 
Nepal’s Hindu rulers to claim and legitimize their political authority and territorial sovereignty.  
I contend that the notion of Bhupati essentially dispossesses and alienates people from their 
embedded relationships with their lands, and transforms the land into a rentable state possession.   
 Second, I focus on the politics of the land tenure system and land grants (Birta and 
Jagir), a widely institutionalized practice of state patronage during 19th and early 20th century 
Nepal.  I rely on the pioneering works of M.C. Regmi on the history of land tenure system 
(Regmi, 1971, 1978, 1995, 1999) in order to illustrate how state control of land hierarchized the 
spatial-political organization of ruler, people, and territory through unequal tenurial and caste 
systems, thereby strengthening the domination of the hill rulers over their Tarai subjects.   
My discussions in this chapter will help us to understand the impact of the emergence of 
the feudal relationships of extraction on the moral economy and relatively egalitarian nature of 
the indigenous communities.  Theoretically, this chapter offers an ethnographically informed 
analysis to approach the intricate concept of ‘state’ by taking into account the dialectical 
relationships of labor, territory, history, and power in our analytical framework.  Since land is a 
central analytic in studying the relationship between the state and indigenous peoples, our 
investigative approach to the state needs to historicize how, by whom, and for what purposes its 
territorial sovereignty becomes objectified in a specific historical context (Abrams, 1988).  
Hence an anthropological account of the state which is informed by the experiences of 
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indigenous peoples, must consider the dialogical relationships of labor, territory, and history in 
grounding our understanding in its analytical framework.   
 As this chapter demonstrates, it is equally necessary to embed our analysis of ‘states’ in a 
larger geo-historical context of political pluralism in the regions in which centralizing 
hierarchical states coexist alongside radically egalitarian polities.  The rise of the House of 
Gorkha, the political order that evolved into the present day state of Nepal at the turn of 19th 
century, together with the emergence of the British Empire in the region, led to the formation of 
a centralized hierarchical polity through its campaign of territorial conquest and colonization.  
This hierarchical political entity attempted to dominate the egalitarian polities that had flourished 
in many indigenous communities of Nepal in the past.  Dhimals, before the Gorkhali king 
annexed their territories, exemplified such egalitarian-oriented polities in the Tarai.  Today they 
are making efforts, through their indigenous political movement, to reform the contemporary 
state in which they are now encapsulated in order to shape it along less hierarchical and more 
egalitarian lines.  I contend that we cannot fully appreciate what motivated Dhimal to engage in 
what we now call indigenous politics without understanding how land shapes their understanding 
of their collective subjectivity (as the Dhimal jāti), history, and political agency.   
 
The Tarai: The Visibly Invisible Place 
!
 Topographically Nepal is divided into the Himal (Nep.  mountain, snowpeak), the Pahad 
(Nep.  hill), and the Tarai/Madhes (Nep.  lowland plains).  Each ecological region includes 
distinct ethnic, religious and linguistic diversity, influencing peoples’ sense of regional identity, 
belonging, and geographical imagination (see Map 2).  The mountains and hills cover about 77 
percentage of the total area, making Nepal predominately a ‘mountainous’ country in her 
topographical composition.  The Tarai/Madhes is a narrow strip of lowlands (with elevations of 
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less than 1000 meters above sea level), located between the foothills of the Himalayan hills and 
the vast Indo-Gangetic plains, stretching over “two thousands kilometers from the district of 
Naini tal in the northwestern Uttar Pradesh to the Arunachal Pradesh in India’s far eastern 
corner” (Guneratne, 2001: 20).16  
 
Figure 4: The Tarai Region 
!
 
Nepal’s present-day Tarai boundary was fixed when the Nepali state gave up much of the 
territory it occupied in the Tarai by signing a treaty of friendship (known as the Treaty of 
Sugauli) with British India after Nepal’s defeat in the Anglo-Gorkha war (1814-1816).17  Later, 
the wholeness of the present-day territory of Nepal was restored when British India returned the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 The Tarai is also written as ‘Terai’.  The inner Tarai or ‘Bhitri Madhes’ refers to the small valleys located 
between the foothills of Siwalik or Churiya hill and the Tarai belt.  In this chapter, I use ‘Tarai’ to refer include both 
the Tarai proper and the Inner Tarai. 
 
17!For the Anglo-Gorkha war (1814-1816), see Michael (2012).  See Stiller (1976) for the impact of the war on the 
social and economic life of the people of Nepal during 1814-1836. 
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current five districts of the Far Western Tarai to the then Nepali rulers in acknowledgement of 
their military support in suppressing the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857 in India. 
Nepal’s Tarai comprises less than one-fourth of the country’s total area, but now it is home 
to almost half of the nation’s total population, and the increasing shifts of population growth 
toward the Tarai shows that a majority of Nepal’s people will be living in the Himalayan 
country’s plains region within the next few years.  Population growth in the Tarai, the result 
chiefly of migration from the hills to the plains, is a recent phenomenon (post-1950s), but the 
region has always been culturally, economically and politically very significant in the geography 
of the Himalayan-Indo-Gangetic region.  For example, the Tarai has been the ‘bread-basket’ of 
Nepal since the onset of nation-state formation, and the people of the region, particularly the 
Tarai ādivāsí, had “nourished” hill principalities (Meyer, 2000:19) long before the Tarai became 
part of the current state of Nepal.18  As a historic region of cultural flows across boundaries (see 
Lal, 2002), the regional history of the Tarai is as ancient and rich as those of any other region of 
Nepal.19 
 Historical records show that substantial parts of Nepal’s Tarai, particularly the Morang 
region, were indeed densely forested until the end of the 19th century (Buchanan-Hamilton, 1819; 
Oldfield, 1880; Guneratne, 2002).20  However, the Tarai cannot be considered to have been a 
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18!For example, at the end of 1950s, the Tarai region had two thirds of Nepal’s total cultivable lands; still almost 53 
% of Nepal’s arable lands are in Tarai and 80 % of the arable land in Tarai is used for paddy- the most important 
cereal crops in Nepal (Nepal Agriculture Census, 2001-2002; CBS, 2001). 
 
19 For example, the archaeological findings at Lumbini- the site of the birthplace of the Buddha located in the central 
Tarai of Nepal, date back to as early as 3rd and 4th century A.D.  The archaeological excavation was led by India 
archaeologist P.C Mukherji in 1899 (see Rijal, 1996) 
 
20!William Kirkpatrick who represented the British Mission to Nepal in 1769 observed dense forest of “eight and 
half miles in horizontal depth” with few settlement and “this forest skits the territories of Nepaul throughout their 
whole extent…separating them everywhere from the Company’s (East India) possessions” (Kirkpatrick, 1811: 16).  
These forests contained “inexhaustible source of riches” which could be made to “supply valuable timber, not only 
to the countries washed by Ganges, but even our settlements in India” (p: 42, emphasis added). 
!
! 49!
“primeval forest” while “civilization” developed elsewhere in the Indian sub-continent and the 
Himalayan regions.  Rather than an unchanging wilderness, the landscapes of the Tarai were 
impermanent.  Criticizing the scholarly and popular depiction of the Tarai as a “primeval forest” 
Krauskopff (2002:35) emphasizes the need to rethink the popular historicity of Nepal’s Tarai. 
She writes:  
Old kingdoms have risen and fallen there (Tarai) for at least 2000 years.  The forest retreated 
when farming expanded under prosperous political conditions; jungle took over in times of 
instability and conflict.  Reading today the journeys of the Chinese pilgrims from the 5th and 
6th centuries in search of Buddhist shrines gives a sound idea of the impermanent landscape of 
the Tarai.  It seems after that several centuries after the Buddha’s birth in the Sakya kingdom 
of present-day Kapilvastu, a previously well-developed area had partly reverted to wilderness 
(Bell 1884: 2680).   
 
 The Tarai is home to many indigenous groups, and these ādivāsi groups had lived and 
thrived in these malarial places long before the rise of the present day nation-state of Nepal 
during the 18th century.  Because of the ‘harsh’ environmental conditions and the shortage of 
labor, the hill kings as well as the British colonial regime encouraged and relied primarily on 
Tarai ādivāsi like the Tharus to reclaim the Tarai forests for cultivation and settlement.  The 
recent publication based on the fifty royal documents issued to the Tharus by Kings of Nepal 
from 1726-197, collected by Tej Narayan Panjiar, a Tharu native from Udaypur district of Nepal, 
shows how the hill rulers who controlled the Tarai territories depended on Tharu chieftains to 
cultivate Tarai land for their principalities during the 18th and 19th centuries (Krauskopff and 
Meyer, 2000).  These documents help us to understand the important role of the Tharu in 
transforming “mosquito-infected malarial jungles of the Tarai into the breadbasket of Nepal” 
(Krauskopff, 2000: 25-49).  So the Tarai ādivāsi, contrary to popular representations of them as 
“savage dwellers of a primeval forest” (Krauskopff, 2000: 35), who are presumed to be “faceless 
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in history” (Panjiar, 1993:20-21), were actively involved in the emergent political 
transformations in the Indo-Gangetic and the Himalayan regions.   
 The Tarai, instead of being an insulated forested region peripheral to the world, was a 
shared frontier formed by an intersection of “ecological, agrarian, social, and political regimes, 
whose extent, though overlapping was never constant” (Michael, 2007: 314).  At the end of the 
18th century, different parts of the Tarai region were controlled by various petty hill principalities 
located in present-day Nepal’s territory, as well as by the kings of Sikkim, now a part of India, 
and some landlords from the neighboring districts of India, then under British colonial rule, 
(Michael 2012, 2007).  For those hill principalities that claimed control over the Tarai areas, land 
tax, agricultural potentials from the Tarai, and its abundant forest resources were important 
sources of state revenue (Buchman-Hamilton, 1819; Michael, 2007; Krauskopff and Meyer, 
2000).  Furthermore, the dense and malaria-ridden Tarai forest also acted as a “natural fence” for 
the hill principalities against potential invasions from the south.  Hence these hill rulers preferred 
to keep large parts of the Tarai forested while encouraging land reclamation in selected areas.  
For instance, Francis Buchanan Hamilton (1762-1829), an accomplished surgeon-naturalist of 
the East India Company who visited Nepal and spent a year in Kathmandu valley in 1802-1803, 
observed that:  
Before the conquest by the Nepalese, the petty Rajas, who governed its different portions, 
were so much afraid of their neighbours, that they did not promote the cultivation of this low 
land.  They rather encouraged extensive woods, and contented themselves, in a great measure, 
with the produce of the forests in timber, elephants, and pasture; even then, however, many 
rich spots were occupied, and very productive; but they were so buried in the forests as to be 
little observable.  The Gorkhalese, being more confident, have cleared much of the country, 
although still a great deal remains to be done (Hamilton, 1819:64). 
 
 The Tarai region, because of its abundance of land (both cultivated and cultivable), forest 
resources, and its strategic location between the Gangetic plains and the Himalayan regions (in 
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terms of geo-politics and transnational trade routes) acquired new political and economic 
importance for the two emerging imperial powers in the Himalayan region: the House of Gorkha, 
the polity that evolved into the present-day state of Nepal, and the British, represented by the 
East India company.21 The Gorkhali annexation of the Tarai at the end of 18th century 
transformed the region in unprecedented ways. 
The historicity of the Tarai is not often considered in the anthropology of Nepal or in the 
popular imagination of Nepal as a ‘Himalayan nation.’  C. K. Lal, one of Nepal’s most 
influential columnists and political analysts, who himself belongs to a Tarai community, 
succinctly describes this paradoxical invisibility and omission of the Tarai from the popular 
representation of Nepal:  
The very name ‘Nepal’ evokes the image of a country set amidst the majestic Himalayan 
peaks, where exotic valleys still harbour the serenity of the lost Shangri-La.  Sold to the world 
by Western explorers and latter-day adventurers and travel writers, this portrayal of mountain 
exotica hides the fact that a considerable part of what constitutes the territory of Nepal is 
actually as flat as a table-top.  This is the Nepal tarai….  Despite its cultural, social and 
economic significance, however, the tarai receives scant attention.  For the Nepali hill elite 
that would like to mold the country after its image, the tarai is a region to be exploited -- its 
resources are useful but its people (not the newly migrated hill folk, but the indigenous tribes 
and the Madhesi of the plains) are a liability.  Meanwhile, as far as the world is concerned, the 
tarai is merely an extension of the Ganga plain.” (Lal, 2002: 100-101). 
 
C.K. Lal’s critical note that “for the Nepali hill elite, the Tarai is a region to be exploited” 
addresses a major thrust of this chapter.  This issue needs a much more detailed discussion of the 
complex political histories of Nepal than this chapter’s focus on the land.22  Here I will briefly 
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21!The control over the Tarai territories was a major source of conflict between these two emerging regional powers; 
the Gorkhali state and the British India fought for two years (1814-1816) over the disputed territories of the Tarai 
(Michael, 2012; Stiller, 1976). 
 
22 On recent writings on the issues of Madhesi people, their history and struggles, see for example, Yadav, 2005; 





address the issues of the marginalization of the Tarai peoples in order to relate them to my focus 
on the land colonization of the Tarai. 
The people of Tarai origin include Hindu caste groups, indigenous or Tarai ādivāsi, and 
other linguistic and religious groups (for example, Muslims).  They are also collectively referred 
as ‘Madhesi’ after ‘Madhes’, the country in the middle between the Himalayas and the Gangetic 
plains.  The term Madhesi was used more derogatively in the past but now, particularly since the 
1990s, it has been established as a powerful political category.  However, the Tarai ādivāsi such 
as the Tharu, Dhimal and others reject the category of Madhesi for themselves.  They argue that 
‘Madhesi’ are descendants of the people from India who migrated to the Tarai region during 
different periods in history.  The Tarai indigenous groups prefer to self-identify themselves as 
ādivāsi or ādivāsi janajāti.  In Nepal, regional identities, particularly the distinction between the 
Pahade (Nep.  people of hill origin) and Madhesi (Nep.  people of  Tarai origin) are also equally 
salient and politically contested (see Guneratne, 2011).  This distinction and conflicts between 
the hill and the plain people have emerged primarily because of the ways in which the lowland 
plains were colonized and the history of discrimination against Tarai people by the state and its 
hill rulers.   
Nepal’s traditional ruling groups come exclusively from the hills, and they had used the 
Tarai as an extractive colony in the past.  In the post-1950s period, when hill-centric nationalism 
became the sacred state ideology (see Gaige, 1975), the hill rulers were successful in 
promulgating the dominant geocentric attitude and view that the “hills contain the soul of Nepal” 
(Himal, Sep/Oct, 1990: 5-8).  Until recently, because of the region’s geographical proximity to 
the bordering regions of India together with existing cultural-linguistic similarities, kinship, and 
economic ties between communities across the borders, the people of Tarai origin were often 
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looked down by the hill people as “Indian in disguise” or for being “less Nepali” than the hill 
people (see Gaige, 1975; Thapa and Mainali, 2006).  After the 1950s, the Nepali state, under the 
rubric of ‘bikās’ (Nep.  development) and ‘national integration,’ aggressively imposed a policy 
of ‘one language, one dress, and one nation,’ based on the cultural symbols of the ruling hill 
caste groups to assimilate the Tarai people, indigenous groups and other cultural minorities. Hill 
peoples were encouraged and systematically resettled in the Tarai region so that they could 
assimilate the Tarai people into ‘Nepali nationalism’ (see Elder and et.al. 1976).23   
 That Nepal’s rulers regarded people of Tarai origin, particularly the Madhesi, with 
suspicion becomes irrefutably evident in the fact the Tarai people were not recruited into the 
Royal Nepal Army (now Nepal Army) until recently, and many of them were denied Nepali 
citizenship on the pretext of their concealed Indian origin (Gaige, 1975).  Therefore, the hill- or 
mountain-centric bias, a dominant attribute of Nepal’s nationalist thinking in the past, is revealed 
in the political marginalization of the Tarai region from state power and the history of 
discrimination against the people of the Tarai origin in Nepal.  In order to provide a brief 
historical analysis of Nepal’s political history and the power relationships that produced and 
sustained such a hill-centric national imagination in Nepal, I will first locate the Tarai and its 
historicity in reference to the history of the nation-state formation in Nepal. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23!In their evaluation report of state-led planned resettlement program in Nepal’s Tarai which was funded by the 
international donors community, the team of “experts” led by scholars affiliated with the department of sociology, 
University of Madison (USA) and the Tribhuvan University, Nepal praised that the state’s efforts of settlement of 
the hill people in the Tarai for ensuring “the cultural stabilization of the border regions.”  They write, “even today 
the majority of residents in the Tarai do not speak Nepali as their mother tongue (p: 28).  …. And the Hindu festivals 
of the Tarai tend to be more Indian than Nepali. Given the degree of cultural continuity between the Tarai and India, 
the decision of King Mahendra and his cabinet to clear and settle a two-to four-mile strip along the entire southern 
border of Nepal is understandable.  The movement of Nepali-speaking hill people on to the Tarai border through the 
Punarvas Company Program (resettlement company) could contribute much to the cultural stabilization of the 
border.  Furthermore, the scrub of jungle on the border had long provided refuge not only for the wild animals but 
also for smugglers and dacoits.  The clearing of these jungles could do much to discourage such “anti-national” 
elements and to civilize the area (Elder et al. 1976: 28-29, emphasis added).  
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The Tarai as a “Currency of Gorkhali Conquest” 
!
The present day state of Nepal evolved out of the territorial expansion of the House of 
Gorkha, then a small hill principality in the mid-western hills, located in the current district of 
Gorkha.24 During the five-decade-long “campaigns of conquest” (Regmi, 1971: 9), initiated and 
led by its Hindu king, Prithivi Narayan Shah (1723-1775; hereafter P.N.  Shah), the ancestor of 
Nepal’s recently dethroned monarch, the House of Gorkha expanded from a state of a few 
hundred square miles into an area of appropriately ninety thousand square miles in the 
Himalayan region (Stiller, 1973: 278).  It controlled territories extending from the Tista river in 
the east to the Sutlej river in the west on its way to “becoming an imperial power in the 
Himalayan region” (Regmi, 1999: 4).   
The dominant nationalist discourses and their state-centric historiography excessively 
glorify P.N.  Shah as the “founding father” of the present day Nepali nation-state, and his project 
of territorial expansion has been uncritically credited for unifying the present day Nepali nation.  
The popular explanation is that P.N. Shah united the petty kingdoms and principalities, which 
had weakened due to the many wars they fought against one another.  P.N. Shah thus rescued 
Nepal from being colonized by the British Empire as it had done with the people in India and 
elsewhere.  However such nationalist history denies the existence of alternative narratives, 
including histories of indigenous and subaltern resistance against the Gorkhali state and its 
political order.25  Similarly such nationalist historiography undermines the larger historical and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24!I use the term ‘Gorkhali state’ or ‘Gorkha state’ to refer to the pre 1930-Nepali state.  The rulers of Shah dynasty 
used to refer themselves as the kings of Gorkha till 1930 (Burghart, 1984: 102)  
 
25!See Chapter 7 for my discussion of the emerging genre of scholarship on the formation of the Nepali nation-state 
has challenged the conventional state-centric official historiography. !
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political-economic contexts in which Gorkhali territorial expansion led to the transformation of 
the Tarai into a colony for resource extraction by the hill rulers. 
The mid-18th century Gorkha was an agrarian principality, which lacked a substantial 
source of monetary income, to such an extent that its rulers used to borrow money from their 
subject population (Regmi, 1971: 4).  Land, as historian Ludwig Stiller has pertinently 
emphasized, “provided the basic motivation for the conquests that led to the unification of the 
petty states of the hills into the modern state of Nepal” (Stiller, 1973: 276; Regmi, 1971: 9).  In 
this regard, the pioneering works of Nepal’s distinguished economic historian, Mahesh Chandra 
Regmi are very insightful in understanding the political-economic contexts of the rise of the 
House of Gorkha as a form of imperial expansion (see Regmi, 1971, 1976, and 1999).  He argues 
that P.N. Shah’s “underlying objective was to gain control of territory of the Tarai as well as the 
trade routes between India and Tibet” (Regmi, 1971: 9, emphasis added). 
Regmi (1995, 1999) has aptly described the Gorkhali territorial expansion as an empire in 
the making.26  His analysis of Gorkhali rule in Kumaun, now a district in the Uttarakhand state in 
North India, shows how the Gorkhali rulers deployed extractive measures to exploit land, labor, 
and tax from the conquered populations, and how they imposed cultural assimilative policies to 
establish the victors’ legitimacy and political control.  I argue that the analytical lens of empire is 
relevant and useful in understanding the political-economic contexts that led to the increased 
significance of the Tarai territory as the “currency of the Gorkhali conquest” (Stiller, 1973, 
1976). 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26!In his last publication, Imperial Gorkha: An Account of Gorkhali Rule in Kumaun (1791-1815), Regmi uses the 
notion of empire in the sense of ‘was an expansionist attempt or policy by one state or some its citizens to influence, 
exploit, and dominate the people of another, usually weaker, country by overt or covert political, military and 
economic and cultural means’ (Regmi: 1999: xii, his emphasis).  He argues that ‘it is the nature of the control, rather 
than its extent, that determines whether or not a state is an empire’ (Regmi, 1999: xi). 
! 56!
 Since the hill regions had only limited availability of new arable land, and there were 
fewer prospects of generating more land-based revenues from peasants in the hills (Stiller, 1976), 
the abundance of agricultural lands (cultivated and cultivable), and other, forest based revenues 
made the Tarai the most valuable of all its conquered territories (Regmi, 1971; Stiller, 1973; 
Ojha, 1983).27  The revenue received by the Gorkhali state from the Tarai came mainly from 
four sources: first and most important, land revenue paid by the peasants; second, duties imposed 
on the felling, sale, and export of timber to British India; third, sale of elephants; and last, fees 
paid by herdsmen who brought their cattle from India to graze on the Tarai pasture during the 
dry seasons (Guneratne, 2002: 28).28  
 The eastern Tarai contributed substantially to the cash revenue of the new Kingdom of 
Gorkha; it is estimated that 60 percent of the state’s revenue in 1861 came from the eastern Tarai 
(Regmi, 1971: 10, 57: fn 9).29  For example, the Tarai region of Morang, located between the 
Kosi and Mechi rivers, though mostly forested (Oldfield, 1880: 142-146), was an important 
trading zone between Nepal and the neighboring districts of then British India in the early 19th 
century (see Buchanan-Hamilton, 1928).  The balance of trade between Nepal and British India 
through Morang in part enabled “the court of Nepal to purchase arms and clothing for their 
troops, and luxuries that are sent from Patna (India) to Kathmandu” (Buchanan-Hamilton, 1928: 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27!They were already overburdened and pauperized by then existing tax, rent and corvée labor obligation (see 
Stiller, 1973; Regmi, 1971). 
 
28!According to Buchannan-Hamilton (1928: 561-578), a large quantity of timber used to be exported from the 
forests of Morang to India during 1809-10.  Nepali state used to collect revenue up to Rs 10,000 from the sale of 
timber from Morang only.   
 
29!The eastern Tarai in the chapter refers to the current districts of Parsa, Bara, Rautahat, Mahotari, Saptari and 
Morang (which also included present day districts of Sunsari and Jhapa). 
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574).30  James Baillie Fraser, an English officer who visited the Tarai regions under British India 
control during the Anglo-British War (1814-1816) commented that without the territories of the 
Tarai, “the Nepālese could never have risen to the greatness which they had attained” (Fraser, 
1820: 9).   
The importance that the Gorkhali rulers assigned to the possession of the Tarai becomes 
evident from a letter that P.N. Shah wrote to one of his generals posted in the Eastern Tarai 
(Regmi, 1971).  In the letter, the Gorkhali king, according to Regmi (1971: 9), described the 
Tarai as “superior and high revenue-yielding territory” and the hill regions as “inferior territory” 
so that “Gorkhali should never relinquish territory in the Tarai… even if there is a war” (Regmi, 
1971: 9).  The fact that P.N. Shah called the hills, the very geography of his belonging, territory 
inferior to the lowland plains indicates that revenue generated from the hills was inadequate to 
sustain the Gorkhali campaigns of conquest.  In other words, even if the “hill contained the soul” 
of the Gorkhali state, it needed the Tarai to ‘nourish” the Hindu kingdom.  Hence, of all the 
conquered territories, the Gorkhali rulers made it their utmost priority to retain control over the 
Tarai territory, particularly in the contexts of the rise of the British imperial power in India that 
also claimed sovereignty over the Tarai region (Michael, 2007, 2012).   
 But even more important than the revenue was the purchasing power of the Tarai land 
that enabled the rulers of the 19th century Nepal to buy political support and to control disloyal 
elements (Regmi, 1971).  Since there was a shortage of cash in the state’s treasury and land was 
the most important source of livelihood for common people, the Gorkhali rulers efficiently used 
land grants (called Jagir) as emoluments to pay army personnel and government functionaries 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
30!Hamilton estimated that the value of exports (mostly timber, agricultural products, woolen cloth, herbs, ghee-
clarified butter, elephants, ivory, copper, etc.) from Morang at Rs 363,000, and of imports (chiefly salt; other import 
included sugar, tobacco, spices, indigo, metal utensils, etc.) to be Rs 71,000 (see Buchamnan-Hamilton, 1928: 556-
576; Regmi, 1979: 23-26). 
! 58!
for their services and loyalty.  On the importance of the Tarai as the supplier of Jagir land, Stiller 
(1976) explains “the unity of the Gorkhali state depended on the continued loyalty of these 
officers and execution of their duties to the state.  The guarantee of both was their Jagir land.  
And this was in the Tarai” (Stiller, 1976: 19, emphasis added).  He credibly argues that the Tarai 
bore the  “cost of the unification” (Stiller, 1976: 18-20); hence, the Tarai was essentially the 
“currency of Gorkhali conquests” (Meyer, 2000:17). 
Similarly, the King and those who controlled state power generously granted Birta, a tax-
free land grant, for three reasons: first, to individuals for appreciation of their services to the state 
(the rulers); second, as ritual gifts (to Brahmins, the “high” caste priests) to earn religious merit; 
and third, as a mark of patronage.31  Birta lands were provided to “members of the nobility, civil 
and other selected groups in the society on which they depended for the sustenance and 
continuance of their authority” (Regmi, 1971: 39).  The practices of land grants may have served 
important economic and political functions in organizing the foundation of the new political 
authority and administration but Jagir and Birta lands did not yield any income to increase the 
state’s treasury (Regmi, 1971).!32   However, these land grants could enrich grantees 
economically and strengthen their political authority and class domination. 
The Gorkhali Shah and the Rana rulers exclusively came from the hill “high” caste groups: 
Bahuns, Thakuri, and Chhetri from the Gorkhali “heartland” (Regmi, 1995: 14), and because of 
their political domination, they also emerged as the “landowning elite.”  Regmi (1971, 176) 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31!On history of Birta and other land tenure in Nepal, see, especially Regmi (1978). 
 
32!The Birta owners and Jagir holders were not only entitled to extract rents from the peasants cultivating these 
lands as their personal income, they were also delegated with the right to dispense justice and extract unpaid labor.  
On the other hand, they were also obliged to supply troops and weapons to the government, reclaim “waste lands” 
and resettle people, and provide additional services for the state on various events.  However, the privileges of Birta 
owners and Jagirdars considerable outweighed their obligations (see Regmi 1971 and especially 1978).  !
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emphasizes that the policy of Birta and Jagir land grants followed by the Gorkhali rulers favored 
“Brahmans, Chhetris and Thakuris, particularly from the western hill areas, who sustained the 
political authority of the new rulers,” while “Gurungs, Magars, Tamangs, and Newars typically 
did not receive such favors and suffered gradual depletion of or encroachment on the lands they 
had obtained during previous regimes as a result of Birta or Jagir assignments” (Regmi, 1971: 
40).33  Therefore these land grants were important tools of statecraft through which the 
traditional dominant groups consolidated economic and political power over the marginalized 
and excluded indigenous communities.   
The politics of land grants further enhanced the significance of the Tarai.  Regmi (1971: 
38) reminds us that, prior to the conquests of the Tarai, the practices of Birta grants were limited 
due to the scarcity of land.  But the rulers’ generosity in awarding Birta lands to individuals 
substantially increased with the annexation of the Tarai territories to the Gorkhali state.  Thus 
these land grants practices simultaneously led to the emergence of privileged landed-class groups 
from the hills, with rights superior to those of common peasants, who, with the favor from the 
state, usurped lands that belonged to the indigenous communities (Caplan, 1970; Guneratne, 
2002).   
 It is important that we consider the fact that the mālik (owners) of Jagir and Birta lands 
in the Tarai were predominately from the hill groups (and “high” caste), and the tenants who 
cultivated these lands were mostly the people of the Tarai origin until the early 20th century.  
Because of the fear of malaria and the perceived hostile climate of the Tarai, land grantees from 
the hills continued to live outside of the Tarai while they rented out their lands to local peasants.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
33!Though Kathmandu, the present day capital of Nepal had also became the new capital of the state of Gorkha in 
1768, “it was the heartland of Gorkha and its peripheral territories that furnished the political leaders of the Gorkhali 
empire, as well as most of its high-ranking administrative personnel.  These ruling families and nobility belonged to 
the same ethnic group, caste and cultural group as their counterparts in Gorkha.  Many were also bound together by 
ties of kinship and marriage” (Regmi, 1995: 14).!
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Hence they were absentee landlords who relied on local cultivators to extract produce from the 
land.  Devoid of any social relationships mediated by kinship and reciprocity, the tenurial 
relationship between the absentee hill landlords and their tenants in the Tarai were an extreme 
form of feudalism in which the primary interest of the landowning elite was not the soil or the 
welfare of their tenants but an economic surplus derived through extreme pauperization of the 
tenants working on the soil (see specially Regmi, 1978). 
In the Tarai, this form of extractive and hierarchical relationship between the hill absentee 
landlords and the local tenants of the Tarai “helped develop a rentier mentality, and the hill 
landowners soon became an idle elite who lived off the labour of others even while despising 
them” (Lal, 2002: 101).  These hill rulers treated the Tarai more as “a colony with subject 
population” (Regmi, 1971); the region, its resources and people were heavily exploited for 
extracting economic surplus, but the Nepali hill rulers adopted a policy of distancing the Tarai 
and its people politically and culturally from the hills, Kathmandu in particular, throughout the 
19th and early 20th centuries.   
The preceding discussion helps us to understand the political and economic significance of 
Tarai land and resources for the formation of the Gorkhali state and for the hill Hindu rulers in 
particular.  In the next section, I will focus on the ways in which the Gorkhali rulers effectively 
arrayed their vision of the Hindu geo-body of their new kingdom and the territorial sovereignty 
of the Hindu king to structure the social-spatial relations between the rulers/landowning elites, 
subjects, and land/territories through caste and land tenure hierarchies.  This discussion 
highlights the moral and political logic that defined the territorial sovereignty of the Hindu state, 
and its land tenure system. 
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“Asli Hindustan”: The Politics of Geo-Body 
!
 Control over the land, as I have discussed earlier, was crucial for the expansion of the 
House of Gorkha.  Its political-economic need to control land, subjects, and labor led to the 
emergence of the Gorkhali polity as a centralized and utterly extractive patrimonial feudal Hindu 
state (Regmi, 1995; Riaz and Basu, 2009).  The new Gorkhali territorial possessions included 
diverse ecological regions traditionally inhabited by various social groups with their distinct 
cultural ways of life which were different from and often in conflict with the Hindu ways of life.  
Similarly, the geopolitical positioning of the Gorkhali kingdom, located between the emerging 
British Empire to the south, and Chinese-Buddhist Tibet to the north, also required its Hindu 
rulers to distinguish their kingdom and its territorial possession in terms of its distinct political 
and moral universe in order to claim their legitimacy and exercise their sovereignty as moral-
pious rulers vis-à-vis its subjects and other political entities (see Burghart, 1984; Michaels, 
1997). 
 The Gorkhali rulers considered their muluk (territorial possession) to be a “genuine lands 
of Hindus” (Nep.  Asali Hindustan) sanctified by the hill Hindu rulers’ practices of maintaining 
the purity of their ritual realms in their territorial possessions (see specially Burghart, 1984; 
Gurung, 1997).  Richard Burghart (1984) has brilliantly examined how 19th-century Gorkhali 
rulers considered their kingdom to be a territorial possession (muluk) and a ritual realm (deśa) 
over which the king had proprietorial and ritual authority respectively.34  Similarly, there were 
many countries (des or deśa) inhabited by distinct peoples with their customs and habits 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34!I consider Richard Burghart to be one of the most important scholars in the overlapping fields of religious studies, 
caste system, cultural history, and politics of Nepal from a regional South Asian and Himalayan perspective.  See 
Fuller and Spencer (1996) on the contribution of Richard Burghart (1944-1994). 
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(deschar) corresponding to the type of natural habitats or the hāvāpani (Nep.  air, water; natural 
environment) of their countries.  So the Gorkhali notion of des or deśa corresponds to “ethnic 
geographies” in which people cultures are shaped by their physical environments.   
 As a ritual realm (deśa), the Gorkhali muluk was “an auspicious icon of the universe 
centered on the temple of the king’s tutelary deity and demarcated on the perimeter by temples” 
in some cases located outside the king’s territorial possession (muluk) (Burghart, 1984: 104-106).  
At the turn of the 19th century, when the southern lowland plains, including the Gangetic basin 
(the central authority of the Hindus) in India, were ruled by “the insolent followers of Islam” and 
later invaded by the “the vile Feringis-the British” (Burghart, 1984: 106), the Gorkhali saw 
themselves to be the rulers of the only independent realm in the scared land of the Hindus.35  In 
other words, the Gorkhali rulers imagined their hill kingdom to be the emerging center of the 
universal Hindu realms, and hence they also imagined themselves to be genuine Hindu kings.  
For the Gorkhali rulers, the caste system provided an auspicious order of the social universe in 
the realm such that the purity of the ritual realm was a major concern of the Gorkhali rulers, thus 
of their governance.  They adopted the Hindu ideology of caste in order to organize and regulate 
the diversity of people (subjects) and their cultures in the genuine lands of Hindus.   
The caste ideologies of purity and pollution were equally applied to the geographical areas 
whereby various ethnic regions were also ranked according to their habits or by their associations 
with other polluting regions.  For example, the northern Himalayan (the Buddhist regions) and 
the lowland Tarai were considered potentially polluting to the auspiciousness of the Hindu 
kingdom because of their people’s habits (for example, beef eating) or because of their 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
35!According to one Brahmanical scheme there were fifty-six universal realms in the Sacred Land of the Hindus 
(bhāratavarsa), of which Nepal was one (Hamilton 1819: 192 cited by Burghart, 1984: 103). 
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geographical proximity to the non-Hindu regions in the north and south.36  The people from the 
mountain regions who followed Buddhism and animism were also considered impure and ranked 
as polluting castes in the 1854 Legal Code that codified Nepal’s caste ranking (see Höfer, 1979; 
Bista, 1991).  The Tarai, even though it was a valuable territorial possession, was nevertheless 
seen as a threat to the purity of the Hindu king’s heartland because of its proximity to the British 
India, a space ruled by the cow-eating British and Muslims.  Hence until the early 20th century, 
people, merchants and travellers in particular, returning from the Tarai and Tibet were required 
to undergo special purification rituals before they entered the capital city (Burghart, 1984) and 
their villages in the hills.37  It can be argued that the perception that the Tarai was a polluting and 
thus inferior region had also influenced the hill Hindu rulers’ belief that the forested malarial 
lowland was a ‘waste land’ to be exploited for economic extraction.  In the official documents 
from the 19th century, the Tarai is commonly referred as “Kala Banjar”– a black barren land, 
hence a waste land with potential resources awaiting reclamation and exploitation; a place 
devoid of history and civilization.38  
 Hence the spatial-social organizations of the Gorkhali kingdom created social geographies 
of inclusion and exclusion based on the regions’ economic, cultural, and political or strategic 
significance for the rulers.  By the early 19th century, the Gorkhali rulers laid the foundation for a 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
36!The sacredness of the cow was one the most revered practices emphasized by the Gorkhali rulers (including the 
Ranas) to claim and justify their Hindu identity, and hence that of Nepal’s, particularly in comparison to the 
Hindustan (land of Hindus) i.e. India (see Michaels, A. 1997). 
 
37!Based on my personal communications with various individuals who had spent most of their life in the hills, of 
age between 60 to 75 years. 
 
38!Why the Tarai was called ‘Kala Banjar’ is not unclear.  Regmi has translated the use of the word in the official 
documents both as “waste land” and as “virgin land.”  In association with the land, the word ‘Banjar’ is commonly 
used to refer ‘barren land’ (BNS, 2010: 220 and 855).  The term Kala for ‘black’ comes from Hindi (Kalo in 
Nepali).  Hence the usage of “Kala Banjar” may be a colonial designation from British India.  In Nepal the color 
black, in many cases, has negative associations such as in kalo dhan (wealth earned illegally), kalo man (heart; evil 
heart), or kalo din (black day).  This information is based on my personal communications with Nepali scholars.   
!
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Hindu nation in which the relations among rulers, people, and territory were hierarchically 
ranked and in which the hill Hindu rulers occupied the apex of the political-social pyramid 
(Burghart, 1984; Höfer, 1979).  The ways in which Nepal’s 19th century Hindu rulers (the 
Gorkhali kings and the Rana regimes) used the territorial sovereignty of the king in the form of 
the land tenure system further illustrates how they used the politics of the geo-body of the 
Gorkhali muluk for their political-economic project of the colonization of Tarai land and political 
control over Tarai people. 
 
 
The Bhupati King and the Moral Economy of Extraction 
!
 As I have earlier highlighted, the political-economic need to control land, subjects, and 
labor led to the emergence of the Gorkhali polity as a centralized and utterly extractive 
patrimonial Hindu state (Riaz and Basu, 2009), in which the King was the Bhupati (Nep.  master 
of the land; husband of the land).  All lands and conquered territories were considered to be his 
rightful possessions and ritual realms (see Burghart, 1984).  Until recently, the King was 
designated as Bhupati in the official usages, particularly those related with the nation’s law.   The 
earlier national anthem of Nepal also praised the King as Bhupati.  The national anthem actually 
begins with a wish for the progress of the “prachada pratapi bhupati” (gallant, courageous, 
sovereign landlord) king of Nepal.39  Scholars including Richard Burghart (1984) have not 
examined the concept and use of the idea of Bhupati in Nepal.  According to the noted historian 
and anthropologist Tom Trautmann:  
It is commonplace in Sanskrit poetry or inscriptions that the king is called "lord of earth" or 
"lord of men" by joining words like pati with words meaning earth or men: bhu-pati, 
prthivi-pati, nara-pati, nr-pati, and so forth--there are dozens and dozens of simple 
compounds meaning, simply, "king.”  Now "pati" also means husband, and often in poetry 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
39!On the politics of the national anthem in Nepal, see Hutt (2012).!  
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the king is treated as the husband of Goddess Earth.  It is a metaphor, of course; but it 
implies sovereignty” (Personal communication, Sep 14, 2012). 
 
Since the Gorkhali rulers had imagined their kingdom to be a  ‘Asali Hindustan’ and the 
pious rulers to be the true Hindu kings (Michaels, 1997), the self-designation of the King as the 
Bhupati, the sovereign owner and possessor of the land, also reflects the classical Hindu ideology 
and practice of treating the king as the landlord.  The notion of Bhupati also implies the protector 
patriarch, and the “husband” of the Goddess Earth, hence it implies a kin relation mediated by 
the ownership over the land and logically with the users of that land.  But I argue the political 
and economic contexts of the Gorkhali territorial expansion equally required the King to retain 
territorial sovereignty, hence the notion that he was the protector and the owner of the land.  
Burghart (1984: 103) has eloquently elaborated how the Gorkhali rulers deployed the notion of 
sovereign landlord or Bhupati in their state-making project.  He writes:  
At the turn of the nineteenth century the Gorkha rulers referred to their territorial domain in 
terms of a Persian loanword meaning possessions (muluk) ….  In the administration of his 
possessions the king saw himself as a landlord (malik) who classified exhaustively and 
exclusively his tracts of land according to tenurial categories and then assigned, bestowed, 
licensed, or auctioned the rights and duties over these tracts of land to his subjects. 
 
Therefore the rise of the landlord state, the sovereignty of which was bestowed with the 
Bhupati king, transformed the value of land and the proprietorial relationship between the state 
and its subjects.  The Bhupati king was the malik of the entire territorial possession of his muluk, 
including the conquered territories.  In other words, the entire bounded territory became the de 
facto property of the King, akin to his personal possessions over which he could exercise the 
proprietary authority to “assign, bestow, license or auction duties and rights” (Burghart, 1984: 
104).  Since the sovereign Bhupati occupied the apex of the socio-political hierarchy, it was the 
crown, the epitome of the state power, who could rent away the lands (called raikar) to its 
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subjects in their capacity as tenants or  ‘give’ it to individuals and institutions (such as the 
temple) in the form of various land grants.40  
 I argue that that any recipient of the crown’s land has a moral and legal obligation to 
reciprocate to the Bhupati king with payment of rent, tax and labor services and that this 
obligation reinforces the legitimizing notion of the Gurkhali rulers that their subjects derive their 
sustenance from the king’s land.  The territorial sovereignty of the Bhupati king helps us to 
understand the Gorkhali moral economy (Thomson, 1971), which they used politically to control 
the land, labor and subjects of their muluk.  Put simply, since people survive primarily by 
consuming what is produced in the king’s land, it is the land, not the labor, the king’s territorial 
possession that is essential for the sustenance of people’s life.  Hence the king , the malik or the 
lord and his proprietorial ownership must be acknowledged through reciprocity of free labor, 
revenue and loyalty.  This Gorkhali notion of moral economy is underlined by the Gorkhali king 
P.N. Shah in his ‘Dibhya Upadesh’, (which literally means the ‘divine counsel’), believed to be a 
historical text containing the king’s teachings.41  In Dibhya Upadesh, he says:  
I have this earned this muluk with lots of pains (struggle).  This is a garden of all castes; all 
should know this.  All small (low) and big (high) castes of four varnas and thirty six jāt of this 
garden should take care of it (p: 50) ….  This is a genuine Hindustaan (land of Hindus).  
Don’t leave your caste religion.  You must pay back the debt of the salt you’ve taken from 




40!Under the raikar tenure individual households were allowed to operate personal plots while the state remained 
the ultimate landlord (Regmi, 1971; Regmi, 1978a).  The only exception to the state ownership of land and the lands 
it had alienated under various grants was the communal form of land ownership called Kipat which continued to 
exist in some parts of hill, particularly among the indigenous groups (Regmi, 1978a).  The Limbus were the only 
ādivāsi group who retained the right to continue the Kipat land until the late 1960s as per the agreement they had 
with the king P.N.  Shah when their ancestral territories were incorporated to the Gorkhali kingdom in the mid-1770 
(see Caplan, 1970; Regmi, 1978: 540).  None of the indigenous groups in the Tarai were granted such communal 
right to land. 
 
41!In the official narratives and the writings of the mainstream historians before 2006, the Dibhya Upadesh appeared 
as a “sacred text” of Nepali nationalism written for future generations (see Stiller, 1968). 
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 The first narrative of “garden of four varna and thirty castes” is a very common saying in 
Nepal popularized by school textbooks and official historiographies to epitomize Nepal’s ‘unity 
in diversity’ albeit under a Hindu caste ranking.  In this narrative, the nation is naturalized with 
the metaphor of a garden, a territorial or geo-body which the king has earned by his labor.  Thus 
it is he who owns and controls the garden.  His subjects, of different castes “high” and “low,” are 
the fruit (or offspring) of his garden.  Thus the narrative also naturalizes caste ranking as a 
constituent element of the garden.  The second narrative transforms the garden into a Hindu 
body.  Since the muluk is a genuine Hindu land, people cannot be related by either the substance 
of common consanguinity or by marriage because they are ranked hierarchically along the 
continuum of their presumed embodiment of ritual purity and impurity.  As it becomes evident in 
the second narrative, it is the salt consumed from the king’s land that provides a common bodily 
substance for all.   
 The eating metaphor carries a deeper symbolic meaning here.  Not only is the salt 
provided by the king consumed by all castes, it is an essential item people need for their daily 
sustenance.  The subjects get the salt from the king’s possession, his muluk, and are thus 
consuming the king’s salt, a daily reminder of the indebtedness conferred by virtue ofthe salt or 
food they eat from their master’s land.  The use of the metaphor “salt debt” is a common way of 
asking for one’s loyalty in Nepal.  The royal decrees issued in the past commonly used the notion 
of salt-debt to demand loyalty and services to the king.  Here is an example of one such royal 
decree issued in 1777 by P.N. Shah to the Kiranti leaders in eastern Nepal when it fell under the 
Gorkhali rule:  
Yesterday, you were the good servants of the Makawani Raja.  As long as you ate his salt, 
you remained in his service.  Your king of yesterday no longer exists; that country of yours is 
now under our sway ….the duty of a servant is to render service as long as he takes salt.  We 
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hereby grant you pardon on your life and property for all crimes committed to us when we 
conquered that country (Regmi Research Series, 1974:82; emphasis mine). 
 
This royal decree clearly affirms the Gorkhali notion that the subjects should render 
service to their master as long as they use the king’s land.  For the Bhupati king and those who 
owned the state’s land, the landlord-subject relation is a moral duty (dharma) not an imposition.  
Therefore I emphasize the need to consider the Gorkhali politics of geo-body in understanding 
the 19th century land tenure system as an extension of the state’s moral economy centered on the 
Bhupati king.  The land tenure system that was introduced by the Gorkhali rulers at the end of 
the 18th century was the most evident and effective exercise of the state’s territorial sovereignty 
over its tenant subjects 
 Under state landlordism, the actual cultivators, the peasants who toiled on the land were 
at best considered the landlord state’s subjects in the capacity of tenants without any ownership 
rights.  They were required to provide free labor service and to pay taxes and rent, generally 
equivalent to half of what they produced, to the state or to other individual landlords who had 
been granted lands with the right to appropriate rents from the peasants using them (see Regmi, 
1971, 1978).  The state’s rights to claim rent, levies, tax and free labor services from its subjects 
were derived from the fact they were perceived as “receivers” of the land from the king.  Thus, it 
was the land and its rentable property that established the relationship between the king (the 
state) and his subjects.   
 The Gorkhali rulers effectively legitimated extractive social relations of hierarchy in 
which the Bhupati king was at the apex and at the bottom were the tenant subjects who were 
required to produce not only for their families but also for the tiers of other malik of the land (see 
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Regmi, 1978).42  As it has been persuasively argued by Burghart (1984), the tenurial system was 
“a control hierarchy in which the diverse subjects of his kingdom were brought together by 
virtue of their tenurial relations to the king” (p: 112, emphasis added) such that “submission of 
such payments through tiers of the tributary, civil, and military administrations indicated one’s 
inferiority to the recipient of such payments, and thereby defined the hierarchical structure of the 
tenurial system” (p: 104).  In other worlds, to become a tenant subject in 19th-century Nepal was 
to accept one’s inferior position within this control hierarchy.   
 For the indigenous peoples, who considered land to be their “inalienable possessions” 
(see Caplan, 1970 for an ethnographic illustration), their subjugation under the Hindu landlord 
state transformed them into ‘tax paying peasants’ subordinated in the tenurial hierarchy.  Even 
though the Hindu rulers had recognized their muluk as being countries of various jāt living in 
their ancestral territories (they had also accepted many of customary practices of various groups), 
they did not recognize the ancestral rights of indigenous groups over their territories.43  The 
tenurial sovereignty of the Bhupati king over the conquered ādivāsi territory converted the 
indigenous lands into rentable state property and the people into dependent ryots who were 
expected, on the moral ground of salt-debt to render service to their new sovereign landlord.  
Legally they were required to provide labor services and land tax to the state or other landlords.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
42!Besides the state, there were other landowning groups, particularly the Birta and Jagir landholders who enjoyed 
special tenurial rights (also some judicial rights) over their tenants.  The power and privileges of these land grantees 
were always at the discretion of the central government yet Birta and Jagir “in fact meant a virtual abdication by the 
state of its internal sovereign authority” (Regmi, 1971: 44). 
 
43 The Limbus, indigenous groups from the far eastern hills of Nepal, were an exception.  The Gorkhali king had 
recognized and granted the right to continue their customary practices of the communal landownership Kipat (see 
Caplan, 1970).  In a royal order issued to the Limbus of the far eastern hills, P.N. Shah decreed:  
Although we have conquered your country by dint of our valor, we have afforded you and your kinsmen 
protection.  We hereby pardon all of your crimes and confirm all the customs and traditions, rights and privileges 
of your country…. Enjoy the land from generation to generation, as long as it remains in existence…in case we 
confiscate your lands…may your ancestral gods destroy our kingdom (Regmi, 1978: 540) 
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On the other hand, the landowning ruling elites, because of their political alliance with the 
Gorkhali rulers, usurped indigenous people’s lands and appropriated economic surplus out of the 
diligent labor of indigenous communities (Caplan, 1970; English 1983, Tamang, 2008).  The 
extractive moral economy, imposed by the Hindu landlord state on indigenous communities 
already politically weakened by the usurpation of their ancestral ownership over their lands, 
severely affected their relative egalitarian social and political organizations (see Caplan, 1970).  
The legal imposition of the caste system in 1854 further subordinated the indigenous 
communities by designating them impure and enslavable subjects (Höfer, 1979).  Thus the land 
tenure system that the Gorkhali rulers introduced during the end of the 18th century structured 
relationships of landownership and the resulting relations of exclusion and inclusion along caste, 
ethnic and regional lines in the Tarai.   
 The rise of Rana autocratic rule (1846-1951) in 1846 further intensified the colonization 
of Tarai land as the state expanded its centralized bureaucracy and revenue administration at the 
village levels.44  The Anglo-Gorkha war (1814-1816) in which the Gorkhali state was defeated 
with the subsequent loss of its conquered territories in the Tarai also ended its imperial 
expansion.  Nepal’s present-day territory was defined when British India returned what are now 
the five districts of western Nepal to the Gorkhali rulers in 1860.45  After Nepal’s defeat, British 
India also recognized the territorial sovereignty of the Gorkhali state as an independent nation-
state.  The Rana regime, its legitimacy recognized by the powerful British Raj, further 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
44!Rana rule began with the rise of Jung Bahadur Kunwar (who later changed his surname into Rana to elevate his 
caste position as Thakuri, the same as that of the ruling Shah king of the Gorkhali state), an army commander who 
became the Prime Minister in 1846 through a “royal massacre.”  With his coming in the palace power, the Shah 
monarch was reduced to a figurehead and the Prime Minister and other government positions became hereditary (see 
Whelpton, 2005). 
 
45!These five districts were called ‘Naya Muluk’ or ‘New Territories’ and were the personal birta of the Rana Prime 
Minister Jung Bahadur Rana (see Whelpton, 2005). 
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consolidated the Hindu identity of the Nepali nation-state in order to distinguish its regime’s 
moral outlook as well as to consolidate its political power in Nepal.  In 1854, the Rana 
government implemented the first legal code of Nepal that enforced a caste hierarchy as a 
“modern” law of the nation.46  Thus, the Rana rulers further remolded themselves as “pious 
rulers” (Michaels, 1997: 83) by enforcing the Gorkhali imagination of Asli Hindustan concretely 
through the legal code that brought all social groups, irrespective of their religions and non-caste 
social system, into the national caste hierarchy. 
 
 
Table 1 The Caste Hierarchy in the Old Legal Code, 1854 in order of descending hierarchy 
(After Hofer, 1979: 45-46, Figures 2 and 3) 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
46!I use “modern” within scare quotes to emphasize that the caste system in Nepal was primarily a governing tool or 
a technique of governmentality dating from a relatively recent period, not a “primordial” features of Nepali society 
as a collective entity. 
Hierarchy of Purity and Impurity 
 





Tāgādhāri: Wearers of 
sacred cord (High Caste; 
Pure Caste) 
The traditional dominant-ruling 
groups; the landowning elites from 
the hill.  Also included the 
Brahmin from the Hindu Newar 
and the Indian Brahmin.  Non-
enslavable.  
“Touchable” by the High Caste; 





Hill indigenous groups including 
those who were recruited in the 
Gorkhali Army (such as the Magar 
and Gurung).  Conquered subjects  
“Touchable” by the High Caste; 




Indigenous groups from the hill 
and the Tarai; Buddhist-
indigenous groups from the 
mountain. 
Impure Caste; physical contact 
avoided but if touched, ritual 
purification not needed. 
Pāni Nācalnyā choi chițo 
halnunaparnyā: Impure 
but touchable caste  
Muslim, European; non-farming-
artisans groups from the hill and 
the lowlands. 
Impure and “Untouchables” 
 
Pāni Nācalnyā choi chițo 
halnu parnyā: 
Untouchable castes  
Occupational caste groups from 
the hills and the Tarai 
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 The caste hierarchy of the Old Legal Code, in theory, did not determine one’s access to 
the land; anyone could become a tenant or own land.  Even a Bahun, the purest body, could toil 
on the soil (Hofer, 1979: 115-118).  However, as Regmi (1978) reminds us, it was control over 
or access to political power (state power) that enabled these groups to accumulate land and 
appropriate others’ labor and produce in order to enrich themselves.  The ruling Hill “high” caste 
Hindus, who by then had become the de facto landowning elites, reaffirmed the purity of their 
social bodies by the Old Legal Code.  They could become polluted or be demoted to other caste 
rankings but they could not be enslaved by others or killed by the state.  In contrast, indigenous 
and other impure bodies were subject to death penalties, and many of them could be made slaves 
(see Höfer, 1979: 121-131), serving as ‘free labor’ for others.  By ranking their tenants and 
potential tenants as lower, less pure, enslavable, and ‘killable’ bodies, the Old Legal Code, as 
Höfer (1979: 40) argues, “cemented a social order as the basis of a centralized agrarian 
bureaucracy and strengthened the privilege of the state-bearing elites.”   
As my discussions of Dhimal experience of the landlord state will show, the extractive 
hierarchical tenurial relationships legitimated under the territorial sovereignty of the Bhupati 
king and the caste hierarchy legalized by the Old Legal Code both intertwined to affect their 
territorial dispossession and landlessness.  So it is important that we consider the interplay 
among caste, land tenure, and power relationships between the landowning elites and the 
indigenous communities in understanding how state interventions in the Tarai led to the 




State Interventions in the Tarai of Morang  
 
 As I have discussed in previous sections, the eastern Tarai became one of the most 
important geographies of extraction for 19th-century Nepali rulers.  The Tarai of Morang was an 
important trade route between Nepal and the neighboring districts of British India when the 
region came under Gorkhali control.  Yet considerable areas of land in Morang were still 
forested, places where cattle herders from neighboring Indian villages would send their animals 
for pasture during the dry seasons (Buchaman-Hamilton, 1928: 414-416; Regmi, 1979: 24).  
While fear of malaria had discouraged outsiders from settling in the lowlands, many of the local 
inhabitants had fled to adjoining Indian territory to avoid the oppressive regime imposed when 
Morang was conquered by the Gorkhali state in 1774 (Regmi, 1979: 24).  In 1849, Brian 
Hodgson wrote that the Dhimal people whom he had met at the border between the Nepal and 
Indian Tarai regions along the Mechi river informed him that they had come there from Morang 
sixty years earlier in “order to escape the Górkhali oppression” (Hodgson, 1849: 131).  Thus the 
Gorkhali annexation of the far eastern region, and the territorial disputes and wars with Sikkim, 
Tibet, and Bhutan had greatly weakened the political and territorial autonomy of indigenous 
communities such as the Kirati (Rai, Limbus, Sunuwar) in the hills (Caplan, 1970; English, 
1983; Pradhan, 1991) as well as in the plains (Gaige, 1975; Guneratne, 2002; Sugden, 2009). 
 Dhimal ancestral territories became, in effect, an internal colony of Kathmandu -- the 
new capital of the Hindu kingdom of Nepal -- when the hill principality of Vijayapur, which at 
the time controlled the Tarai territories between the Koshi river in the west and the Mechi river 
in the east, fell to Gorkhali conquest in 1774.47  After the annexation of Morang, the Gorkhali 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
47!On the history of the Vijayapur, see Subedi (2005) and Chemjong (2059 V.S.  [2002 A.D]).  Both of these 
historians claim that Vijayapur was the principality of the Kirati people.  The hill indigenous groups of the eastern 
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rulers consolidated the development of a feudal mode of production in the Morang plains and 
considerably strengthened the power of the bureaucracy and its capacity to appropriate surplus 
from Morang (Sugden, 2010: 129-146).  The territories under Vijayapur were split into two 
administrative units with headquarters in Chainpur and Morang for the Hill and the Tarai 
territories respectively.  At the district level, the power of the King (the state) and his territorial 
sovereignty was represented by a state-appointed official called Subba -- generally a high 
ranking military official belonging to the hill “high” caste groups -- who was responsible for 
ensuring the collection of revenue, rents, levies and fines, promoting land reclamation and 
settlement, and maintaining law and order.   
 The district territory was furthered divided into many revenue collection units called-
Pragana in which a Chaudhari (generally a local headman) was appointed to collect revenue 
(land tax, rent, levies, fines, etc.) and to promote land reclamation and settlement (Regmi 
Research Series, 1970: 107-109).  Hence the Gorkhali rulers incorporated the indigenous village 
socio-political institution, the village head, into the state revenue administration as an 
intermediary local tax collector.  According to Sugden (2009: 133-134):  
The expansion of the rural administration also led to an intensification of social stratification 
within indigenous communities, facilitating the emergence of a powerful, but diverse, local 
nobility and further undermining the older indigenous mode of production.  On lands operated 
under the predominant raikar tenure, the hill based state employed wealthier families from the 
indigenous Tharu, and sometimes Rajbanshi community, to act as tax collectors.  …… The 
chaudharis and lower level functionaries were granted salaries and land assignments for their 




Sugden’s analysis (2009) of the emergence of class differentiation among indigenous 
communities and disruptions of the earlier indigenous mode of production due to direct state 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Nepal -- the Rai, Limbus, Sunuwar -- are collectively called Kirat.  Dhimal also identify themselves as Kirat, and 
hence they claim to be “brothers” of Rai and Limbu (see Chapter 7). 
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intervention is relevant.  But class differentiation also emerged through peoples’ strategies of 
evading the oppressive landlord state (Guneratne, 1996, 2001).  I will return to this point later in 
the discussions of Dhimal narratives of Tarai history.  Here I merely mention that not all 
indigenous communities in the Tarai were primarily farming communities when they became 
subjects of the Gorkhali state.   
A shortage of labor, an insufficient number of people to reclaim land and expand 
agriculture by clearing the forest, was a major challenge for the Nepali state and its rulers for 
their Tarai land colonization project.  Unclaimed and forested lands were allotted as Birta land 
grants to civil and military officials, members of nobility, chieftains of the conquered hill 
principalities, and other supporters of the ruling regime.  Government employees or functionaries 
were paid for their service through Jagir land grants in Morang.  It was the responsibility of the 
recipients of these land grants to recruit tenants, including some from India, to expand 
agriculture in their land holdings.  As early as 1799-1800, the Nepali state had attempted to 
promote settlement programs in Morang whereby the settlers could receive “as much land as one 
could reclaim” (Ojha, 1983: 25).  ‘Waste land’ or unclaimed lands could be freely allocated to 
any individual from Nepal or India willing to settle and reclaim these lands for farming, and tax 
remissions were made for an initial period that ranged from four to ten years (Regmi, 1971: 144).   
Despite such seemingly liberal state efforts, the resettlement programs failed to attract the 
desired numbers from outside to the Tarai of Morang.  The fear of malaria, the exploitative and 
oppressive land tenure system, imposition of high land tax, extraction of extralegal rents, levies 
and forced labor service, and opportunities for wage labor outside Nepal, particularly in the 
neighboring districts of India, had discouraged people from reclaiming land in the Morang region 
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(see Ojha, 1983; Regmi, 1971).48  Hence, labor, not land, had become the most important 
limiting factor in the effort by the state and its landowning elites to extract economic surplus 
from the Tarai.  Thus, Dhimal and other Tarai ādivāsi were increasingly coming under pressure 
to reclaim land and pay tax, rents, and levies to the state and other landed classes who claimed 
ownership of Tarai lands. 
 Here it is important to consider that the ‘malarial environment’ of the Tarai and its 
perceived unsuitability for hill people significantly structured the nature of state intervention in 
the Tarai, particularly for the non-Hindu indigenous peoples.  The overall pattern of Hindu 
landlord state expansion was similar in the major ecological regions: the mountain, the hill, and 
the Tarai.  However, in terms of the migration of the hill Hindus, who represented the cultural 
identity of the Gorkhali rulers, if not their political power, the hill indigenous groups had been 
affected much earlier than their counterparts in the Tarai.  The hill Hindu groups did not migrate 
to the northern high mountain areas of Buddhist highland people.  After the Gorkhali conquests 
of indigenous territories, the hill Hindu groups migrated to the ancestral territories of hill 
indigenous groups, primarily for land.  Hence, in the hill regions, Hindu-indigenous interactions, 
which had intensified in the early 19th century, resulted in land encroachments, landlessness, 
adoption of Hindu worldviews, land indebtedness, and emigration of indigenous populations to 




48!Historical records dating back to 1779 show that large numbers of ryots (tenant peasants) had left Morang and 
emigrated to India due to the high level of taxation and oppression of the revenue functionaries (RRSS, 1971 Vol. 3 
(1): 249-251).  Even state officials were reported to have said that the eastern Tarai had been ruined because of such 
oppressive extraction of the revenue officials and “independent” tax collector such as Ijaradar who were allocated 
right to collect land tax on a certain area based on his contract with the state (Regmi, 1971) As such, Ijaradar, who 
belonged to the hill High caste groups, were the most effective yet oppressive revenue functionaries (not civil 
servants of the state) (see Regmi, 1971). 
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Land had already become a scare resource in the hills by the mid 19th century (Mishra, 
1983), whereas in the Tarai it was labor that was the most prized resource for the state and the 
landowning elites.  In contrast to the hills, the dominant hill Hindu groups migrated to the plains 
relatively late in the recent period (post-1950s).  Therefore the state-indigenous relations in the 
Tarai were mostly regulated through the regime of the land tenure system and its bureaucratic 
practices.  As I have discussed earlier, the state’s practice of granting Birta and Jagir land grants, 
and its policy of favoring the hill “high caste” groups from the Gorkhali homeland as state 
officials and revenue functionaries strengthened the political and economic domination of the hill 
groups over the Tarai peoples.  The shortage of labor together with the absence of hill 
immigrants created pressure on the Tarai adivasi to reclaim land for the state or to become 
tenants of absentee landowning elites from the hills.  State officials and revenue functionaries 
often forced the Tarai adivasi to reclaim land (Regmi, 1971).49  The Gorkhali policy and the 
predisposition to treating the Tarai as a colony and its people as suppliers of labor were made 
further concrete through bureaucratic practices on the Tarai ground.   
 With the rise of Rana rule, the political-economic importance of the Tarai in funding the 
regime both through revenue from timber, which was sold to the British, and agrarian taxation, 
continued to grow (Guneratne, 2002; Sugden, 2009; Regmi, 1978).  In the later part of the 19th 
century, the spur of economic activity in northern India, mainly because of the development of 
railway transport facilities, opened up new prospects for land colonization in the eastern Tarai 
(Regmi, 1978: 140).  In order to tap these emerging economic opportunities, the state promoted 
more land reclamation and settlement projects (Ojha, 1982; Regmi, 1971), construction of 
irrigation facilities, and expansion of the revenue machinery (ibid).   
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49!See Chapter 3 for Dhimal narratives. 
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In 1861, the Rana rulers introduced the jimīndāri system as the local apparatus for state 
revenue administration of the Tarai region.50   The purpose behind promoting jimīndār was not 
only to collect land tax but also to encourage “private enterprise in the colonization of large 
tracts of forests and other uncultivated lands whose development lay beyond the capacity of the 
local farmers because of the inconvenient location or paucity of capital” (Regmi, 1978: 141).  In 
other words, the jimīndār was expected to play the role of an agricultural extension agent, who 
was capable of mobilizing the required financial capital and labor to reclaim new lands.   
The earlier system of Chaudhari was replaced by jimīndār within the mouja (lowest level 
revenue collection unit comprising many settlements).  But the preference for jimīndār was often 
given not to the traditional landed gentry at the mouja level, but to elites with strong connections 
to the bureaucracy, usually from the dominant Brahmin and Chhetri castes from the hills or in 
some circumstances high caste groups of Indian descent (Guneratne, 2002; Regmi, 1988 cited by 
Sugden, 2009: 137).  Despite such intervention, the situations of the tenants and small 
landholding peasants deteriorated in the Morang Tarai because of the increasing feudalization of 
agrarian social relations, higher land taxes and an oppressive regime of taxation,51 labor 
extractions, monetization of the land tax, increasing indebtedness and land mortgage, and lack of 
any welfare or other sustainable assistance from the state (Regmi, 1978b, 1971: 194).  
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50!A jimīndār was entrusted with responsibility of collecting revenues at the level of mouja – the lowest revenue 
collection unit that included a village or many settlements in the state land (raikar), not in birta and jagir land.  A 
jimīndār was made responsible for the cultivation of “waste land” in his area by settling new people on vacant 
holding or to cultivate the land by himself.  The post of the jimīndār was inheritable and secure as long as he was 
able to make the full revenue collection or unless he committed an offence for which he was liable to be punished by 
confiscation of property.  The position however could be sold and transferred to others.  A jimindar was entitled to 
receive a certain commission on the revenue he collected, and was allowed personal use of land called Jirayat in his 
mouja.  Since there was no limitation to the numbers of mouja a jimīndār could hold, he was not necessarily a local 
resident of a village (Regmi, 1978: 132-139).  In fact, many jimīndār came from the hill “high caste.”  The jimīndār 
system was abolished in early 1960s.  For ethnographic study of the jimīndār system, see Guneratne (1996, 2002).   
51!Not only many tenant peasants but even jimīndār fled to India because of their inability unable to meet the 
stipulated land-tax obligations to the state  (Shrestha, S, 1976 in RRS 3(1): 50-53) 
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 Thus the introduction of the jimīndāri system which operated at the level of villages 
intensified the stronghold of the landlord state over the local villagers, led to increased class 
differentiation between villagers, and further reinforced the domination of the hill landowning 
elites over the Tarai people.  The intensification of the Tarai’s identity as a “state space” together 
with the clearing of forests forced non-farming indigenous communities such as Dhimal and 
Meche to become tenant peasants beholden to either the state or its landowning elites from the 
mid- 19th to early 20th centuries.  Increasingly, the evolving state-led feudal relations and the 
recognition of the “property right” of peasant cultivators in raikar in the late 19th century further 
increased the importance to state and revenue functionaries of the village head and other socially 
recognized community leaders or economically dominant indigenous families (Regmi, 1978).  
They were increasingly coopted by state revenue officials as well as by the hill landowning elites 
for their land colonization project.  Similarly, the expansion of the jimīndāri system also brought 
more hill peoples, and hill jimīndār into the lowlands of Morang (Sugden, 2009).  This 
reinforced the relationships of domination based on class, caste and regionalism.   
 Some families from the Tarai ādivāsi communities, particularly the headmen and 
landlords from the Tharu communities, who had played important roles in the cultivation of the 
Tarai long before the rise of the House of Gorkha, also emerged as part of the landed class 
(Guneratne, 2001; Krauskopff and Meyer, 2000) by the early 19th century.52  They acted more as 
local village functionaries who mediated among the state rulers in Kathmandu, Birta and Jagir 
owners, and the local peasants (Regmi, 1971).  But it is important to consider that, with 
increasing state intervention in land tenure governance during the mid-19th century (see Regmi, 
1971), the symbiotic relationship that had developed between the Crown and the local 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
52!See Krauskopff and Meyer (2000) for the changing relationships between Tharus and the Kings of Nepal (from 
the early 18th century, before the rise of the House of Gorkha).   
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indigenous chieftains (particularly among the Tharus) before the Gorkhali conquest, and during 
the early period of the state-led colonization of the Tarai (at the turn of the 19th century) 
gradually “turned into one-side exploitation” (Meyer, 2000: 19) of the latter by the former.   
  
As my later discussion will show, Dhimal village heads were also incorporated as local tax 
functionaries or used by the jimīndār and birta holders by the early 20th century.  The local 
indigenous landed families also enjoyed some political authority and privileges over other of 
their community members.  Since these village landlords were also themselves community 
members embedded in the localized social and religious lived worlds mediated by kinship, 
exchange, reciprocity, ritual obligations, and other habitations of communal life, the tenurial 
relationships between the village landlords and their subjects were less exploitative than those 
between the hill landowning elites and their subjects (see Guneratne, 2002; Dhakal, Rai, 
Chemjong, et  al.  2000).  In contradiction to the local villager landlords, as Regmi (1978: 39) 
asserts, “the interest of the non-resident landowning elites was confined to the amount of income 
they could collect from the lands granted to them by the state.”   
A Dhimal village head, even when he was a local tax collector, could never attain the 
political status of birta holder or nor could he exercise the kind of authority that a state revenue 
function like an ijaradar could.  These influential local individuals or families from indigenous 
communities acted as agents and representatives of the Gorkhali interests but as Regmi (1995: 
141) reminds us, “their acceptance of Gorkhali authority by no means assured them a role in 
Gorkhali political, military or administrative leadership.”  Following Bourdieu (1986: 46-58), in 
spite of their status as landholders, they lacked social capital (such as family and kin connection 
to state power), cultural capital (such as language, education, and Hindu ways of life), and 
symbolic capital (being non-Hindu people of Tarai origin) to transform their economic capital 
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based on landholdings into becoming nationally or regionally dominant landowning elites. 
 
The Land and The State-Ādivāsi Relations 
The preceding discussion focused on the predatory processes by which the Nepali state 
was formed and the ways in which relations between rulers and their subjects were restructured 
along caste, tenurial, and spatial hierarchies in order to extract labor services and economic 
surplus, as well as to ensure political control in the Tarai region.  This chapter helps us to 
understand the impact of the emergence of the feudal relationships of extraction on the moral 
economy and relatively egalitarian nature of the indigenous communities.   
Theoretically, this chapter offers an ethnographically informed analysis to approach the 
intricate concept of ‘state’ by taking into account the dialectical relationships of labor, territory, 
history, and power in our analytical framework.  Since land is a central analytic in studying the 
relationship between the state and indigenous peoples, our investigative approach to the state 
needs to historicize how, by whom, and for what purposes its territorial sovereignty becomes 
objectified in a specific historical context (Abrams, 1988).  The ways in which the 19th century 
Hindu rulers used the territorial sovereignty of the king to claim their control and ownership over 
the indigenous territories through hierarchical tenurial and caste ranking helped them to 
consolidate their political and economic domination thereby creating social geographies of 
inclusion and exclusions based on caste, regional identity, and class in Nepal.   
As this chapter demonstrates, it is equally necessary to embed our analysis of ‘states’ in a 
larger geo-historical context of political pluralism in the regions in which centralizing 
hierarchical states coexist alongside radically egalitarian polities.  The rise of the House of 
Gorkha, the political order that evolved into the present day state of Nepal at the turn of 19th 
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century, together with the emergence of the British Empire in the region, led to the formation of 
a centralized hierarchical polity through its campaign of territorial conquest and colonization.  
This hierarchical political entity attempted to dominate the egalitarian polities that had flourished 
in many indigenous communities of Nepal in the past.  The Dhimal community, before the 
Gorkhali king annexed their territories, exemplified such egalitarian-oriented polities in the 
Tarai.  Today they are making efforts, through their indigenous political movement, to reform 
the contemporary state in which they are now encapsulated in order to shape it along less 
hierarchical and more egalitarian lines.  I contend that we cannot fully appreciate what motivated 
Dhimal to engage in what we now call indigenous politics without understanding how land 
shapes their understanding of their collective subjectivity (as the Dhimal jāti), history, and 
political agency.   
In the next chapter, I will focus on how Dhimal understand their own historical belonging 
in Nepal’s Tarai vis-à-vis their encounter with the landlord state.  As I underlined earlier, Nepali 
rulers saw the Tarai as a place rich in exploitable resources.  Yet they also considered it “waste 
land” because it had remained “barren or uncultivated,” an outcome of its low population people 
density that was exacerbated by its malarial environment and the state’s own oppressive tax 
regimes.  It is also the case that Tarai ādivāsi such as Tharu, Dhimal, Meche, Koch, and others 
had thrived at the fringes of these malarial forests, transforming this “deadly place” into their 
homes.  By virtue of being aboriginal inhabitants and because of their distinctive historical 
relationship with the Tarai, ādivāsi experiences and understandings of their past differ from those 
of the Nepali rulers who colonized the region and of the recent immigrants who settled there 
after 1950s.   
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Chapter Three  
From Ādivāsi to Sukumbāsi: Losing Ground in Nepal’s Tarai 
 
‘We Dhimal are bhumiputra (sons of the soil) ādivāsi but now 
sukumbāsi (landless squatters), why?’ 
  -- A popular Dhimal political slogan 
  
A Ruptured Sense of Place 
!
Mr. Jharilal, a fifty-five year old Dhimal farmer from the upper Kharkhare village of Damak 
municipality, was plowing the field by the side of his home when I arrived there on the morning 
of January 9, 2008.  One of my Dhimal friends had suggested that I could learn more about 
Dhimal history from Jharilal warang.  Warang is a Dhimal kinship term for senior men; it is also 
used as an honorific term.  So on that day, I drove my scooter along a sandy and dusty trail, 
passing north of the Campus Road, about a mile east of the Himalayan Tea Estate garden on the 
East-West Highway.  On my way, even with a cursory observation of houses and peoples in the 
fields, roadsides and teashops, I sensed that the village, which I had anticipated to be a 
homogenous Dhimal village, had more hill caste groups than Dhimal.   
 When I reached Jharilal warang’s small, two-story house, I saw his wife weaving the 
traditional garment of Dhimali women, the Bohna, on a wooden loom erected on the floor in the 
left corner of the verandah.  I greeted her, introduced myself and explained the purpose of my 
visit.  I will call her Boi after the Dhimali kinship term for mother’s elder sister which people 
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commonly use as a respectful term for senior women.  When I greeted her, Boi stopped her 
weaving and got up from her loom to offer me a chair.  Having already interrupted her work, I 
did not want to disturb her husband who I learned was tilling the soil for wheat.  So Boi and I 
began to converse, talking about common things like families and what we do for a living.   
At one point, as she was feeding fodder to her goats, I asked Boi: “Do only Dhimal live in 
this village?” To this she promptly responded, “Not any more.”  Looking around the landscape 
with a wide gaze, she paused for a moment and said:  
Yes, in the past it used to be only a Dhimali village.  My grandfather, his grandfather, and his 
grandfathers lived here.  Even when I was growing up, only we (Dhimal) were here; others 
had not come.  And then the Chhetri-Bahuns came; others came down from the hills and 
settled nearby.53  Then they moved in and, slowly, we, Dhimal moved out.   
 
Pointing towards a small but crowded settlement located further toward the southeast border of 
the village alongside a dried stream, she asked me:  
Do you see that thick basti (Nep.  settlement) down there? You see the smaller houses with 
thatched roofs by the khahare (dried stream)? That’s Sukumbāsi tol (Nep.  settlement of 
landless “squatters”); many of them are Dhimal who once lived here and owned land.54  Now, 
they are either rickshaw-pullers in Damak, or they do work as wage majduri (labor work) to 
live.   
 
I only nodded.  Looking at my face, she said in an elevated tone Nepali:  
There are more Chhetri-Bahuns in the village, and they are also the prime minister and 
ministers in Kathmandu.  Now this place has become so different.  Hamro Jātiko itihas harai 
sakyo (Nep.  our ethnic history has already been lost) (Field note; January 9, 2008). 
 
 My first encounter with Boi provides a grounded instance of the ways in which land 
emerges as a central trope in Dhimal’s sense of who they are, and what has happened and 
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53!Bahuns, with a population about 12.9% of the total population [23.1 million] of Nepal in 2001, and Chhetri, with 
a population about 16.1 % of the total population in 2001(CBS, 2001), are the two dominant social groups belonging 
to the Hill “High Caste” groups in Nepal There are more than 100 caste and ethnic groups (non Hindu groups) with 
linguistic, religious and regional variations but the three groups: Chhetri, Bahun, and Newars (an indigenous group 
from Kathmandu valley with 5.6% of Nepal’s total population), together have controlled 85% of the total 
governmental, judicial and parliamentary positions since the last two and half century in Nepal (see Lawoti, 2005).   
 
54!Sukumbāsi literally means “landless dwellers” often occupying public lands.!
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continues to happen them as Dhimal.  Boi poignantly narrated a fraction of her lived history in 
which she had experienced how her ancestral place had changed over time.   
 As the above conversational excerpts clearly show, Boi’s “senses of place” (Basso, 1996) 
vividly alludes to her ruptured sense of belonging: the irony of her people becoming squatters on 
their own ancestral land, the disappearing jāti itihas (Nep.  ethno history) and Dhimal state of 
marginality both in the village and in Kathmandu, the capital city.  She reminded me that 
peoples’ senses of place not only index their emotional, bodily, socio-religious and historical 
relationships with their landscapes (Basso, 1996) but they also use it to convey “their sense of 
marginality and experience of unequal power relations” (Thomas, 2002: 369; Kirsch, 2006; 
Myers, 2002).  The ways in which Boi narrated her experiences by weaving together the three 
social geographies  -- her village, the “squatters’ settlements” of her landless kin members, and 
the capital city, the center of Nepal’s state power controlled by the same social groups as of her 
neighbors -- into a socio-spatial relation of dominance and marginality is very insightful.  She 
succinctly pointed out to me the key historical events which can function as signposts for 
temporalizing her experiences of changes in and around the village: the coming of other peoples 
to the village and Dhimal emigrating out of her village, her kin members becoming sukumbāsi 
who now live at the periphery of their ancestral village, and the political dominations of the hill 
“high” caste groups in governance.  Her telling resonates with many of the experiential 
narratives that I have heard from other Dhimal of her generation (age between fifty and seventy). 
 For example, once I walked along the East-West Highway with Raj Dada (Dh.  big 
brother) nearby his home in Damak Municipality.  In his early fifties, Dada is one of the most 
respected Dhimal leaders affiliated with the Dhimal Jāti Bikas Kendra, the national indigenous 
organization of Dhimal.  As we walked, Dada showed me many patches of barren farmlands 
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along the sides of the highway.  He could recall names of all those Dhimal who had sold these 
lands and the stories behind why they had to sell their lands.  He also knew about the later 
transactions of these lands to different peoples.  There was a big parcel of land by the other side 
of the road across from Dada’s home.  He told me that the original Dhimal owner of the land had 
left the village when his three children died of cholera (before the 1950s).  Later a Newar family 
bribed the land revenue officer to get this land registered under their names.  The Newar family 
was given the land entitlement based on the (false) claim that they had acquired the land by 
clearing a forested area.  Until the early 1920s, anyone could settle in the Tarai by reclaiming 
what the state considered “waste land” as long as they could pay the land tax to the state.   
 Dada made me realize that embedded in the barren lands that surrounded me were many 
such stories of dispossession and displacement.  And he could literally read the histories of these 
lands - histories of migration and land transactions from Dhimal to others.  As we reached his tol 
(Nep.  settlement unit), we stopped at a local teashop and ordered tea.  While we waited, Dada 
recalled:  
This whole area used to be a thick jungle when I was little.  Elephant, tiger, deer and other 
wild animals used to roam nearby our village.  Then this place was called Charakpada.  
Charakpada is the Dhimali name of a fish that used to be found in the local river.  Many 
months a year, we used to catch and eat fish here (smile).  Now it’s gone.  Maybe around 
1960s, few pahade (people of hill origin) came down to our area.  Other groups- Bahuns and 
Chhettri and then some Newar families came.  This Himalayan tea garden, I think, was 
established in the mid-1960s.  Then many other pahade people: Rai, Limbus, Magar, and 
Tamang came and settled here.  One pahade opened a teashop here at this junction.  We did 
not used to drink tea, then.  Workers in the tea estate used to come here and drink tea.  More 
people came.  Eventually, the forest was gone; the river dried.  Now you see only a small 
stream in that river.  When the highway was built, more hill peoples came.  After 
that…(paused) this place was named Chiya pasal (Nep.  teashop).  Now the name of this tol 
has become Chiya pasal (laughter); even many Dhimal do not know its original name (Field 
notes; taped interview, December 21, 2009). 
 
As I remembered from my previous meeting with him, Dada had a cheerful face that 
always glowed whenever he smiled and laughed.  As he narrated this story, his face brightened 
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up when he spoke of his childhood memories.  But when he laughed at the name Chiya pasal, 
this glow in his face disappeared.  His voice was low when he said, “even many Dhimal do not 
know its original name.” The silence that followed this statement was broken by the odd sipping 
sound we made while drinking the hot tea.  But Dada’s silence, augmented by his low voice and 
the seriousness in his face, powerfully conveyed the deep sense of loss Dada had felt on the 
disappearance of the original name of his village.   
 The anthropologist Stuart Kirsch reminds us that for indigenous people, “who frequently 
have special ties to their lands and place, the theme of loss has echoes throughout the 
indigenous world, often in association with damages to and/or displacement from their land” 
(Kirsch, 2001: 167).”  Both Boi and Dada expressed their profound sense of loss and marginality 
while talking about their villages and their experiences of social changes.  Boi emphasized the 
loss of Dhimal’ ethnic history in referent to Dhimal’s landlessness, and Dada, as a way of 
chitchat, hinted to me that the transformation of his village name from Charakpada to 
Chisapasal underlines a deep history of Dhimal’s alienation from their ancestral homeland.  
Scholars have shown that place-names are not only toponymic markers that people and the state 
imprint on the territory, they also signify the relationships of power that allow or erase the use of 
certain names as the place-names (Murray, 2002).   
 Dada’s village was renamed when its forested areas became private property of Nepal’s 
royal family who then transformed the land into a tea estate for profit making (capitalist 
production) in the early 1960s.  The present-day name Chisapasal suggests that the place became 
a village only recently (circa1960s) when “tea drinking” people settled there after the opening up 
of the tea garden.  Hence the name masks the long history of how Dhimal ancestral territories 
became the private property of the royal family, the epitome of Nepal’s traditional dominant 
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groups, in conjunction with state-led colonization of the Tarai during the 19th and early 20th 
centuries whereby these ruling groups, because of their control of political power, accumulated 
large tracks of the Tarai land.   
 In other words, the imposition of a new village name and the subsequent forgetting of its 
original name by its original inhabitants reveal a deep history of Dhimal’s marginalization and 
dispossession from their ancestral territories.  Boi’s statement- “Hamro Jātiko itihas harai sakyo 
(Nep. “our ethnic history has already been lost”) indicates that changes in land ownership and the 
renaming of their villages have had the severe effects of disembodying Dhimal’s history of 
belonging and dispossessions from their ancestral land.  Yet for Dhimal of Dada and Boi’s 
generation, their historical wisdom firmly “sits on land” (Basso, 1996) – land is inseparable from 
their knowledge of their lived jāti itihas (ethnic history).  And by retelling their stories of lands 
and sense of emplacement, Boi and Dada, as historical agentive actors, also used land as a way 
of talking about what being ādivāsi entails for Dhimal when they have become sukumbāsi in 
their own ancestral place.   
In this chapter I examine Dhimal experiences of the landlord state to understand why the 
issues of land and landlessness have become so important for them.  In order to illustrate the 
focus of this chapter, a brief sketch of the ethno-historical contexts of Dhimal becomes necessary 
here.   
 
Ādivāsi and the Collective Experience of ‘Losing Ground’ 
!
Dhimal were living in the easternmost lowlands or the Tarai long before the rise of the 
present day Nepali state.  Until the early twentieth century, most of the plains of Morang and 
Jhapa districts (see Map 1) were thinly populated and thickly forested. 
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 The Tarai of Morang was considered to be “extremely swampy with its pestilent 
climate…the most malarious and unhealthy district” (Oldfield, 1881: 61-622) till the early 
twentieth century.  The Nepali state and its rulers had tried continuously to bring people from the 
hills and across India to the Tarai so that they could reclaim what the state viewed as waste 
lands, expand agricultural productivity, and thus increase the revenue for the state (and its 
rulers).  The state-formation processes that began at the end of the 18th century, the rise of the 
landlord state and its extractive policies in particular, which I have discussed in the previous 
chapter, had adversely affected the subsistence economy of the hill people.  The growth of 
population, scarcity of agricultural land, and the oppressive regimes of taxation had compelled 
large numbers of people from the hills to migrate, seasonally and permanently, to the 
neighboring districts of India for wage labor in, for example, the Tea plantations or other 
agricultural work.55  Despite government incentives and the abundance of agricultural lands in 
the Tarai, hill people were reluctant to settle there.  The prevalence of malaria, the perceived 
belief that the Tarai’s hāvāpāni (Nep. literally, air and water) was bad for the hill people, and the 
oppressive-extractive nature of the state’s tax regime discouraged settlement in the plains 
(Regmi, 1971).56 
However, after malaria eradication (control) in the early 1950s, the attitude of hill peoples 
toward settling in the Tarai completely changed.  The abundance of land, the increasing growth 
of industrialization in Nepal’s plain regions and across the border in India, and the prospects of 
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55!Of course, this historical shift was more complex.  The severe marginalizing impacts of the state led extractive 
policies were further aggravated by the progressive incorporation of Nepal’s economy in the world capitalist system 
which weakened the indigenous productive economy and its relations of productions (Blakie and et al.1980; Mishra, 
1987).  For an ethnographic account of the land scarcity and migration in the Himalayan region of Nepal, see Fricke 
(1984). 
 
56!This is akin to the geographical deterministic view that one’s biological and cultural self is conditioned and best 
suited to his/her native ecological niche or geography.  See Burghart (1984) for a historical analysis of this concept.!
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jobs and commercialization of agriculture made the Tarai the most attractive destination for 
those people from the hills and the migrants who returned from India seeking land.  The place 
once popularly perceived as Kala bajnar became the new economic frontier of Nepal. 
Implementation of the state-led land reform of 1964 and settlement projects in the 1960s-
70s, as well as the construction of the East-West highway (early 1970s), and the resulting 
infrastructural expansion of roads, schools, markets, electricity, industries, hospitals, and so on, 
brought more and more people into the Tarai.  For example, the population of Morang and Jhapa 
districts grew by 46 percent, 77 percent, and 88 percent during 1920 to1952/54, 1952/54 to 1971, 
and 1971 to 1981 respectively (CBS, 19952/54, Table2; CBS, 1977, Table 1; CBS, 1987, Table 
1).  At the same time forest coverage in Morang, Jhapa and Sunsari -- the three present-day 
districts comprising Morang district until the 1950s  -- decreased by 45 percent from 1927 to 
1977 (Gurung, 1984: 85), while the rate of forest depletion accelerated to 55.6 percent between 
1954 to1972 (Gurung, 1999 [1983]: 23).  All of this indicates the indiscriminate clearing of 
forests in Dhimal ancestral territories.   
This “frontier settlement” (Shrestha, 1989) in the Tarai progressively dispossessed Dhimal 
from their ancestral territories and marginalized them politically, culturally and economically.57   
Earlier studies show that the problem of landlessness had hit hard in Dhimal communities by the 
early 1970s (Dahal, 1979; Regmi, R, 1985).! Frederick Gaige (1975), in his pioneering study of 
the marginalization of Nepal’s Tarai people, succinctly and empathetically describes the impact 
of frontier settlements on the Tarai ‘tribal’ (indigenous communities) peoples.  He observes:  
Until recently, the tribal people have been able to find isolation from the subcontinent’s more 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
57!Both from the state’s perspective as well as that of the migrants moving in, the Tarai was a frontier -- in terms of 
its location as a “border” as well as a “place for abundant opportunity for settlers” (Turner, 1920: 38 cited by 
Shrestha, 1989: 370), the most important being the acquisition of land, “an overriding goal of the frontier settlers’ in 
Nepal’s Tarai” (by Shrestha, 1989: 370). 
!
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advanced economic society in the forests of the tarai and other geographical peripheral 
regions.  The surge of population into the peripheral regions and the clearing of forests to 
provide additional farmland have confronted the tribal people with the need to adjust to a new 
and essentially hostile society.  Relegated as they are to the lowest rungs of the caste ladder, 
without the experience needed to compete for scarce economic resources, they have generally 
found the adjustment process confusing and painful.  Indeed, in many cases, it has been a 
struggle for survival (Gaige, 1975: 20, emphasis added) 
 
I argue that the ādivāsi “struggle for survival” that Gaige (1975: 20) so thoughtfully 
emphasizes should not be understood only in the sense of struggle for physical survival or only 
for their livelihood.  It also needs to be understood as ādivāsi struggle for the continued creation 
and recreation of their collectivity as distinct cultural community (Turner, 1988).  For Dhimal 
and other Tarai ādivāsi, their experiences of the Nepali state in the last two centuries have been 
about “losing ground”!(McDonaugh, 1997:280), which involves the collective loss of their land, 
culture, and their traditional hold on local political and administrative power.  Hence, when 
Dhimal ask themselves and others, “We Dhimal are ādivāsi, but now sukumbāsi, why?” they 
advance ‘land’ as a political language to which Dhimal whatever their differences of class, 
gender, location, or generational and party affiliations feel universally connected.  Stories of land 
powerfully concretize their shared history of belonging and dispossession in their ancestral 
territories.58  The collective experience of ‘losing ground’ is central to Dhimal political 
mobilization as an indigenous people.59  
In the preceding chapter, I discussed how the rise of the landlord state and its extractive 
policies led to the colonization of the Tarai for land, labor and political control.  Drawing on the 
recollections of the Tarai’s past narrated to me by the generation of people like Boi and Dada, I 
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58!According to one report (UNDP, 2004), 24.5 % of the total households in Nepal are landless and 7% of 
households are semi-landless (owning less than 0.2 acres).  Disadvantaged indigenous groups are differentially 
characterized by landless and semi-landless status.  Almost 45% of Dhimal households are landless, and 6% are 
semi-landless; only 3% of Dhimal households are large cultivators (cited by Adhikari, 2008, table 2.8; p: 44). 
!
59!Dispossession from their ancestral land and territories is a globally shared indigenous experience, and thus this 
shared experience has become a key force for global indigenous political mobilization (see Castree, 2003).  For the 
relationship between land and indigenous political mobilization in Nepal, see (Caplan, 1970; Guneratne, 2002). 
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will discuss how Dhimal experiences of losing ground have shaped their understanding of their 
past, and their sense of ethnic identity vis-à-vis other social groups, particularly the dominant 
social groups, the hill “high caste” Hindus.  The transformation of the Tarai into a state space of 
extraction is pivotal in understanding Dhimal’s experience of losing ground.   
As I described earlier, Nepali rulers saw the Tarai as a rich region abundant in exploitable 
resources vital to consolidating their political power and dominance.  But they also considered it 
‘waste land’ because the majority of it had remained barren or uncultivated due to the shortage of 
labor resulting from the malarial environment and the oppressive tax regimes.  Yet the Tarai 
ādivāsi such as Tharu, Dhimal, Meche, Koch, and others had thrived within the fringes of these 
malarial forests.  The very lands outsiders called a ‘deadly place’ were their homes and they 
inscribed this territory with their own histories.  Because they lived in these malarial forests, 
their relationship and reliance on the land was radically different from the ways in which the 
rulers related to it as state property rentable to the subjects with certain obligations.  I argue that 
these differential understandings of Tarai land and its uses by its aboriginal inhabitants are 
central analytics for examining the disjunction between two moral economies, one imposed by 
the state and the other practiced by these ādivāsi communities.  The disjuncture led to the 
dispossession of marginalized indigenous communities from their ancestral lands.  In this 
chapter, I will foreground Dhimal perspectives to discuss how they understand Tarai histories by 
interpreting their experiences of and encounters with the landlord state in the past.  I will focus 
on why malaria is central to Dhimal analysis of their past relationship with the Tarai and their 
use of the notion of “jungali life” (life in wilderness) in order to underline the political ecology 
of their belonging in the Tarai as well as their political choice for evading the predatory state.  In 
particular, I will focus on how the interplay between the malarial ecology of the Tarai, Dhimal 
! 93!
differential notions of land, and their collective efforts of evading the landlord state inform 
Dhimal analysis of their present-day landlessness.   
 
Malaria, Jungali Life and Dhimal Ancestral Past 
!
 In this section, I discuss how the malarial past of the Tarai shapes Dhimal understanding 
of their belonging in the Tarai, and how it informs their diachronic views on the changing 
relationship with the Nepali state.  More specifically, I focus on the notion of jungali life (life in 
wilderness) that many Dhimal use to specify the temporal emplacement of their ancestors in the 
Tarai as well as to describe their mode of livelihood in the past.   
 In the popular imagination of Tarai history, malaria is the defining image of the region 
(Guneratne 2002: 22).  Until the early 1950s, the prevalence of malaria was believed to be deadly 
and life-threatening in the Tarai.  Nepal’s hill people still refer to the Tarai as “aul” after “aulo”- 
the Nepali word for malaria.  Prior to the 1950s, because of the life-threatening prevalence of 
malaria, the lowlands of current districts of Morang and Jhapa were perceived as “Kala Pani” 
(Nep.  black-water) -- “dangerous places” where hill people would definitely die if they were to 
stay long.  But indigenous groups like Dhimal, Tharus, Meche, Koch, Danuwar and others 
survived and continued to dwell in the Tarai when outsiders feared the place.   
For the state and its landowning elites, the malarial environment of the Tarai posed a major 
challenge that hindered their ability to exploit the region’s potential resources.  To some extent, 
malaria helped Tarai ādivāsi to protect their territories and customary ways of life from outside 
interventions.  In other words, for Dhimal and other Tarai ādivāsi, the malarial environment 
provided them relative political autonomy and a way of avoiding the Nepali state’s oppressive 
tax regime during the early period of regional colonization (the 19th century).  Hence, before the 
! 94!
disease of the marshy land was conquered, malaria -- both as an endemic condition and also as 
an image -- mediated the relationship among Dhimal, outsiders, and the Nepali state.60  
 There is no available record that can help us to understand the nature and intensity of 
malaria in Nepal prior to the early 20th century.  But malaria was not confined to Nepal during 
that period, and it was equally a major public health issue for the colonial administrators of then 
British India.61  The colonial administrative records (circa 19th and 20th centuries) on public 
health conditions in the British colonies bordering on Nepal’s eastern Tarai can shed light on the 
intensity and occurrence of malaria and its impact in the region during that period.  For example, 
the Bengal District Gazetteers (1905) describes the Tarai region of Darjeeling areas (bordering 
the Nepal’s eastern Tarai) as “a low malarious belt striking the base of the Himalayas,” and “the 
Terai is a tract of reeking moisture and rank vegetation that Nature has marked out as a home of 
fever” (p: 1).62  Citing the Nepali migrants who worked in the tea plantation in the region, the 
Gazetteers (1905: 1) write: “It is indeed common saying among the Nepalese in these parts that 
any child born to them will not reach the age of two years; and the infant mortality is very great, 
being over 38 percent, in 1905, for the whole.”63  The prevalence of malaria in the Tarai regions 
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60!Of course, with the aid of the western science technology, and money; the support from the government of the 
United State was instrumental in “malaria eradication” in Nepal (see Isaacson et al. 2001). 
 
61!Though few studies have focused on the social history of malaria in Nepal, there is a rich scholarship on the 
history of malaria in the Indian subcontinent, particularly in the Tarai region.  Scholars have approached the history 
of ‘malaria’ in India to critically examine various aspects of the British colonial rule such as the production of 
colonial biomedical knowledge, the relationship between race and science, empire and colonial economy, and so on  
(see Kar, 2003; Arnold, 2006; Bhattacharya, 2011). 
62!The Bengal Gazetteers are part of the provisional gazetteers of the British Indian Empire that, akin to an 
encyclopedia, provides general information on physical, history, economy, public health, demography and other 
aspects of social and cultural life of a colony state.  The imperial gazetteer was first published in 1881(http:!
//dsal.uchicago.edu/reference/gazetteer/pager.html?objectid=DS405.1.I34_V01_004.gif, accessed January 2, 
2013). 
!
63!In 1891, it was estimated that 40 per cent of the workers in the labor force in the Dooras (the Tarai) region, 
especially in the northern-western fringes of Bengal district bordering Darjeeling districts were Nepalis.  These were 
the regions where malaria was the number one killer (Ray, 2002: 89).  The presence of the Nepali immigrant 
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of India, which border Dhimal ancestral territories (Morang and Jhapa) were “hyper-endemic of 
malaria” during the early 20th century.  Similarly, the Bengal District Gazetteers on Darjeeling 
(1947) report that “…in the Terai malaria is hyper-endemic (90 per cent), and in the hill valleys 
(specially the Tista valley) the rate is below 20 per cent” (Dash, 1947: 7).  Drawing from these 
colonial records of neighboring regions in India, we can infer that the prevalence of malaria must 
have been endemic in Nepal’s easternmost Tarai as well during the 19th and the early 20th 
centuries, the historical period that concerns this chapter.  According to the United States Agency 
for International Development’s (USAID) recent memoir (2001), Half-a-Century of 
Development: A History of US Assistance to Nepal: 1951-2001):  
In the early 1950s, malaria was Nepal’s most serious health problem afflicting roughly 25 
percent of the total population.  Cases numbered over two millions per year, with a 10 percent 
mortality rate that took an especially high toll among young children….  Endemic malaria 
threatened the roughly 50 percentage of Nepal’s population living below 1,300 meters 
altitude” (Isaacson et.al, 2001: 45).   
 
 According to this USAID report, malaria was a serious threat to people’s survival in the 
Tarai until the late 1950s.  Hence the popular imagination of the pre-1950 Tarai as Kala Pani 
may have been derived from the region’s history as a malarial environment.  But I argue that this 
popular image of the Tarai acts against the region, its people and their history.  As I have 
discussed earlier, this image of  “deadly place” reiterates the dominant geographical imagination 
marginalizing the Tarai as merely, until recently, a swampy, malaria-ridden, unhealthy, and wild 
place without history and civilization.  Its corollary implication is that only “inferior” people 
could have lived in such “uncivilized” places.  That both Nepal’s dominant groups and British 
colonial scholars often discriminately referred to the Tarai ādivāsi as “primitive” and “wild 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
workers in these malarial regions of India shows that the malarial environment of Nepal’s Tarai was not the sole 
reason discouraging hill people from settling in Nepal’s own Tarai.  The political environment -- that of exploitative 
and oppressive tax regimes in Nepal on the one had, and the prospects of cash-based wage labor in the colonial 
plantations located in the bordering regions of India, on the other hand -- seemed to have motivated Nepali migrants 
to choose the malarial Tarai of India over Nepal’s Tarai. 
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people” (jungali people) bolsters the image of the Tarai as Kala Pani (see Guneratne, 1998; 
Müller-Büker, 1997; Regmi, R.  1986).   
 The travel journal of Major L.A. Waddell (1854-1938), a British surgeon stationed in 
India who travelled extensively in the Himalayan region, echoes the perception that the malarial 
“immune” ādivāsi were like “wild beasts.”64  In the his travelogue, Among the Himalayas 
(1899), Waddell describes the landscape of the Tarai as seen through the window of a small train 
that he rode from Siluguri to Darjeeling (bordering Nepal’s easternmost region):  
We’re soon rattling gaily across that dreaded belt of fever-laden forest --- the Terai, which 
separates the plains from the foot of the hills…. [W]e streamed through some deserted tea-
plantations in clearings in this deadly forest.  For this poisonous environment no labourers can 
be induced to settle.  Each fresh batch of imported coolies soon flees panic struck before the 
“Black-Death” (Kala-anzar), “Black-water Fever” and other malarial pestilences which lurk 
in every brake and lay their avenging hands on every intruder who invades there seeking 
solitude…. Still it is possible to get acclimatized even to such an unhealthy place as this.  The 
few wild aborigines, the Mech and Dhimal, who live in the depths of these forests, and who 
will undertake no hired service, have acquired almost as much immunity from the deadly 
fevers of these forests as the tigers and wild beasts who make this their home (p: 5-6)” 
(emphasis added). 
 
Waddell’s description of the Tarai’s “poisonous environment” helps us to imagine the 
challenges outsiders faced working in the tea plantations located in the Tarai regions of 
Darjeeling.  Waddell was surprised that aboriginal people like Meche and Dhimal could 
acclimatize to the malaria-infested forests.  Nevertheless he used their adaptive ability to suggest 
that these aborigines making the malarial forest their home were “wild beasts” akin to tigers.  I 
should point out here that Waddell’s emphasizing that these “wild aborigines… will undertake 
no hired service” suggests that the indifference Dhimal and other forest dwellers had toward 
wage labor (their refusal, in other words, to become wage labor subjects within the colonial 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
64!Even though Waddell was referring to the aboriginal subjects of British India rather than not Nepal, I find it an 
apt example of the dominant view on the perceived “primitiveness” of such indigenous groups as Dhimal whose 
ancestral territories transcended the national boundaries between Nepal and India. 
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economy) may also have made them appear “wild” (in the sense of not domesticable) in the eyes 
of colonial officers.   
In South Asian contexts, the idea of ‘jungali’ or ‘jangli’ (in Hindi) is widely used to 
describe people mostly belonging to the ‘tribal’ or ādivāsi community who subsist by foraging or 
who live in the fringes of the forest, (Guneratne, 1998, 2001; Fortier, 2012; Shah, 2010).  The 
concept is deployed as a “keyword for prejudice” (Ramos, 1998: 13-59) against ādivāsi in order 
to discriminate against them as “uncivilized,” “primitive” or “backward” in Nepal (see 
Guneratne, 1997) and in the other regions of South Asia (Dove, 1992; Shah, 2010).  For 
example, the Nepali Brihat Sabdhakosh, a national dictionary published by the then Nepal Royal 
Academy (a state institution), defines “janajāti,” the term now used synonymously with ādivāsi, 
as:  
the backward caste groups like Naga, Kusunda, Meche who clear forest and survive by 
scavenging, and who lack behind in education and who are indifferent even to their immediate 
surrounding (of progress) (cited by Bhattachan, 2005: 106). 
 
Hence the official dictionary associates the forest-based foraging practices of some ādivāsi 
communities with their perceived stage of “backwardness” implying that janajāti are the 
equivalent of  “wild people” (Skaria, 1999).  However, in the South Asian context, scholars have 
also shown that categories such as ‘jungali’ and even the meaning of the word ‘jungal’ which 
now denotes ‘forest’ are historically contingent; their meanings and the social use of such 
meanings have changed over the years in dialectical relationship with peoples’ colonization of 
nature, and the changing power relations between people, the state, and the colonial regime 
(Dove, 1992; Skaria, 1997, 1999).  According to the anthropologist Michael Dove, the cognate 
term for the contemporary word ‘jungal’ in classical Sanskrit is ‘jangala’ which means “an open 
arid savanna stage of vegetation” (Dove, 1992: 23).  In ancient India, “most importantly the 
! 98!
jangala was “pure” and the home of Brahmins, where as the non-jangala area was “impure” and 
the refuge into which the Brahmins drove the barbarians (pastoralists)” (Dove, 1992: 234).  
During the succeeding millennia, with the intensification of human colonization of ‘nature’ by 
‘culture,’ the contemporary concept of ‘jungal’ came into social usage but with a meaning 
contrary to the ancient meanings implied by jungala.  The present-day notion of ‘jungal’ is 
associated with “nature” and “barbarism” in opposition to the non-jungal associated with 
“culture” and “civilization” (Dove, 1992: 232).   
Although Dove’s focus is to explicate the dialectical history between nature and culture by 
examining the shifting semantics of the concept of ‘jungala’ to ‘jungle,’ his analysis can be used 
to understand the historical contexts within which the present day association of “jungali people” 
with “uncivilized” and “barbarous” became socially dominant.  Weaving power relations into the 
analysis of such changes of meaning and their popularization adds to Dove’s important historical 
analysis (see Skaria, 1997 and1990 for how the social meanings of ‘jangli’ changed from 
rebellious group to “primitive people” in colonial India).  The case of Dhimal, the ways in which 
they use the notion of jungali life and jungali yug (era of the life in the jungle) to describe their 
ancestral past in the malarial environment of the Tarai challenges the popular association of 
“jungali people” as “primitive.”  As my analysis in the next section shows, the uses by Dhimal of 
these notions brings into relief their own distinct history of belonging, moral economy, and 
political autonomy as they characterize their life in the Tarai before they become tenant subjects 
of the Nepali state. 
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Jungali life: Forest of Belonging 
!
 Many Dhimal, particularly senior community members, use the notion of jungali life to 
refer both to themselves as people and to the place, in specific reference to the historical period 
before and during their encounter with the Nepali state (before and around the early 19th 
century).  At the onset of my analysis here, I emphasize that my use of the Dhimal self-
conception of  “jungali” is not intended to invoke the “return of the primitive” that the 
anthropologist Adam Kuper (2003) so vehemently argued against in his discussion of the 
category of “indigenous peoples.”  As I will discuss in Chapter 5, Dhimal indigenous activists, 
particularly youth activists, claim that in the past Dhimal had their own independent kingdom in 
the Tarai Morang and that they bravely resisted the Gorkhali invasion of their territories.   
There are multiple historical understandings among Dhimal, and which historical 
understandings they choose to advance depends on the narrators and the contexts of their 
storytelling.  In this section, I have chosen to emphasize the narratives by senior Dhimal of their 
ancestral past in relation to the question of how they understand their experience of losing 
ground during the 19th and early 20th centuries.  My analysis of ‘jungali life’ also shows, in 
essence, Dhimal political agency in resisting the landlord state and thus adds to their 
contemporary claim of ancestral resistance to the Gorkhali invasion.  The idea of ‘jungali life’ as 
emphasized by senior Dhimal is a way to relate their conception of Tarai history in terms of its 
malarial environment and is crucial to their understanding of the dialectics of political struggle in 
the region.   
 In the past, control over land was the major regulatory force mediating the relationship 
between Dhimal and the landlord state.  In this regard, I argue that Dhimal notions of ‘jungali 
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life’ help us to understand Dhimal explanations of why their ancestors appeared indifferent to the 
state project of clearing the Tarai forests and reclaiming land for tenants.  Dhimal use their self-
conception of ‘jungali life’ to emphasize how their ethics of egalitarianism and reciprocity 
structured their use of land, forest, and other resources on which they relied for their continuity, 
both as individuals and as a collective people.  They deploy the concept of jungali life and 
malarial environment to advance their historical understanding of the geopolitics of the Tarai as 
well as to reassert their history as the ādivāsi of the region.   
 “In the past, these whole areas were covered with jungle.  Our ancestors used to wrestle 
with wild animals; they survived the diseases of aulo (Nep. malaria) and haija (Nep. cholera).”  
All senior Dhimal whom I interviewed repeatedly used these words when they spoke about how 
their ancestors lived in the Tarai.  In their retellings of the past, they invariably mentioned the 
threats of wild animals, malaria and cholera to emphasize the everyday challenges their 
ancestors encountered when they transformed the dense forested Tarai into their dwelling places.  
Dhimal believe that the power of their deities and Dhami, the priest, protected their ancestors in 
such a harsh environment.  I should emphasize here that Dhimal religious worldviews and ritual 
practices are shaped by their historical experience of the challenges of living in the Tarai.  A 
fundamental aspect of Dhimal ritual is the recognition of all the agents and material objects that 
contribute to their sustenance and well-being throughout the year.  Forests, rivers, soils, wild 
animals, and other beings in “nature” are reckoned and honored during their rituals.  Dhimal 
explain that their ancestors began these ritual practices in order to survive malaria, wild animals, 
and other possible threats when they were living a jungali life (see Chapter 6).   
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 Similarly, Dhimal also claim that their daily intake of Chiraito (Swertia chirayita), an 
herbal plant that they mix in all of their food, helped them resist malarial affliction in the past.65  
They also assert that their food habits such as drinking beer (Dh.  gora) brewed from herbs like 
haŕoo (Terminalia chebula) and baŕoo (Terminalia belerica) and their special consumption of 
“gohoro ko masu” (meat of goroho, a species of Yellow Monitor lizard, Varanus flavescens ) 
helped them to “kill” the malaria inside their bodies.  Regarding the curative and preventive 
property of the Goroho’s meat, one Dhimal told me: “Gohoro eat snake, scorpion, deadly wild 
ants, and other poisonous insects.  It can digest all kinds of poison.  So its meat will help us kill 
the bugs of malaria in our body.”  So Dhimal credit the power of their ritual mediated by their 
priest and their traditional food habits for developing their bodily resistance against malaria.   
 I should emphasize here that the Dhimal collective belief that their ancestors survived 
and stamped these malarial forests with their culture and history has profoundly shaped their 
sense that they are the original inhabitants (ādivāsi) in the Tarai.  I argue that their culturally 
mediated capacity to adapt and survive in the malarial ecology of the Tarai informs their sense of 
‘relative autonomy’ from state intervention in the past.  Recall that after the eradication of 
malaria in the early 1950s, the pace of losing ground to outsiders accelerated rapidly with the 
unprecedented influx of land hungry settlers from outside.  Dhimal often refer to the end of the 
Tarai’s malarial environment as the catalyst that propelled their political-economic and cultural 
marginalization.  “It was not just the eradication of malaria.  It almost eradicated us: Dhimal Jāti 
and our culture,” the chairperson of Dhimal Jāti Bikas Kendra remarked at a village level 
meeting that I attended in 2008.  Hence the Dhimal notion of jungali life, I propose, is an 
important analytical category that needs to be examined by privileging Dhimal’s analysis of their 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
65 Chiraito is widely used by people as an anti-malarial and anti-fever herb across Nepal. 
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own lived history as understood through their present-day collective experience and the present-
day struggle of reproducing themselves as Dhimal.   
 
Differential Understanding Of Land 
!
 The Tarai of Morang was considered to be extremely swampy and the most malarious 
and unhealthy district (Oldfield, 1881: 61-622) until the early twentieth century.  In the past, 
Dhimal lived in the fringes of the dense forests along the foothills of the Siwalik Hills.  Dhimal’s 
recollections as well as the earliest scholarly account of them by Brian Hodgson (1847) tell us 
that Dhimal lived more of a semi-“nomadic” life following an ecological niche that availed them 
plentiful resources: fish, wild animal and plants to survive without much competition with other 
human beings.66  They relied more on gathering, fishing, hunting, periodic cultivation, and barter 
of grains, herbs, wool, cotton, and other items with people from the hills and across the Indian 
border.  In our discussions of their mode of livelihood in the past, senior Dhimal stressed to me 
that the threat of wild animals and the destruction of crops by wild animals made farming less 
practical in the past.  Babai, a sixty-two year old Dhimal, whom I will introduce in more detail in 
Chapter 4, and who can be aptly called an ‘indigenous historian’ for the depth of his knowledge 
and storytelling skills about Dhimal ancestral history, helped me understand how Dhimal 
ancestors adapted to the ecology of the Tarai.  Babai told me in 2009:  
 First, earlier Dhimal were not much of a farming people.  They lived a jungali jiwan (jungali 
life).  They could not rely on crops that they used to grow.  Wild animals would eat most of it; 
whatever would have been left after its damage by the animals would not be sufficient.  The 
yield was never high.  Unlike today, farming could not sustain our lives.  My grandfather used 
to tell us that our ancestors used to carry dried seeds of jayā in a container made out of the dried 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
66!Ramos (1998: 33-40) argues that “nomad” is one the key words of prejudice against indigenous peoples.  With a 
different analytical focus, James Scott (2009: 1-39) argues that “nomadic” people were “non-state people” in the 
sense they could enact the “art of not being governed” by moving into non-state spaces where the centralizing force 
of the state was less penetrative.   
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squash.  They used to plant these seeds in some areas in the forests, and after some months, they 
would collect them.  In Dhimali, it used to be called Jayā Kherakā; jayā means Kaguni (Nep. a 
species of wild millet), kherakā means ‘to plant by clearing the bushes’.  Wild animals don’t 
like jayā; they don’t eat the crop.  So people could freely plant these crops without much effort.  
Back then, fishing, hunting and wild fruits must have been our major sources of food (Interview 
transcript; January 9, 2009). 
  
 As becomes evident in this interview excerpt, Babai used the notion of jungali life to 
emphasize that Dhimal ancestors relied less on farming (i.e. on land) as their primary means of 
livelihood.  The threat of wild animals figures prominently in Dhimal narratives (also in their 
village rituals, see chapter 5) about the challenges their parents and grandparents faced while 
living in the fringes of the Tarai forests.  More than malaria, I discovered that, albeit 
unexpectedly, senior Dhimal such as Babai recalled that it was the outbreaks of Haijā or cholera 
that affected people most severely in the past, often wiping out entire villages when it struck.67  
In the event of the spread of cholera and the resulting deaths of the people, I am told, Dhimal 
would abandon their villages and move to a new place in order to avoid contamination.  They 
explained to me that since people were forced to move from one place to another due to the 
outbreaks of haija and threats of wild animals, their ancestors continued to live a semi-nomadic 
life until the recent past.   
 Since resources were plentiful, Dhimal ancestors lived in semi-permanent settlements, 
moving from place to place within a closed ecological niche.  Farming along and inside the 
forested areas was undesirable and less attractive; more than the people, the other cohabitants of 
the forests, the wild animals, would consume all their crops.  Thus Dhimal ancestors subsisted by 
foraging, hunting, fishing, periodic farming, and engaging in exchange relationships with the 
neighboring hill groups.  At that time, the Dhimal sense of territorial belonging was not strongly 
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67!I was unable to collect additional information on how Dhimal remembered the epidemics of haija and its social 
history.  Some oavailable sources show endemic cholera in Kathmandu and elsewhere including Morang district 
(Gimlette, 1885; Abou-Gareeb, 1961).   
! 104!
based on cultivation of crops.  They derived their sense of territorial belonging more from the 
components of their ecological niche -- earth/soil, forests, rivers, animals, sacred places, and 
others.   
In the past, when they were living a jungali life, Dhimal did not think of land as something 
that could be owned.  Later I will show how their different ideas about land made Dhimal 
indifferent to the state-led project of reclaiming land in the Tarai.  In the first scholarly account 
of Dhimal (in India), published in 1847 by Brian Hodgson (1880 [1847]), they are described as 
“erratic cultivators of the wild (p: 117).”68  Hodgson further notes that Dhimal are “migratory 
cultivators of a soil in which they claim no proprietary or possessory ownership, but which they 
are allowed to till upon the easy terms of quit-rent and labor tax, because no others will or can 
enter the malaria guarded unit (p: 119, emphasis added).”  Hodgson mentions that at that time 
Dhimal possessed no word for “plough,” and “agriculture” was described by the term “felling” 
or “clearing the forest” (p: 103).  Hodgson’s discussions indicate that Dhimal, during the mid-
19th century, had no conception of land as a proprietary possession.   
 
Land: Bhonai And Meeling 
!
 Dhimal use two different terms, bhonai and meeling, to refer to land.  Though these 
words can be used interchangeably in everyday usage, meeling is more strictly used to refer to 
land in the sense of its proprietorial possession and ownership, and bhonai is used in a broader 
sense that encompasses the notion of soil or earth.  Dhimal use the Nepali word for land “jagga” 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
68  Brian H.  Hodgson was a prolific scholar and civil servant of British Empire based in Kathmandu and Darjeeling 
during the 19th century (1820-1858).  He has written on a wide range of topics on the Himalayan peoples.  Hodgson 
is considered as a pioneering ethnologist in the origin of  ‘Himalayan Studies’ (see Walterhouse, 2004).  Hodgson’s 
observation was based on the Dhimal who were living in the Indian plains across Nepal’s Mechi river.  This region, 
unlike Nepal’s Tarai, was more integrated into the colonial market economy by the early 19th century.   
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to designate a meaning equivalent to meeling.69  The word “jagga” is used specifically to denote 
personal property and ownership of a piece of land.  On the other hand, the Dhimal notion of 
bhonai hews closely to the Nepali/Sanskrit concept of bhumi (earth/soil) and the indigenous 
articulation of land as inalienable wealth (see, for example, Castree, 2004; Caplan, 1970).  As 
examples of the ritual use of bhonai as a symbol of purity, the protective power of the altar made 
of bhonai used for the most powerful household deity (Dh. Sa Di Berang, a female deity), and 
the offering of bhonai to the deceased during the funeral ritual suggest that bhonai invokes an 
elemental aspect of life for Dhimal.  “Māto le baneko jivan tyai māto mai jāous (life made of soil 
should go back to the very soil).  That’s why we offer soil to the dead ones before they are taken 
to the forest for burial,” many Dhimal explained to me regarding their practice of bhonai pilikā 
(Dhi: giving soil) during their funeral ritual.70  I suggest that bhonai helps to mediate Dhimal’s 
relationship with their deities and spiritual forces.   
  The concept of bhonai as an embedded relationship among humans, deities, and soil 
suggests that Dhimal in the past did not consider land as a commodity or a property to be owned 
by an individual.  Therefore when Dhimal characterize their ancestral past as jungali life, they 
emphasize that they did not rely on cultivation for subsistence, and as such their relationship to 
the land was mediated through their notion of ‘bhonai’ rather than ‘meeling’.  In contrast, the 
state was encroaching on the Tarai with the sole purpose of transforming the land into ‘meeling.’  
And given the oppressive and extractive nature of state interventions, Dhimal preferred to 
maintain their jungali ways of life as a political choice (Scott, 2009) in order to maintain their 
control over both their ways of life and, arguably, their territories.  I will illustrate my argument 
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69!In their everyday conversation, Dhimal use meeling to refer to their possession or lack of land (jaggā).  For 
example, they say, “E Chakari samma kelai ko meeling manthu” [I don’t own land of even the size of a small piece 
of flat straw mattress.” 
!
70!I did not observe any funeral ritual of Dhimal during my fieldwork period. 
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with a story that I was told by a prominent and politically active Dhimal indigenous leader (fifty-
eight years old) at the end of a long interview that I had with him in 2008. 
 
At one time, during the Rana rule one high-ranking Rana official, or maybe he was the Prime 
Minister, had come to our area for supervision.  The next afternoon, he set out in the forest for 
hunting. Military personnel and a local guide accompanied him into the forest.  While 
roaming in the forest, he saw a weird creature on top of a high tree.  Holding a branch of that 
tree with its hands, that creature had tightly wrapped the tree with his feet.  Only its backside 
(buttocks) was seen from the ground.  The Rana man became curious; then he aimed his gun 
at this creature.  Suddenly his local guard requested: ‘Sarkar (your highness, lord; the state), 
that is a human, please don’t shoot him.’  That person was our Dhimal ancestor (loud 
laughter!).  He was looking for bird’s eggs or something.  He was a short guy with black 
tanned skin.  He was almost naked, wearing a thin pieced of cloth wrapped around his hip, 
only to cover his male organ.  He looked like a wild animal to the Rana minister.  
 
 I was perplexed when I heard the story.  First I thought the narrator told me this story as a 
way of adding humor to a discussion that had already lasted for more than ninety minutes.  We 
did laugh loudly but this story forcefully struck me.  Babai, the narrator of this story, is one of 
the most committed, engaged, and inspiring Dhimal indigenous leaders whom I had met and 
worked with during my fieldwork.  Since the early 1970s, Babai had been involved in the 
communist political movement in Jhapa, and he had been jailed for two years (in the mid-1980s) 
for his “anti-nationalist” activities.  He was one of the founding members of the Dhimal Jati 
Bikas Kendra in the early 1990s (see Chapter 4).  Both as an indigenous activist and a leftist 
politician, Babai championed the issue of land rights for Dhimals.  Why would a politically 
conscious individual such as Babai tell a story that seemingly exoticizes Dhimal ancestor as if he 
were “wild” creature who would be mistaken by a hunter for a game animal?  In societies in 
which people experienced severe racism, colonial subjugation, and other forms of structural 
discriminations such as casteism, these subjugated people can appropriate the representative 
schemas and signs, such as racist images, historically used against them in order to challenge and 
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subvert such marginalizing forces (see Errington and Gewertz, 1994 for an ethnographic 
example).  I take this story to be one of such subversive performance of “auto orientalism” 
(Errington and Gewertz, 1994: 106) in which the image of an almost naked “wild” ancestor, by 
way of locating the events in the template of experiential history, disrupts the unequal power 
relations between the palace and Dhimal in the Tarai forest. 
The story includes many key symbols: the visit of the high-ranking Rana (state official) in 
the village for supervision, the state ritual of hunting (aided by the military and the local guide), 
the “wild” Dhimal (engaged in foraging activity), the intended act of violence (the Rana minister 
almost shot the wild creature), and the defiant Dhimal ancestor unaffected by the presence of the 
Rana and his military force, even to the wryly included detail of his revealing his buttocks to 
them.  All illuminatingly historicize the indigenous-state encounter in the Tarai during the Rana 
regime (1848-1851).  I argue that the story powerfully conveys several important themes that 
Dhimal highlight in their own accounts of the Tarai past as they incorporate their encounters 
with the state, outsider images of their identity, their past livelihood pattern, and their 
indifference to the state policies of land reclamation in the Tarai. 
 The chronotopic nature (Bhaktin, 1981) of this story, the meeting between Dhimal and 
the Rana officer in the Tarai forest, is tellingly significant.  The Tarai forest was a critical space 
for the encounter between the Tarai ādivāsi and the state during the formative period (early 19th 
century) of regional land colonization.  In the story, the state official had come to the Tarai for 
the purpose of supervision, an important state-making practice adopted by the Nepal’s rulers 
during the 19th century.  During this period, due to its inadequate administrative expansion, it 
was difficult for the royal palace in Kathmandu and its rulers to effectively make the panoptic 
gaze of the state visible and felt across the topographically diverse regions where the majority of 
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their subject population resided.  They governed the villages from Kathmandu by relying on the 
loyalty and services of the thinly present state officials stationed in the district headquarters, 
local revenue collecting functionaries, and landlords.  From time to time, the Kathmandu based 
government would receive written complaints from their subjects, issue royal decrees or write 
back to the district level state representative or the local state functionaries with state directives 
and orders.   
During the Rana regime, the state regularly used to send state officials or ordered the chief 
of the district, Bada Hakim, to undertake what was called  ‘daudaha’ (Nep. daudanu means ‘to 
run’) – an inspection visit to villages in order to supervise the revenue administrators and their 
performance, dispense justice, hear complaints against the local tax collectors and landowners, 
and so on (see Edward, 1976 on the history of the daudaha system).  Sometimes, even the Rana 
prime ministers would undertake such “inspection tours” of the Tarai villages along with their 
hunting trips.71 
 Hence, by making these officials from Kathmandu physically present in villages, this 
pedestrian mode of bureaucratic practice helped the 19th century Nepali rulers to periodically 
circumvent “the state’s verticality” (Gupta and Ferguson, 2002: 982-984), i.e. the administrative 
and spatial distancing between the palace and its subjects as well as to legitimize the state’s 
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71  In December 1891 (In Marg 1948 V.S.), Prime Minister Bir Shumshere Rana left on a hunting tour of Morang 
through Sindhuli.  On September 1891 (Aswin Sudi 2, 1948 V.S.), the following order was sent to the officials of 
Sindhuli-Gadhi (a hill fort east of Kathmadu valley):  
The Prime Minister's party will include 10,000 troops and 200 horses.  Rice, pulses, salt, oil, vegetable, ghee, 
spices, tobacco, ducks, sheep, goats, ducks, eggs, and feed for horses will be required for them.  Issue orders to 
the inhabitants of villages situated in that area for the procurement of these supplies.  Make arrangements to 
stock them at each camp four or five days in advance.  Construct roads strong and wide enough to ensure that 
horses of Arab bread pass through without any obstruction.  Construct dirt bridges on streams and rivers, or make 
arrangements for boats in adequate numbers, as appropriate.' (RSS, vol. 50, pp. 625-38). 
 
It is unclear if this hunting tour actually took place.  But this information helps to imagine that this tour would exert 
considerable pressure on the local villagers to provide additional free labor services, and economic burden in order 
to host the visiting officials of 10,000 troops and 200 horses. 
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sovereignty over its subject population and its territorial possessions.  In the above story, the 
local guide refers to the visiting Rana official as “sarkar” which also means “the ruler or the 
government,” an indication that the daudaha system was used to further reinstitute the hierarchal 
power relationships between the rulers and their subjects.  The visiting Rana official, 
accompanied by military guards, personifies the landlord state and marks its spectral presence in 
the Tarai forest while undertaking the state ritual of hunting.  I suggest that the way in which this 
story uses the two very different acts of hunting (the elaborate Rana hunt contrasting with the 
more subtle Dhimal) to set the scene for the encounter between the Rana official (the state) and 
the Dhimal ancestor equally signifies the history of the forceful invasion of state power in the 
Tarai forest that was an inalienable part of ādivāsi’s ways of life.   
 Until the early 20th century, some parts of Tarai forest areas were used by the Nepali 
rulers as hunting reserves for the exclusive use of the Royal palace and their important guests, 
including British colonial officers from India and members of the British royal family.72  The 
memoirs of the British colonial officers (Oldfield, 1880) who participated in the hunting 
expeditions of the Rana rulers show that these royal hunting tours were important state-making 
practices that produced state power and the dominant-subordinate relations between the rulers 
and their subjects (see Bhatt, 2003).  When we consider royal hunting as a state making practice, 
the way in which Babai narrated the militarized presence of the Rana official inside the forest 
and his aiming of a gun to shoot the “wild” Dhimal vividly enlivens the invasive state 
intervention on Dhimal’s ancestral territories.  Yet the Dhimal ancestor, completely focused on 
his foraging activity on the top of a tree, his back and buttock facing towards the high-ranking 
state officer, a reversal of the hierarchy between the two, is depicted as defiant and unconcerned 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
72!King George V took part in a large organized hunt in the Tarai areas of Chitwan, Nepal from December 18 to 28, 
1911 (Rookmaker, Nelson and Dorrington, 2005).   
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with the presumed power and authority of the Rana ruler below him.  By way of invoking an 
image of his ancestor as “jungali,” Babai emphasized that his ancestors were still engaged in 
their forest-based mode of subsistence or what he called “jungali jivan” when the state had 
begun enforced reclaiming of the “waste land” in the forested areas of the Tarai in Morang 
throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries.   
 As early as 1790, the Nepali state had promoted land reclamation and settlement 
programs in Morang where settlers could grab “as much land as one could reclaim” (Ojha, 1983: 
25) if they could pay the tax after a few years (Regmi, 197: 144).  If we consider the history of 
state-led efforts of resettlement in Morang (see Ojha, 1984) the state-Dhimal encounter narrated 
in the above story can be read as an example of Dhimal indifference to the opportunity for 
grabbing “as much land as one could reclaim” available to everyone.  Dhimal lack of interest in 
land acquisition can be explained in terms of their differential livelihood patterns and 
conceptions of land that I have discussed earlier.  But this explanatory frame is not sufficient to 
explicate why Dhimal preferred not to own land under their names when they eventually became 
tenant subjects of the Nepali state.  They continued to follow their non-farming ways of life even 
after the state promoted land reclamation in the Tarai by offering various incentives such as the 
provision of loans, and tax exemptions for a few years, and sometimes through coercive means 
(see Regmi, 1971).  I suggest that Dhimal preferences not to own land and to continue their 
forest-based mode of subsistence in the past (prior to the early 20th century) needs to be seen as 
their “political choice”  (Scott, 2009: 178-219) in order to resist the oppressive and extractive 
agrarian bureaucracy of the landlord state during that 19th and early 20th centuries (see Regmi, 
1971).   
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As I discussed in the previous chapter, throughout the 19th and early 20th century Nepali 
peasants lived on the margin between subsistence and destitution.  Yet they were made to 
support the affluence of the ruling groups, landowning elites, other state functionaries and village 
landlords by paying them rent and taxes in the form of money, commodity and labor.  The entire 
state apparatus and its legal and administrative policies were geared to the task of extracting 
economic surplus from the peasantry for the benefit of these groups to such an intolerable extent 
that peasants were often left with no option but to emigrate to India (Regmi, 1978: 153; Regmi, 
1971).  Given the existence of such exploitative political-economic relationships which structure 
the land tenurial system, the Dhimal politics of indifference to reclaiming land was a subversive 
strategy of avoiding the oppressive landlord state (Scott, 2009) although they could not evade the 
state for long.73 
 Hence, the above story, disguised as apparently funny and perhaps exoticizing, is 
nonetheless a clear political statement of noncompliance.  The significance of this story and how 
politically shrewd people like Babai used such storytelling to assert their political agency 
(Jackson, 2002) helped me to realize that we need to pay close attention to the ways in which 
people produce historical knowledge by privileging the concrete and lived practices which make 
their daily lives possible and meaningful.  For instance, all senior Dhimal with whom I discussed 
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73!The!Dhimal strategy of resisting the state’s tax regime is akin to what James Scott (2009: 178-219) describes as 
“escape agriculture” as an art of “not being governed.”  According to Scott, non-owning of land by many 
communities in the highland of the South East Asian states was a historical choice and political strategy, what he 
calls “state repelling” techniques (p: 180), adopted by these groups to ‘escape’ the oppressive state.  However, 
Dhimal were not the “Zomia” population in the ways in which Scott uses the concept to describe the Southeast 
Asian highlanders who resisted the complete assimilation into the state governance by fleeing the oppressions of 
state-making projects in the valley- slavery, conscription, taxes, corvee labor, epidemics, and warfare.  Scott’s 
analysis is insightful, however it is less applicable to describe the Tarai ādivāsi.  Similarly his sweeping 
characterization of the Zomia as “runway,” “fugitive” and “stateless” people can potentially misrepresent the ways 
in which indigenous peoples exercised their political autonomy (including territorial autonomy), and resisted the 
Hindu landlord state in Nepal (Dambar Chemjong, 2010, personal communication).  See Shneiderman (2010) for a 
critical analysis of James Scott’s notion of  “Zomia” for the Himalayan region of Nepal. 
!
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land, landlessness, and their history emphasized the hardship of owning land in the past.  They 
often used the Nepali term “dukkha” (Nep.  pain, sorrow, hardship) to highlight the challenges of 
owning land in the past.  If land had become the major means of economic production for 
Dhimals by the 19th century, then why was owning land so difficult when it was plentiful for 
everyone in the Tarai?  Why would land that Dhimal consider a constituent part of their selves 
and their social worlds, as evident in their notion of bhonai, became a source of dukkha when it 
was transformed into meeling i.e.  a proprietorial possession?  In what follows, I draw on my 
discussions with senior Dhimal and the available published historical information to expand on 
why owning land was so much of a hardship for Dhimal in the past.   
 Dhimal’s experience of dukkha is central to their understanding of how the extractive 
feudal state and its land tenurial policies led to the present-day landlessness in Dhimal 
communities.  As I have indicated earlier, Dhimal progressively lost their landholdings in the 
post-1950s period: many small land holders lost their lands through mortgage and selling, while 
the state took away lands from the big landowners when it imposed a ceiling on land holdings in 
the 1964 land reform.  By the mid-1970s, many of these former Dhimal landlords also became 
landless or near landless.  In general, Dhimal blame the state, hill immigrants) the “high” caste 
groups in particular), the expense of maintaining such customary practices as rituals and feasts, 
and “lack of awareness and concerns about future” for their landless condition.  Moreover, 
scholars have also reiterated similar explanations focusing on increasing expenses against the 
lower household income, and the resulting compulsion to mortgage or sell their lands to non-
Dhimal (Dahal, 1980: 75-91; Regmi, R.  R, 1991: 104-119).  Yet these explanatory frameworks 
assume that Dhimal’s landlessness is a post-1950 phenomenon and thus foreclose the larger 
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political-historical contexts of the rise of the landlord state in Nepal and the penetration of 
capitalist expansions in dispossessing Dhimal from their ancestral territories. 
 The transformation of land into capital, a private property to be accumulated, sold and 
purchased, is a recent development for Dhimal.  In his study of the impact of revenue collection 
on Tharu subsistence strategies of, Arjun Guneratne (1996) has challenged the dominant 
scholarly view that the control of land is the most important guarantee of subsistence in the 
peasant economy.  His historically grounded analysis of the changing relationships between the 
Tharu of Chitwan Tarai and the Nepali state over land control and tenure shows how the burden 
of the land tax, the oppressive nature of the revenue administration at the village level, and the 
emerging class differentiations based on landholding and access to state power actually 
discouraged many Tharu peasants from owing land even when it was readily available.  Instead, 
these Tharu peasants elected to work for the landlord families, and thus exchanged their labor in 
order to guarantee their subsistence and shelter.  In other words, these Tharu peasants became 
landless by choice. 
 In this case of these Chitwan Tharus, it was not the scarcity of land, but specific historical 
and material conditions such as the shortage of labor in the Tarai, the extractive relationship of 
the state with peasants, and the local manifestations of the oppressive revenue regimes in 
existing village social relations (landlords and peasants of the same community), that combined 
to lead many Tharus to opt for “voluntary landlessness” (Guneratne, 1996: 31).  Yet they still 
secured their subsistence from the land through the exchange of their labor.  Guneratne’s 
pioneering work in the case of Tharu adds an insightful comparative perspective to my analysis 
of Dhimal notions of dukkha in owning land in the past.   
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The Dhimal case, as I will show, also affirms Guneratne’s (1996) overall conclusion.  
However, Dhimal, unlike the Tharu, became peasants relatively late (circa after the mid-19th 
century) in the history of land colonization in the Tarai.  The Tharus, especially their village 
chiefs, had a longer history of alliance with the state rulers in Nepal (see Shrestha, Krauskopff 
and Meyer, 2002) with the consequence of influencing “the form and organization of the Tharu 
society, even to its nature as a moral community” (Guneratne, 1996: 32).  Class differentiation 
based on land and political power had also emerged among Dhimal after they became 
incorporated in the state land tenure system by the mid-19th century, but they lacked the kind of 
stratified and hierarchical social relations that Guneratne has described for Tharu society.   
 Guneratne’s analytical model is based on the concept of peasant and state-peasant 
relationships over land.  I approach Dhimal explanations of why many of their ancestors did not 
own land in the past by first considering the fact that Dhimal were not peasants.  Dhimal notions 
of land differed from those of the state before they were forced to reclaim the Tarai land.  
Dhimal were not landless in relation to the people who owned the land on which they lived, 
because that land was not historically subject to ownership – it was not yet meeling for them.  
Thus when they were forced to become tenants for the Nepali state, Dhimal had to struggle to 
secure their subsistence as well as to reproduce the moral economy that sustained their 
customary use of land and other resources.  Hence, my analysis of the Dhimal case will add the 
ādivāsi perspective to Guneratne’s very rich analysis. 
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‘Owning Land Was So Much Dukkha in the Past’ 
!
 At the beginning of my fieldwork, many senior Dhimal repeatedly told me that their great 
grandparents did not want to own any land under their names.  If Dhimal had been peasantized 
by the early 19th century, why would they be “landless” when anyone could grab as “much as 
they can own” in the Tarai?  Through several interviews and discussions, Dhimals emphasized 
that their ancestors preferred not to own land even when they were forced (by the state) and 
compelled (under the evolving political-economic conditions) to settle as peasants.74  
 At the end of 2008, as Dhimal became more involved in the ādivāsi politics for ethnic 
federalism in Nepal (see Chapters 4 and 7), the issue of land resurfaced in their indigenous 
movement.  Not only senior Dhimal, but youth of twenty to thirty years of age, who had spent 
more time in their studies than in working on their family farms, had begun expressing an 
urgency to write and understand the ‘history of land’ (see Chapter 7) in their political organizing 
and campaigns.  During this period, Dhimal activists were writing and publishing newspaper 
articles on their ethnic history and landlessness.  So these emergent ethnographic contexts also 
motivated me to revisit my previous field notes and follow up what I had been told about the 
challenges Dhimal had faced in the past as land-owning peasants.  In one random bhet-ghat 
(Nep.  casual meeting) in the late January of 2009, Babai even specifically asked me to meet him 
so that he could tell me how Dhimal became landless over the course of time.  That is, Babai 
himself had joined in the sense of urgency and transferred it to me, the need that I “write down” 
this particular history in my work.  This is how the Dhimal collective sense of the dukkha of 
landownership rose to ethnographic prominence in the final year of my fieldwork (2009). 
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74!!I had read Arjun Guneratne’s (2002) book before my fieldwork.  However he does not discuss the issues of 
“voluntary landlessness” in the book, but does so in an article (Guneratne, 1996) I read only after the completion of 
my fieldwork.   
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 For Nepali people, the notion of dukkha is an “embodied metaphor” (cf.  Low, 1995: 138: 
162) widely used to underline the experiences of pain, suffering and hardship that they face in 
their lived social worlds.  Scholars have shown that the idea of dukkha permeates people’s 
narratives of their life histories throughout Nepal (Des Chene, 1996; McHugh, 2001; Desjarlais, 
2003; March, 2002; Leve, 2007).75  Dukkha is “not simply a biologically rooted experience that 
humans naturally and necessarily wish to overcome.  To the contrary, it is also shaped by and 
rooted in particular social contexts, some of which can make it profoundly meaningful” (Asad, 
2003 cited by Leve, 2007: 152).  And analysis of how people deal with their experience of 
dukkha can also help us to understand how people exercise their individual and collective agency 
to overcome such conditions of hardship (Leve, 2007).   
 Thus, with my focus in this chapter, I analyze Dhimal’s use of the metaphor duḥkhá in 
terms of their historically located social experience of subordination and the results of becoming 
land owning tenants during the 19th and early 20th centuries.  Drawing from available historical 
information and Dhimal historical understandings of that period, I argue that the Dhimal notion 
of duḥkhá is interwoven with three major structural challenges associated with that period’s 
state-led extractive project of Tarai colonization.  These intertwined challenges included: (a) 
practical constraints of reclaiming land in the forested ecology of the Tarai, (b) bearing the brunt 
of an extractive state and its regimes of taxation, and (c) the emerging new moral economy based 
on the feudalization of the tenurial relationship.   
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75!The theme of ‘suffering’ is central to the Buddhist religious world-views, but this is not the focus of my 
discussion here.  Ethnographically the concept of ‘dukkha’ has been most explored and examined in the study of life 
experiences of Nepali women from various communities.  For example, in her study of the Tamang women in an 
area she calls Stupa hill, Kathryn March writes that “every women I interviewed located her life overall, and the 
events in her own narrative, in relation to dukka and sukha. …Dukka is suffering: it is the physical hurt of illness, 
hunger, cold, or injury; it is the weight of knowing the fears, worries, wrongs, and obligations of life; and it is the 
sorrow, sadness, melancholy, or grief at being unable to forget hurt and hardship.  Sukha is the opposite: it is the 
ease and comfort of health, food, warmth, clothing, and companionship; it is the feeling of uncomplicated pleasure; 
it is the purest as a happiness unaware even of its own good fortune” (March 2002: 36). 
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The characteristic feature of 19th century agrarian relations, the subordinated (pauperized) 
position of the peasant in the hierarchical structure of the extractive political economy, is 
important to understanding why the ancestors of the present-day Dhimal preferred as much as 
possible to avoid coming into a tenurial relationship with the state and the landowning elites in 
the past (prior to the early 20th century).76  From the perspectives of the Bhupati king, the tenant 
Dhimal were seen to be accepting the tenurial sovereignty of the king (the state), and agreeing to 
become morally and legally accountable to pay the required taxes, rents, and levies and to 
provide free labor services to the ‘malik’ of the land.  When Dhimal reclaimed land for the state 
and became its tenants, they were required to produce not only for themselves but also for the 
state and other “parasitic groups” (Regmi, 1978: x) who had rights to extract rent and levies 
because of these groups’ tenurial ownership of the land on which Dhimal labored so diligently.  
This was a contradictory political economic relation imposed upon Dhimal whereby they, by 
virtue of reclaiming the land that they had always used, also became a subordinated peasant class 
subjected to payment of tax and labor services to those who claimed ownership of their ancestral 
territories.  It restricted the relative autonomy that they had enjoyed when they were pursuing a 
non-farm based jungali life, enforced a new moral economy based on the ideologies of state 
landlordism and caste hierarchy, and thereby restructured village-level social relationships into 
an unequal and exploitative feudal social order.  The following ethnographic examples will help 
us to expand my arguments. 
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76!Regmi (1978b: 33) has put 19th century agrarian relations in this way:  
The ownership of land was usually vested in the state.  For political and administrative reasons, large areas of 
state-owned lands are granted on freehold tenure to members of the aristocracy and the bureaucracy, religious 
and charitable institutions, etc.  The actual cultivator, therefore, usually held his land on tenancy.  He paid rent 
either to the government or to individuals or institutions who were beneficiaries of state land grants….  In effect, 
the system that meant that the surplus produce of the land belonged to the surplus produce of the land belonged 
to aristocratic and bureaucratic groups in the society, where the peasant was a mere instrument to work the land 
and produce for their benefit (emphasis added). 
!
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 In late 2008, I met a sixty-five year old Dhimal farmer from Kari Koshi village of 
Morang.  I will call him Aaju after the Dhimal kinship term for ‘grandfather,’ which everyone 
present in our discussion used to refer to him.  Aaju belonged to the Majhi (village head) family 
of one Dhimal village in Kari Koshi.  After the institutionalization of jimīndār as the local 
functionary for the state revenue administration of the Tarai region in 1861, some Dhimal village 
Majhi emerged as jimīndār while many of them became large land-holding families mainly due 
to the state’s revenue administration policy of entrusting the responsibility of tax collection to the 
local village heads (Regmi, 1971; Guneratne, 1996; Sugden, 2009).  Since Aaju’s family used to 
own large tracts of land until the early 1940s, he had himself experienced and observed the pre-
1950 land tenurial system, changes in the state land tenure policies, and the loss of their lands by 
Dhimal in his village and elsewhere.   
 I asked Aaju why Dhimal were landless in the past when there was plenty of land in the 
village.  Upon hearing my question, he first gave me a conspicuous smile and provoked me with 
this very question: “In those days?  Why would Dhimal need to own land?” He paused for a 
while and continued: “Tyo bela Jaggā hune manche ta kangāl hunthiyo (In that time, people 
owning land would be like a kangāl  [which literally means a skeleton without flesh and blood, 
but used here to mean poor people without anything]).”  His comical use of the image of a 
kangāl to describe what would happen to the people who owned land in the past was very 
interesting and expressive.  “The main thing was that people did not want to own land,” he 
emphasized.  “But why?” I insisted to express my desire to go for a detailed discussion.  He 
explained:  
There were many reasons.  Ek dam dukkha jamin rakhna afno naam ma (It was too much 
hardship to have land under one’s name).  At that time, there were fewer people, but land was 
plentiful.  For example, you have land but no people to plow your farm.  This would drown you.  
So what do you do? You need to find and please people to plow your farm by offering them 
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money in advance, a place to live, cattle to herd, and so many other things.  You need to take 
care of these people more than your own children.  And then there was this problem.  People 
could not sell their crops in the market.  There were no demands for crops in the market.  People 
could not pay the land tax, and then their lands were taken by jimīndār and patuwarī and given 
to others.77  Not that the land tax was high.  But where would people get money from?  There 
was a shortage of money (cash).  They could not even sell their crops.  There were few desi 
(read Indian) traders who used to come to Rangeli (now a town located in the southern part of 
Morang, bordering with India, former district headquarters of Morang). Not all of them could 
take their crops there to sell.  Not many people knew how to make connections with these 
traders.  Dherai Jhanjhāt thiyo (It was lots of trouble) (Excerpt from taped-interview, October 
13, 2009). 
 
 Aaju’s explanation of the nature of the hardship of owning land testifies to how practical 
constraints such as the shortage of labor, difficulty of selling crops in order to pay the land tax, 
and vulnerability to losing land ownership title due to non-payment of taxes discouraged Dhimal 
from keeping land under their tenancy until the early 20th century.  Instead many Dhimal 
preferred to cultivate lands for landowning families; Aaju’s family was one of them.  I will 
expand on the emergence of the Majhi family as a land owning class in Dhimal society in the 
later part of this discussion.  For now, it is sufficient to underline that the shortage of labor and 
the taxation regime were major challenges for reclaiming land, particularly if a family wanted to 
own large tracts and pay the required taxes, levies, and rents to the state.   
 For individual families who held land as tenants of the state or of the landowning elites, 
the burden of tax and the oppressive ways in which revenue and compulsory labor services were 
extracted (see Regmi, 1971) greatly discouraged their owing it.  Hence we can infer some of the 
reasons why Aaju emphasized his point that “the main thing was that people did not want to own 
the land” because “ it was too much of hardship to have land under one’s name, Ek dam dukkhȃ 
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77!A patuwarī was the village functionary appointed by the state to assist the jimīndār in collecting land taxes and 
maintaining records and accounts.  A patuwarī needed to be a local resident of the village as well as a Nepali citizen, 
and he was provided remuneration of a commission, generally at the rate of Rs 0.015 for every rupee of land 




jamin rakhna afno naam ma.”  That people lost their land holdings when they could not sell their 
crops in order to pay the land tax is very important.  However, we should not interpret this 
statement of hardship simply to suggest that Dhimal ancestors became dispossessed of their 
lands because they failed to submit the required revenue.  The land tax was more than an 
economic burden imposed on Dhimal by the state.  In the very act of defining the right to use 
land in terms of monetary payment, the state transformed Dhimal ancestral territories into 
rentable property that anyone could take if he could submit the stipulated tax and labor services.  
Thus, by monetizing tenancy rights, the state simultaneously pulled the rug out from under the 
Dhimal’s historical and cultural relationship with their own land by introducing a moral 
economy that was radically contrary to their indigenous ethos and practices.  I will once again 
rely on what I have learned from Babai, whom I have already introduced, to illustrate my 
arguments. 
 In January 2009, Babai asked me to meet him so that he could tell me more about how 
the state intervened to make Dhimal landless in the past.  As I indicated earlier, Babai and other 
Dhimal were themselves making efforts to publish articles and books on Dhimal history, place-
names, and relationship with land (see Chapter 5) during the period of my fieldwork.  Hence, 
Babai’s retelling of “how the state intervened on Dhimal land,” to use his actual phrase, strongly 
reflects the political standpoint that Dhimal articulate in their indigenous activism.78  He 
explained to me:  
After 1777, when Prithivi Narayan Shah won Morang and made it a part of Nepal, Dhimal 
began encountering intervention on our lands.  First, this whole area was covered with forests.  
The state and its rulers could not clear the forests on their own; the fear of malaria chased them 
away.  Then they forcefully (jabardāsti) made us to clear the forests, cultivate land and pay tax 
for them.  First, reclaim land and then pay money to them (laughter).  Hāmi le aniwaŕyā jaggā 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
78!“Rajya le Kasari Dhimal Bhumima hastachep garyo” (/ fHon ] s;/L lwdfn e " lddf x:tIf ]k u/ \o f ] ]  
). 
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linai parne (we were compulsorily required to take the land).  From there (the palace; 
Kathmandu), they (the rulers) sent them, the jimīndār and patuwāri, here.  Then they caught 
people like us Dhimal living in the forest (Hami haru, jungal ma basne Dhimal harulai 
pakadāi bhanyo) and told our Majhi (the village head), “You! Look! Either you register these 
lands around your place or be prepared for the punishment!” They, the military people, beat 
our ancestors and made them take the land.  Aniwaryā rupale (compulsorily), Dhimal were 
made to take land under their names.   
 
 After taking the land compulsorily, then they (Dhimal) needed to pay the mālpot (land 
tax), one rupee re (they say).  The price of paddy was fifty paisa but the land tax was one 
rupee, they (our ancestors) used to say!79  In order to sell the paddy, they had to carry it from 
here all the way to Rangeli through the thick forest.  They had to travel in a group because of 
the fear of tigers and bears (wild animals).  On the one hand there was this kind of fear, but on 
the other hand, not much in the way of crop yields used to be here.  Most of it used to be eaten 
up by the wild animals.  Then how could Dhimal pay the tax? And then after, when they could 
not pay the annual tax, they (the local tax functionaries, non-Dhimal) would beat them.  Our 
grandfather used to tell this: the tax collectors used to make a flat wooden plank.  Then people 
who had failed to pay the land tax needed to stand on that plank, only with their lower bodies 
covered with clothes.  Then they would be beaten up with a leather whip.80  This was not 
actually done for reclaiming the land but to chase away Dhimal once they had cleared the 
malarial forest.  So either you get beaten with a whip or you run away to new places 
(Interview, January 9, 2009; emphasis added). 
 
 This interview excerpt is a substantive illustration of how Dhimal use the notion of the 
dukkhȃ of owning land as a way to explicate their experience of state intervention in their 
ancestral territories.  Babai claimed that their ancestors were forced to reclaim land for the state 
and then to become its tenants.81  Babai’s use of the commanding voices of the state 
representatives, amplified by words such as jabardāstī (forceful), aniwaŕyā (compulsorily) and 
pakardāi (Nep.  forceful capture), and the painful descriptions of the physical violence used 
against non-payers of the land tax strongly animates the violent means and processes through 
which Dhimals were made to take land and become tax paying subjects.  Even as they were 
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79!Paisa is a monetary unit, equivalent to 1/100 of a rupee.  In general usage, paisa is used to mean ‘money’. 
80!The anthropologist Dilli Ram Dahal, in his ethnography of Dhimal conducted in Damak region of Jhapa in the 
late 1970s, had recorded a similar historical narrative of physical punishment used against those who failed to pay 
the land tax (Dahal, 1979).   
81!The history of such enforced land reclamation is also corroborated by M.  C.  Regmi in his study (1971) of 
history of the land tenure system in Nepal.  According to him, “In the early stage, the government undertook the 
reclamation of waste lands through forced labor under its direct supervision and control” (Regmi, 1971: 144).   
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forced to do so, Babai also asserted Dhimal historical agency in helping the state to reclaim the 
malarial Tarai land.  He invoked the power of malaria to chase away the powerful ones: the state 
and its rulers who were unable to clear the Tarai land on their own.  Because there was an 
ongoing shortage of labor force needed to reclaim Tarai land, the Nepali state and other 
landowning elites had to rely on malaria-resistant Tarai ādivāsi to cultivate the malarial land (see 
Shrestha, Kruaskopff and Meyer, 2000: 1-56).  But once Dhimal had assisted the state, the rulers, 
instead of reciprocating Dhimal contributions in meaningful ways, forced them to pay money for 
the reclaimed land.   
 The laughter that followed Babai’s statement, “First reclaim land and then pay money for 
it (first they made us reclaim the land, and then they forced us to pay money for that land)” 
vividly captures the contradictory experiences Dhimal ancestors had to face in reclaiming the 
land.  The lands that Dhimal reclaimed were part of their ancestral territories which they had 
been using since “the time immemorial,” as they often claim.  As I have discussed earlier, for 
Dhimal, bhonai (land) was not a bounded entity to be owned by individuals but a constituent part 
of their selves and their lived socio-religious worlds.  When Dhimal were deriving their 
subsistence from non-farming activities, they still relied on land and its productivity for their 
livelihood.  During their village rituals such as Shrejat (see chapter 4) Dhimal acknowledge their 
use and reliance on land and other resources.  They reciprocate with their expressions of 
gratitude of gratitude to soil, river, trees, forests, wild animals, and other beings in their 
territories through ritual offerings.  A distinctly Dhimal ethics of responsibility, exchange and 
reciprocity, what they consider part of their dharma (Nep. duty and also religion), structured the 
moral economy of Dhimal jungali life and mediated the use of land and other resources they 
depended upon for their livelihood.  Unlike the tenurial system of the landlord state that 
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embraced the superiority of the “giver” over the “receiver” of the land, the Dhimal cultural ethos 
of exchange and reciprocity structured their use of the land before they were forced to become 
tenant cultivators.   
 When they became tenant subjects of the landlord state, Dhimal rights to use land 
depended on their payment of taxes, levies, rents, and periodic labor services to the state and its 
functionaries.  Babai’s description of the physical punishments used against non-tax payers 
attests to the true parasitical nature (Regmi, 1971) of these groups receiving those taxes; they 
only extracted economic surplus and labor service from Dhimal without any consideration for 
their welfare.  Thus Babai’s statement “first they made us reclaim the land, and then they forced 
us to pay money for that land” describes to us Dhimal perceptions of the paradox contained in 
the novel moral economy imposed upon them by the land tax system and its transformation of 
bhonai into meeling. 
Babai emphasized that this was a deliberate strategy by the land-owning elites and state 
officials to compel people to clear the land, and then to take it away from them.  His claim that 
the abrupt increase in the land tax and the taking away of the reclaimed land when they failed to 
pay that tax were strategic acts “to chase away Dhimal once they had cleared the malarial forest” 
can be challenged on the available historical evidence which documents that not only tenant 
farmers but even many jimindār and other landowning families periodically escaped to India 
when they failed to pay the required land tax (see Regmi, 1971).  Babai cited many examples of 
how the land once claimed by Dhimal was converted into birta lands for powerful people and 
their families.  I read this particular claim of Babai as revealing how people’s dispossession from 
their lands depended on their access to and control over political power or their lack of it. 
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 Many Dhimal told me that the idea of paying tax for the use of their own land did not 
make much sense to their ancestors.  They said that during the early period of state-led land 
reclamation in the Tarai, when there were fewer people but many lands to reclaim, their 
ancestors could simply move on to new places in order to avoid possible state repression.  As 
both Aaju and Babai emphasized, the low level of agricultural productivity, inability to bring 
crops to market, and the low price of crops made the obligation to pay the land tax in cash a 
troublesome burden for Dhimal.  All the senior Dhimal that I interviewed invariably claimed that 
the imposition of a monetary tax system at a time when the Dhimal subsistence economy was 
still at a low level of monetization (until the early 20th century) intensified their experience of 
duḥkhá in owning land.82  Recall that when Dhimal ancestors lived the jungali jiwan, outbreaks 
of cholera forced them to move from place to place.  Like cholera, the state, particularly because 
of its virulent burden of land taxes, evicted Dhimal from their villages once they had become 
tenant cultivators, thereby abandoning the material, labor, and emotional investment they had 
made in clearing the land.   
In Dhimal narratives of dukkha the state (and its representatives) appeared to be 
excessively violent, outsiders associated with “high” caste people.  Babai’s analysis also 
highlights how the local state functionaries used to deploy their authority oppressively to 
dispossess individual tenants from the land they had reclaimed.  Since owning land under 
tenancy rights was a contractual acceptance of the stipulated requirements by tenants, the failure 
to comply with their tenurial obligations could bring serious consequences for them.  So in some 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
82!In the Tarai region, the land tax was usually accessed and collected in cash, and it is estimated that during the 
early 1840s, people used about 40 percent of their produce for the land tax (Regmi, 1978: 44).  While narrating how 
things were different when she was growing up in the village, a sixty-seven year old Dhimal mai, the mother of my 
host Dhimal family, once alluded to the lack of market in the village by saying: “In those days, this village was a 
place where not even a mana [measurement unit; one manna equal 0.05 kg] of uncooked rice would sell in a month.”!
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cases the local functionaries would actually add more lands under some Dhimal’s name 
(ownership) in the expectation that Dhimal would be unable to meet the tax burden of owning 
large tracks of land and they could be punished.  The case of Mr. Karu Dhimal’s grandfather is 
an interesting example of how owning land came with ‘punishment’. 
 Mr. Karu Dhimal belongs to a family of some repute in the Damak area of Jhapa.  His 
elder brother is an active political leader, who was also an elected member of the Damak 
Municipality in the early 1990s.  Mr. Karu and his elder brother, are both also actively engaged 
in Dhimal Jati Bikas Kendra.  People told me that these particular family members owe their 
achievement in maintaining their economic affluence and political influence to their 
grandparents who had been able to accumulate large landholdings in the past.  In 2009, during 
our participation in the annual Shrejat ritual journey organized by Dhimal Jati Bikas Kendra on 
the eve of the Nepali New Year (see Chapter 4), I asked Karu how his grandparents had owned 
so much land in the past.  He told the following story of how his grandfather became a 
landowner:  
What had happened is this.  Then, my grandfather was a Majhi.  He had already owned some 
land, maybe 40 bigah or so.  Many Majhi used to have land.  You know that, yes? (I nodded).  
Then at one time, the Badahakim (the district administer) came to our village in order to 
supervise the land tax and other things.  This was a Thapa (hill “high” caste) Badahakim, 
younger than my grandfather in age.  I don’t remember his name now.  Then, Badahakim 
generally used to stay (Nep. bās bashnu) in the Majhi’s house.  With a big man as pahunā 
(guest), my grandfather had to treat him very well.  He asked our grandmother to prepare a 
good meal of roaster’s meat, and a special teen pani rakshi (alcohol made by distilling three 
times).   
 
In the evening, they all ate and drank.  The Bada Hakim and his patuwāri were busy keeping 
the hisab-kitab (record update; audit).  They drank more rakshi.  Sabai lai ali ali lagyo – all of 
them got bit drunk.  The Badahakim was sitting on a small stool on the floor, and looking 
over the patuwāri.  My grandfather was standing behind the hakim; he also became curious, 
and looked over to see what the patuwāri was doing.  Then he -- maybe accidentally or maybe 
he just did it -- put his hand over the shoulder of the Badahakim.  The Badahakim did not like 
my grandfather putting his hand over the hakim’s shoulder.  The drunk Badahakim got furious 
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and said: ‘How come this muji Dhimal put his hand over my shoulder?#83  What does he think 
of himself? He called on his assistant: Oh! Mr. Patuwāri! Listen here! 
 
And then the Badahakim ordered angrily, “That 20 bigah of vacant paddy fields.  Register that 
20 bigha of land under this Dhimal’s name.  He wants to be too battho (Nep.  smart/clever).  
He will see it!” 
 
That’s how my grandfather added another 20 bigaha (laughter).  He had three sons; they each 
got 20 bigah.  Our father got 20 bigah too.  Our father did not add any land.  We were three 
brothers so we each got about 6 bigah of land.  Most of it, I have already sold for my 
children’s education.” (Interview Transcript, April 14, 2009) 
 
 Mr. Karu’s explanation of how his grandfather accumulated the additional 20 bigah of 
land also supports the Dhimal claim that owing land was full of hardships in the past to the 
extent that they deemed the land tenancy to be a state imposed punishment.  Similar to Babai’s 
analysis, this particular story, based on a lived historical event, also highlights Dhimal past 
experiences of the abusive use of state power by local state functionaries for various reasons 
related to land and revenue administration before the 1950s.  It further accentuates how the 
interplay of caste ranking and tenurial status mediated the Dhimal relationship with state 
representatives who mostly belonged to the dominant hill “high” caste groups.  As a village 
Majhi, Kuru’s grandfather occupied an important and respected social position in his village.  In 
this event, as a Majhi, Kuru’s grandfather hosted the visiting Bada Hakim as a village guest, and 
extended warm hospitality accordingly.  But the Bada Hakim, without respecting the kindness 
the host family had offered to him, demeaned Kuru’s grandfather, an aged person, by using 
vulgar language when he patted his shoulder as if that physical touch “polluted” his body and 
disgraced his honor.   
 Thus, the act of touching the state official’s shoulder, perhaps with a gesture of equality, 
if not of juniority (by age), seemed to have subverted the existing subordinate-dominant 
relationship between the two whereby Karu’s grandfather, despite his respectable social position 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
83!Literally means ‘pubic hair of’ but it is commonly used as a swear word akin to “asshole.”   
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as a village head and his seniority in age, was expected to be submissive.  Since the Bada Hakim 
knew that owning additional land would likely intensify hardship for the host Dhimal family, he 
added more lands under the tenancy of the Karu’s grandfather, not as a favor but to punish him 
for the perceived disrespectful acts he committed against the representative of the landlord state. 
 The explanations provided by Babai, Aaju and Karu Dhimal regarding the hardship of 
owning land help us to understand why Dhimal preferred to avoid coming into tenurial 
relationships with the state in the past.  Increasingly, however, they had no other options than to 
rely on cultivation of land for subsistence.  Moving out of their villages and resettling in new 
places was perhaps the last resort, not the alternative Dhimal would have preferred in order to 
ameliorate the brunt of the oppressive landlord state and its representatives.  They were less 
likely to work at wage labor in the colonial planation economy in neighboring districts of India 
(Hodgson, (1880 [1847]: 119; Waddell, 1899: 4-5).  As becomes evident in the narratives of the 
three Dhimal that I have used here, while many individual families preferred not to own land 
under tenancy, Dhimal village Majhi such as the grandfathers of Aaju and Kuru had become 
landowning families as a result of state policies of revenue administration during that period.   
 
Dhimal Majhi And The Landlord State 
!
 As an alternative to becoming tenants of the state or of the landowning elites, many 
Dhimal cultivated the land holdings of their village Majhi as sharecroppers or recipients of a 
fixed share of the yield.  According to Dhimal, the village Majhi would hold the village land 
under his name and thus he would deal with tax officials and other state functionaries, while 
other villager members would cultivate the land and share the produce with the Majhi.  In other 
words, the hardship of owning land as individual families and the state’s cooption of indigenous 
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institutions, such as the Majhi system, for land colonization and revenue administration in the 
Tarai impacted the existing customary social relations between Majhi and villagers.  Thus the 
Dhimal traditional cultural ethos and practices implied in the Majhi system were molded into a 
new relationship based on the state’s imposed ideology of the hierarchical landlord-tenant system 
as a means to address the continuing challenges for Dhimal of gaining subsistence on the land.  I 
argue this development was an effect both of the state’s land tenure and revenue policies and also 
of Dhimal efforts to use their cultural institutions to blunt the effects of the oppressive state tax 
machinery.  Dhimal insistence that the hardship of land tenurial relations in the past compelled 
them to be non-owners of land and that they found it convenient to work for or to cultivate the 
village Majhi’s lands needs an empathetic analysis.   
 The dominant explanation espoused by many Marxist scholars that the village heads in 
indigenous communities were essentially a ‘landed elite class’ at the village level reduces the 
institution of Majhi to an instrument of class exploitation and subjugation.  But the Majhi role 
cannot be reduced to that of landlord in any elemental sense – he was not merely a creation of 
the feudal mode of production dominated by Nepal’s ruling elites.  On the contrary, Dhimal 
claim that their Majhi institution predates the formation of the present-day state of Nepal.  For 
them, the Majhi of the past represented an important customary institution, indispensable to the 
governance of Dhimal communal life including village ritual, marriage, and maintenance of 
social order.   
 Like the Dhami (priest) whose spiritual power used to protect Dhimal from malaria and 
other afflictions, the village Majhi, also called deuniya, a patriarchal hereditary social position, 
was entrusted with responsibilities such as: maintaining social order in the village, organizing 
and managing the annual village Shrejat ritual, representing the village during the marriage 
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processes, and mediating in quarrels or disputes among villagers, divorces, and other incidents 
that could potentially create conflict between villagers and villages (see S. Dhimal, et al. 2010).  
Though the Majhi could exercise social power to make and impose decisions on behalf of the 
villager, it was not a vertically ranked social position nor was it a permanent position that one 
could continue in without enacting and being part of locally embedded social relationships and a 
moral economy mediated by kinship, ritual obligation, reciprocal exchange, and other 
community making practices. 
 As Babai explained to me, with increasing intervention in their ancestral territories, state 
officials and intermediary revenue functionaries like jimīndār and patuwāri held the village 
Majhi accountable for reclaiming waste lands in their territories.  Since the landowning elites 
(birta and jagir land holders) who controlled a substantial part of the Tarai land seldom lived in 
the villages where they held their lands, they also needed the services of local village leaders 
such as Majhi.  Because the state had no tax collection offices in the village during the 19th 
century, the state and the landowning elites relied on these village heads to collect agricultural 
rents and taxes on their behalf (see Regmi, 1971; 1978a, 1978b: 70-88; Guneratne, 1996).  These 
village heads thus played an “intermediary role between the landowning elites or the government 
and the peasant” (Regmi, 1978b: 70) without any formal emoluments for their services.  Rather 
they were given special status and privileges vis-à-vis the peasantry that made it possible for 
them to take a share of the agricultural surplus in lieu of emoluments (ibid.).  Thus the state’s 
cooption of the indigenous institution of governance for its land colonization project delegated 
some state-sanctioned authority such as collecting taxes to Majhi, who added this role to the 
communal power he enjoyed as village chief.  But these new roles did not replace the relevance 
of the Majhi position as embedded in Dhimal social relationships mediated through kinship, 
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marriage exchange, ritual obligation, reciprocal labor exchange, and other community making 
practices.   
 Many Dhimal preferred to cultivate their village Majhi’s lands, not because the village 
head represented state power or controlled all village lands, but because the Majhi-villager 
relationships, unlike the tenancy relationship with the state or other landowning elites, were 
relatively egalitarian and mediated by the ethic of exchange and reciprocity embedded in Dhimal 
moral economy.  These new “class” like relationships between the Majhi and his tenant Dhimals 
still maintained the reciprocal relationship of production and distribution mediated through their 
kinship and ritual obligations.  One Dhimal farmer whose families in the past had cultivated the 
lands of the Majhi, the brother of his grandmother in Karikoshi village, explained to me: “During 
that period, we did not need much land.  Then we did not need many things and money.  Our 
biggest pír (Nep. worries, concern) then was the marriage of our children.  However, we used to 
get support from Majhi and others to marry off our children.  We could always rely on the Majhi 
if we needed any money and rice.  We could pay him by plowing his fields.  He was our own 
kin.”  Kinship ties, ethics of reciprocity, and the assurance that they would be helped in times of 
need (for example, for the marriage of their children, the most important duty of Dhimal parents 
as well as a matter of family and village honor, see Chapter 5) equally defined and structured 
individual families’ tenurial relations with Majhi.  Accumulation of wealth for future investment 
(or expenses) was not a salient feature of Dhimal’s household economy.   
 As I have emphasized, the lack of market access had discouraged Dhimal from 
cultivating crops as commodities.84  Tenancy under the village Majhi served to collectivize 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
84!This does not mean that Dhimal social life during that period remained outside the market.  Dhimal would engage 
in barter or sell of their crops in periodic haat bazaar (petty village market) near by their villages to buy other 
household needs like salt or chiraito (to be exchanged with the hill people for rice), clothes, etc.  Unlike the state 
and the absentee landowning elites, Dhimal did not cultivate land for the purpose of selling the crops in the market. 
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village labor and redistribute agricultural production among the villagers, though not necessarily 
on an equal basis.  But given the hardship of owning land for an individual family and the social 
embeddedness of their village Majhi, many Dhimal found their tenancy relationship with the 
Majhi more convenient and less troublesome during that period.   
 It was obvious that Majhi benefitted more from retaining large tracks of land.  Yet they 
also risked the challenges of meeting the stipulated tax requirement and pleasing the state 
functionaries and revenue collectors.  Recall the Aaju’s use of the metaphor of kangāl to 
emphasize what would happen to landowning families in the past.  He said to me, “For example, 
you have land but no people to plow your farm.  This would drown you.  So what do you do? 
You need to find people and entice them to plow your farm by offering them money in advance, 
a place to live, cattle to herd, and what not.  You need to take care of these people more than 
your own children.”  If we were to reduce Aaju’s explanation to the logic of cost-benefit 
analysis, given the shortage of labor and relative absence of immigrants from outside, the Majhi, 
even for a purely instrumental purpose, needed to be caring and providing.  Otherwise, he had a 
higher chance of losing the locally available supply of labor and its loyalty, the loss of which 
could potentially deprive him of his land entitlements.  On the one hand, this also implies that, in 
the absence of immigrants from outside, he provided more leverage for the tenant Dhimals to 
make their “tenancy” relationship with the Majhi less exploitative.85  On the other hand and most 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
!
85 The six village Majhis who I interviewed for my research emphasized that their relationships with their fellow 
Dhimal villagers who used to cultivate the Manjhi’s lands (as tenants) were like that of kin and family members.  
“We treated them like our own sons.  We helped them in times of their family members’ wedding or funerals.  We 
were kin members from the same village; it was not like a kamaiya system (Nep. exploitative bonded labor system; 
see Dhakal, Rai, Chemjong, et al. 2010),” one village Majhi told me.  Other Dhimal also emphasized that it was 
more beneficial (read, less troublesome) to become a tenant under the Majhi than having land registered under one’s 
name.  The Majhi were required to provide ‘everything’: land, cattle, seeds, and other needed materials to cultivate 
the land by his “tenants.”  The agriculture produce, I am told, used to be equally distributed between the Majhi and 
his tenants in the beginning but later it changed to certain fixed amounts.  See Guneratne (1996) for similar practice 
among the Tharus in the past. 
! 132!
importantly, in the absence of the immigrants Dhimals were able to keep village land, though it 
would registered be under the names of a few individuals in the state records. 
 I do not underestimate the issue of “tenant exploitation” in the tenancy of land under the 
Majhi (see for example, Guneratne, 1996).  As Dhimal themselves emphasized, Majhi-villager 
relationships transcend the political economy of land tenure and economic production.   
 In order to understand how the interface between Dhimal moral economy and the state’s 
extractive political economy reconfigured the customary Majhi-villagers relationships, we need 
to consider the indigenous system of Majhi as, first and foremost, a culturally structured set of 
practices for reproducing community.  Even in the present-day context, the Majhi system is a 
respected, even revered, institution in Dhimal society.  Dhimal use term ‘Majhi warang’ to 
express their respect for and acknowledgment of their village head.  The title warang or warange 
is used as an honorific for senior males in general and also for Dhimal male deities.  Despite the 
class difference between the Majhi and other villagers in the past, these groups not only 
participated in and shared the same communal social and cultural life, they were also united by 
their common political subjugation and their common experience of losing ground.  In the post-
1950s, both families from the former landlord Dhami and their Dhimal tenants had become 
sukumbāsi.  My analysis of Dhimal explanations for the duhkhā of owning land, and how they 
worked to lessen that hardship shows that it was the weight of the landlord state and its 
oppressive tax regime that created ‘landed’ and ‘landless’ social groups among Dhimals.   
 People such as Babai with a long history of political activism argued that it was the state 
that “ate up our lands” by the political tactic of dispossessing Dhimal through its land tenure 
policies.  In the same interview, Babai claimed that once Dhimal had reclaimed the Tarai land 
and toiled so diligently to enhance its productivity, the ruling groups, the hill Hindu “high caste,” 
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because of their political domination, were able to use the state’s tenurial power manipulatively 
to “chase Dhimal away from these lands.”  He cited examples of frequent increases in land tax 
and the consequent eviction of Dhimals for failure to pay these taxes, state granting of lands that 
Dhimal had reclaimed as Birta and Jagir grants to the families of the ruling groups, the control 
of land administration by members of the landowning elites, and in more recent times, the 
implementation of the land reform (1964) to argue that the state had always acted predatorily to 
make Dhimal sukumbāsi.   
 Refusing to own land was a political choice (Scott, 2007) that many Dhimal cultivators 
made in order to avoid the hardship of being tenant subjects.  But this political choice became 
counterproductive for Dhimal when property rights in land were ensured at the turn of the 20th 
century and when land became the most important proprietorial ownership -- a meeling – a 
capital that one could use to access other resources.  At the end of the 19th century, economic 
expansion in India due to the “spurt in economic activity in northern India, mainly because of the 
development of railway transport facilities” (Regmi, 1978b: 140), opened up “unprecedented 
prospects for agricultural expansion in the Tarai region” (ibid).  The Nepali rulers emphasized 
the private reclamation of land through fiscal concession and birta allotments for any land 
colonizer, made rights to reclaimed land inheritable, encouraged the hill people to cultivate the 
Tarai land, promoted irrigation developments in the Tarai, encouraged colonizers to procure 
settlers from India and introduced the jimīndāri system (1861) in order to facilitate private 
enterprise in the colonization of large tracts of forests and other uncultivated lands in the Tarai 
during the mid-19th century (see Regmi, 1971; 1978).  These renewed state interventions in the 
Tarai brought more people to the Tarai, and increasingly land ownership began to shift from 
Dhimals to non-Dhimals, particularly to the hill “high caste” groups. 
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 After the fall of the century-long autocratic feudalistic rule of the Rana family regime 
(1846-1950), ‘land reform’ emerged as a national political project for making “modern” Nepal.  
Since many Dhimals did not have land registered under their names and many of them lacked the 
necessary documentation (or access to the political power to produce such documentation), 
Dhimal dispossession from their land accelerated after the 1950s.  When malaria was 
‘eradicated’ in the Tarai during the late 1950s, the region was ‘opened’ for legal and extra-legal 
land grabbing and settlements by clearing more forests.  A huge influx of immigrants, 
particularly from the hills, poured into the Tarai regions.  More and more Dhimal lost their land 
through mortgage and indebtedness, sale by unfair means, development of public infrastructures 
like roads, schools, administrative offices, ‘modernization’ of agriculture (for example, the 
development of the tea-gardens) and other forms of ‘developmental’ encroachments in their 
territories.  The Land Reform of 1964, which was implemented to impose a land-holding ceiling 
and to distribute the surplus land equitably to landless peasants (see Zaman, 1973) 
disproportionately benefitted the hill immigrants, particularly the hill “high” caste groups in the 
Tarai (see Gaige, 1975; Chaudhary, 2007 [B.S.  2064]; Guneratne, 2002).  The land reform 
worked against the landowning Dhimal Manjhi landlords, who because of their lack of political 
connections, lost most of their landholdings.  And many Dhimals who used to till the Majhi lands 
also could not secure their legal ownership of the land and became landless.   
 The preceding discussion of the colonization of Nepal’s Tarai shows that the rise of the 
‘modern’ Nepali state led to the dispossession of Dhimals from their lands and ancestral 
territories.  The state project of territorial colonization also paralleled the making of Nepal as a 
Hindu nation and the imposition of the hill nationalism that I have described in chapter one.  In 
the post-1960s, the local Dhimal social world increasingly became multiethnic, and in that world 
! 135!
Dhimals became progressively marginalized.  Their historical experiences of ‘losing ground’ 
also prompted Dhimal to collectivize their efforts and agency in challenging their state of 
marginality.   
The next chapter will discuss the history and spaces of Dhimal’s indigenous organizing 
from 1950s onward.  The chapter will further illustrate the importance of understanding why the 
issue of land remains central to the Dhimal sense of identity and how it forms the moral ground 
for demanding their rightful belonging as a unique Tarai ādivāsi with an inalienable relationship 
to their ancestral territories.   
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Chapter Four 
‘I’ve Been Walking And Walking Into It’: Indigenous Activism As A Moral Practice 
  
 
‘This Samaj Seva Is Like An Addiction!’ 
!
In the last week of December 2009, the three-day-long nationwide ‘shut down’ (Nep. 
bandh) called by the Maoist party left me stranded in Damak municipality where I had come to 
participate in the national convention of a political organization led by Dhimal youths.  Unable to 
get to Karikoshi village, my primary field site, or to my hometown, a three-hour bus ride towards 
the west from Damak, I had taken refuge at one of my Dhimal friend’s one-room apartment in 
Damak bazaar, which by that time had become my second home in the field.  Since the city was 
literally shut down and I was tired of watching and observing the jubilant protestors and their 
actions on the street, I decided to walk to Dada’s home, about two miles west of Damak, 
expecting that he would be there because of the strike.   
Dada, to whom I have briefly alluded in Chapter 2, was a central-level leader of the 
Dhimal Jāti Bikās Kendra, Dhimal’s national indigenous organization, at the time of my 
fieldwork.  For the last thirty years or more, Dada had been wholeheartedly engaged in 
organizing the Dhimal community for what he calls jāti bikās or ethnic development and jāti 
adhikār or ethnic rights, which I have translated as activism.86  He played a key role in 
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86!According to Sciences, “activism refers to action by an individual or group with the intent to bring about social, 
political, economic, or even ideological change” (Embrick, 2008: 18).  Indigenous activism centers on the claim of 
! 137!
establishing and strengthening the Kendra.  A vey respected member of his community, Dada 
also actively participates in the regional-national indigenous political movement as well as in 
other public alliances to represent the Dhimal community.  However for most of the time, Dada 
lives in Morang and Jhapa, and, like many other Dhimal activists who I know, he relies on 
farming for his family’s livelihood. 
Dada and Bhauji (Dh.  elder’s brother wife) have a daughter who now lives with her 
husband’s family in another village in Morang district.  Having grown up in the post-1950 period 
of social and political-economic changes in which Dhimal’s experiences of “losing ground” 
(McDonaugh, 1997) had amplified exponentially, Dada and Bhauji have witnessed and 
experienced what the opening up of the Tarai after the eradication of malaria meant for Dhimal 
and other Tarai ādivāsi.87  As a high school student in the early 1970s, Dada found himself in an 
economically challenged family as his parents had to sell much of their family land in order to 
support him, his siblings and other family members.  At that period, education, particularly 
college education was a “scarce resource” (Appadurai, 1981) for Dhimal; not everybody could 
have access to it despite the state’s rhetoric of education as a universal right.  However, Dada 
was able to complete two years of college thanks to the scholarship he got from the local 
government.88  
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ethnic identity, and the self-consciousness of their ethnic identity as members of a collective is the defining attribute 
of indigenous activists (Rappaport, 2004), which makes their activism meaningful for them and their community. 
87 On the concept of “losing ground” see my discussion on Chapter 2.  The eradication of malaria in the early 1950s 
opened up the Tarai for others. 
 
88!Until 1950, the Rana regime restricted public education; families belonging to the nobility and “high” caste 
groups with access to the state power were allowed to pursue education in Nepal, and mostly in India for higher 
education.  Public education was introduced in the early 1950s.  However, despite the linguistic and cultural 
diversity of people, Nepali language, the dominant group’s language, was made the medium of education in order to 
foster a sense of “national identity” and to erase people’s loyalties to their mother tongue.!
!
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This scholarship was made possible by the efforts of one village elder who met the king 
during one of the royal visits (1969/1970) to eastern Nepal.  Realizing that Dhimals’ lack of 
education had denied them important access to state power, administration and bureaucracy 
which had further diminished Dhimal ability to subvert their political and economic marginality, 
the loss of lands in particular, the village elder requested the head of the state to provide 
scholarships for school and college level education for Dhimal.  He had hoped that college 
educated Dhimal youth would be in better positions to negotiate with state officials and the 
dominant groups both as individuals and members of Dhimal community.  Hence Dada became 
educated in part because the village elders or warang-berang had acted out their social 
responsibility of helping Dhimal youth to have access to the important entitlement of education.  
In that sense, the college scholarship that Dada received also symbolizes the moral action his 
village elder enacted with his felt sense of responsibility and duty for the community. 
Educated Dhimal youths, with the help of their village elders, were instrumental in 
collectivizing Dhimal efforts at ethnic organizing beginning in the late 1970s, which were later 
consolidated into the present-day Dhimal Jati Bikas Kendra in the early 1990s.  When I began 
my fieldwork and came to know Dada in mid-2007, he was leading the Kendra in the national 
indigenous political movement during the period of radical political transformations in Nepal 
that I have highlighted in Chapter 1.  Thus with three decades of continuous contributions to 
community organizing, Dada embodies a rich history of Dhimal indigenous activism.  His 
unceasing voluntary involvement in activism had taken Dada away from his family 
responsibilities, Bhauji would occasionally complain.  At the family level, activism had severely 
affected Dada’s household economy.  Their daughter, who was employed by a local NGO, was 
supporting the family.  But after her marriage, they could no longer depend on their daughter’s 
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income.  In mid-2009, Dada and Bhauji sold their family land, demolished their old traditional 
Dhimal house and built a new, cemented house, which they planned to rent out for needed 
monetary income.   
On that day of the ‘Nepal shut down,’ when I arrived at their place in the afternoon, the 
new house was still under construction; Dada and Bhauji were using their old kitchen to shelter 
themselves and the construction materials.  They were surprised yet happy to see me on that day 
at their home.  I handed Bhauji a small bag of jalebi (South Asian sweet) that I had bought on the 
way from a street vendor.  After a brief conversation about the Maoist strike, I asked Dada how 
things were at the Kendra.  Bhauji interrupted by saying that it was only because of the strike 
that Dada was at home.  Dada smiled and asked Bhauji if we could have some khaja (Nep.  
snack).   
At one point, I asked Dada why he continued to be involved in the activities of the Kendra 
even after so many years.  Bhauji, who was frying some chicken meat in a pan, gazed at Dada’s 
face with a curious look.  Perhaps more than me, she wanted to hear Dada on this topic.  With a 
sign of seriousness in his face, Dada first faced towards the floor and slowly spoke looking at 
me:  
Janak bhai (Nep. younger brother), this samaj seva (social service, activism) is like a nashā  
(Nep: addiction)!  Thirty years, more than thirty years, I have been walking into it (pause)- for 
the community, and for the development of our jāti.  So much time, I’ve invested for this.  
What did I get for myself?  Nothing! I earned no money out of it.  Instead, I had to sell my 
land to support my families.  The biggest lost (pause, low voice)… I lost my son, only son.  
Ke garne! (what to do?) Always, I say to myself, I should quit now.  But I get involved 
anyway.  Everybody comes and asks me to continue.  Yes, I tell you, this is a nashā! 
(Interview with Dada, December 20, 2009). 
 
 As Dada spoke, Bhauji listened quietly.  Perhaps Dada’s mentioning of their son who had 
died, I was told because of high fever when he was a college student, made her emotional.  A 
silence fell on our conversation.  Bhauji added some water to the pan.  Dada stood up and 
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suggested that we should have some janajāti chiyā, which literally means ‘indigenous tea’ but 
here he used it to refer to the locally brewed alcohol.89  He went out of the room to get some 
janajāti chiyā; perhaps he needed to be alone for a while.  When Dada left, I asked Bhauji what 
she thought of Dada’s contribution to the Dhimal community.  “People respect him a lot.  I have 
seen that.”  I expressed my own respect for Dada.  Adding some lafā (Dh. green leaves) and 
slowly stirring them in the boiling soup in the pan, Bhauji responded, “Yes, he has done a lot.”  
Then she paused for a while and said:  
Ijāt ta chha- yes, there is the honor and prestige.  But one has to look for the family as well, 
isn’t it so?  He is always out, never around home.  Who’s going to do work here?  We don’t 
have our son; now our daughter is gone [married].  Who’s going to plough the fields?  This 
monsoon, we were the last family to plough our fields for paddy plantation.  I cannot do all 
things by myself.  It isn’t that easy, is it so? (Interview with Bhauji, December 20, 2009). 
 
 
 The brief account of Dada and Bhauji’s reflections help us to imagine the complex lived 
realities of the senior Dhimal activists whom I know and interviewed for this study.90  Why do 
people such as Dada, who encountered particular political-economic and historical conditions of 
marginality, dispossession from his lands in particular, become devoted to activism to such an 
extent that it became inseparable from their sense of selves? Informed by this question, the 
central goal of this chapter is to offer an understanding of indigenous activism by privileging the 
experiences and reflections of people like Dada.   
 In this chapter, I will provide an ethnographic introduction to Dhimal indigenous 
activism, its history and social geographies of activism by drawing on my observation and 
interviews with the Dhimal activists.  In order to elucidate why people like Dada become 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
89!Since alcohol is an integral part of ādivasi (janajāti) cultural ways of life, Dada’s use of the term ‘janajāti chiyā’ 
for alcohol is interesting for positioning alcohol as a regular drink such as ‘tea.’ 
!
90!“Activist” is a label I have imposed on them for the purpose of my study.  Dhimal don’t use any particular term to 
mark their distinction as activists.  Some of them use term as samajik karyakarta (social worker) or refer to their 
positions in the organizational structure of the Kendra such as sadhasya (member). 
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involved in indigenous activism, we need to locate their activism in its historical contexts.  
Hence I will also briefly sketch the general political-economic conditions between 1950 and the 
1980s to highlight how these historical circumstances influenced these activists’ understanding 
of ethnic identity, political subjectivities and agency, and their sense of responsibility to act on 
the conditions which had “disempowered their ability to socially produce themselves as 
collectives” (Turner, 1999: 132).   
 The primary goal of this chapter is to provide an understanding of Dhimal indigenous 
activism by focusing on the life experiences of the senior Dhimal activists whom I know and 
worked with for this study.  In doing so, this chapter will challenge the ‘spatial-economic’ 
framework, popular in the study of ethnic and identity politics in the South Asia and Himalayan 
regions, which depicts “ethnic activists” as middle-class and urban intellectuals (Shah, 2010; 
Fisher, 2001).  As an alternative, I approach indigenous activism by centering on how peoples’ 
understanding of themselves as moral social actors with a felt sense of social responsibility and 
duty towards their community motivate them to become activists.  My approach to indigenous 
activism as a moral practice with emphasis on people’s felt sense of embodied duty and 
responsibility is informed by my ethnographic data.   
  
 
Activism And The Production Of Social Collectives 
!
 In the interview passage cited above, Dada used the notion of samaj seva to refer to his 
continual involvement to work for the collective good of Dhimal community.  I have used the 
term ‘indigenous activism’ to refer to what Dada described as samaj seva, in order to emphasize 
his enduring embodiment of and commitment to his ethnic identity as the basis of his community 
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organizing actions (see Rappaport, 2004).91  In Nepal and India, the concept of samaj seva, 
though very fluid and elusive, is widely used to mean service (seva) for the welfare and benefit 
of community or society (samaj) (Srivastan, 2006: 427) and evokes the sense of people’s selfless 
action and involvement.  Related to the Hindu ideology and social practices of caste (Watt, 
2005), the notion of seva, according to Srivastan (2006: 146) “may traditionally have been 
associated with a normally menial, demeaning or polluting act of service” such as “as pressing 
another's feet or legs to relieve suffering.”  But the meaning of seva changed when it was used as 
an idiom of political action and mobilization in the freedom movement during the colonial period 
in India (Srivastan, 2006).  It gained its present popular meanings of ‘service’ and ‘selflessness’ 
when the nationalists and political leaders used the concept of seva to elicit people’s participation 
in  “serving the nation” (Watt, 2005) in their attempts to create an active and responsible 
citizenry in the post-colonial period in India.   
 Similarly, in Nepal the concept of samaj seva became popular after the advent of the 
party-less, autocratic Panchayat regime (1960-1990) which defined the right of peoples to form 
political parties and political associations as anti-nationalist and thus legally punishable actions.  
The Panchayati rulers popularized the notion of samaj seva in the sense of ‘serving the nation’ as 
secular “principles of selflessness and sacrifice” (Ciotti, 2012: 149) in order to produce a 
depoliticized citizenry.  Thus, the state discourses of samaj seva and encouragement of people’s 
participation in ‘social services’ offered ethnic and political activists an important public space to 
organize their activism without being seen as ‘doing politics’ by the state authorities.  This 
particular historical context can explain why Dada deployed the term samaj seva to describe 
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91!The anthropologist Joanne Rappaport (2004: 116-117) reminds us that consciousness of their ethnic identity, their 
sense of identity as members of a collective, is the distinctive attribute of indigenous activists which makes activism 
meaningful for them and their community. 
!
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what I have called ‘indigenous activism.’  What struck me most in Dada’s explanations is his use 
of the idea of nashā, which I have translated as “addiction,” to describe why he would continue 
to devote to himself indigenous activism despite the many hurdles and challenges he had 
encountered.92 
 According to the Nepali Brihat Sabdakosh (2010 [1983]), the official dictionary of 
Nepali language, the word nashā has five meanings, and three of these are associated with 
conditions of or materials causing intoxication that negatively affects an individual’s mental and 
physical conditions.  Nashā’ also means ‘proudness” or boastfulness’ as in sampati ko nashā 
(being boastful of one’s wealth).  However, it also refers to “the mental attitude to be 
continuously involved in one particular work, thing or event, no matter whether good or bad” 
(NPP, 2010: 672).  Hence the word also implies undeterred devotion and dedication towards one 
particular compulsion.  Dada’s use of the metaphor of nashā to characterize the inseparability of 
activism from his body, his sense of self, further becomes evident by the idea of ‘walking’ he 
invoked to underline his undeterred continuity in activism despite the enduring pain caused by 
the loss of his son and the weakening effects activism had on the sustenance of his family.  Like 
Dada, many other Dhimal activists use Nepali terms such as hidnū (to walk or hidēko to mean 
“having walked”) and ‘lāgnu’ (lāgēko, past participle of lāgnu) − which Turner’s Comparative 
and Etymoloigcal Dictionary of the Nepali Language (1931) translates as “to be attached to, 
cling to; persevere” – in order to emphasize their continual involvement in activism.  In a later 
part of this chapter I will return to the significance of hidnū and ‘lāgnu’ for elucidating Dhimal 
activists’ understanding of their activism as an embodied practice.  Here it is sufficient to 
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92!Interestingly, the etymological root of the English word ‘addiction’ is similar to the meaning of nashā in Nepali.  
According to Oxford English Dictionary (1996, 2nd edition), the verb “addict” was used to mean “to attach (anyone) 
to a pursuit” and “to devote, give up, or apply habitually to a practice” in the 17th century.   
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emphasize that these terms convey Dhimal activists’ deeply felt sense of social responsibility and 
duty, which they embody and enact as moral practices. 
 At the family level, as Bhauji poignantly expressed, Dada’s commitment to indigenous 
organizing had kept him detached from his necessary familial duties and responsibilities.  It is 
not that Bhauji disapproved of Dada’s activism; she appreciates the contributions that her 
husband has made for the Dhimal community.  However, as her statement “one has to look for 
the family as well” lucidly explains, they cannot sustain themselves by leaving the family fields 
barren.  Perhaps she wished that Dada could have approached his family responsibilities with the 
same level of dedication that he had devoted to his activism.  Bhauji is not directly involved in 
organizational leadership positions in the Kendra, but she is equally an “indigenous activist” 
(Rappaport, 2004), a point I should make explicit here.  She actively participates in and 
contributes to the Kendra’s activities in her village, particularly with Dhimal women through 
their gendered spaces of activism, which I will discuss in the next two chapters.  Despite her 
involvement in activism, Bhauji did not give me the sense that she is addicted to it as Dada is, 
which is not to suggest that she is less concerned with or indifferent to the issues raised by the 
Kendra.   
 It is important we recognize that who could become completely ‘addicted’ to activism is 
equally shaped not only by people’s social positions such as class, education attainment, political 
participation, and other things, but most importantly the normative gender roles and 
responsibilities people socially inherit in specific social-historic periods.  Unlike Dada, Bhauji 
was deprived of educational opportunities during the 1960s and 1970s, as were many other 
Nepali women at that period, and there was no social encouragement for women to participate in 
formal political activities (ibid).  Moreover, her roles as mother and wife, and her felt 
! 145!
responsibility and duty towards her family equally restricted her social geographies for activism 
while it simultaneously provided the needed family support for Dada to devote himself to work 
for their community.  So when Bhauji asked me, “It isn’t that easy, is it?” she was also alluding 
to the challenges they encounter in maintaining the delicate balance between one’s felt sense of 
responsibility towards the continual making of Dhimal as a community and sustaining one’s own 
family without having to sell one’s ancestral lands for individual survival. 
 The preceding reflections of Bhauji and Dada equally relate to the social experiences of 
other Dhimal indigenous activists whom I closely followed and worked with in Morang, Jhapa 
and Kathmandu, Nepal’s capital city, during my fieldwork period.  My “friendship” (Fricke, 
2006) with them enabled me to understand indigenous activism with a more empathetic gaze by 
paying close attention to their life experiences and the challenges they face not only as activists 
but also as father, husband, wife, daughter, son, village head, priest, and so on.  These Dhimal 
activists whom I know do not fit the images of ethnic activists that circulate in scholarly and 
popular critiques of ‘identity politics’ in Nepal (see Mishra, 2012). 
  Many scholarly works on ethnic and identity politics in Nepal and South Asia describe 
ethnic activists as educated and middle class individuals who live in cities detached from the 
reality of the rural people they claim to represent and speak for (Shah, 2010; Fisher, 2001).  Or 
they are the ‘elite’ members of their community (Guneratne, 2002), who, with supports from the 
state, international donor community, and mainstream political parties, set the movement agenda 
in order to gain economic and political opportunities for their personal benefit (Mishra, 2012).  
In her recent work among the ādivāsi in Jharkhand region of India, Alpha Shah (2010) exposes 
what she calls the “dark side of indigeneity” (p: 9) to show how “global discourses of indigeneity 
can reinforce a class system that further marginalizes the poorest people” and how “this class 
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dimension to the indigenous rights movement is likely to get erased in the cultural-based identity 
politics it produces” (Shah, 2010: 12).   
 I acknowledge the value of these scholarly works and their arguments.  They point to the 
need for a critical approach in which analysts/scholars pay equal attention to the ways in which 
social movements generate their own internal contradictions and struggles in terms of class, 
gender, regionalism, generation, the urban-rural divide, and so forth.93  But the claim that only 
urban or elite members of a community have a stake in indigenous political movements (Shah, 
2010), and that “the poor (in Nepal) are more interested in making a living than in their ethnic 
identity (Gellner, 2012: 98) simply reduces activists like Dada to ‘homo economicus’ and tags 
his enduring engagement in activism as a middle class politics of resource and power 
appropriation.  In this chapter, I offer an alternative approach to indigenous activism that moves 
beyond the narrow spatial-economic framework based on class positions and the urban-rural 
divide of activists. 
 I argue that for Dhimal activists, indigenous activism is a moral practice based on their 
sense of embodied duty and responsibility towards their community.  My approach to activism as 
a morally embodied practice is informed both by my ethnographic data and Terence Turner’s 
(1999) formulation of indigenous activism.  He has persuasively argued that the essence of 
indigenous activism is “the struggle for the continued production of collective identity, the self-
reproduction of the social group, with its values and forms of personhood.  This is a struggle for 
social production in the broadest sense” (Turner, 1999: 132; see also Holmberg, 2011).  I find 
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93!The claim that indigenous politics silence or marginalize class politics is a recurrent theme in anthropological 
debates on ‘indigeneity’ (see Veltemeyer, 1997; Beteille, 1998; Warren, 1998; Friedman, 1999; Rata, 2000 
Kjosavik, 2005), and this has been vocally championed by Marxist scholars in Nepal as well (Mishra, 2012; Fisher, 
2001; Sakar, 1995; Toffin, 2009).  For a productive engagement between Marxism and indigeneity, see Turner, 
2007; Veltemeyer, 1997). 
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Turner’s emphasis on the “social production of collectives with its distinct values and forms of 
personhood” useful to approach activism as one form of social practice people enact in order 
produce their social collectives as Dhimal, not simply as a generic Nepali (Holmberg, 2011).   
 But I also take cautiously scholarly emphasis on ‘struggle’ and ‘resistance’ as the 
defining attribute of indigenous activism.  Turner (1993: 132), rightfully so, emphasizes that 
indigenous political movement is a struggle to respond to “the global-national political forces 
that disempower peoples’ ability to socially reproduce their social collectives” (Turner, 1999: 
132).  His emphasis on struggle against the global-national political forces captures the defining 
feature of global indigenous politics (Niezen, 2004), and it is relevant for considering the 
centrality of power relations between the state and Dhimal in our analysis of their activism.  
However, an overt emphasis on ‘struggle’ and ‘resistance’ without taking into account how 
people understand these practices can potentially miss the embedded meanings that motivate 
people to become activists (Mahmood, 2005). 
 In Nepal, the possibility of waging an overt organized resistance based on ethnic identity 
and the claim of indigenous rights was severely limited under the oppressive, and utterly 
assimilative and homogenizing Panchayat regime (1960-1990).  Similarly, the omission and 
muting of ethnic issues in the oppositional political movement, based on liberal ideals of 
democracy and civil political rights, and leftist politics, based on ideologies of class struggle, had 
further curtailed the space for organized ethnic struggle during that period.  Given the dominance 
of such marginalizing political environments, we need to pay closer and more sensitive attention 
to the kinds of political options and resources which were available to Dhimal during the period, 
and how they used these options in their struggle for claiming their ethnic identity and continual 
production of their community.  Similarly, in order to ground activism in its historical contexts, it 
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is equally important to focus on the meanings these practices of struggle carry for the activists 
and their community.  My discussions of the Dhimal embodied sense of duty and responsibility 
will help to illustrate why they consider activism an embodied moral practice. 
 Therefore when senior Dhimal activists like Dada and many others whom I know 
explained to me their involvement in activism as a nashā, they did not simply convey their 
enduring altruistic involvement for the betterment of their community.  They emphasized the 
inseparability of activism from their sense of self, hence activism as enactments of their 
obligatory duty and responsibility.  Related to this understanding of activism by these activists is 
the self-positioning of themselves as ‘conscious’ social actors cognizant of their political agency 
to act on the world that acts on them.  The understanding that they were political actors during 
the period of temporal urgency for their community is central to Dhimal activists’ explanations 
that they acted out of their realization of duty as aware and righteous members of their collective.  
Hence in their retellings of why they became involved in activism, senior as well as youth 
activists emphasized their felt sense of temporal urgency to act on the existing political-
economic circumstances in order to positively influence the empowerment of their community.   
But what is equally illuminating in these Dhimal activists’ views of themselves as agentive 
social actors is their acknowledgement of Dhimal predecessors as morally embedded political 
actors who laid the path for future generations to engage with the forces affecting their 
community.  Dhimal activists understand their political agency and embodied duty towards their 
community by relating their social biographies of belonging to a particular historical period 
(1950s-1980s) -- a time in which the Dhimal community faced devastating political, economic 
and cultural marginality.  And while locating themselves as political actors confronting these 
historical conditions, these activists also connect themselves with their predecessor activists and 
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render their ancestors’ contributions and political agency visible to new generations.  To put it 
another way, my use of the term ‘moral’ to qualify Dhimal activism is strongly informed by 
Dhimal activists’ emphasis on the social relations of responsibility and duty that their embodied 
practices of activism reproduce across generations.  I argue that this sense of embodiment is vital 
to understanding Dhimal explanations for their becoming involved in indigenous activism, 
explanations that call to mind moral practice and their understanding of responsibility and duty. 
 
 
The Social Geography Of Dhimal Indigenous Activism   
 
 Dhimal’s indigenous activism that I observed during my fieldwork was not an isolated 
phenomenon; it was intricately tied with and influenced by larger political transformations and 
similar indigenous mobilizations at the local, regional, national and global levels.94  However 
there exists no single or homogenous indigenous political movement of Dhimal.  Instead, they 
are engaged in indigenous political activism through various organizations and political 
alliances.  Apart from their national indigenous organization, Dhimal Jati Bikas Kendra, there 
were five ethnic associations of Dhimal affiliated with various political parties at the time of my 
fieldwork.  Yet the Kendra still stands out as the most important and influential pan-Dhimal 
indigenous organization that can encompass all Dhimal irrespective of their political ideologies, 
party-affiliations, class, and gender backgrounds.   
 Since the majority of Dhimal still live within their ancestral territories, their indigenous 
activism and the activities of the Kendra are mostly concentrated in Morang and Jhapa.  In 
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94!I use these spatial scales as heuristic frameworks to highlight Dhimal’s different yet sometimes overlapping 
geographies of activism, their intended target groups, and participants in the movement activities.  They are not 
discrete and independent spaces.  However, for my analysis, it is also important to distinguish between Dhimal’s 
activism, for example, in Morang and Jhapa with that in Kathmandu where only 8 % of the total population of 
Dhimal reside (Gurung, H. et al., 2006, Table: 33, p: 100).   
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Nepal, the majority of the representative indigenous organizations (jāti organization) of other 
indigenous groups are based in Kathmandu, with their district chapters in their ancestral 
territories.  However, Dhimal have reversed the prevalent “state spatialization” (Gupta and 
Ferguson, 2002) by centering Morang as the ‘headquarter’ of the Kendra, while making 
Kathmandu, the epicenter of Nepal’s state power and political activism, its district chapter.  
Hence the urban-rural dichotomy becomes obsolete in examining Dhimal indigenous activism.  
It is the local embeddedness of the Kendra and its activists that defines Dhimal indigenous 
activism. 
The majority of Dhimal indigenous activists live in their communities, and no matter what 
class or profession they belong to, their everyday lives are shaped and mediated by similar 
textures of social and cultural worlds that their fellow Dhimal community members share.  You 
can meet these Dhimal activists organizing the blocking of the East-West Highway in their 
solidarity, for example, with the Limbus, to demand the establishment of ‘the autonomous state 
of Limbuwan.’95  Next week, you can see them in their farms plowing or helping their Brahmin 
neighbors to harvest their paddy or you can find them performing their communal ritual, Shrejat 
or attending funerals, marriages, and so forth.  Moreover, as members of the actually existing 
localized Dhimal community, these activists cannot escape and are expected to abide by the ties 
of kinship, marriage, rituals, reciprocal exchange and other shared practices that Dhimal enact to 
socially reproduce themselves as a members of a Gramthan, the village shrine or a village (see 
Chapter 5).  Their locally embedded cultural practices of community making such as clan 
membership, marriage, village ritual, and annual fairs in which people suspend their differences, 
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95!!Limbus have been demanding that the regions between the present day Arun river and Mechi river, which also 
include Dhimal’s ancestral territories, should be declared as an autonomous federal state of Limbuwan (see KYC, 
2007). 
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even though temporarily, are also the very spaces of everyday practices which provide the 
sources of moral authority for Dhimal indigenous activism and activists (see Chapters 5 and 6). 
A span of three generations of Dhimal, each bringing with them different as well as shared 
experiences, worldviews, knowledge, skill, and tactics of activism, is involved in the making of 
Dhimal indigenous activism in Morang, Jhapa and Kathmandu.  Many of the senior activists, 
fifty years and above, have a longer history of activism; some of them, who are also the founding 
members of the Kendra, have been involved for more than three decades.  All the senior Dhimal 
activists are male, predominately from farming families based in Morang and Jhapa.  And it is 
important to mention here that none of them lives in Kathmandu.  For Dhimal living in Morang 
and Jhapa, the capital city is not a ‘local’ for the simple fact that Kathmandu does not constitute 
a ‘village’ as it is understood and lived by Dhimal in their everyday life (see Chapter 5).   
Many of these senior activists are also involved as regional level leaders or workers of 
various national political parties; some of them have been involved in ‘party politics’ since the 
early 1970s, within the period when party politics was still banned in Nepal (1960-1990).  Thus 
these senior activists also have grounded experiences of political activism.  The category of 
senior that I have used here also includes the important social actors affiliated with Dhimal’s 
customary institutions such as Manjhi (the village head), Dhami (the village priests), Oja 
(shaman), and Hanuwa (assistant of Dhami) who are indispensible to the constitution of any 
Dhimal village.  The importance that the Kendra has accorded to this group of seniors, whom I 
call ‘cultural activists’ (Warren, 1998), and their active involvement in the organization’s 
cultural and political activities strengthen the moral authority and social legitimacy of Dhimal 
Jati Bikas Kendra (see Chapters 5 and 6). 
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The other important category of Dhimal activists is the “Yuva” or the youths.96  Based in 
Morang, Jhapa and also in Kathmandu, these Dhimal youth activists are youth between the ages 
of fifteen and thirty five years, who mostly come from high school and college students.  Other 
professionals such as journalists and teachers of these age groups are also the leading members 
of this group.  However, more than age, it is the group’s orientation, their modalities of activism 
and their organizational approach that mark these youths as a distinct category of Dhimal 
activists.  One of the most important marks of this distinction is that they have formed their own 
political party based on indigenous identity.  They reject the mainstream political parties in 
which their parents and senior Dhimal activists are involved.  The youth activists are also distinct 
in terms of the remarkably higher participation of Dhimal women, including in leadership 
positions within their organizational structures.  The conflict between the youth and other groups 
of activists, and how they mediate these generational divergences is the major focus of my 
discussions in Chapter 5. 
There are other activists who do not fit either of these two categories, warang-berang and 
youth activists.  Even if they belong to the same age group as ‘youth,’ they are not part of the 
youth activists because of their affiliation in the mainstream political parties.  And since many of 
them are under fifty, and are not the founding members of the Kendra and its Manjhi-Dhami 
committee, they do not fit the category of ‘seniors’ that I have used here.  Nevertheless, as an 
intermediary group, these activists are in the forefront of the Kendra’s leadership in all levels -- 
the central, regional and the village committees -- and in all three districts: Morang, Jhapa and 
Kathmandu.  They include people from all walks of life, but again men outnumber women. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
96!On the notion of “youth” as an analytical political category in Nepal, see Snellinger (2009). 
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The categorization of Dhimal activists that I have presented here, though a tentative 
typology, is ethnographically relevant in understanding the dynamics of Dhimal indigenous 
activism.  The diversity of activists and Dhimal’s social geographies of activism challenge the 
simplistic academic trope of ‘spatial-economic’ distinction that many scholars use to characterize 
indigenous activists simply as urban and middle-class people.  Instead Dhimal indigenous 
activism is both heterogeneous and complex.  It is important to emphasize here that their 
differences in terms of generation, gender, political ideologies, spatial locations of activism, and 
modalities of activism often rupture the needed cohesiveness and cooperation among Dhimal 
activists.97  But this important academic concern with the “dark side of indigeneity” (Shah, 
2010) also needs to focus on how people, activists and non-activists alike, confront and subvert 
the structural relationships of domination which get perpetuated in the community through social 
movements.  At the same time, our focus on conflicts and contradictions among movement 
actors should not divert our analytical gaze from what brings these divergent activists together as 
a collective in their indigenous activism.  My subsequent chapters will illustrate in detail how 
Dhimal activists also strive to come together as a community through concrete practices and 
efforts.   
In her important ethnographic work on Mayan indigenous activism in Guatemala, Kay 
Warren (1998:177-193) has demonstrated the significance of focusing on ‘activism across 
generation’ in order to understand how political struggles are reproduced over time.  Informed by 
her analysis, I argue that in order to understand why Dada and other Dhimal indigenous activists 
felt compelled to become involved in organizing their community, we need to grasp the 
particular historical-political conditions that shaped their life experiences as Dhimal, rather than 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
97!See my discussions on Chapters 4 and 5 for illustrations. 
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approach them as merely some generic Nepali individual social actor.  Hence, taking the present 
Dhimal activists as the protagonist narrators of Dhimal’s history of ethnic organizing, I will 
briefly discuss the general political-economic conditions between 1950 and 1980 in order to 
highlight the interplay among historical contexts, Dhimal activists’ understanding of their 
political agency and political subjectivities, and their history of ethnic activism. 
 
Narrating the History of Dhimal Ethnic Organizing: Activism Across Generations 
 
 “ It’s a very jumping interview.  It moves forward and backward along five decades in 
time!”  I wrote a reminder to myself in the notebook after Babai and I finished our ninety-minute 
long conversation on the morning of April 9, 2008, at their beautiful traditional Dhimal house in 
Damak region of Jhapa.  Babai, then sixty-two years old, whose help and knowledge have been 
instrumental in shaping my research, is one of the senior Dhimal indigenous activists and a 
political leader now affiliated with the United Communist Party of Nepal, Maoist (UCPNM), the 
political party of the former Maoist insurgents who waged a violent “people’s war” in Nepal 
from 1996 to 2006.  Like Dada, Babai has lived most of his time in Morang and Jhapa, and he 
too has been involved in indigenous activism for the last four decades.  Our conversation on that 
morning focused on the history of Dhimal’s ethnic organizing – a topic that Babai has lived and 
made a major part of his life history.  It is a past that he himself, like Dada, represents and 
continues to live in in the present (Tonkin, 1992: 2).   
As he opened up some pages of his experiential history of activism for me, Babai himself 
undertook an emotional “memory walk” (Bonilla, 2011) through which he connected his actions 
with those of his ancestors, and with the events and political contexts that had influenced him 
and his warang-berang in the past.  What astounded me as Babai begin to relate the history of 
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Dhimal ethnic activism is the centrality he accorded Dhimal ancestors and their experiences as 
the subject and focus of his reflections.  “Things were different in the Tarai before 1950.98  Our 
purkhā (Nep.  ancestors, seniors) were happy with their life in the forest,”!Babai unwrapped his 
reflections suggesting that Dhimal had more control over their ways of life when their ancestral 
areas were densely forested and thinly populated.  And he added, “then our ancestors did not 
know much about politics,” which I read as his emphasis on the past, prior to 1950, when Dhimal 
were not required to deal with the state on an everyday basis.  Even though Dhimal purkhā may 
been less interested in politics, Babai did not forget to emphasize how some of their grandparents 
actively participated in and contributed to Nepal’s first people’s revolution that overthrew the 
century-long oppressive Rana Regime (1846-1950) in 1950.  Babai’s emphasis on this particular 
history of Dhimal’s participation in the “epoch-making event in Nepal’s history” (Joshi and 
Rose, 1966: 175) is tellingly illustrative of how Dhimal activists understand their ancestors as 
political actors, and how they commemorate these ancestors, for example those who participated 
in the revolution of 1950, in their activism in order to spur political action today.   
The social history of the 1950 revolution is beyond the scope of this discussion, but it is 
important to emphasize here that the Tarai, particularly Morang (and Jhapa), had become a major 
zone of oppositional politics since the late 1940s, including an armed revolution against the Rana 
Regime (see Bastola, 1996).  According to the Nepali anthropologist Rishi K.  Regmi (1991: 175) 
who studied Dhimal in the late 1970s,  “no Dhimal took part in it (in the 1950 revolution).  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
98!By the mid 19th century, Nepal, under the autocratic and oligarchic Rana Regmi (1846-1950), had turned into a 
highly centralized, hierarchical and extractive ‘patrimonial’ Hindu state in which few social groups controlled the 
political power and economic resources (Chapter 2).  The Rana Rulers, with support from the British colonial 
regime, had attempted to seclude its polity from the outside world.  There were sporadic indigenous resistance 
against the Hindu state and the Rana polity during this period (see Tamang, 2008), however, the Rana regime to 
large extent, suppressed the popular as well as everyday resistance through various means.  However, the global and 
regional political transformations that followed the Second World War, particularly the processes of decolonization 
and liberation movements in India and the socialist uprising in China fueled the increasing anti Rana uprising in 
Nepal that had cumulated and consolidated during the 1940s (Joshi and Rose, 1966). 
!
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Sometime after the revolution, they had heard that the Rana’s reign was over and a People’s 
Government has been established” (see also Dahal, 1979: 102; emphasis mine).  But Regmi 
asserts, “the revolution of 1950 brought a new consciousness among the Dhimals” (p: 176).  In 
other words, the epoch-making political event of 1950 made Dhimal politically aware, but they 
remained outside the revolution.  Given the invisibility of non-dominant social groups in Nepal’s 
official historiography (Tamang, 2008) and popular presumptions that “backward” communities 
are unlikely to participate in nation-making politics (Panta, 1984; see Chapter 7), such 
representation of Dhimal as a ‘politically unaware’ social group is hardly surprising.  However, 
contrary to the claims of earlier Nepali scholars (Dahal, 1972: 102; Regmi, R.  K., 1991: 175), 
many Dhimal had actually participated in the revolution including the armed rebellion under the 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) formed to fight against the Rana regime (Dhimal, Som et. al.  
2010; Bastola, 1996).99  
In this interview, Babai provided me the names of Dhimal such as Sikaru Dhimal and Nar 
Bahadur Dhimal who had participated in the revolution of 1950.  Interestingly, he called them 
“our purkhā who raised guns against the Rana” but who were later forgotten and ignored when 
their party leaders “became minister and prime ministers” after the revolution.  The silencing of 
Dhimal political history (Trouillot, 1995), the question why their grandparents who ‘raised guns 
against the Rana regime’ have been forgotten and why they ended up becoming landless squatters 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
99!A people’s army called ‘People’s Liberation Army’ was formed under the Nepali Congress Party in 2006 in order 
to initiate an armed revolution, along with the popular protest, against the Rana regime.  People from various 
indigenous communities who had served in the British Indian army, because of their military skill and knowledge 
played crucial role in the leadership and operation of the People’s Liberation Army in the 1950 revolution (see 
Tamang, 2008).  According Mr.  Narendra Nath Bastola (born in 1919), who was responsible for leading the armed 
revolution under the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in the easternmost region of the Tarai in 1950, the Tarai 
ādivāsi supported the PLA by providing food, shelter, elephants for transportation, and additional military strengths 
by physically participating in the attacks with simple but deadly bow and arrows (see Bastola, 1996: 38-41).  In the 
preface of his memoir, Bastola acknowledges the contribution of Dhimal families in the revolution.  He writes, “we 
people living in the Aath Rai region (eastern Nepal) have not forgotten what they (Dhimal and others) had done for 
the success of the 1950 revolution in Jhapa” (Bastola, 1996; preface).!
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after the 1950 revolution, have re-emerged as emotionally charged narratives in their present day 
activism.  It was Babai who first told me how they were making the new generation aware of this 
history, and how this retelling of history and its forgetting had produced tangible political 
impacts.  Babai illustrated this with a story about the election campaigns for the Constituent 
Assembly in 2008.   
In this election, there were two Dhimal candidates on behalf of the Maoist party.  One of 
the candidates was Mr. Bhisma Dhimal, born in 1954, who was a political prisoner for 17 years 
(1972-1989), one of the longest in Nepal’s political history, for his involvement in the Jhapa 
Insurgency of the early 1970s.  After his release in 1989, like the revolutionary Dhimal of 1950, 
Bishma Dhimal had also suffered non-recognition from the political parties and the democratic 
state, and had faced severe economic hardship.  Babai, who had actively participated in the 
election campaign, recalled what he used to tell to Dhimal:  
Our ancestor Sikaru Dhimal raised his gun and fought against the Rana.  But what had 
happened to him afterwards at the end?  He came from a simple peasant family.  And he was 
ignored by his party.  The Nepali Congress completely ignored him while its leaders became 
māntri (Nep. minister) and pradhan māntri (Nep. Prime Minister) after the revolution.  There 
was Nar Bahadur Dhimal who joined the communist party in 1949.  He later became a 
sukumbāsi (Nep. landless squatters) and left his village.  Bishma Dhimal spent 17 years in 
prison fighting for the rights of landless, peasants, and Dhimal.  Now he is at Ghottetār.  
Others are in Baluwatār.100  Why? (Interview with Babai, November 5 2008). 
 
 Hence the story of Mr. Sikaru and Nar Bahadur Dhimal, when used in the election 
campaigns, resonated well with Dhimal in favor of the Maoist party that seemed to have 
recognized political activist such as Mr. Bishma Dhimal.  In other words, for present-day 
activists, their revolutionary Dhimal of 1950s and 1970s not only represented the political 
agency of their ancestors and their overt resistance against the oppressive regimes, hence their 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
100!Ghottetār is a place in Kathmandu valley (Bhaktapur) where Bishma Dhimal was living with his wife by doing 
commercial farming.  Baluwatār is the place in Kathamndu where the official residence of Nepal’s Prime Minister is 
located.  The use of place names signify the continuity of Bishma Dhimal as the diligent tiller of land in contrast to 
his many comrades who had lived in Baluwatār.!
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historical coevalence (Fabian, 1983).  They also indexed Dhimal’s experiences of non-
recognition and marginalization from Nepal’s mainstream political parties and the state.  Thus by 
enacting an emotional “politics of memory” (Rappaport, 1998), contemporary activists are 
reintroducing their ancestors as political actors, who in the past were unrecognized and ignored 
by the nation, but who now must be commemorated by the present-day Dhimal so that they 
would not have to face a similar experience of rejection and marginalization in the future.   
In their retellings of the history of Dhimal ethnic organizing, all the senior activists whom I 
interviewed portrayed their ancestors, to whom they referred in the possessive honorific Nepali 
pronoun ‘hamro purkhā’ (our ancestors), as the protagonist historical actors until they themselves 
become one of them in their narrated history.  In doing so, these senior activists assert their 
political agency and their felt sense of responsibility to act for their community in relation to the 
political-economic conditions in which they grew up, experiencing what it meant to be Dhimal 
and the challenges they had faced in order to continue as a jāti.! Hence I will discuss these 
historical contexts here in order to highlight how Dhimal activists locate themselves as morally 
embedded social actors acting on these political-economical conditions of marginality. 
 
 
‘The Responsibility Has Fallen On Our Shoulder’: Sense of Temporal Urgency and  
Activism 
!
 Dhimal had felt urgency to ‘preserve’ their culture and ethnic identity, and to expand 
their access to political power and state resources since the early 1950s.  Following the 1950 
revolution, Dhimal made efforts both individually and collectively to form ethnic associations 
and to expand their political alliances with other indigenous groups, for example, with the 
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Limbus, to contest Nepal’s first parliamentary election in 1959.101  However, these efforts failed 
to materialize into a social movement after the king took state power through a military coup and 
imposed a party-less political system called Panchayat system in 1960.  The Panchayat regime 
(1960-1990) fostered a monolithic notion of ‘Nepali identity’ based on the cultural ethos of the 
hill Hindus, and it severely repressed ethnic associations, particularly those with ‘political’ 
nature (for the state) and ethnic politics.   
 While the post-1950 political transformations stirred new political consciousness among 
Dhimal (Dahal, 1979; Regmi, 1985, 1991), their experiences of ‘losing ground’ further deepened 
when these political changes propelled new forms of state-led colonization of land, resources and 
political control in the Tarai, albeit under the umbrella of economic development, modernization 
and prosperity to build a ‘modern’ Nepal.  ‘Land reform’ was one of the most prioritized 
political agendas put forwarded by the political parties that had fought against the Rana regime 
to establish a democratic system in 1950 (Gaige, 1975).  In order to realize the full economic 
potential of the Tarai, malaria in the Tarai had to be ‘eradicated.’  Following malaria 
‘eradication’ in the mid 1950s, the state-led land reform of 1964, the settlement programs 
bringing hill people into Morang and Jhapa, and the construction of the east-west highway in the 
late 1960s, and other infrastructural developments transformed Dhimal ancestral territories into a 
new economic frontier for others (see Shrestha, 1989).  An unprecedented influx of hill migrants!
poured into the plains of Morang and Jhapa that resulted in the clearing of forest, indiscriminate 
land grabbing, and social and political-economic transformations which further marginalized the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
101!One of the earlier efforts of fostering pan Dhimal solidarity were initiated by Dhimal Manjhi (village head) in 
the aftermaths of the revolution of 1950 by convening a week long all Dhimal Majhi meetings in Jhapa which 
attended by more than fifty six villages in 1951 and 1962.  This alliance between Dhimal and Limbu are aimed at 
strengthening their ethnic identity.  And it also later developed into political form (Dahal 1979: 103).   
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Tarai ādivāsi to such an extent that many of them had to “struggle for survival” (Gaige, 1975).102   
 The reflections of the American anthropologist Robert Rhoades (1942-2010), who was 
involved in the US government assisted agricultural extension program as a Peace Corps 
volunteer in the Tarai in the 1960s provides a succinct illustration of how the clearing of the 
Tarai forest adversely impacted the local ecology and the Tarai ādivāsi.103  He reflects:  
After my first year of service, I was transferred to Chitwan (we called it Rapti valley) where 
I assisted in the extension activities of the newly established Rampur farm.  Along with my 
Peace Corps colleagues, Nepali counterparts, and USAID works, we operated International 
Harvest tractor crawlers and large moldboard plows to break up the elephant grass and tame 
the beautiful and wild Chitwan for settlement of migrants from the hills.  We did not give 
much thought to our impact on the environment as we drove the tiger, leopards, and other 
wild life to the brink of extinction and the indigenous Tharu to the margins of their native 
lands.  Reflecting back, I was a naïve but yet dangerous agent of the dominant post war 
“development” paradigm which promoted growth at the cost of environmental and cultural 
integrity (Rhoades, 1999: 13). 
 
As Rhoades indicates, the interplay among the post war development paradigm, the Nepali 
rulers’ need to settle the hill people in the Tarai, and the agricultural extensions drove Tarai 
ādivāsi such as the Tharu and Dhimal to the margins of their homeland.  The Rapti valley project 
was initiated in 1955 with US aid in order to “alleviate a food deficit in the Kathmandu valley 
and surrounding hill areas and to accommodate and provide employment to “poverty stricken” 
farm workers including flood refugees” (Government of Nepal 1956: 65 quoted by Ojha, 1983: 
27-29).  It tellingly illustrates how the aboriginal inhabitants of the Tarai, already marginalized 
by state landlordism and the Hinduization of the polity during the 19th century, increasingly 
became the “victims of progress” (Bodley, 1982) in order to feed Nepal’s capital and the hill 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
102!One of the earlier technical surveys of forest cover in the Tarai conducted in 1963/64 reported that Morang had 
the least forest coverage (32.3 percent of the total area) whereas Dang, located in the far western Tarai had its 75.4 
percent of the total area covered with forest (Department of Forest, Government of Nepal, 1967, Table.1, p: 17).  
According to another report, Morang lost about half of its forest area during the period between 1921 and 1977 
(Gurung, 1984: 85).  This comparative figure on the conversion of forest into cropland indicates that demographic 
and environmental shifts in Morang and Jhapa that directly impacted Dhimal and other Tarai.!
 
103!On Rhoades, see: http: //sfaanews.sfaa.net/2010/08/19/robert-e-rhoades/, accessed March 28, 2013.!
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people after 1950s.   
 
Paralleling this political-economic marginalization was the hard-hitting state-led policy of 
cultural assimilation imposed by the Panchayat regime under the rubric of ‘bikās’ or 
development (Pigg, 1993) and ‘national integration’ (Gaige, 1975).  The Nepali state and the 
ruling elites had aggressively promoted the cultural ethos of the ruling hill “high caste” Hindu 
groups as the “national culture” through state institutions and governance (Gaige, 1975; Gurung, 
1997).  This making of ‘hill nationalism’ in the post-1960s also impacted the evolving inter-
ethnic relationships in Dhimal villages.  Dhimals encountered tremendous social and political 
pressure to assimilate into the dominant culture.  They needed to learn and acquire new “forms 
of capital” (Bourdieu, 1986) to become modern Nepali citizens not only to achieve individual 
social mobility but also for the continual production of their collective selves as Dhimal.  They 
had to learn new ways of life such as learning to speak the Nepali language, wearing ‘national 
dress,’ celebrating the Hindu rituals as part of national festivals, and so on, in order to be 
accepted by the dominant others, state officials in particular.  They needed new skills and social 
organizations to cope with the challenges of a cash economy.  Similarly, ‘education,’ political 
participation in state-sanctioned institutions and access to administrative bureaucracy and state 
officials became an essential to resisting their conditions of marginality and to appropriating new 
opportunities for the continual social production of their community. 
All the senior Dhimal activists whom I know and interviewed were born between the 
1950s and 1960s.  They confronted radically different socio-economic and political 
environments than did their grandparents.  These senior Dhimal activists understand their 
political agency and their embodiment of a sense of responsibility toward their community in 
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terms of their social biographies of belonging in these historical periods.  When these senior 
Dhimal activists were growing up, their shared experiences of marginality, the loss of land and 
culture in particular, cemented their realization that the responsibility to collectively act for their 
jāti had “fallen on their shoulder,” as they put it to me.  Their collective understanding of 
temporal urgency, and their felt social responsibility for collective action is well captured by 
Babai when he explained why he and other Dhimal in the late 1960s become involved in 
activism.  He told me:  
 When Panchayat came and opened the forest after the malaria eradication, people from all 
over came here.  Then our land began to vanish away.  More and more Dhimal became 
landless.  Our culture was changing; people were taking cultural practices of other groups who 
settled here.  Our society was facing economic and cultural crisis.  Our festivals, wedding and 
ritual were becoming expensive.  Dhimal were weakened politically, economically and 
culturally. 
 
Our purkhā knew many things.  Many of them also became Pradhan Pancha but they did not 
know how to deal with the CDO (Chief district officer) and Anchalādhis, the administrative 
head of the zone.104  They did not have access to sarkar (the state, and also the king).  In the 
early 1970s, when we were youth, we were also a little bit padhe lekheko (literate, educated).  
Then we youths used to meet and say, “Oh, our land is almost gone now.  Our language and 
our culture are about to be vanished.  The responsibility has fallen upon on shoulders.  We 
must do something for our samaj (society).” At that time, we were also caught up by the wave 
of the communist movement that had come in Morang and Jhapa, (laughter) [Interview with 
Babai, April 9, 2008]. 
 
The passage cited above shows that the experience of loss, particularly the loss of land and 
culture, permeates Babai’s recital of the political-economic and social challenges his 
predecessors and the people of his generation had faced after the 1950s.  As the results of 
demographic shifts toward an increasing multi-ethnic sociality, the arrival of dominant other 
groups in their villages, and the state’s embracing of a monolithic national culture in all spheres 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
104!After the advent of Panchayat regime, Nepal was divided into 14 zones (Anchāl), 75 districts (jilā) 5 
development regions (bikās chetrā).  Each district was divided into many Panchayat- the village level elected 
governing unit for development, hence it was called Panchayat Bikas Committee (Panchayat Development 
Committee). 
! 163!
of national life after 1960s, Dhimal had to mediate the challenges of continuing their customary 
ways of life while adjusting to the new pressures of Hinduization and modernization (see Regmi, 
1985; 1991).  As Babai’s reflections show, Dhimal youths were also becoming assertive about 
the increasing Hinduization of their cultural ways of life at that period (see Regmi, 1985: 192).  
They were worried that the conditions of political and economic marginality might cause Dhimal 
ethnic identity and culture to vanish away in the same way that many of their ancestral land 
holdings had disappeared after the 1950s.  Hence their sense of ādivāsi identity and shared 
experiences of marginality had made them conscious of their responsibility to act collectively for 
their jāti 
Babai acknowledges the efforts that his predecessors made in order to subvert their 
emerging conditions of marginality.  But he also points out that the political agency of Dhimal 
ancestors was limited because of structural constraints imposed by the power relations between 
Dhimal and the dominant group vis-à-vis the new forms of bureaucratic and governing power of 
the exclusionary centralized state.  Dhimal had no access to nor control over these new power 
structures, even though many of them had become politically active at the village level.  It 
indicates that activists like Babai understand, drawing on their own lived experiences, that 
political agency is always limited and people mediate within the political options and resources 
available to them in order to act on the world in the specific historical-political conditions (Marx, 
1852).  His understanding of the constrained nature of political agency becomes apparent when 
Babai infers how access to ‘education,’ an entitlement that his parents and grandparents were 
deprived of, and then the emerging oppositional leftist politics opened up new possibilities for 
him and other Dhimal during the early 1970s in order to collectively work for the empowerment 
of their jāti. 
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But it was their shared experiences of loss of land and culture which ignited the realization 
of these Dhimal youths of the 1970s that the social responsibility of “doing something” for their 
samaj (community, society) had now had fallen from their predecessors to their own shoulders.  I 
argue that Babai’s statement “Oh, our land is now gone.  Our language and our culture are about 
to be vanished.  The responsibility has fallen upon on our shoulders” clearly illustrates how they 
as youths perceived the collective need to respond to their conditions of marginality as an 
embodied responsibility, not a free choice, the weight of which they felt on their shoulders.  Thus 
this social responsibility became a moral duty that the youths were required to carry on both by 
continuing the efforts of their predecessors and also by making new subversive efforts for their 
collective empowerment.   
Similarly, for Dhimal, the land reform of 1964 epitomizes the most devastating state 




The Land Reform And The Tarai Ādivāsi 
!
Land reform had been a major political agenda since the late 1940s during the formative 
period of Nepal’s two leading political parties, the Nepali Congress, a liberal democrat party, and 
the Nepal Communist Party (Gaige, 1975).  After 1950, a series of legislative measures was 
initiated in order to reform the existing unequal land tenurial relations, and ensure the property 
rights of the tenants (Regmi 1976: 176-191), though without any consideration for collective and 
customary land rights of the indigenous communities (Caplan, 1970).  Of all these efforts, the 
land reform of 1964 was the most important legislation; it imposed a ceiling on landholding size 
and abolished the jimindary system; it promised to redistribute land to the landless and advocated 
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lessening the burden of peasants’ indebtedness by lowering interest rates and institutionalizing a 
compulsory saving scheme at the village level (Zamin, 1973: 12).105  Here my concerns are not 
with the history, the overall impact, or the failures of the land reform program of 1964 (see 
Zaman, 1973), but specifically with how Dhimal experienced the land reform of 1964, and what 
it meant for them.106 
The land reform was completely insensitive to the preexisting land tenurial relations in 
Dhimal and the moral economy of reciprocity and redistribution supported by these relations of 
production; most importantly it failed to understand the ways in land was more than a 
commodity or an ‘economic’ property but an integral and generative part of Dhimal culture and 
history (see Chapters 2 and 5).  The land reform had devastating impacts for Tarai ādivāsi (see 
Guneratne, 2002; Gaige, 1975); all Dhimal irrespective of the size of their landholding were 
affected.   
In the previous chapter, I discussed why many Dhimal in the past, before 1950, had 
preferred not to own land as tax-paying tenant landholders of the state.  Instead they had 
established tenurial relationships with the village Majhi which had ensured a reciprocal relation 
of agriculture production and resource distribution among themselves.  When the ceiling of 25 
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105!The land reform of 1964 was implemented as a major political project of the Panchayat regime after the king 
Mahendra came into power through a military coup.  Federick Gaige (1975) has pointed out that Nepal’s land 
reform of 1964 was equally caught up in the geo-political relations of Nepal with the larger world.  The Indian 
government opposed the land reform for the potential dispossessions “the Tarai plain people who owned 50% of the 
rich Tarai land.”  Where as the US government made it clear that Nepal’s chance of receiving foreign aid and 
assistance would depend on the implementation of the land reform.  The US had worried that the communist 
insurgency would escalate in Nepal without reforming the disparity of land ownership (see Gaige, 1975: 172-178). 
!
106!The land reform of 1964 aimed to “ (a) impose a ceiling on land ownership, acquire land in excess of the ceiling 
and allot such land to others; (b) abolish jimindary (local landlord as tax collector) system; (c) give security to 
tenant-farmers, and to regulate the rent payable by them, and (d) to collect savings compulsorily, intercept 
outstanding loans and make institutional arrangements for credit operations” (Zaman, 1973: 12).  Landholding 
ceilings were fixed at 16.4 hectares (25 bigah), 2.7 hectares and 4.1 hectares per family for the Tarai and inner Tarai, 
the Kathmandu valley, and the hill and other regions respectively.  A family was defined as husband and wife, their 
sons below 16 and unmarried daughters under 35 (Zaman, 1973: 12, Ft.  1).!
!
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bigah of land holding per one family in the Tarai was imposed by the state in 1964, many of 
Dhimal village Majhi and landholding families lost their ‘excess’ lands.  This dispossession of 
Dhimal Majhi and landowning families also impacted the existing redistributive economy on 
which many villagers had become interdependent.  The situation further deteriorated when the 
intervening state failed to provide any alternate forms of redistributive economy and supports.107  
Many of these tenant families did not receive their tenancy rights nor did they get land from the 
state.  Those who received lands from the state in other areas eventually became landless by 
selling or mortgaging the land for subsistence.   
On the top of their devastating experiences of dispossession produced by land reform, what 
seems to have angered Dhimal the most was the ways in which the actual implementation of the 
land reform produced differential impacts for caste and ethnic groups based on their relative 
control over and access to political power.  In contrast to their own experiences, Dhimal saw how 
the big land-owning families belonging to the hill “high” caste groups did not lose land, and it 
was the people from the hill who disproportionately benefitted from state redistribution of the 
land (see Gaige, 1975: 175-197).  While these land-holding groups from the dominant social 
groups consolidated their economic and political power even after land reform, Dhimal village 
landlords, whose excess land was taken away by the state, progressively joined the class of 
proletariats.  Hence what happened to their village landlords after the land reform clearly 
signaled to Dhimal that even with their landholding, and hence economic power, rich Dhimal 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
107!For example the land reform had introduced new practices of ‘compulsory saving’ program in 1965 in which 
“every farmer was required to deposit a small percentage of his crops with the government each year, and the capital 
required in this way would be loaned back to villagers” (Gaige, 1975: 175).  There were widespread resentments 
against this scheme, which the villagers saw as another form of state taxation (ibid).  The villagers were required to 
manage such compulsory saving groups.  Dhimal mentioned me that such state schemes required new knowledge 
and skill such as accounting, auditing and technicality of the group management.  They only felt it as an imposed 
burden, incompatible to their ways of life.  Such saving scheme did not replace the role of village money lender who 
would still charge, for instance forty kilograms of paddy per year as interest to one hundred rupee borrowed by 
people.   
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were as vulnerable to political and economic marginality as any other Dhimal due to their lack of 
control over and access to the state power bureaucracy, and political alliances with the dominant 
groups.  For instance, when I asked Babai why he became a leftist political activist (communist) 
in the early 1970s, he told me:  
When the Panchayat came, what did the Chhetri-Bahun [the hill “high” caste people] do? 
They brought this land reform, and they said it was a ‘revolutionary land reform.’  But for 
whom?  They said they would take away the excess land people hold and give it to the 
landless or to those who have few landholdings.  How did they do it?  No landlords from 
their community (Chhetri-Bahun) lost their extra land holdings.  They are the clever people; 
they have connections with the palace, Kathmandu, administration-bureaucracy, police, 
military, and what not.  So some of them registered their lands under industry, tea garden, 
factory, and so on.108 
 
Those Dhimal who had more than 25 bigah of land, they could not do like this.  They did not 
know people in power.  They were innocent and did not lie.109  Their excess lands were taken 
away, and they also gradually became landless later.  And many of the tenant Dhimal, who 
were supposed to get land from the state, did not receive any land.  Those who received land 
from the state eventually became landless when they had to sell land to subsist, and meet 
their expenses such as the education of their children, marriage, etc.  [Babai provides a detail 
and long explanations of how Dhimal further became landless and marginalized]…It was not 
the Panchayat per se, not even the feudalism, but it was the Bahunbad (Brahmanism, the high 
caste dominance and its institutionalized forms in the state) that affected us the most.110 
 
Did you understand Janak bhai?  We, Dhimal, are the ādivāsi bhumiputrā (descendants of the 
earth/soil) of this area, but we became the first sukumbāsi (landless squatters), the first 
proletariat.  Then, what could we have become if not the communists? Tyasaile hami 
communist ma lāgēko- therefore we became (in the sense of “to clinch to, to attach to” or 
embody) communist (Interview with Babai, April 9, 2008). 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
108!With this statement, Babai is referring to the provision in the land reform that allowed people to register their 
excess landholding as ‘commercial or industrial lands.’  But only people with capital and power, hence the dominant 
group could take advantage of such provisions. 
!
109!Such self-perceptions of ādivāsi as candid and innocence people are common in Nepal and South Asia (need to 
cite).  Beside the fact that it was how Babai and other many Dhimal think of themselves and their ancestors, my 
intentions is not to privilege these perceptions.  But I do believe that as historically constituted ideas; these 
perceptions, like the colonial category of “primitive,” also make visible the power relations that shape the social and 
political life of these categories.  See Deloria (2004) on how unequal relations of power produce and sustain social 
stereotypes. 
!
110!In Nepal, the idea of ‘Bahunbad’ was first introduced by anthropologist Dor Bahadur Bista (1992) and later 
popularized by indigenous and Dalit activists.  See Bhattachan, 2003, 2005; Kamata, 1992; Malla, 1992.  For 
critique of the concept of “Bahunbad,” see Pahari, 1992). 
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 Thus Babai clearly states that the land reform disproportionately dispossessed Dhimal 
community while the traditional dominant groups were able to use it for their benefit.  I argue 
that Babai’s critiques of the land reform program as an expansion of the “high” caste domination 
should not be seen as his expression of hatred against the hill groups.  It needs to be understood 
as his critique of the exclusionary state practices and the political economy of power relations 
which continually perpetuated the historically produced structural relations of domination and 
subjugation based on caste, ethnicity and regional affiliations.  By the late 1960s, the hill groups, 
the “high” caste groups in particular had outnumbered the other groups demographically, and 
they had also become the dominant social groups in Dhimal ancestral territories.  111 The 
ideologies of caste hierarchy continued to shape the social relations between Dhimal and the hill 
Hindu groups (see Regmi, 1985).  Their control of the economic and political power, both at the 
national and the local level, enabled the hill “high” caste groups to appropriate lands from 
Dhimal through sale, mortgage, and by “unfair means.”112  As R. K.  Regmi (1985: 193) 
succinctly observed that “the friendship between the Brahmins and Dhimals were based on the 
relationships between the tax collector and the tax-payer ties at the best, and creditor-debtor 
relationships at the worst,” the relationships between Dhimal and their hill “high” caste 
neighbors were less egalitarian and respectful.  The land reform only poured more salt on this 
wounded social relationship between the two groups. 
 The land reform once again validated for Dhimals that their collective subordination as a 
Dhimal jāti mattered more politically in relation to the state and the other social groups.  In other 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
111 For instance, one study conducted in Budhbare village Panchayat of Jhapa in 1973 found that out of the total 
1844 household, 60% belonged to three groups: Brahmin, Chhetri and Newars.  And of all the owner cultivators of 
the land 70% were Brahmins and only 7% were the “natives” population- Dhimal and Rajhbansi (Sainju, Shrestha 
and Shah, 1973: part II, p: 1). 
 
112 Many Dhimal would keep telling me stories about how they were “cheated” by their Bahun-Chhetri neighbors.  
Also see Caplan (1972), Guneratne (2002). 
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words, their experiences of land reform and their increasing loss of land to the hill immigrants 
after 1950s strengthened Dhimal’s conviction that despite the change in regime, the state is at 
best under the spell of the political power of the hill “high” caste groups, and it exists only to 
benefit these dominant groups, not them.  Dhimal also experienced land reform as a state-
sanctioned political weapon, which the dominant “high” caste hill groups used, to borrow 
Harvey’ (2009) concept of “accumulation by dispossession,” to accumulate political and 
economic power at the expense of the Tarai adivasi.  Thus it is important to emphasize here that 
like the Limbus (Caplan, 1975) of the hill, and the Tharu of the lowlands (Guneratne, 2002), the 
“shared experience of losing land” is central to Dhimal sense of ethnic identity and their ethnic 
and political mobilization after the 1950s 
 
 
Leftist Political Movements And Ethnic Activism (1970s-1980s)  
!
 By the 1970s, Dhimals’ political and economic marginality had manifested itself in 
further landlessness, land mortgage through indebtedness, and the weakening of their customary 
social institutions of the Majhi system (Dahal, 1979).113  The oppositional politics that 
intensified after the rise of the party-less Panchayat system in the 1960s offered an important 
space for Dhimal to resist their political marginality.  After the 1960s, Morang and Jhapa 
districts had become strongholds of communist mobilization against the Panchayat regime and 
the feudal relations production that had continued in the Tarai despite the land reform of 1964.  
The failure of land reform of 1964, the pauperization of the peasantry, the periodic peasant 
uprisings in the Tarai (Mishra, B.  2001; Gaige, 1975; Thapa, 1996), the expanding underground 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
113!According to Dahal (1979: 24), 24 % of the Dhimal households were landless and there were very few 
households with large landholding in his study area.  It shows that within two decades of land reform, landlessness 
had become a major a problem among Dhimal.!
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communist organizing in the villages of Jhapa and Morang, and the resurgence of the violent 
peasant insurgency, popularly called the Naxalite movement (Singh, 1995) in the bordering areas 
of India, had stirred new political consciousness for Dhimal, particularly the newly educated 
youths at the end of the 1960s.   
Even though the leftist movements at that time had not addressed the issues of domination 
and oppression based on caste and ethnic identities, the communist agenda of  ‘land rights,’ 
‘lands to the tiller,’ and ‘liberation of oppressed class’ (see Mishra, B.  2001) resonated well with 
Dhimal; they found a common ground between leftist political ideologies and their state of 
marginality, particularly their shared experiences of loss of land and proletarianization.  
Moreover, the communist leaders and activists, who had to be underground during the period, 
sought shelter in Dhimal villages and held interactions with Dhimal youths in particular.  
Institutions of higher education were the major centers of Nepal’s oppositional politics during 
the Panchayat regime, and it was where many Dhimal students became involved in student-led 
political mobilizations.  At that period, Dada and other Dhimal youths joined or supported the 
underground leftist movements.  Some of them also become involved in the first post-1950 
armed communist insurgency movement, popularly called the Jhapa Insurgency of the 1970s. 
 
Dhimal’s participation and support for the leftist political movements during this period 
did not stem only from the narrow Marxist ideas of class based on economic criteria or relative 
position in the relationships of production.  As Babai explained, they understood it was the 
domination of the hill “high” caste group in the state power, the merging of caste and class in the 
hegemonic production of the political-economic relationships of exclusion and resource control 
which transformed Dhimal, irrespective of the size of their family landholdings, into an 
oppressed class.  To paraphrase Babai’s question, what else could they have become then (in the 
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early 1970s) if not communists, when the ādivāsi community had become the first sukumbāsi 
(landless squatters) in their own ancestral place?  It explains that for Dhimals, their political 
participation in the leftist movement was especially motivated by their need to place themselves 
back in their lands again.  Being sukumbāsi (landless squatters) was about being dispossessed not 
only from their means of economic livelihood but also from the inalienable relationship with 
their ancestral place (Caplan, 1970), which is indispensible for Dhimal’s collective ability to 
socially create themselves as a community with its distinct cultural ways of life and history.  The 
centrality of the claim of indigenous identity and the collective experiences of loss they had 
encountered as an ādivāsi, not simply as a generic poor peasant, helps us to understand why 
Babai and other Dhimal frame the history of their involvement in leftist politics as part of their 
ethnic activism.   
 Dhimal participation in the leftist movements during the 1970s and1980s did not directly 
contribute to advancing their ethnic organizing nor did it help them counter the conditions of 
Dhimals’ landlessness.  However, it certainly helped them to radicalize their political 
assertiveness and to challenge the everyday forms of cultural and political dominance of the 
other social groups in their villages.  In the early 1980s, the anthropologist R. K.  Regmi (1985: 
129-130) observed that:  
The author had evidence that many young Dhimal aligning with the Marxist group…In the 
general election on 1981 (for the Panchayat parliamentary system) many youth Dhimal youths 
canvassed for the Dhimal candidate, who contested and won from Morang constituency.  There 
are Dhimals, as well as Rajbhansi and Tharus (both are the Tarai indigenous groups) who have 
helped this Dhimal member to be elected. 
 
Furthermore, he also writes:  
 
“the young educated Dhimals are not ‘Sanskritization’ in the same sense that old Dhimals are 
doing….114  The conscious educated revolutionary youth of Dhimal society neither see 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
114!The concept of “Sanskritization” was developed by the noted Indian social anthropologist M.N.  Sriniwas to 
describe the social processes by which a “low caste” and other non-Hindu groups adopt the cultural ways of life and 
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themselves within the caste hierarchy nor unlike their elders find any religious meanings in 
Hindu religious practices” (Regmi, 1991: 145) 
 
 Hence R.  K.  Regmi’s observations tell us that the “educated and revolutionary” Dhimal 
youths of the early 1980s were rejecting the caste hierarchy and Hinduization of their social and 
cultural practices, and forming an inter-ethnic political solidarity to elect the Dhimal candidate to 
represent their concerns at the national level so that their voices could be heard (see Regmi, 
1985: 129-131).  Similarly, in his study of Dhimal undertaken in the late 1970s, Dahal (1979: 
120) succinctly captured Dhimal’s mistrust of the Nepali state and their feeling of ethnic 
solidarity.  He writes: “Dhimal still thinks the state to be rigid and authoritarian” and “they have 
cultivated the feeling that they should not let other groups win the election in their own place.”  
He asked one 70 years old Dhimal woman why she did not go to vote when her own son was the 
candidate in the village Panchayat election.  She told him: “Why wouldn’t I go to vote for my 
own son? I am too old.  I cannot even walk with the help of a stick.  I cannot travel by bus; the 
crowd (in the bus) would kill me.  What to do?  Everywhere the hill people dominate” (Dahal, 
1979: 120).  It shows that Dhimal were very vocal about their marginality and domination by the 
hill people in every sphere of society, including the crowding of a public bus.  However the 
existing political regime was too powerful to allow for a community mobilization based on claim 
of ethnic identity and rights.  Similarly, it was not possible for the Dhimal youths involved in the 
leftist political movements to organize Dhimal as a community solely on their Marxist inspired 
political ideologies alone.   
 A middle ground option they sought was to appropriate the dominant state-led discourses 
and practices of bikās under the seemingly non-political idea of jāti bikās (ethnic improvement) 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
values of the “high” caste Hindu groups (Brahaminic values and ways of life) (see Sriniwas, 1956).!!The concept has 
widely been used in earlier ethnographic studies (1950s-1980s) in Nepal in the study of the Hindu-tribal relationship 
and social-cultural change (Jones, 1976; Sharma, 1977).!
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to advance the processes of ethnic organizing as a community.115  The Nepali state and its rulers 
had aggressively promoted bikās as an inherently non-political nation-building practice such that 
to do ‘politics’ in bikās or to use bikās for political goals was deemed morally wrong and anti-
nationalist act.  Therefore, for Dhimal, organizing their community through jāti bikās would 
make their ethnic mobilization less suspicious to the state and others.  Furthermore, it also had 
the advantage of accommodating people from different backgrounds, particularly those with 
access with the state power, in community organizing.  The story of Mr. Naya Dhimal, a seventy 
three year old farmer from Karikoshi village of Morang illustrated how Dhimal elders and 
educated Dhimal youths appropriated state resources for ethnic organizing during the 1980s. 
 
 
Appropriating The State For Ethnic Activism 
!
Remembering his meeting with the king Mahendra (1955-1972) in 1970/1971, Mr. Naya 
Dhimal told me, “when I came out of the room and walked outside, I realized that my whole 
body was soaked with sweat as if someone had poured one ghailā (earthen water pot) full of 
water on me.  I have never seen and met the king before! Even my trouser was wet as if I had 
urinated in it.”  The meeting between the king, Nepal’s most powerful person at that period, the 
self-proclaimed incarnation of the Hindu deity Vishnu, and an ‘ordinary’ farmer from a 
peripheral village of Morang, perhaps explains why Naya Dhimal’s body was soaked with 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
115!The idea of jāti bikās, though it reiterates the notion that Dhimal are “backward,” hence “undeveloped” 
community, people can also transform their sense of “backwardness” into political subjectivities and mobilize their 
community in order to subvert their state of marginality (see Guneratne 1998, 2001; Fujikura, 2004).   
!
! 174!
sweat.116  “I was damned nervous as the king asked his secretary to note down many of things 
that I said.  I thought I was in trouble,” he recalled bursting into a loud laughter.   
The narrator of this story is a seventy-three year old farmer from Karikoshi village, who 
comes from a Manjhi (village head) family and whose family was politically influential in the 
past.117  Naya Dhimal had not attended any school nor had he held any position in the village 
level governing bodies, but because of the economic and political status of his family, he had 
more “time, resources, and social standing in the society to be persuasive” (Guneratne, 2005: 
125) in order to work for the community’s welfare and social change.  However his motivation 
to “work for the Dhimal jāti,” as he always used to say to me, derived more from the experience 
of humiliating encounters he had with dominant groups, particularly the state officials, and from 
his realization that lack of education had accelerated Dhimal loss of land and deepened their 
political marginality. 
Upon hearing that the king was to visit Dhankuta, the regional headquarters in the eastern 
hill located to the west of Karikoshi, Naya Dhimal traveled there in order to, as he said to me, 
“put down Dhimal’s concerns” to the king.  After six days of waiting, when he finally met the 
king, he requested that the head of the state provide free scholarships for school and college level 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
116!During the Panchayat regime (1960-1990) in which the sovereignty of the nation was vested in the king, these 
royal public audiences or dharshan bhet used to be important performative events in which public could ‘talk’ to the 
king in person and express their concerns or demands, thereby acknowledging the king’s sovereign authority as well 
as their own subordinated positions as subjects.  See Bista, 1998 
!
117!His elder brother, the village Manjhi, a local tax collector before 1950) and also served as the Padhan Pancha, 
the head of the locally elected village council, for many years during the Panchayat system (1960-1990).  Hence 
Naya Dhimal and his family have a long experience of dealing frequently with the state and its officials before and 
after 1950s.  However I would not characterize him as the “Dhimal elite” (cf.  Arjun Guneratne, 2002).  During my 
fieldwork period, of which I spent more than five months in Karikoshi village, none of the villagers indicated that he 
was an “elite” detached from the rest of others.  In contrast, he was, like other village elders, well respected and 
embedded in the village social relationships. 
!
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education for Dhimal, and a ‘weaving and tailoring’ training program for Dhimal women.118  On 
my asking if he remembered what he said to the king, he reflected:  
It’s been so many years.  I don’t remember all of what I said.  But I said something like this.  
Sarkar (the king, state)! We Dhimal used to own jagga-jamin (land), shelter, and cattle.  We 
used to have all these.  We used to protect ban-jungal (forest).  We have not indulged in any 
kind of jhoda padhani.119  But when the land reform was implemented, it completely 
messed us up, sarkar [Yasle hamilai lathaa lithinga banayo sakrar!].  People from 14 zones 
and 75 districts came to our place.  Now we have become bhumihin (landless), sarkar.  Now, 
we need education, and Dhimal jāti should get higher education.  We need free education 
from grade one to grade ten (high school), and in the college level as well.  Our kids need 
education.  Our youths need education.  Unless our society become educated, we cannot 
reach to the same level as other groups, sarkar (Interview with N.  Dhimal, April 5, 2008) 
 
 
 What I find insightful in the passage cited here is that it powerfully resonates with the 
emphasis by Babai and other Dhimal on the shared experience of loss of land that defines 
Dhimal’s sense of marginality and their critiques of social changes resulting from state-imposed 
policies and programs such as the land reform (see also Guneratne, 2002: 138-140).  The fact 
that it was the king Mahendra who had implemented the land reform and settlement programs in 
the 1960s makes this conversation further insightful, because it illustrates how subaltern subjects 
can enact subtle yet subversive politics by appropriating the dominant relations of power.  By 
telling the king to his face that Dhimal, who used to own land and protect the forest in the past, 
had become completely “messed up” and landless after the land reform program, Naya Dhimal 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
118  The scholarship was meant for Dhimal men and women, the girl child in the school in particular.  According to 
him he requested ‘weaving and tailoring’ with a hope that the training and introduction of the modern loom would 
enhance Dhimal women’s traditional weaving skill into an income generating means.  However, his emphasis on 
‘weaving’ training also signals the dominant development ideologies of the 1970s- ‘Women in Development’ which 
emphasized on modernizing women’s traditional skill for their development. 
  
119 Illegal clearing of forest for cropland or for settlement; People mentioned to me that Jhoda Padhani had become 
a widespread practice in Morang and Jhapa during this period. 
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politely critiqued the state and held the king morally responsible for dismantling the inalienable 
relationship between bhonai (land) and Dhimal culture.120  
 Yet despite his critique of the land reform and how it adversely affected them, Naya 
Dhimal, instead of demanding ‘rights to land,’ asked the king for scholarships and weaving 
training.  These demands such as ‘education’ and  ‘vocational training’ resonate well with the 
dominant discourses of bikās and modernity that the state had fervently promoted during this 
period.121  Naya Dhimal did not demand scholarships for Dhimal simply to make his community 
educated, hence ‘modern’ (cf. Ahearn, 2001).  His realization of the empowering force of 
education equally derived from his lived experiences of mistreatment and discrimination he and 
other Dhimal faced from “educated” people, particularly the state officials in the district 
headquarter and administrative offices.  This becomes evident in his reflections:  
!Too much of domineering to us! No matter which offices I used to go, they (the hill “high 
caste Hindus) were the ones who were sitting in the chair.  Not a single Dhimal or Madhesi 
(people of the Tarai origin).  And they treated us like we were nothing.  Ke garne, harmo 
pada lekheko manche thiyena  [What to do? We did not have people who could read and write 
(educated)].  They were everywhere! 
 
 At that time, Naya Dhimal believed ‘education’ was even more important because the 
power of writing and reading which the dominant group held and the state power that such 
‘educated’ people controlled was instrumental in dispossessing Dhimal even when they had 
‘plenty of land’ in the past.  Naya Dhimal’s belief in education as an empowering force was 
shared by other Dhimal, as well as by other indigenous community such as Tharu (Guneratne, 
2002).  In his study of the history of ethnic identity formation and ethnic politics among the 
Tharu, the largest indigenous group from Tarai, Arjun Guneratne (2002: 139) also describes how 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
120!See my discussion on Chapter 2 on Dhimal’s notions of land. 
 
121!The issue of  ‘indigenous land rights’ was certainly not the language of the state that the king would understand 
or prefer to hear at his royal audience.   
!
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Tharu blamed their “lack of education for the ease with which they were exploited” and thus they 
focused on the promotion of education through their ethnic organization.  Many Dhimal 
reiterated their conviction to me that their lack of education was one of the reasons that Dhimal 
lost lands through unfair means in the courts or in the district administrative officers.  They also 
cited their lack of education as one of the fundamental factors that had “lagged them behind” 
other groups politically and economically.  Hence, for these senior Dhimal such as Naya, 
‘education’ symbolizes a collective hope for moving their community forward, an essential 
means for challenging their political marginality.   
 I differ with Guneratne’s understanding that emphasizing education in the Tharu 
community in the early 1950s was part of “the concerns of a modernizing elite” (2002: 142).  
Instead I argue that Naya Dhimal, despite being from a landed family, was equally motivated by 
his sense of responsibility and duty, hence his understanding of himself as working for the 
collective good of his community.  He was instrumental in motivating and mobilizing the 
present-day senior Dhimal activists to form ‘jāti sānstha’ (ethnic organization) in the early 1980s.  
In 1973, Naya Dhimal sent another petition to the office of the Prime Minister requesting 
‘leadership development training’ for Dhimal youths so that they could constructively, to use his 
words, “contribute in the nation’s development and for the welfare of their own society.”  His 
petition was heard, and a total of forty-six youths from Jhapa and Morang were provided three 
months long residential training on ‘leadership development’ at the Panchayat Training Center in 
Jhapa in 1973 (Dhimal, S. et. al. 2010: 32-33).   
 This training event is important for Dhimal history of ethnic organizing for several 
reasons.  First, all of the present-day senior Dhimal activists, including the founding members of 
the Kendra, were participants at this government sponsored training program.  This suggests, and 
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the senior activists also acknowledged to me, that the training program provided them knowledge 
and skills in ‘community organizing’ which they later used to advance their ethnic organization 
in Dhimal community.  The Panchayat Training Center, a government institution as its name 
suggests, was supposed to impart not only “modern” skill and knowledge deemed necessary for 
social change or bikās but also to produce loyal subjects for the state, the Panchayat regime in 
particular.  Interestingly, many of the participating Dhimal youths such as Babai were already 
involved in leftist political movements, and some of them participated in the training program in 
order to avoid their arrest by the police.  For these leftist Dhimal youths, it was not possible to 
formally organize Dhimal community on party ideologies nor even on ethnic issues.  Hence, the 
training provided them the much-needed skills, knowledge, and most importantly the 
government’s approval to form organization along the ideals of ‘jāti bikās.’   
 Throughout the 1970s and the 1980s, along with their leftist political activism, the 
educated and other politically active youths collaborated with village elders including former 
landlords such as Naya Dhimal, many of whom had themselves become landless or nearly 
landless by that time, to collectivize Dhimal’ distinct cultural identity through community 
organizing.  They used all available state resources as well as their zeal for leftist politics to 
advance collective efforts of community organizing under the banner of jāti bikās by 
appropriating the dominant state discourses of development and modernization.  After the 
training, there was a series of efforts to form ‘community development’ organizations which 
combined development ideologies of jāti bikās such as education, particularly girl’s education, 
and income generating skills with cultural reforms such as de-Hinduization, lowering ritual and 
marriage expenses, and cultural “preservation” in terms of continuity of Dhimal language, 
religion and customary practices.  These efforts at community organizing solidified into the 
! 179!
present-day Dhimal Jati Bikas Kendra in the early 1990s, retaining the idea of ‘jāti bikās’ in its 
name. 
 The history of Dhimal’s ethnic mobilization from the early 1950s to the late 1980s that I 
have discussed in this section highlights how Dhimal collective experiences of landlessness, 
economic-political marginality and cultural loss, and the caste-ethnic based domination and 
exclusion shaped their understanding of their political subjectivity as an oppressed ādivāsi 
community.  These historical conditionings of the social worlds these senior Dhimal activists 
inhabited and confronted as educated and political conscious youths had stirred in them a strong 
and deeply embodied sense of social responsibility to act for their community.  In the next 
section, by way of conclusion, I will elaborate the ways in which these activists explained their 
involvement in the activism as an embodied social practice they pursued out of their moral duty 
by following the path their predecessors had initiated for subsequent generations.   
 
!
‘I’ve Been Walking And Walking Into It’: Activism As Embodied Social Actions 
!
 At the end of an interview, Babai expressed his confidence and a sense of satisfaction that 
his continuous involvement in organizing the Dhimal community in the last four decades has not 
been in vain.  He told me:  
There are few of us who have been continuously lāgēko and lāgēko (read, involved and 
involved) to establish our jāti sansthā [ethnic organization] since the early days.  Till now, 
there is not a single year that I have not been involved in our jāti sansthā.  Since 1970, I 
have been walking by saying ‘Dhimal’ and ‘Dhimal’ (involved as Dhimal, and for 
Dhimal).  Now we have reached here, yet I am still walking and walking.  Now we have 
our own ethnic organization that has reached to all Dhimal villages.  I am confident this 




Notice that throughout their retelling Babai and Dada’s narratives of why they became involved 
in activism, they used words like “lāgnu” and “hidnu” (to walk).  Similarly, Naya Dhimal, who is 
older than Babai and Dada, also used the notion of lāgnu to express his dedicated involvement as 
a member of and for the Dhimal jāti.  He told me:  
I have always thought about Dhimal jāti.  I become involved [lāgē]…After the training, we 
opened a library here in the village.  My duty was to show these youths a bāto or a path or 
road.  I was the guru (the teacher, the leader) who showed these youths the bāto to form our 
jāti sānstha .  I am still in it, still lāgēko chhu (I’m still clinched to it)” (Interview with N. 
Dhimal, April 5, 2008) 
 
 I argue their uses of the words such as lāgnu and hidnu succinctly convey that they 
consider activism as an enactment of their embodied social responsibility and moral political 
actions.  Recall the historical circumstances of Dhimals’ shared and lived experiences of 
political, economic and cultural subordination, the loss of land and culture in particular, in which 
these activists grew up and felt the weight of the responsibility of “doing something” for the 
community that had fallen on their shoulders.  So these words also help us to discern activists’ 
understanding of political agency, their “culturally constrained capacity to act” (Ahearn, 2001: 
53-64) in specific historical-political conditions that shaped their sense of temporal urgency and 
their understanding of themselves as agentive social actors with moral responsibility toward their 
community.  Illustrations of the ways in which lāgnu and hidnu are used in other contexts will 
further clarify their significance in the narratives of Dhimal activists.   
 The standard English translation of lāgnu from Turner’s Comparative and Etymoloigcal 
Dictionary of the Nepali Language (1931) includes: to be attached to, cling to; persevere.  
Matthews defines it in his A Course in Nepali (Routledge, 1998) as: to be attached, to seem, to 
happen, to begin to.  While these understandings capture some of the senses of this Nepali word, 
their inability to capture the full richness of its Nepali meanings is shown when we consider 
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some of the common contexts in which it is used.  For example, rakshi lāgnu (to be drunk), 
bokshi lāgnu (to be bewitched), krishtin dharmama lāgnu (to become Christian), kaamma lāgnu 
(to be immersed in work).  One could go on, but the point is that the element of existential states, 
of being and identity, are not fully captured by the usual English glosses.  What gets lost, in part, 
is the quality of embodiment, the joining of what is separate.  According to the anthropologist 
Tom Fricke (2013), who has studied the Tamang people of Nepal, a people who share a similar 
notion of personhood and self with the Dhimal:  
 “the Middle English use of “one” as a verb to connote a joining, fusing, or unifying that 
bears many of the same senses as laagnu.  The OED reports that this use as a verb became 
obsolete in the later 15th or early 16th century and only reappeared in a conscious revival 
during the 19th century in theological contexts.  Like laagnu, oneing is inadequately 
translated by contemporary English words.  Kerrie Hide points out that its use in the writings 
of Julian of Norwich, for example, brings up metaphors of knitting together and the sharing 
of substance (in Julian’s case, sharing of substance with deity)...This gets us a little closer to 
the sense of laagnu for Nepalis.  There is a union that transforms the person.  A part of that 
transformation is embodiment and what may be embodied has to do with virtue and moral 
practice (McHugh 2001) (Fricke, email correspondence, March 15, 2013).122 
 
 Hence when Babai and Dada emphasize their ongoing involvement as lāgnu or lāgēko 
and lāgēko, they are emphasizing both the duration of their involvement in activism and the 
nature of their activism as embodied social action, which for them began with a felt sense of duty 
and responsibility, and which over time has become part of their selves, inseparable from the 
textures of their lived everyday life and biographies -- hence a nashā as Babai used to describe 
activism is a state or condition of being-in-the world as if possessed or completely immersed.  
Their use of the idea of “walking” further illustrates the embodied and moral nature of activism. 
  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
122!“Julian’s concept of oneing is virtually untranslatable.  To be oned in Middle English means to be one, united, 
joined, blended or fused.  Yet none of these words conveys the sense of this primordial interpenetration of the divine 
and the human that preserves difference in identity….  There is something mystical and indefinable about the union 
that oneing conveys….”   (Hide, 2001: 53). 
!
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As becomes evident in the concluding passage of my interview with Babai, the physical presence 
of the Kendra and its organized activities across Dhimal villages evokes a sense of achievement 
for activists such as Babai and Dada who had been “walking,” as they call it, on the path of 
community organizing for the last four decades.  The Kendra also embodies Dhimal history of 
ethnic activism, and this particular history is an indivisible part of the life histories of  Dhimal 
activists like Babai, Dada, Naya and many others who had labored hard to establish and expand 
their jāti sānstha.  This sense of deep, historical connection is well expressed by Babai when he 
said, “Till now, there is not a single year that I have not been involved in our jāti sansthā.  Since 
1970, I have been walking by saying Dhimal and Dhimal.”   
 Babai’s emphasis on walking is not just allegorical; Babai and Dada have literally walked 
to all Dhimal villages, met and held discussions with people during the last three decades, in the 
course of organizing their community.  They have physically connected with Dhimal villages, 
their ancestral places and other regions by means of walking.  And this practice of walking is 
both a moral and a political practice.  It is moral as their act of ‘walking’ was inspired by their 
felt sense of duty and responsibility and by their belief that they were following the paths their 
ancestors had began for Dhimal.  This ‘walking’ is also a political practice as they wanted to 
collectivize their ethnic identity and shared experiences of marginality so that they could act as a 
community in order to subvert the conditions of their collective subordination.  I argue that the 
act of collective ‘walking’ is an important political practice in Dhimal indigenous activism.  For 
example, each year, on the first day of the Nepali New Year, they collectively walk to the 
recently rediscovered ancestral place at a village called Raja Rani in order to claim their 
historical relationship with the place (see Chapter 5); their street rallies proclaim their political 
rights as they ‘shut down’ the city or block the road to stop others (in their vehicles) from 
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walking on the street in order to make the state listen to them. 
Moreover, this act of activism as ‘walking,’ which few of them chose to pursue 
unremittingly, was never an easy endeavor; it was fraught with many challenges -- suppression 
by the state, tensions within their movement, cooption by the state and the political parties, 
economic vulnerabilities for their families (as Dada told me) and so on.  Yet, the path of activism 
they followed despite these challenges has now fortified a collective political movement, though 
many new and some old confrontations still attempt to block their path.  Hence Babai and Dada’s 
emphasis on the actuality of ‘walking’ signifies their experiential history of the activism that they 
had chosen out of their sense of moral responsibility and duty towards their community. 
Babai’s statement, “now we have reached here, and I am still walking and walking” 
suggests that he sees his involvement in activism (walking) as a journey that has taken him from 
the past into the present.  It is important to emphasize here the generation of Dada and Babai did 
not begin the path of activism from nowhere; but rather they were following in the footsteps of 
the ancestors who had initiated this particular journey.  This notion of activism as walking in the 
footsteps of ancestors is well captured by the Kendra’s first publication on ‘Dhimal history.’  In 
the book entitled, History of Dhimal vol.  1 (2010), the activist writers describe the history of 
Dhimal political participation under the title “Political footsteps that our ancestors had trod in the 
past” (Dhimal, S.  et.  al.  2010: 22-30).  Their use of the bodily metaphor of “footsteps” also 
illustrates how Dhimal activists remember their history of ethnic activism by highlighting the 
political agency of their ancestors.  The idea of history-making as physically leaving footprints 
on a path fort future generations to follow helps us to understand why Dhimal activists use the 
metaphor of ‘walking’ to describe their long and continual involvement in activism.  Their use of 
‘walking’ also connects their actions to those of their ancestors and makes their emphasis on 
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generational continuity explicit for us, as expressed by their conviction that the Kendra “will not 
stop now.” 
The strong sense of optimism and hope that Babai’s statement “Now we have our own 
ethnic organization that has reached to all Dhimal villages.  I am confident this organization will 
continue even after us.  It will not stop now” vividly shows how people like Babai and Dada see 
the Kendra in terms of inter-generational social relations between activists and activism.  
Envisioning himself in the role of his ancestors, Babai’s expression of optimism that “this 
organization will not stop now” underlines his conviction that new generations will continue to 
build upon the path that they and their predecessors had begun in the past.  When they said that 
they are still lāgēko and lāgēko in the Kendra and its activities, they underlined that they still 
have responsibility to show bāto (path, direction, road) for the new generation.  This is well 
captured by Naya Dhimal when he claimed himself to be a guru or a teacher-leader with a felt 
duty to “show these youths bāto or a path or road” while he himself continued to cling (lāgēko 
chhu) to that path of activism.   
I argue that by relating their activism to the actions of their predecessors and by 
commemorating Dhimal ancestors such as those who participated in the revolutions of the 1950s 
and 1970s as political actors, these activists connect their activism to the widely held and 
practiced cultural ethics of Dhimal social worlds in which recognition of and respect for their 
warang-berang (Dh. seniors, ancestors) constitutes one fundamental practice Dhimal morality.  
Warang-berang are Dhimal’s elemental deities whom they worship and to whom they offer 
rituals during their family and the village rituals (see Chapter 4 and 5).  People prefix either 
warang (for male) or berang (for female) when referring to the village Dhami (priest), village 
Majhi (head), Oja (shaman) and all other elders, which illustrates the moral values and cultural 
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practices that shape Dhimal understanding of ancestors.  My next chapters will detail how 
Dhimal marriage, ritual and place-making practices are centered on the importance of their 
ancestors in the constitution of Dhimal society as a collective. 
With regard to the focus of this chapter, I want to emphasize here that an important 
attribute of Dhimal ancestors is their contribution to the continuity of Dhimal as a community or 
a village.  For instance, as I have discussed in Chapter 2, people believe that without the ritual 
power of Dhami they would not have survived the malarial environment in the past (Chapter 2).  
People also believe that agriculture, their primary source of sustenance, is impossible without 
performing the Shrejat ritual, for which they need both the village Manjhi and Dhami.  Like their 
ancestors, these senior Dhimal activists are also contributing to the continuity of the Dhimal 
community by means of their indigenous activism in particular.  More than a functionalist 
explanation, these are lived practices that define Dhimal’s sense of self and its embedded 
relations to a shared collective.  When this cultural ethos becomes part of their indigenous 
activism, even non-activists in the community can equally identify with the movement agenda 
and its discourses.  Stories of ancestors like Sikaru and Nar Bahadur Dhimal can move Dhimal 
politically as well as emotionally and not simply because a gifted orator like Babai speaks about 
them during an election campaign.  People identify with these stories and they relate them to 
their own experiences of the present as exemplified by the case of Mr. Bhisma Dhimal.  Thus by 
reconnecting with ancestors and constituting themselves as warang-berang, these senior Dhimal 
activists also enact a compelling cultural politics of their moral authority and their social 
legitimacy as community leaders.  In the next two chapters, I will discuss how different activists 







‘Our Wedding Should Look More Dhimali’: Politics Of Cultural Reforms 
 
 
A Wedding Amidst ‘Cold’ Social Relationships 
!
One evening in July 2008, Dai (Nep.  elder brother) from my host Dhimal family called, to 
my great joy, asking me to attend and observe a wedding in the village.  An invitation to a 
wedding! I thought this was an important rite of passage, if not a moment of triumph, for my 
fieldwork.  I had met Dai in one of the village meetings that I had attended in early 2008.  On 
knowing that I was desperately looking for a family to live with and do my work in a Dhimal 
village, he generously asked me to stay with his family in Karikoshi village of Morang.  Two days 
later, I was in Karikoshi living with Dai’s family.  I was no more an “orphan ethnographer” as I 
used to describe myself earlier as an anthropologist without “my family” and “my village” in the 
field.   
However, my first fieldwork in Karikoshi village sadly lasted no more than a month.  I had 
to leave the village, though temporarily, following the declaration of the historic election for the 
Constituent Assembly that was held on April 10, 2008.  As election campaigns became exuberant 
across the nation, electoral politics engulfed the village.  The seemingly cohesive Dhimal village 
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became polarized into political factions: people seemed to mediate social distance between one 
another based on their affiliation with a party.  Even my daily ritual of drinking tea with Dai at the 
local teashop early in the morning, a distinctive male activity in the village, began to attract fewer 
and fewer of those people whom we were accustomed to meet every morning around 6 am at the 
teashop.  Fewer people were willing to join Dai (and me) because of the changing dynamics of 
party politics in the village.  With the exception of a few families including that of Dai, the entire 
village of 121 houses had gone Red by supporting the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) or the 
CPNM.123  
 The Maoist Party had recently ended a decade-long violent “Peoples’ War” and was 
contesting the CA election with a radical election manifesto that included a proposal for 
federalism based on ethnic autonomy with the right to self-determination.  Many prominent 
Dhimal indigenous leaders affiliated with Kendra were actively campaigning for the CPNM; 
they promoted the CPNM as the only “revolutionary” party for the ‘liberation of all oppressed 
class, caste and ethnic groups’ in Nepal.124  These Dhimal had formed the Dhimal Jati Mukti 
Morcha (Dhimal Liberation Front), an ethnic wing of the CPNM.  The membership and activities 
of the Morcha, as Dhimal call it, were expanding in Dhimal villages.  But Dai has long been a 
dedicated party worker of the Nepali Congress (NC), a liberal democratic party established in 
1949.125  Dai’s family and eight others refused to join the Morcha and continued to support the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
123!!The CPNM, now United CPNM, as a party, was formed in 1993.  On February 13, 1996, it declared ‘Peoples’ 
War’ which they waged till the April 2006.  Following the Peoples’ movement of 2006 which overthrew the 
Monarchy, the Maoist party ended their ‘Peoples’ war,’ entered into the ‘open’ political processes and emerged as 
the largest political party in the Constituent Assembly election of 2008.  See http: 
//www.ucpnm.org/english/index.php. 
 
124 At times it was confusing for the local people as many of their prominent leaders from the Dhimal Jati Bikas 
Kendra were also the leaders of Morcha.  They would take the Morcha’s activities to be that of the jaati organization 
and vice versa. 
 
125 See the party’s official site: http: //www.nepalicongress.org/index.php!
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NC.  Thus they became a political ‘minority’ among their kinfolk and in daily social interactions 
when the village became polarized along the party affiliations.  “We are one people but our 
social relations have become cold now,” Dai often complained about the emerging political 
polarization in the village.  It was obvious that he blamed the Morcha for souring village 
relations.   
 The factionalized social worlds I encountered in the village show how party politics can 
override people’s sense of belonging and relatedness based on kin ties and culture.  I was 
growing uncomfortable with maintaining my stance of ‘neutrality’ to party politics.  My efforts 
to persuade people that I was there only to study ‘Dhimal culture’ become increasingly 
unconvincing.  After all, I was myself a Nepali living with a family that openly supported one 
party.126  I was worried that my staying with Dai’s family might cause problems for them.  Thus, 
with a heavy heart, I left the village and moved to Damak municipality to stay, again with a 
Dhimal friend, a radio journalist, who was then working for a local FM Radio station.  So, when 
Dai called me with the invitation for the wedding, I could not help wondering how the marriage 
would go when social relations had turned, as Dai used to say, so “cold” recently.  The CA 
election had just ended and the Maoist party had emerged as the biggest political winner in the 
election. 
 When I reached the village on the evening before the wedding, I was pleasantly surprised 
to see that normal social ties in the village seemed to have reemerged; individuals who were not 
on speaking terms a few months before were once again working, joking, and drinking together.  
Dai, who is the maternal uncle to the groom, was asking other people (affiliated with the CPNM 
party), with appropriate use of kin terms, to perform certain tasks.  They seemed to follow Dai’s 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
126 I am raising this issue of ‘nationality’ in order to draw attention to some of the challenges of doing ‘ethnography 
at home.’  My intention is not to open up the ‘foreigner’ vs.  ‘native’ anthropologist debate, which is more 
pronounced in Nepal (see Fisher, 1987). 
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suggestions and commands with no hesitation.  The next morning I met Dai behind the wedding 
house.  He was digging the ground to make the fire hearth where they would prepare the 
wedding feast.  There was a bamboo-fenced garden to the left side of the fire hearth from which  
a loud animal cry emanated.  I ran toward the site where I saw six people struggling to tie and 
kill a giant female pig that the family had raised for a year.  I escaped the men-animal battle and 
returned to Dai.  Dai had already prepared an altar by clearing a small patch of the ground He lit 
three packets of incense, and performed a quick ritual.   
Knowing that I would be interested, he gave me a simple and straightforward explanation: 
“We need to worship our village deity and our ancestors so that bad eyes (evil) won’t fall on our 
food.  Otherwise, our guests can get sick.  It will be a big shame for our village and us if that 
happens.”  The wedding was a village affair, and both individual honor and the collective honor 
of the village were closely tied to its success. 
A black baby goat was offered as a sacrifice, and Dai asked his nephews to prepare the 
slaughtered goat.  When they left, Dai was alone for a while.  I slowly whispered my happiness 
that all of his relatives and neighbors had come together for the wedding.  He smiled and said.  
“Oh, yes! This is our cheli’s (Nep. sister) family.  We need to come together.  This is for the 
samaj (Nep.  society/ community).”  Dai reiterated that people could, and should, suspend their 
differences, and must come together as a collective during the wedding in the village.  Hence, 
marriage and wedding are communal events in which people would enact the shared cultural 
notion of the good (Taylor, 1989; Fricke, 1997: 191-192) by coming together as kin and as 
members of the Gramthan, the village shrine. 
The marriage event had brought the politically polarized villagers together.  People seemed 
to have suspended their political differences for the wedding.  There was a sense of collective 
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ownership and unconditional unity among the relatives for the wedding.  They came together, as 
Dai had commented, for the samaj (society/community) and because the success of the marriage 
ceremony was also tied to the village’s prestige.  There was a practical need for the cohesion of 
the community for the wedding.  In practice, a wedding is financially challenging for a low-
income peasant family, and it is a time- and labor-intensive cultural practice.127  During the 
marriage preparation, each individual family from the village, as a social rule, contributed some 
cash (fifty rupees from each family) to the groom’s family.  The villagers had something more to 
contribute- labor, uncooked rice, brewed beer and alcohol, and money depending on their kin 
reckoning with the groom’s family.  For three consecutive days, people came to the groom’s 
family to greet and bless the new bride and groom.  People offered to help the family prepare 
food and clean the dishes; they spent hours chatting, eating and drinking together.  All the 
villagers were invited and for three days the feasts continued.  This practice of collective sharing 
and support for a wedding was not unique to this particular village, but is a common Dhimal 
practice in other villages as well.  I argue that these practices of sharing and taking collective 
responsibilities in order to execute the wedding, and rising above their political disagreements 
with one another, is a substantive example of how marriage and wedding can reconstitute 
Dhimal as a community.  And in doing so, marriage and wedding events also recreate the 
localized moral basis of sociality (Fricke, 1997: 192-194), even if such relations are always at 
risk of becoming “cold” again, to use Dai’s apt metaphor. 
The above fieldwork reflection, by way of an ethnographic vignette, shows that the lived 
everyday social worlds of the Dhimal do not always reflect the image of a cohesively bonded 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
127 I was told that for this wedding the family spent about Rs two lakh (two hundred thousand rupees).  The groom 
had worked in the Gulf countries for two years and thus had saved some money that he was able to spend for his 
own marriage.  This amount is worth a year salary (in 2008) of a tenured lecturer in Tribhuvan University, Nepal’s 
oldest and largest public university. 
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community.  Dhimal, like any other group of people, are divided along class, political, and 
regional lines, in addition to the other lived realities that can perpetuate such social differences.  
Kin relations and the shared substance connoted by the Gramthan, as the incidents of the CA 
election showed, do not necessarily always tie people together in practice.  In the same way, 
things that keep people apart, like political ideologies, do not always sever people’s sense of 
relatedness and community belonging.  But Dhimal do strive to forge a sense of common 
belonging and membership to a shared moral community through concrete practices.  As this 
ethnographic example of the wedding in Dai’s village illustrates, marriage is one of the concrete 
practices through which Dhimal work to remake their community.   
However, Dhimal activists and village elders also point out that they have too many 
“kuriti” and “bikriti,” the Nepali terms they use to describe “bad” and “deviated” practices in the 
ways in which Dhimal enact their marriage and wedding ceremonies.  In 1993 the Dhimal Jāti 
Bikās Kendra approved a code of conduct, akin to a set of social rules, to standardize Dhimal 
marriage and wedding practices, among other Dhimal customary practices, to make them 
compatible with the present day.  During my fieldwork, Dhimal abided by some of these newly 
reformed wedding practices while they completely ignored others.  Dhimal elders seemed very 
particular about following the Dhimal riti-thiti (customary practices) regarding exchange 
(exchange of marriage payments or prestations).  Dhimal activists, village women and others 
also make sure that the new bride and groom wear their traditional ethnic dress during the 
wedding, a practice revived after the implementation of the Kendra’s rules.  The Kendra asked 
people not to use the service of Hindu priests and ‘Hindu ways of doing wedding rituals.’  
Similarly, the organization has also banned the use of the desi musicians (the traditional 
occupational caste groups of Tarai origin) in their wedding.  Hence there is a selective preference 
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for reviving and reforming Dhimal marriage and wedding practices.  How can we understand 
Dhimal activists’ concerns with reforming what they considered as kuriti and bikriti of their 
cultural practices? In what ways do these cultural politics inform Dhimals’ indigenous activism?  
In this chapter, I discuss why Dhimal community elders and indigenous activists focus on 
certain cultural practices, for example, those related with marriage, as arenas for cultural reforms 
and preservation.  I argue that in order to understand why Dhimal are concerned with their 
marriage and wedding practices, we need to approach marriage as a ‘community making’ 
practice.  My emphasis on ‘community making’ practice is informed by Dhimal indigenous 
notion and practice of ‘village’ and how they reconstitute ‘Dhimal village’ and its customary 
social organizations through concrete practices, exemplified by the ethnographic example 
disused above, and symbolic representations.   
The goal of this chapter is to substantiate my claim that these politics of cultural reforms 
Dhimal leaders enact through their jaati organization are ‘constitutive practices’ of their 
indigenous activism.  I label them ‘constitutive practices’ to emphasize the significance of these 
cultural politics in reproducing the legitimacy of Dhimals’ indigenous organization and the 
authority of its leaders.  These cultural politics target the very terrains of communal practices that 
Dhimals consider part of their cultural heritage.  Thus, these cultural politics offer Dhimal 
leaders with both opportunities and challenges to solidify their roles and social power.  My 
ethnographic analysis shows the ways in which multiple actors attempt to consolidate their social 
legitimacy by imposing or resisting the reforms.   





‘Dhimal village’: An Indigenous Notion and Practice 
!
In everyday parlance, Dhimal use the Nepali term ‘gaun’ (village) to evoke the idea of 
shared belonging, their sense of relatedness, and their experience of commonality with others 
living in a locally embedded social and territorial entity.  In terms of kinship organization, both 
patrilineal and affinal relationships are important in Dhimal society, but it is their patrilineal 
descent perceived in terms of consanguineal relationships that defines their clan.  Each Dhimal 
belongs to one of the ten major clan groups or harā.  They are clan exogamous, and with the 
death of a clan member, all clan members must undergo the required rite of passage as part of the 
mortuary rituals.    
However, a clan membership is not territorial nor does it determine the structure of a 
Dhimal village.  The village, the space of everyday social relationships is heterogeneous both in 
terms of clan memberships, and now also increasingly in terms of its ethnic composition.  In fact, 
the ways in which a Dhimal village is constituted and structured through the centrality of its 
village shrine, the village Majhi (the head), and the Dhami (village priest) define its ritual, social-
geographical and political boundaries.  I argue that the village as defined by its shrine, the 
Gramthan, is the shared substance that defines Dhimal sense of relatedness in their everyday 
practice (Carsten, 2000). 
This notion of ‘village’ is different from the commonsense use of the term as a rural setting 
in contrast to what is a ‘city’ (see Pigg, 1992, 1996 on the idea of ‘village’ in Nepali contexts).  In 
Dhimali, ‘village’ is called dera, which connotes more of a socio-geographical residence than a 
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deeper sense of dwelling and belonging.128  The Gramthan, the village shrine, is elemental to the 
constitution of a village.  The Dhimal notion and practice of  ‘Dhimal village’ has specific 
delimitations and deeper cultural meanings.  At the minimum, as a residential unit, a ‘Dhimal 
village’ must have its village shrine, Gramthan and its village head, Majhi, which is a hereditary 
social position.  Similarly there is a village priest, Dhami, the ritual specialist, who performs the 
annual village ritual Shrejat at the Gramthan for the well-being of the villagers, their animals and 
crops.   
For Dhimal, the idea of ‘our village’ is crucial to their sense of belonging and dwelling in a 
closed socio-spatial networks of kin or kin-like relationships by virtue of their common residence 
in and shared membership of their Gramthan.  So Dhimal often use the term ‘Grammati’ in order 
to refer to their sense of ritual membership in the village Gramthan and their shared loyalty to the 
specific village deities they worship during the rituals.  As members of their Grammati, Dhimal 
have moral obligations and duties to support each other during agriculture activities, village 
rituals, marriage, funeral, and other realms of social life that demand mutual reciprocity among 
them.  Thus the Gramthan establishes the reciprocal and inter-dependent relationship between 
village deities, non-human beings, the natural environment, and the villagers.  In this sense a 
Dhimal village is a moral community. 
I contend that the idea of ‘Dhimal village’ discussed here can be used as an analytical 
framework to examine Dhimal marriage and wedding practices by drawing attention to their 
habituated cultural world.  The ‘village’ should not be understood as the construction of a 
“bounded” territorial unit, an isolated rural space inhabited by distinct people.  I focus on the idea 
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128!I use Heidegger’s notion of ‘dwelling’ (Heidegger, 1971).  Heidegger’s notion of dwelling as an experience of 
being in the place and location emphasizes the acts of building i.e. the making of the dwelling place such that the 
relationship between the dwellers and the place is not a prior or given.  It also emphasizes the caring for others and 
the nature (the earth, the sky, and the divinities).  !
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of ‘village’ because, for the Dhimal, it is an objective structure (Bourdieu, 1977: 78-87) 
which shapes their understanding of who they are by informing their sense of belonging as 
members of a collective or a ‘jāti’ connected to a place.  As I show in this and the next chapters, 
Dhimal continue to reconstitute and remake their villages through concrete collective 
efforts.  Each year Dhimal collectively perform their most important village ritual, the 
Shrejat, which reconstitutes the village and its customary social organization (see Chapter 6).   In 
the case of Dhimal marriage reforms, the village elders (both men and women) and activists 
deploy the moral force of the community, or the “village agency” (Sax, 2010), to ensure that 
people follow customary practices for their marriage and wedding ceremonials.  A Dhimal 
marriage cannot be completed without the involvement of the community, the village Majhi, and 
village elders.  Thus, marriage and wedding events become important political spaces whereby 
people work to recreate their village, its traditional social organization, and internal power 
relations.  
In recent years, scholars working in South Asia have revived the notion of “village” as an 
analytical construct in order to understand how a village “continues to be vibrant grounds for the 
production of culture, social relations, forms of sociality, identity, environments, 
histories, politics, bodies, imageries, and persons” (Mines and Yazgi, 2010:13).  The significance 
Dhimal give to their village in their everyday life and in their indigenous activism has 
important implications for its relevance as an analytical category in anthropology (see Mines and 
Yazgi, 2010 for new approaches to the village as an analytical category in the South Asian 
context).   Mines and Yazgi (2010:1) argue that “villages are a lost object in the anthropology of 
India, at least in Europe and North America.…  By the 1970s, ‘village studies’ had been pushed 
to the margin of the anthropological field.”  I am not emphasizing that ‘village study’ should 
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again become the focus of anthropology in South Asia, but as scholars (Mines, 2005; Sax, 
2010; see Mines and Yazgi, 2010) have shown, the village still matters in peoples’ everyday 
lives.   As a localized form of social life, a ‘village’ constantly emerges in dialogical 
mediation with the wider world.  The village and its sociality have not simply disappeared 
with the forces of globalization (cf. Appadurai, 1996a).   As a lived social formation, 
people continue to experience a sense of continuity within their village, its moral-ethical 
underpinnings, and social relationships even though these are always mutually constituted by their 
experience of constant disjuncture and change in their social life.    
As I discussed earlier, the Dhimal experience of myriad radical social and cultural 
transformations in the last six decades powerfully informs their sense of collective self and their 
outlook toward the Nepali state and other social groups.  They also made make consciously 
strive in political action to recreate their ‘village’ as a means of continuing their identity as a 
distinct people.  Dhimal also experience this continuity in the social-cultural formations and 
practices that they consider their ‘culture,’ again as a way to define themselves as a 
distinct people.  These understandings and experiences of cultural continuity through perceived 
customary practices are made ethnographically visible only by bringing their idea of ‘village’ into 
our analytical framework.  An historical overview of Dhimal collective efforts at marriage 
reforms in the past and the continuity of these reform efforts in contemporary indigenous activism 
will help us understand how Dhimal consider marriage and weddings an important community-
village making practice.   Echoing Mine’s (2005:59) emphasis that “village-making is at the same 
time nation-making, for the processes in which villagers engage at home participate, too, in the 
constitution of national movements and agendas as they are enacted regionally,” I contend that an 
anthropology of indigenous political movements in Nepal, and arguably in the entire South 
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Asian region, needs to pay closer attention to village-making processes.  Hence, my emphasis on 
the politics of cultural reforms as “constitutive practices” of indigenous activism underlines the 
importance of community-making practices in these political projects. 
 
 Reforming Marriage: Historical-Political Contexts 
!
 In the years 1951 and 1952, as many as fifty-six Manjhi from different villages of 
Morang and Jhapa met for a week-long period during which they are believed to have decided to 
implement a program of “uniform social rules regarding marriage practices and to eliminate 
other kuriti (Nep. bad customary practices) from society” (Dhimal, S. et. al., 2010: 20).  Dhimal 
activists cited what they called “capture marriage” as an example of such kuriti that had 
prevailed in Dhimal society before 1950.  They used Nepali terms like ‘tanne chalan’ (after 
tannu which means ‘to pull,’ and chalan meaning habitual/customary practice), ‘supari bihe’ 
(areca nut marriage) and ‘chori bihe’ (Nep. marriage by theft) to describe some of the ways in 
which a Dhimal man used to seek a woman he liked under the system of “capture marriage” in 
the past.129  According to Dhimal activists, at these meetings in the early 1950s village Majhi 
decided to end the practice of “capture marriage” prevalent in Dhimal community.   
The practices of forced marriage, I am told, became a source of concern when non-Dhimal 
began to settle in Dhimal ancestral territories.  As I have discussed earlier, the 1950s was a 
period of radical social and political transformations in Nepal.  It was very likely that the Dhimal 
Majhi, who used to mediate relations between their villages and the state functionaries until the 
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129!According to these Dhimal elders,!under the ‘supari bihe,’ the prospective groom would try give a supari to the 
woman he liked to marry.  If the girl would accept the nut or remain silent, he would take the girl (sometimes 
forcibly) home.  Then the girl’s parents and village elders would come to the boy’s home to discuss the marriage.  In 
the ‘chori bihe,’ Dhimal boy would capture or forcibly drag the girl he liked and hide her for a while.  Then, with 
the consent of the village heads and their parents from the two villages, the marriage would be negotiated.  In both 
of these practices, it is claimed that the prospective bride was required for the approval of the marriage.   
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1950s, were required to deal with these emerging social and political changes.  Their traditional 
authority was under threat from the new political system, but they were still important political 
actors in the Dhimal communities during the early 1950s.   
During this period Dhimal social worlds were increasingly becoming multi-ethnic and their 
everyday interaction with the newly settled social groups, particularly the dominant groups with 
their different world views and caste ideology, were reshaping Dhimals’ sense of their jāti 
identity.  Dhimal were ranked as an inferior matāwali (Nep.  liquor drinking) caste group in 
Nepal’s 1854 Old Legal Code that officially legalized the caste system in the nation (see Höfer, 
1979).  The new settlers in Dhimal ancestral territories, particularly the dominant hill “high” 
caste groups, looked at Dhimals as “sano jāt” or the low ranked caste group.  The hill Hindu 
settlers considered Dhimal to be “totally illiterate” and their “animistic type of religion as crude 
and primitive” (Regmi, R. 1991: 131).   
Hence, with these emerging inter-ethnic social interactions mediated by caste ideologies, 
some of the customary practices of Dhimal became impractical or were deemed discordant with 
the moral, ethical, and even legal standards of the larger society or the nation.  As a result 
customary practices like capture marriage, for which these Dhimal activists used the popular 
Nepali term ‘kuriti’ (here ku means “bad”), became targets of reform. 
Similarly, after the 1950s, the state-led projects of modernization and development, access 
to education, and the promotion of the cultural worldviews of the dominant group as “Nepali 
culture” stirred new social and cultural changes in Dhimal community.  Dhimal activists 
emphasized that people began to abandon Dhimal riti-thiti to adopt new alien marriage rites 
because of the influences of other cultures.  Dhimal cultural activists use the popular Nepali term 
‘bikriti’ to underline deviation from the normative cultural riti-thiti, for example, as a result of 
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the adoption of Hindu practices.  I argue that Dhimal explanations about kuriti and bikriti help us 
to uncover the interplay of history, the state, inter-ethnic relations, and changing social and 
political-economic conditions in shaping Dhimal’s reflexive evaluation of their cultural 
practices.   
Four decades after this Majhi meeting, Dhimal held the First National Convention of their 
present-day Kendra in December 1993.  This convention adopted the ‘Dhimal Samajik Riti Riwaj 
Niwamawali, 2050’ (Rules regarding Social Customary Practice of Dhimal, 1993; hereafter 
Niwamawali, 2050) to regulate and standardize Dhimal rituals and marriage.130  The politico-
historical contexts of these two meetings are different but ‘marriage reform’ was a major focus 
of these meetings undertaken in span of forty years, and involved representatives from all 
Dhimal villages.  Dhimal activists provided me many explanations for why they kept their focus 
on regulating their marriage riti-thiti (Nep. customary norms and practices).  Common to all 
these explanations was their belief that marriage is an important part of their culture and a 
marker of ethnic identity, governed by distinct customary rites and rituals.  They also emphasize 
that these riti-thiti are historically constituted practices that had continued from the time of their 
ancestors (see the fn 130).  As such, these riti-thiti also reflect their ethnic history, and the moral 
and ethical values of Dhimal society.   
 With the establishment of the Kendra in 1991, these activists decided to focus on reviving 
Dhimal customary practices and reforming the prevalent kuriti and bikriti in marriage and other 
cultural practices.  Why did Dhimal activists and their representative organization focus on these 
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130!The preamble of this Niwamawali, 2050’ (Rules-Regulations for Dhimal Social Customary Practices, 1993) 
mentions: “From the ancient time, this jati has been following customary social rules prepared by the collective 
efforts of the Majhi, Dhami learned people and others.  Dhimal…continue to use such social rules with regard to 
their customary practice, religious activities, customs regarding death, birth and marriage, and to govern other 
possible concerns and problems society encounters.  In the past, there were kuriti like the forced marriage whereby a 
girl would be dragged or pulled by force for marriage.  In order to eliminate such kuriti and to standardize marriage 
practices, the Majhi warang met at Damak in 1952 and decided to reform these practices (cited by Dhimal, S. et. al 
2010: 82). 
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particular practices for marriage reforms?  S. Dhimal, a central-level member of the Kendra in 
his early forties, and one of the prominent Dhimal public intellectuals who have been writing 
about Dhimal culture and history in Dhimali, Nepali, and English, emphasized that the Kendra’s 
marriage reform is an organized project for ‘de-Hinduization.’  He said:  
Before the First National Convention (1993), what happened is that, our Dhimal marriage 
practices were becoming more like that of Nepali Bahun-Chhetri.  The culture of the 
Chhetri-Bahun had become the dominant one.  The old system laid down by the Majhi 
became weakened.  Then Dhimal began wearing saree, pant shirts and using ‘jagge’ (Nep. 
altar made for marriage ritual modeled after the Hindu religion).  Dhimals began copying 
what Chhetri-Bahuns do in their marriage.  In places where there are more Chhetri-Bahuns, 
Dhimal even used the Hindu priests and jagge for the marriage rituals.  In other places, 
people used jagge but without the service of a Hindu priest.  There were no uniform 
practices.  Our parampara (Nep. customary practices, tradition) got deteriorated.   
 
 We discussed this problem at length in our (Kendra’s) First National Convention.  We all 
had felt the need to ‘maintain’ (his word) our parampara.  The use of saree, the Hindu 
priest, jagge, and marrying like Chhetri-Bahun… all these were making us Nepalized 
(assimilated to the dominant groups’ culture).  Therefore, in order to maintain the 
parampara and to make our wedding making similar in all villages, Dhimal and Majhi came 
up with some proposals.…  Then the Second National Convention approved and passed 
these rules and regulations’ (Interview with S. Dhimal, April 8, 2009). 
 
 
 Hence by focusing on the Hinduization of Dhimal marriage and wedding practices, S.  
Dhimal implied that the bikriti in marriage or deviations from Dhimal parampara emerged in the 
inter-ethnic social and cultural contexts mediated by the unequal power and structural relations 
of domination and subordination.  Though he also alluded to the adoption of ‘modern’ dress 
codes such as sarees, shirts and pants as wedding dress to index some changes in wedding 
ceremonies, I found it interesting that S. Dhimal focused more on the adoption of the Hindu 
rituals as examples of ‘Nepalization’ and weakening of Dhimal parampara.131  His repeated 
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131!I use the concept of ‘Nepalization,’ after Gaige (1975) to refer to the state policies of promoting ‘hill 
nationalism’ (one language, one culture and one religion) as way of cultivating sense of ‘being one people’ i.e. 
Nepali.  Since these policies were disguised under the banner of ‘modernization’ or ‘bikas’ (development), the term 
‘Nepalization’ is more apt here than the notion of ‘Hinduization’ which may only indicate religious assimilation.  
Nepalization and Hinduization were related historical processes in Nepal (see Gaige, 1975; Bista, 1982).!
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emphasis on reviving ‘Dhimal parampara’ clearly indicates that the Kendra’s effort at marriage 
reform was strongly influenced by the pan-national indigenous project of resisting the Hindu 
nation and the dominance of the Hindu ways of life as normative ‘Nepali’ ways of life. 
Dhimal activists’ emphasis on efforts at de-Hinduization also needs to be understood in the 
context of the political changes of the early 1990s, the most important of which were the 
restoration of democracy in 1990, the constitutional recognitions of Nepal as a multi-ethnic 
nation for the first time in its history (but sill a ‘Hindu’ nation), the state’s recognition of the 
categories of ‘indigenous nationalities’ in 1993, and the resurgence of a strong pan-national 
indigenous movement.  All of these opened up a vibrant political space for the revival of 
indigenous cultures and practices across indigenous communities (see Gellner et. al. 1997; 
Hangen, 2005b, 2007; Hangen and Lawoti, 2013).  Indigenous peoples and their organizations 
have been the most vocal protagonists demanding the establishment of a ‘secular nation-state’ 
since the 1990s.  They led strong social movements to reject and boycott Hindu public rituals, 
which had been promoted by the state as emblems of  ‘Nepali culture’ promoting ‘unity in 
diversity.’  For example, in eastern Nepal, indigenous groups, their organizations, and ethnic 
parties like the National Mongol Organization (see Hangen, 2005b) had successfully mobilized 
their communities to boycott Dashain, the most important public ritual of the hill Hindu, 
enshrined by the state as the great Hindu national festival.   
As I have discussed earlier, the Dhimal had been making these efforts to reclaim their 
cultural identity by resisting the Hinduization of their everyday life since the early 1950s.  But 
their efforts could not mature into an organized collective movement under the oppressive 
Panchayat regime which had promoted and institutionalized the dominant’s group culture as the 
normative ‘Nepali identity,’ and its practices the symbols of Nepali nationalism.  But with the 
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establishment of the Dhimal Jati Bikas Kendra in 1991, Dhimal efforts to redefine their religion 
as ‘praktik dharma’ (nature worshipper), hence non-Hindu, and to revive their customary 
practices and de-Hinduize their culture gelled as a collective movement. 
But why would Dhimal activists and community elders still be concerned with reforming 
their marriage and wedding practices in the post-1990 period?  In order to explain the continuing 
Dhimal interest in reforming marriage and wedding practices, I argue that we need to approach 
marriage as a constitutive practice of indigenous activism.  We need to understand how marriage 
as a communally embedded practice constitutes Dhimal community and its customary social 
organization, and how Dhimal indigenous activists and the Kendra derive their moral and social 
legitimacy from engaging in these reform efforts. 
 
Reinstituting The Village Through ‘Marriage Rit’ 
!
For Dhimals, marriage is one of the most important communally embedded practices and 
socially encompassing events.  Dhimal still preferentially marry within their community, 
although the frequency of inter-caste and inter-ethnic marriages is on the increase.132  In all the 
weddings that I attended during the period of my fieldwork, the age of the grooms ranged from 
twenty-five to thirty while the brides were from nineteen to twenty-six years old; none of them 
were high-school students at the time of their marriage.  Marriage within the same clan group 
and within three generations of cross-cousin relations is prohibited.  There is no preference for 
nor a social norm of ‘exchange marriage’ of sisters.   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
132!For example, among the 121 Dhimal houses in Karikoshi, there were 10 marriages to non-Dhimals as of August 
2008 (based on interview with the local Dhimals).  Dhimal report that the trend of inter-group marriage is highest 
among Dhimals working in Kathmandu. 
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Marriage, in most cases, is village- or Gramthan- exogamous.  Hence Dhimal villages, 
particularly those in Morang and within the Mai river of Jhapa, are tightly connected through 
marriage alliances and the resulting kin relations.  The social geographies of marriage are 
expanding as a result of the expansion of transportation, increased face-to-face interactions, and 
because people are increasingly moving outside their ancestral territories for jobs and education.  
Therefore the village Shrejat ritual and its celebrations become socially important in 
acknowledging and reconstituting these individual, as well as village-to-village, kin relations.  
Marriage and the village rituals are still important locally embedded cultural practices through 
which Dhimal socially produce their community and their sense of collective peoplehood, a 
nation. 
Divorce and widowhood are not stigmatized in Dhimal community; in these cases, both 
women and men can remarry if they choose to do so.  One of the traditional duties of the village 
Majhi is to mediate divorces and the conflicts between families and villages arising out of the 
breakup of marital relations before or after the wedding.  This suggests that Dhimal not only 
value the community-making potentials of marriage but, as a community, they are institutionally 
prepared to deal with the potential community-breaking aspects of marriage should it fail for 
various reasons.  Their consistent efforts at marriage reform are also about mitigating the adverse 
effects of social conflicts which could arise from problems with marriage and wedding.  I will 
highlight two related aspects of Dhimal marriage that I see as important in producing the Dhimal 
village and its customary social relationships: the importance of the marriage rit (prestations) and 
the centrality of the community in the completion of a marriage.   
The normative marriage processes and wedding ceremonies cannot be completed in 
socially accepted ways without the involvement of the village Majhi, Dhami and other important 
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kin groups.  Their involvement is required not only for symbolic representations but for actual 
execution of the marriage in customary ways.  The common marriage practice is the ‘maghi 
bihe,’ which literally means ‘marriage by asking,’ but it has generally been translated as 
“arranged marriage” in which the parents of the couples getting married, at least in theory or in 
symbolic practice, select the bride or groom for their sons and daughters.   
In this marriage practice, the community elders and village Majhi are involved from the 
beginning of the marriage negotiation.  For example, in the initial marriage negotiation, at the 
stage of the marriage proposal, the boy’s family must go to the girl’s family with proper rit (Nep. 
prestations) accompanied by some community elders and the village Majhi.  The presence of 
community elders and the Majhi, I am told, not only signals their moral support of the marriage 
but it also ensures social accountability on behalf of these community elders regarding 
marriageability between the boy and the girl based on clan exogamy, and the character of the 
boy, and his family, proposing the marriage.133   
Similarly during the wedding, the physical presence of these village representatives 
including the village Majhi is required to complete the marriage processes.  Before the groom 
and his procession called jānti set out for the bride’s village, the Majhi warang blesses the groom 
and wishes him good luck.  In return, the groom’s family offers him a bottle of gora or brewed 
alcohol, the primary item of marriage rit.  When the groom and the jānti returns home with his 
new bride, the final marriage ritual involves the village representative who would then “approve” 
the marriage.  This special ritual will be held in the courtyard of the groom’s home.  In this ritual, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
133!Dhimal marriage is clan exogamous, and cross cousin marriage is permitted after the third generation only.  
During this negotiation ritual, the village Majhi, community elders and kin members from the two families first 
inquire about the clan histories to determine if the marriage is permissible, ask the girl and the boy if they have 
consented to the matrimonial relationship, and make inquires regarding any other information to ensure that the boy 
is prepared to take the responsibility 
 
! 205!
the village Manjhi, the groom’s senior male kin and other community elders sit on the cleaned 
ground in a circle.  A chicken will be sacrificed and a few drops of this chicken’s blood will be 
added into a container of water.  All the people sitting on the ground will throw some of this 
water behind them.   
This ritual is performed, I am told in order to avoid the ‘sins’ of eating the wedding food 
should the marriage turn out to violate rules of exogamy and incest.134  Then the bride serves 
these village representatives and kin members cooked rice and lentils on a banana leaf.  The 
acceptance of food served by the bride, and the bodily consumption of the “sins” by the village 
Majhi, groom’s kin members and other community elders symbolizes the formal acceptance of 
the groom into the family and the community at large.  Upon the completion of this final ritual 
the marriage is approved and the new bride is accepted as one of them.  As Dai once explained to 
me, “you cannot marry without the samaj” -- Dhimal marriage practices and wedding rituals 
necessitate the active participation and support of the village at large.  The analysis of the 
exchange of marriage rit, the fundamental wedding ritual, also illustrates how Dhimal marriage 
reinstitutes the community and its traditional social organization. 
 Over the period of my fieldwork, I attended as many as twenty Dhimal weddings, and 
participated in five wedding jānti in which I observed the rituals of marriage rit, the exchange of 
marriage prestations.  During the wedding rituals, the two families must exchange customary 
marriage rit in order to complete the marriage ceremony.  Dhimals take these marriage rit to be 
essential customary rules, which they must follow in order to have a culturally acceptable and 
meaningful wedding.  Gora, the traditionally brewed alcohol, and cash (five to ten rupees) are 
the two major rit items that the groom’s family offers to the bride’s family while the bride’s 
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134!!People explained to me that this ritual, which they called “paap katai pileka” (to throw off the sin), began when 
Dhimal did not have system of arrange marriage, some people could marry within clan group or between non 
marriageable kin groups (or because of the incestuous sexual relationship).   
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family would reciprocate their acceptance with the Gora.  I observed the standardized use of 
these marriage rit in all of the wedding ceremonies that I attended between 2008 and 2009.  I  
 have presented the details of Dhimal marriage rit in the Annex 1. 
!
Figure 5:  The village elder blesses the groom before the janti leaves for the bride’s home.  Karikoshi 
village, Morang (2008). 
 
!
Figure 6: Village representatives from the groom and bride sides engage in the marriage rit exchange.  




 In all of the weddings, the exchange of these wedding prestations between the two sides 
commenced as soon as the groom’s jānti arrived outside the bride’s home.  The groom’s family 
offered the required rit which include Gora, cash, and areca nut to the warang and berang (the 
village elders), and friends (boys and girls separately) of the bride.  The village representatives 
and mediators from the two sides, as an act of friendship and acceptance of relatedness, smoked 
tobacco together out of a long bamboo pipe, and thus reconstituted one of the fundamental 
practices of everyday sociality among villagers – the sharing of tobacco (cigarette) and smoking 
together.  Only after recognizing the representatives of the brides’ village, both elders and other 
members, and the bride’s friends, was the groom jānti allowed to enter into the wedding house. 
The fact that the wedding rit began first by acknowledging the members of the bride’s village, 
not her immediate family and kin members, illustrates the importance of the village as the shared 
substance of sociality and relationship in Dhimal community. 
 Once the jānti entered the compound of the bride’s house, the groom was taken to the 
altar where the wedding ritual would take place, while the representatives from the two sides 
would continue to engage in the exchange of marriage rit away from the wedding altar.  In all the 
weddings, I observed that a special space was allocated in the courtyard of the wedding house 
where the community elders from the two villages would engage in the exchange of such 
marriage rit.  Even when the courtyards were full of people, and the loud music (mostly Hindi 
songs from Bollywood movies) from the rented music system would make you feel completely 
deaf, these community elders meticulously attended to the performance of the rit exchange.  In 
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these exchanges, the groom’s family offered specific rit first to the bride’s mother, and then to 
her father, followed by rit offerings to the village Majhi, Dhami, and the village elders.   
 Such marriage prestations are important ritualized practices through which the social and 
kin ties between the bride and groom families are reckoned and constituted in an embedded 
relationship characterized by reciprocity, rights, and obligations.  Hence these marriage rit help 
to create a moral social world between these two families and their villages.  Even a casual 
observer can see how these marriage rit, in the form of the marriage prestations, reinstitutes 
‘Dhimal village,’ and its traditional social order and relationships.  The reflections of a Chhetri 
villager from the Kari Koshi village, whom I will call Mr. Prakash Thapa, will be illustrative 
here.  Mr. Thapa has been living in the Dhimal village for the last twenty years, and I would 
often meet him, actively participating during the village marriage as a mit brother of the local 
Dhimal family.135  In one of the wedding ceremonies that took place in December of 2009 in the 
village where we both participated together, he told me after the marriage rit:  
I have seen many Dhimal marriages in this village and other villages.  I have been to many 
wedding janti.  Many things have changed.  But one thing that has not changed is that they 
still follow their marriage rit very seriously.  In our wedding (the Hindu), the priest does all 
the things.  In the case of Dhimal, their marriage rit brings the whole community together -
- their village head, Dhami, their families, friends -- all are brought during their wedding 
rituals.  This has not changed’ (field note, December 21, 2009). 
 
 This observation of a non-Dhimal who have been living in the Dhimal village for more 
than two decades about the significance of Dhimals’ customary practices of marriage rit in 
bringing ‘the community together’ affirms how Dhimal customary marriage practices and 
wedding rituals reproduce their ‘village’ and its traditional social order.   
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135 Mit can be loosely defined as ‘ritual friendship’.  Individuals from two different social groups (caste or ethnic 
groups) ritually become ‘mit’- a special kind of friends who would in turn consider each other’s families as their 
‘mit’ families, and reckon proper kin relations with one’s mit families (Okada, 1957).  Mit used to be a widespread 
social practice in Nepal across caste and ethnic groups. Anthropologists have (mis) translated ‘mit’ as “fictive 




Recently, with the adoption and implementation of the Samajik Niyam 2055 by the Kendra, 
the presence of the village Majhi in this pre-wedding ritual has been compulsory.  The Kendra 
has even issued an ID (identification card) to the village Majhi to ensure that the “real” Majhi are 
involved in facilitating the social legitimacy of the marriage.136  In the past, one of the important 
customary responsibilities of the Majhi was to decide the social legitimacy of marriage 
(particularly with respect to clan exogamy) and to mediate in marriage-related social conflicts 
such as divorce or failure to comply with the marriage payments.  After the 1950s, with the 
advent of a new political system and the expansion of bureaucratic governance, the traditional 
power of the village Majhi in social practices shrunk and was now limited mainly to their roles in 
the village rituals.  The establishment of the Kendra in the 1990s was instrumental in reviving 
the role of the village Majhi, among other customary institutions.  The revival of the village 
Majhi and the legitimacy of their roles under the banner of the Kendra had provided a sense of 
empowerment for Dhimal Majhi.  One Dhimal Majhi from Kirtipur village of Morang told me:  
Yubā ketā haru (youth guys) may not come to us in other periods.  They may not have 
recognized us as the Majhi.  But when their time of marriage comes.  They recognize us 
and come to us (laughter) (Interview with Majhi DK Dhimal, age 45, September 21, 2009). 
 
 
This village head concisely explained that the social recognition of the Majhi as an 
important customary social actors and the representatives of Dhimal customary social-political 
institutions has widened after the implementation of the Kendra’s Samajik Niyam 2055.  Recall 
that the Majhi-Dhami committee of the Kendra, the representative organization of the village 
Majhi and Dhami actually proposed the Samajik Niyam 2055 in order to revive and standardize 
Dhimal customary practices, including the marriage and wedding rituals.  The resurgence of the 
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136!One Majhi told me that there were cases in which young grooms, instead of their village Majhi, used Majhi from 
another villages for marriage negotiations.  And when there some problems in the marriage, the village Majhi 
refused to get involved because he was not part of the marriage negotiation, and thus not socially and morally 
accountable to represent the family in dispute resolutions. 
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indigenous political movement, and Dhimal efforts at cultural revival and reform have revived 
the communal legitimacy of Majhi and Dhami and transformed them into ‘cultural activists’, 
hence an important political actor for indigenous activism.   
Many anthropologists working in the other regions have highlighted how the 
internationalization of the indigenous rights movement has revived the political roles of 
customary indigenous social actors such as shaman and ritual specialists (Turner, 1995; Conklin 
2002; Jackson, 1995; Rappaport, 1994).  In the contexts of the Himalayan anthropology, there is 
a growing scholarly interest in examining the political roles of the customary social actors such 
as the shamans, the village heads and other ritual practitioners in indigenous activism 
(Holmberg, 2000; Shneiderman, 2009; Pettigrew, 1999).  The ratification of the ILO 169 by the 
state and its endorsement of the UN declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples (UNDRIP) 
have further strengthened the importance of customary social actors like Majhi and Dhami as 
they represent the ‘indigenous customary social institutions.’  The existing Nepali laws do not 
recognize any specific indigenous customary social institutions as domains of rights and 
protections.  Therefore, indigenous groups and activists invoke the ILO 169 and the UNDRIP to 
demand that the state should recognize their rights to indigenous customary social institutions as 
part of the meaningful implementation of these international instruments of the indigenous 
human rights (see Bhattachan, 2009; 2012).   
In other words, Dhimal Majhi and Dhami are increasingly becoming subjects of 
transnational indigenous rights discourses.  Conklin (2002) has shown how shamanic knowledge 
and shaman as political actors have received new relevancy and importance in the interface 
between the internationalization of indigenous rights movement, the global environmental 
movements, and the discourses of national sovereignty in Brazil (see also Turner, 1995).  But 
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unlike in Brazil where shaman as well as other ritual and religious leaders had become politically 
active since the early period (Conklin, 2002:1050), the roles of Dhimal Majhi and Dhami were 
increasingly sidelined and marginalized after in the post 1950 social changes in Nepal.  In such 
contexts, the interplay between the heightened resurgence of indigenous rights movement and 
Dhimals’ organized efforts of revival of their customary practices and institutions have rendered 
new political relevance of the Majhi and Dhami for indigenous activism.  And, Dhami and Majhi 
themselves have become instrumental in strengthening their social positions and communal 
power associated with their customary roles.   
 
The codification and implementation of customary practices as regulatory social rules, in 
the language of a ‘state,’ does not mean that the Kendra’s Samajik Niyam 2055 is an imposition 
by a selected group of people over the community.  There is a widespread moral and social 
expectation among Dhimal that they should follow their customary rit and rituals in the marriage 
and wedding ceremonies, while allowing enough flexibility to accommodate new practices, as 
my subsequent discussions will attest.  Recall the case of my friend Kewale that I discussed in 
Chapter 1: that his family and village elders made him redo the engagement ritual in proper 
customary ways shows that people are both conscious of their customary practices and also more 
willing to follow these customary norms through practices.  Such collective awareness of their 
culture and ethnic identity can also be taken as evidence of the impact of indigenous activism 
and cultural revival led by the Kendra and Dhimal activists.  However, the Kendra itself is not a 
cohesive nor a coercive organization.  How do the representatives of the Kendra implement their 
regulatory customary practices? What is being regulated or reformed? I will address these issues 
in the next sections in order to highlight the selective spaces of reforms and the ways in which 
such reforms are negotiated, implemented and resisted on the ground.   
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Making Marriage ‘Look More Dhimali’ 
!
“Our wedding should look more Dhimali.  When people see our wedding from distance, 
they should say, ‘Oh! It’s a Dhimal wedding!’ They should not be confused if it’s a Chhetri 
Bahun wedding, Tharu wedding or a desi (of Indian origin) wedding,” JB Dhimal told me in 
response to my asking why the Kendra had formulated standard rules regarding Dhimal 
weddings.  JB Dhimal is an active member of the Majhi-Dhami Committee of the Kendra, and he 
has played a leadership role in codifying the Samajik Niyam 2050.  His emphasis on the visual 
appearance of the wedding as an enactment of Dhimal jāti identity and a marker of ethnic 
distinction in relation to three different social groups helps us to understand why Dhimal activists 
focus on certain practices as sites for marriage and wedding reforms.  Later I learned that the 
marriage reforms which Dhimal activists prioritized included: following their marriage riti-thiti, 
that is, avoiding the use of Hindu rituals and Brahmin priests in Dhimal weddings, using their 
traditional dresses as wedding dress, and banning the use of desi musicians.   
I have already discussed the issues of the de-Hinduization of Dhimal wedding practices, 
and elaborated with ethnographic examples showing how Dhimal practice their customary riti-
thiti in wedding rituals and their significance for Dhimal.  I was told that the use of desi 
musicians, which had become customary in Dhimal wedding processions, first became 
widespread in practice after the 1970s more in imitation of other groups’ practices than for any 
particular ritual or religious purpose (see also Dhahal, 1979).137  Later, rich Dhimal families 
began to use more expensive and ‘modern’ brass band musicians, particularly in Damak areas.   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
137!!Dahal (1979) observed that “Dhimals bride preferred to have desi musical band than using the hill Damai 
[traditional occupational caste groups, considered “untouchable” but their music were considered auspicious, see 
Tingey 1994] musical instruments.  There are Madhesi Haari [a Tarai ‘occupational caste group’ [classified as 
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The decision by the Kendra to ban the desi musicians and brass bands was completely 
honored by people.  Dhimal activists told me that they had decided to ban the use of these 
musicians because they were becoming expensive and because they represented the desi culture.  
It can be agued that the Dhimals’ sense of not being Madhesi has certainly influenced the 
Kendra’s success in achieving a complete ban on the use of desi musicians in Dhimal wedding 
procession, the public display of their wedding culture.  It is very common for Dhimal, young 
and old, to say, “ We are not Madhesi, and we are not Pahade (Nep.  hill people) either.”  This 
collective sense of distinction also explains why JB Dhimal emphasized that their wedding 
should “look Dhimali” so that “people are not be confused if it’s a Chhetri Bahun wedding, 
Tharu wedding or a desi (of Indian origin) wedding.”  This success story also illustrates how the 
politics of labeling the use of desi musicians as bikriti, when used in Dhimal wedding, is shaped 
by the interaction of Dhimal practical concerns about lowering wedding costs and their 
indigenous activism of asserting distinct ‘indigenous identity’ in the sense of being the aboriginal 
people of the Tarai 
 
‘Women Are The Pillars Our Culture’: Bohna Beyond The Marker Of Dhimal Identity  
 
Bohna, also called Petani in Nepali, is a single piece of long (about 3 meters) cotton cloth 
woven in black color as the background with red, orange/yellow or purple stripes in the 
middle.138  A traditional garment that Dhimal women weave and wear in their everyday life, the 
bohna has become one of the most powerful emblems of ‘Dhimal identity’ in the post-1990 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
“untouchables” by the state in the past] generally in a band of 9 people, playing such desi music.  Dhimals say that 
they began to have such music in their wedding ceremony after the introduction of arranged marriage” (p: 132,Fn: 7 
translation and emphasis mine).!
138!There are different types of bohna.  For the purpose of this study, I will simply call all these patterns bohna.  On 
different types of bohna, see Shepherd (2006). 
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period of resurgent indigenous politics in Nepal.  Women wrap bohna from their chest to below 
their knees.  The most common bohna is the Da Bohna (Dabha means black in Dhimali), black 
with red colored stripes.  The Da Bohna is “often associated with young girls, and with beauty, 
and it is the only bohna that brides wear at their own weddings.  Overwhelmingly, it is also the 
first choice for attending weddings, visiting the market, or attending mela (festivals or fairs)” 
(Shepherd, 2010: 16).  It is the most widely used bohna, hence has become the iconic symbol of 
Dhimal jāti identity in indigenous activism and Dhimal public events like rituals, fairs, and 
meetings.   
The bohna is everyday dress, not a special cloth to be used only on certain occasions and 
events.  It is still primarily woven for personal and social uses, not for selling in the market.  
Dhimal women wear it in all kinds of social spaces and events: home, fields, markets, cinema 
halls, colleges, mela, and other places.  The bohna in its design and style is distinct from that of 
the Pahade dress, the traditional dress of the dominant groups in particular, and its alterity: the 
dress of the Madhesi people.  This everydayness and distinctiveness of bohna -- the product of 
Dhimal women’s knowledge, labor, skill and time, and their daily bodily adornment -- imbues 
this ubiquitous cloth with significant meaning as an ethnic marker in addition to its political 
meanings for Dhimal activism. 
In recent years, the bohna has also moved well beyond its undeniable importance in 
Dhimal contemporary indigenous activism.  From the Dhimal beauty pageant competitions to 
their everyday college life, young Dhimal girls are creatively refashioning bohna in order to 
reclaim their ethnic identity and express their sense of being “suitably modern” (Liechty, 2003).  
The public circulation of images of bohna-wearing Dhimal women representing ‘Dhimal jāti’ 
has intensified, thanks to the efforts of Dhimal themselves.  Now Nepal’s mainstream media 
! 215!
(newspapers and TV), even when they do not cover the political agendas raised by Dhimal, seem 
‘inclusive’ enough to circulate images of bohna wearing Dhimal women for public consumption.   
The wider circulation of such images of bohna as the material emblem of Dhimal identity 
also signals the increasing public sensitivity to the multicultural realities of Nepali society.  Even 
at the level of recognition of difference, the celebratory consumption of bohna in Nepal’s 
“mediascape” (Appadurai, 1996a:35-36) indicates the impact of Dhimal political mobilization.  
Now Dhimal-organized public cultural events and political mobilizations have become 
inconceivable without the concrete embodiment of Dhimal collective identity in the form of 
bohna adorned women.  The increasing presence of bohna-wearing women in Dhimal 
indigenous activism reflects not only their ‘participation’ in the movement.  It also underlines 
women’s assertion of indigenous identity and their collective political agency to challenge their 
subordinated position in the nation, as well as within their own community and their indigenous 
political organizations.   
 “Dhimal women are the pillars of our culture,” many Dhimal men proudly told me.  
Scholars have warned us to take cautiously such feminization of indigenous identity in 
indigenous political movements for its “naturalizing women identities with stereotypical female 
identification…and while (it) marginalizes their voices by providing very few spaces for actual 
political participation” (Muratoria, 1998: 411).139  I acknowledge this important concern.  
However, as the anthropologist Ann-Elise Lewallen’s (2006) work on the Ainu women of Japan 
has demonstrated, the increasing significance of cultural artifacts and knowledge associated with 
indigenous women in the indigenous political movement can also empower indigenous women 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
139!Many women indigenous activists expressed similar views during various interaction programs I attended in 
Kathmandu during my fieldwork.  However, all the Dhimal women leaders who I discussed the issues of the Dhimal 
ethnic dress and indigenous activism asserted their sense of pride of wearing their bohna on everyday basis as well 
as in their activism.  On indigenous women and feminism, see Suzak et al. 2010.!
!
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as political actors.  Dhimal men’s appreciative acknowledgement also helps us to understand 
Dhimal women as agentive culture maker on their own (Warren, 1998).   
With regard to the resurgence of the bohna, I argue that the cloth needs to be understood as 
more than the defining materiality of Dhimal identity by centering on women’s skill, labor, and 
the kinship relations within which bohna continued to operate as an “inalienable possession” 
(Weiner, 1992) of Dhimal women’s social world.  In order to understand bohna as the resurgent 
cloth, we need to locate women’s collective agency in continuing to weave and wear bohna 
under the assimilative state policies as well as in the cultural embeddedness of bohna and its 
production. 
Scholars have shown how dress practices become entrenched in the fields of power, 
economic, political, gendered, or generational (see Allman, 2004; Lewallen, 2006).  The 
relationship between cloth and the fields of power becomes evident in the case of the 
disappearance of the traditional dress of Dhimal men.  Dhari (Dh.) -- the traditional dress of 
Dhimal men -- is similar to Dhoti (in Nepali and Hindi), a common cloth that men wear in 
Nepal’s Tarai and in India.140  Dhimal men’s dress was still worn into the late 1960s, but it 
disappeared from everyday use by the late 1970 (Diwas, 1980) after the arrival of the hill groups 
and the state-led assimilative policies of ‘Nepalization.’ 
With the advent of the Panchayat regime in 1962 led by the King Mahendra, the ruling 
regime effectively used the notion of  ‘national dress’ to foster a shared sense of  ‘Nepali 
identity’ whereby all social groups were asked to consider ‘Nepali language and dress dearer 
than their lives.’  The irony in this national sentiment was that the 'language' and 'dress' was that  
of the dominant hill Hindu groups, which others were required to hold as dearer than their lives.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
140!It is a rectangular piece of unstitched cloth, usually around 4.5 meters long, wrapped around the waist and the 
legs and knotted at the waist.  The hill people often derogatively call the people of Tarai origin as ‘Dhoti’ to mark 
them as “Indians” from their idea that all Indians wear Dhoti.!
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Thus the Panchayat politics of national dress also illustrates “how relations of power are 
constituted, articulated, and contested through dress” (Allman, 2004: 1).  A major yet unspoken 
aim of these state policies of creating hill-centric ‘Nepali’ subjects was to assimilate the people 
of Tarai origin into the hill culture and to prevent the political influence of India in Nepal via the 
Tarai region (Gaige, 1975).  Furthermore, when the traditional dress of the hill Hindu groups was 
recognized and promoted as the ‘official dress,’ Dhimal were required to mediate state-led body 
politics by distancing themselves from any visible markers that could designate them as “people 
of Indian origin.”  By the 1970s, Dhimal men, because of their increased participation in the 
public sphere, education, and interactions with state power, had become ‘Nepalized’ in their 
dress practice (Diwas, 1980; Regmi, 1985).   
Dhimal women’s experiences of state-led body politics were not different from those of 
Dhimal men.  In the past Dhimal women had not worn blouses (Nep.  Chola) with bohna i.e. the 
upper parts of their bodies above their chest were left uncovered, perhaps because of the heat of 
the Tarai climate.  Dhimal women began wearing the blouse, I am told, when they encountered 
new neighbors moving in from outside the Tarai, with different worldviews about clothing and 
bodies.  These incomers took the failure to wear a blouse as a form of “nudity” and questioned 
Dhimal women’s morality and character (Regmi, 1982; see Guneratne, 2001 for similar 
experience of Tharus).  Dhimal women began to wear blouses more frequently after the 1970s in 
public places like the markets, mela, and weddings (see Diwas, 1982: 41-53).  The use of 
blouses, an innovative adoption by Dhimali women, added to the wider acceptance of the bohna 
in the larger society.  Dhimal women continued to weave and wear bohna, but outside their 
domestic spaces it was displaced by the saree, kutra suruwal, and other ‘modern’ dresses.  Still 
the continuity of the weaving and the wearing of bohna, though not in the same form, signifies 
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the social agency of Dhimal women to creatively withstand the very forceful assimilative 
conditions which had emerged after the 1950s in the Tarai. 
Why did Dhimal women continue to weave and use bohna? Were they not “modern” 
enough (cf. Deloria, 2004)? I argue that the embeddedness of bohna in Dhimal social 
relationships, particularly among women, and its ritual roles largely contributed to its 
continuity.141  As with the Tamang women described by Kathyrn March (1983), weaving 
represents dense symbols of gender, and the practices of weaving connect women in the 
“reciprocal network of affections and mutual obligation” (March, 1983: 731), particularly with 
other women.   
Weaving is a distinctive feminine skill that Dhimal women learn from their grand/mothers 
and other female kin groups at home in their natal village.  In the past, weaving was associated 
with women’s character and hard work, and as such it constituted an important social 
embodiment related to social recognition, honor and prestige for women, their family and the 
village.  For a young girl, her weaving skill was also associated with social preference for her 
marriageability.  The skill and labor of weaving women produced many household garments 
such as blankets, rugs, bed sheets, hammocks for babies, sacks and others.  For Dhimal, then, 
women’s weaving was an integral part of the household economy and sustenance. 
Weaving also connected women with their ancestral deity, and so evokes their relationship 
with the spiritual power.  Dhimal believe that weaving bohna is a divine skill that their ancestral 
grandmother, revered and worshipped under many names, among them Laxmi Berang, Dhobini 
Berang, and Sadi Berang, taught other women.  Each year during the ritual celebration at a place 
called Raja Rani, the ancestral grandmother used to leave bohna and jewelry in a particular place 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
141!Weaving provided occasional cash income.  But the bohna even at that time of this writing is not produced for 
the market.!
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so that the Dhimal women who were attending could use them during the ritual.  At the end of 
the ritual, the women were expected to return these bohna and jewelry.  At one such mela, some 
people, who had become greedy, did not return these items to the Grandmother, but instead took 
them home.  The Grandmother got very angry at their greed and breach of trust.  And she 
punished the entire village with death.  Thus bohna carry deeper meanings related with Dhimal 
history, notions of morality, the power of Berang, and the senior women (see Chapter 7). 
Each year, during the Parwa ritual, Dhimal women unpack their weaving looms, wash all 
the parts with clean water, and worship them.  In this ritual, the loom that works with Dhimal 
women for many months a year to produce cloths of their designs is revered as a deity, and its 
contribution is acknowledged and reciprocated with ritual offerings.  “We have to thank this 
loom and ask it to be more enduring for the coming year.  So we have to worship it today,” the 
Karikoshi bhauji explained to me during the Parwa ritual of 2009.  The care, affection and 
respect that Dhimal women accord to their looms say much about their indigenous moral 
economy that produces the piece of cloth, now one of the most visible markers of Dhimal ethnic 
identity. 
For Dhimal women, bohna gain special meanings during weddings.  The bohna is an 
important wedding item that women must weave in other to gift it for the new bride coming to 
their villages or to their female kin or friends on their marriage.  Similarly, the mother-in-law 
must weave a new bohna and give it to her new daughter-in-law in the hope that before long, the 
new daughter-in-law will provide both a grandson and a granddaughter (Shepherd, 2010).  Even 
now, Dhimal women continue to make bohna in their free time for the wedding seasons.  “Only 
lazy women will buy a readymade cloth (lungi, cotton cloth that women wear by wrapping 
around their waist) and give it as a wedding gift concealed in a paper wrapper,” one Dhimal 
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bohna weaver said as she explained to me in 2009 why they must weave the wedding gift.  Thus 
the bohna, also a symbol of divine creation that is crafted through women’s labor, skill and their 
sociality with other women, helps to recreate and connect the embedded relations of affection, 
exchange and mutual obligations between Dhimal women. 
!
Figure 7:  A relative of the groom gifts a new bohna to the bride. 
Karikosi village, Morang (2008) 
!





With the increasing Hinduization and modernization of their local social worlds, Dhimal 
had given up the use of their ethnic dress as wedding dress by the early 1980s.  The saree for the 
bride and shirt-pants for the groom became the most widely used wedding dress.  After 1990, as 
Dhimal indigenous activists began enforcing their marriage reforms, this effort also engendered 
new spaces of generational conflicts.  While the wedding dress code adopted by the Kendra 
recognizes the cultural significance of the bohna by making it the authentic wedding dress, it 
also makes the everyday dress which women use everywhere the required special dress for their 
wedding.  Moreover, grooms are required to wear a form of dress that they do not relate to or 
identify with their habitual practices.  Hence the wedding dress code imposed by the Kendra was 
often resisted by the bride and groom for different reasons in the early phase of implementation.   
How do these reforms work on the ground during wedding events?  In what follows, I 
focus on the experiences of the Kendra cultural activists in implementing the wedding dress 
codes in their villages.  How do these social actors variously positioned by their gender, 
generation (the elders vs. youths), their status within the customary social organization (Dhami, 
Majhi, and kin groups), and by their involvement in the cultural activism in organizations like 
the Kendra and other political organizations, resist, struggle and negotiate in order to shape what 
appears in its objectified form a ‘successful’ acceptance and enactment of the Kendra’s wedding 
dress code?   
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Reforms In Practice: The Moral Authority Of The Community 
!
In all of the weddings that I observed during my fieldwork, the bride wore the bohna and 
the groom wore the kurta-suruwal (though not of the same color) and the turban.  When the 
grooms and the brides came to the stage made for the wedding ritual, I did not observe any signs 
of resistance to the wearing of traditional dress.142  All the Dhimal whom I interviewed about 
this issue confirmed that nowadays the use of their ethnic dress as wedding dress is on the rise.  
Dhimal Jati Kendra and its cultural activists cited the revival of the use of their traditional dress 
in the wedding as an important achievement of their reform efforts.  But the revival of and 
peoples’ self-identification with one’s ‘ethnic dress’ is also shaped by the larger political 
transformations in Nepal after the 1990s, which I have discussed earlier.  The actual 
implementation of the wedding dress code, I am told, was met with resistance both from the 
bride and the groom in the earlier reform period.  It was the moral force of the community or the 
‘village’ that became instrumental in defusing such resistance to the Kendra’s regulation.   
As I have emphasized earlier, the participation of the community elders and village Majhi 
are crucial for the completion of Dhimal marriage and wedding rituals.  These groups of people 
are also formally included in the village-level committee of the Kendra.  As such, many of them 
need to perform their responsibilities as the members of the Kendra.  The two cases I will discuss 
here illustrate how peoples’ positions within the Kendra compelled them to negotiate when they 
encountered resistance from the bride and groom.    
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
142!Sarah Shepherd, then Fulbright student (University of Michigan) who studied Dhimal weaving during 2008-2009 
had observed!a wedding in the bride’s village in which both the groom and the bride did not wear their traditional 
dresses.  Eventually, the bride was made to change her saree (by wrapping bohna over it) by the village women while the 
groom was allowed to continue without the required dress  (personal communication, 2012). 
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Mh. Dhimal, in his mid-thirties, was one of the younger executive members of the Central 
Committee of the Kendra.  He comes from a Dhimal village near by Belbari bazaar of Morang.  
In  2005, during a marriage in his village, the bride refused to wear a bohna.  She wanted to wear 
a new saree.  “It’s my wedding day, the only time in my life, and I want to wear what I like the 
most,” the bride said, according to Mh. Dhimal.  She refused to compromise.  She was Mh. 
Dhimal’s cousin sister (daughter of his mother’s younger sister) and he promised to buy her two 
sarees if she could wear a bohna for the wedding ritual.  But she would not listen to him or to her 
mother.  “I honestly bowed down to her feet begging that she wear the bohna,” is how Mh. 
Dhimal expressed his frustration over the relentless refusal.  This act of persuasion was not just 
about making the bride wear the bohna in order to abide by the Kendra’s rule.  The credibility 
and recognition of Mh. Dhimal as the central level representative of the Kendra was also on the 
pyre because the groom jānti was being led by no other than the two senior-most leaders of the 
Kendra.  Mh. Dhimal said:  
What to do, what to do? The Cheli (Nep. sister) won’t listen to us at all.  Budda (Nep. older 
people, here senior people) were coming to my village.  I am a Kendriya (Nep. Central 
level) sadasya (Nep. member).  I was in trouble.  It was also matter of my ijat (Nep. 
honor).  Then I discussed the issue with the village elders.  They were also not happy with 
her.  Some senior women also complained that the bride should wear the bohna.  Then 
they said to her, ‘look, this is our chalan (culture).  If you don’t wear the bohna, then we 
won’t join your wedding.  We won’t eat the food; we’ll leave your home now.’  Finally, 
she agreed to wear the bohna.’ (Interview, Mh. Dhimal, April 2009) 
 
This is a telling example of how the bride, despite her continued individual resistance, was 
finally forced to comply with the wedding dress code only when the community members 
threatened to boycott her wedding ceremony.  Given the liminal phase of the wedding ceremony, 
the bride could not risk the withdrawal of her own community from her wedding.  Such an act 
would have affected her family’s honor and potentially her marriage as well.  The bride 
challenged Mh. Dhimal’s position as an executive member of the Kendra, making him feel 
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equally vulnerable.  It becomes evident when he said, “I am a Kendriya sadasya.  I was in 
trouble.  It was also a matter of my ijat.”  Mh. Dhimal, on his part, deployed the tactics of 
‘community withdrawal’ in order to reproduce his social position.  Dhimal leaders and cultural 
activists often use the tactics of ‘community withdrawal’ as a way of enforcing the Kendra’s 
marriage rule, not only for the bride but also for the groom. 
The following conversation with a youth political leader of the Sanghiya Parsihad 
illustrates how the moral force of the community confronts the resisting groom.  I was told that 
the use of the turban did not go well with the groom.  BG Dhimal told me:  
Well, the Kendra has provisions of fines in such refusal.  We tried to convince the bride and 
the groom why they should wear our Dhimal dress.  Many young men had complained to me 
about the white color turban.  They don’t understand the historical significance of the turban.  
The turban symbolizes the Mangol uniform, and our historical connection to the Mangol.  
But they don’t know about this history.  There is a lack of training, and a lack of education. 
 
On my asking what they would do when someone refuses to wear the required dress in the 
marriage, he elaborated:  
In most cases, they do.  They follow.  For some, there was need of more ‘obligatory’ means in 
the beginning (when the decision was made).  If no one goes for his janti, what can he do?  Is 
he going to get married by himself?  That is impossible.  We have done this for some people.  
[I asked him, “Oh…if samaj (society) does not go, you cannot marry?].  “Yes, exactly,” he 
said (Interview with BG and Mh.  Dhimal, April 2009) 
 
 
 BG Dhimal is the leader of the political front that demands that the easternmost region of 
Nepal should be federated as the ‘Limbuwan autonomous state’ under which Dhimals will 
exercise political autonomy (see Chapters 1 and 7).  Therefore, for Dhimal political activists such 
as BG who are committed to a specific political project, the wedding cloth symbolizes an 
important political history of relatedness, their kinship with other non-Hindu indigenous groups, 
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whom he subsumed under the racial category of “Mangol.”!143  So he emphasized that Dhimal 
should wear the turban during the wedding in order to claim their indigenous identity and 
embody the political history of resistance to the colonizing Gorkhali rulers (see Chapter 2).  He 
sees the role of Kendra (and himself) as an educator to teach people the historical meanings of 
their traditional dress.  And, sometimes, such teachings come through what he called “obligatory 
means.”  Like Mh. Dhimal, he also emphasized the importance of ‘community’ in making an 
individual marriage successful.  Hence if the bride and the groom resist accepting the wedding 
dress code, they can be forced to comply using the tactics of ‘community withdrawal.’  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
143! See Hangen (2005a) for discussion the use of the notion of ‘race’ in indigenous politics in Nepal. 
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 These two examples illustrate clearly the important roles of community elders, both men 
and women, and Dhimal activists in enforcing the wedding dress code.  In enforcing the 
Kendra’s wedding code, indigenous activists like Mh. and BG Dhimal not only reconstitute the 
moral authority of the Dhimal community and the Kendra, but also socially reproduce 
themselves as activists.  Similarly, Dhimal ideas of indigeneity, ethnic histories, the significance 
of their indigenous organization like the Kendra, and indigenous bodies also enter into and 
become locally meaningful as well as contested ideas through these localized cultural politics. 
 Still, such tactics of community withdrawal do not always work.  The experiences of 
Babai Dhimal, one of the pioneering indigenous activists and “cultural reformers” substantiate 
the challenge to and vulnerability of individual Dhimal cultural activists when they confront 
resistance in their own homes.  The First National Convention of the Kendra held in 1993 
decided to implement the Kendra’s rules on marriage and other customary practices.  Therefore, 
when Babai was to marry off his daughter in that year, he was under lots of social pressure to 
actually implement the rules.  There was no problem on his side (the bride’s side) but his soon to 
be son-in-law, a soldier in the Nepal Army who was indifferent to the Kendra’s rules, came 
dressed in ‘modern’ suit pieces with his jānti. 
Oh, there were so many people who had come to see the marriage of the central member’s 
daughter.  So many people!  We killed three pigs; still the meat was not enough.  It was a big 
marriage!  Many people had just come to watch the marriage.  My son-in-law is an army 
man.  It was during the Maoist insurgency and the Nepal Army was on the street (they were 
in the war with the Maoists, hence the Army was politically dominant).  They won’t listen to 
us (civilians).  Oh!  What a challenge fell upon me!  Then I brought my son-in-law inside and 
explained my situation to him with the utmost request.  He agreed to wear the kurta-surwal 
but he would not wear the turban.  I tried to convince that he does not have to wear it 
throughout the ceremony.  I apologized to him, and finally convinced him to wear the turban, 
almost by bowing to his feet.  Then we performed the wedding ritual in Dhimal ways.  The 
Dhimals and non-Dhimals who watched the wedding commented: “Yes, this wedding made 
Dhimal identity” (Interview; April 22, 2008) 
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 The story of Babai, like that of Mh. Dhimal, shows how Dhimal activists saw resistance 
by bride or groom to the reform rules they had decided upon as a challenge to their social honor 
as activists in the community.  Recall that both of them used the language of “bowing down” to 
the bride and the groom’s feet.  Senior people like Babai are referred to as warang (berang for 
women), the same terms their deities are called.  The ceremonial greetings assume and reproduce 
the kin and the age status between Dhimal.  In the normative greeting practices, it is always the 
younger family members, irrespective of their gender, who bow down and touch the feet of their 
seniors.  Therefore, bowing down to feet of persons who are younger than oneself is a complete 
reversal of the normative kin and age status in Dhimal community.  So when cultural activists 
like Mh. and Babai say that ‘they bowed down to the bride’s and groom’s feet,’ they suggest that 
they would even risk lowering their social status in order to convince their kin members to 
comply with the reformed wedding dress code.   
Thus by inverting the normative greeting practices, Mh. and Babai used Dhimal shared 
everyday cultural ethics and the morality of kinship practices in order to persuade the bride and 
the groom to abandon resistance to the new code.  The Kendra is not a hegemonic jati 
organization that can simply impose its ideology to compel individual compliance.  The moral 
support of the community, expressed in the tactics of ‘community withdrawal,’ is vital for 
enforcing the Kendra’s decision.  As these ethnographic examples attest, we also need to pay 
closer attention to the individual efforts of the indigenous activists and their sense of 
vulnerability in making the Kendra’s rules ‘real’ and ‘pragmatic’ in order to understand how 
these cultural reforms become normal practices.   
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The Kendra is neither a coercive nor a cohesive social organization.  Dhimal cultural 
activists from the Kendra have recognized that the bride and grooms’ preference for their choices 
of dress during the wedding cannot be completely suppressed.  There is, as some activists put it 
to me, flexibility of the dress code during the wedding ritual.  S. Dhimal, to whom I have alluded 
earlier, explained to me how they mediate to provide choices for the groom and bride if they 
prefer not to wear Dhimal dress throughout the wedding:  
In all Dhimal villages, if we are Dhimals then our wedding should be in our dress, and in 
accordance with our parampara.  If they (the bride and the groom) feel that they are Dhimal, 
they should wed wearing our Dhimali dress.  It does not mean that they have to wear it for 
the whole event.  But they should wear the dress until the major parampara regarding the 
bride and the groom is done.  After that, if they don’t like it, they can change to dress of their 
choice.  There is the flexibility.  Sometimes, the ceremony does not even last for ten minutes.  
In some cases, our younger brothers and sisters (groom and bride) have refused to wear the 
Dhimal dress.  So the village Majhi and community elders have to be strict in such cases 
(Interview, April 14, 2008). 
 
 S. Dhimal clearly states that wearing Dhimal dress during the wedding is more about 
expressing one’s deep sense of self-identification as ‘Dhimal.’  He suggests that a wedding is an 
important ritual through which individuals and community are socially reconstituted as ‘Dhimal.’  
By wearing the Dhimal dress in the most important phase of their wedding ritual, Dhimal brides 
and grooms embody their Dhimal parampara and they also publically state their sense of pride 
of being and becoming Dhimal.  Therefore, wearing Dhimal dress during the wedding is a moral 
choice people have to make.   
In the recent years, more and more Dhimal youths are using their traditional ethnic dresses 
for their wedding and following ‘Dhimal parampara’ for their marriage ceremonies.  The 
resurgence of indigenous political movement, the efforts made by Dhimal activists and village 
elders under the banner of their jāti organization, the active participation of Dhimal youths in the 
indigenous politics, and Dhimals’ sense of collective responsibility to ‘preserve’ and promote 
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their ‘culture’ – all have contributed towards this indigenization of their marriage and wedding 
practices.  The objectification of certain practices such as ‘ethnic dress’ as marker of Dhimal 
identity and ‘customary practices’ for political and social purposes may have effects of turning 
“culture into things” (Handler, 1988: 14-15).  But as the anthropologist David Akin (2004) has 
persuasively demonstrated and argued that objectified customs (or kustom for the Melanesian 
regions) can equally become part of peoples’ everyday custom and that anthropologists should 
also focus on the “the concurrent subjectivization of kastom as culture” (Akin, 2004: 302).  The 
significance of bohna for Dhimal culture, and the ways in which Dhimal women identify 
themselves with bohna is a substantively illustrates why the Kendra codified it as the wedding 
dress for the Dhimal bride.   
My ethnographic focus on the cultural politics of marriage reforms move beyond the issues 
of “authentic” or “invented” nature of these customary practices that Dhimal activists 
emphasized (cf. Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983).  I was interested in understanding why Dhimal 
activists emphasized these practices as spaces for reforms and revival.  The ethnographic 
examples that I have discussed here illustrate that various social actors mediate, negotiate and 
comprise to implement the ‘code of conduct’ or ‘social rules’ imposed by the Kendra.  I have 
shown how these micropolitics of negotiations also reproduce the power of the Dhimal 
community or the ‘Dhimal village’ by making people abide to these prescribed customary 
practices.    
It is equally important to recognize that many Dhimal activists consider the communal 
power and moral authority that the Kendra commands in enforcing social rules regarding their 
cultural practices such as the Dhimal marriage-wedding ceremonials is an inherent exercise of 
their inalienable collective right to cultural autonomy and self-government.! They argue that the 
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continuity of their customary institutions such as Majhi and Dhami, despite many challenges 
they had faced in the past, attests that Dhimal have been practicing their traditional system of 
governance in the realms of their customary practices before the advent of the modern state of 
Nepal.  Thus, Dhimal can easily relate with and strongly support the indigenous peoples’ 
demands for right to self-government and recognition of indigenous traditional institutions.  In 
the next chapter, I will further expand on the significance of the politics of cultural reforms for 





‘This Ritual Was Like A Doctor In The Past’: Indigeneity, Ritual And Cultural Politics  
  
 
Participating In A National Ritual 
!
The central office of Dhimal Jati Bikas Kendra, located along the east-west highway at a 
place called Mangalbare in Urlabari Village Development Committee of Morang district, has a 
huge open space covering a total of ten bigah (1 bigah = 1.67 acre).  Dhimal generally refer to 
the Kendra as ‘Dus Bigah,’ meaning both its physical address and also the area of the land it was 
able get from the state in 1995.144  There are two small office buildings and a few other small 
houses, but the rest of the area is open field with huge trees.  A giant white cement gate, the 
‘Welcome Gate,’ about fifteen feet tall, proudly stands at the entrance of the Kendra, its name 
carvedd in red at the top.  On June 29 of 2007, when I got off a bus in front of the gate around 
eleven in the morning, hundreds of bicycles were parked along the two sides of the entrance.  
Hundreds of people who had come from different villages were pouring into the Kendra’s 
compound.  I had come there to observe the final performance of the most important annual 
village ritual of the Dhimal, the Shrejat Puja, also called Jatari Puja, organized by the Kendra to 
mark the ending of the ritual for that year. 
A big banner painted on a blue cotton-cloth hanging in the Welcome Gate said, “Greeting-
Welcome to all guests who have come to observe the national Jatari ritual.”  This was the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
144!The land is still under the state ownership but registered under the Kendra’s name (Dhimal, S.  et.al.  2010: 182). 
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national ritual, belonging not to a particular village but to the entire Dhimal jāti on a par with any 
other ‘national’ ritual of the nation.  And it was the first Dhimal public event that I observed in 
Morang, and thus the source of my first field-based ethnographic data.  I had come all equipped 
with all the necessary data collection tools: notebooks, an audio recorder, and a camera 
A mela (Nep.  fair) was also organized for the general public on one side of the huge 
ground, in which a vibrant mini market drew public attention and money.  There were many 
small stalls of the nomadic traders, who wander from one mela to another to sell items such as 
bangles, plastic toys and balloons (a remarkable attraction for children), sweets, ice creams, teas, 
and other items.  This was a completely secular space where entertainment and intensive 
circulation of commodities ruled.  The Kendra may have earned good income by levying some 
monetary fee from these vendors and the other stall keepers on that day.   
 
!




At the eastern side of this entrance gate, the Kendra had built a Dhimal shrine, the 
Gramthan, where Dhimal priests, Dhami, and his assistants (hanuwa) were busy performing the 
ritual.  People queued in a long line to offer their prayers and ritual offerings to Dhimal deities; 
many of these devotees were non-Dhimal from different villages where practices of religious 
syncretism define the local sociality.  Some journalists from local newspapers and FM radio 
stations were interviewing the head Dhami.  One reporter from the local FM radio was using his 
cell phone to broadcast the event ‘live’- an innovative style of radio journalism that I had not 
observed before.  It seemed the local media had recognized the importance this particular 
cultural event attended by thousands of people.   
 
  
Figure 11:  Dhimal priest preforming the ritual (left); journalists interviewing the head of the Dhimal priest 
during the Shrejat ritual celebration at the premise of the Kendra, 2007    
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Beneath a huge tree standing to the east of the shrine, twenty to thirty Dhimal men, lined 
up in a row, were playing their traditional drums or Dhong made of goatskins and wood.  Each 
drummer represented his village, and the village name was imprinted on one surface of the drum.  
Because many villages hold inter-village drum competitions during the Shrejat celebration, the 
ritual event is also called Dhong Dhonge melā.  This particular ritual organized annually by the 
Kendra is considered to be the national ritual, which belongs to no one particular Dhimal village 
but to the whole Dhimal jāti.  Thus I was participating in the collective national Shrejat ritual 
performed for the well being of all Dhimal and their villages.  And these Dhimal drummers, by 
representing their respective villages, were also enacting the making of this national ritual. 
Further north in the crowded ground, a big stage was built for the folk dance competition 
organized by Tungai Sanskriti Manch, a cultural wing of the Kendra responsible for reviving and 
promoting Dhimal art, music and dance.  In the beginning, relatively fewer people had gathered 
there but the crowd grew bigger when someone announced that the event would soon begin.  I 
was very excited and ready to collect my first field data, the voices of Dhimal activists at this 
important public event.  Five minutes after I reached there, the master of ceremony, a Dhimal 
youth in his early thirties, with an impressive skill and voice, called the chairperson of the 
Kendra, Mr. Ram B. Dhimal, onto the stage to address the inaugural event.  The audience 
greeted him with a warm cheer.  I turned on my recorder -- a red flash glowed ensuring me of its 
loyal operation.   
The chairperson of the Kendra, while addressing the public, introduced Dhimal as “the first 
group of people to imprint their footsteps on the soil of the Tarai region of Sunsari, Morang and 
Jhapa districts.”  Then he highlighted the importance of Dhimal Jati Bikas Kendra for promoting 
Dhimal culture and for advancing their political concerns to the state.  Emphasizing the Kendra’s 
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role in the national indigenous movement, he explained that it had endorsed and supported the 
demands put forward by the national representative association of the indigenous peoples, the 
NEFIN (Nepal Federation of Indigenous Nationalities) that the federal restructuring of Nepal 
should be based on ethnic identity, history and territory.  But what struck me the most in his ten 
minutes long speech was the emphasis he put on the efforts that the Kendra had made in the last 
few years to reform “bikriti” (Nep.  bad practices; deviations from the customary practices).  He 
termed these reform efforts “revolutionary.”  He told the public:  
This organization (Dhimal Jati Bikas Kendra) has undertaken a revolutionary step to 
preserve the Dhimal culture, religion, language, and traditions as well as to reform bikriti 
(Nep. “bad” social practices prevalent in our community).… In order to address the need of 
this contemporary time, it is necessary that we not only preserve our culture but also 
reform any bad practices our customs and culture have.  In this regard, Dhimal Jāti Bikās 
Kendra has decided to end the Jatiri mela being organized in different villages, and to 
organize the mela at one place only (at the Kendra).  This has been discussed and adopted 
in the First, Second and the Third National Conventions of the Dhimal Jaati Bikas Kendra.  
It is ironic that our villages are still continuing to organize the Jatari mela.  Why did the 
organization (Kendra) decide this?  Dhimal are increasingly spending more money in the 
name of celebrating our traditional culture like Jatiri mela.  In a year, Dhimals spend about 
twenty million rupees or more in order to celebrate Jatari puja….  We need to preserve our 
culture but we also need to give up the bad practices in accordance to the need of the 
contemporary time… 
 
This was truly a spectacular event that powerfully signaled me the importance of the 
Kendra and how indigenous activists use their annual village ritual to consolidate a shared sense 
of  “an imagined community” (Anderson, 1983) as a collective ‘jāti.’  Shrejat is a village ritual 
collectively organized by people for the well-being of their families, crops, cattle, and the village 
as a whole.  However, the Kendra organized this particular Shrejat as the national ritual, the 
representative jāti ritual of and for all Dhimal living in Sunsari, Morang, Jhapa, and even in 
Kathmandu where more than thousand of them live, but without a Gramthan.   
Thus the event also underlined the important role of jāti organizations like the Kendra in 
codifying what constitutes Dhimal religion to create new collective subjectivities such as ādivāsi 
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with certain religious practices, in dialogical mediation with newly emerging political conditions 
and with their practical concerns with the costs and duration of ritual celebrations (cf. Fisher, 
2001).  However my first ethnographic data --- the public address by one of the most influential 
and respected Dhimal leaders – also brings to the surface a seemingly paradoxical issue.  
Addressing thousands of people who had come there to participate in the event, the chairperson 
of the Kendra criticized his own community for cultivating bikriti in celebrating their annual 
village ritual.  He publically criticized Dhimal, whom he introduced as the “first group of people 
to step on the eastern Tarai” for indulging in unnecessary ritual spending.  The reflexive critique 
of one’s own community in such an important public space by a Dhimal indigenous leader first 
puzzled me, and many months later led me to understand the importance of such reform efforts 
in Dhimal indigenous organizing. 
On a specific day between the months of Baishak (April-May) and mid-Ashar (June-July) 
but before people begin planting the paddy, each Dhimal village organizes its Shrejat ritual and 
celebrates it in festive ways by inviting kin members and people from other villages for a feast in 
their homes.  So during some weeks during the Shrejat period, there will be multiple village 
rituals in different villages and people will be busy visiting from one village to another, 
reconnecting and recreating their social relationships by way of celebrating the rituals.   
The long duration of the Shrejat ritual has become a matter of concern for Dhimal and their 
jāti organization.  They argued that the many weeks of Shrejat ritual celebration have kept 
Dhimal students away from school, which they believed has led to students’ poor performance in 
their exams.  Similarly, with the monetization of the economy and the challenges many Dhimal 
face to meet their daily subsistence, the increasing cost of celebrating the ritual in festive ways 
has become a major issue; people invariably raised this point with me pointed me.  I should 
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emphasize it here that this was a not particular class-based agenda raised by some ‘modernizing’ 
“elite” activists (cf.  Guneratne, 2002; Fisher, 2001).   
In the last few years, the Kendra has enacted a cultural politics of what I will call “ritual 
time compression” in order to shorten the period during which the villages must complete their 
Shrejat ritual.  By limiting the ritual time, Dhimal activists argue, ritual celebration will become 
more economical and problems like the low attendance of Dhimal school-going children during 
the ritual-festival period will improve.  To this end, the Kendra has introduced new practices of 
making their annual village Shrejat ritual into what they call the “ekakrit rastriya puja” (Nep. 
integrated national ritual) of all Dhimal villages.  Now Dhimal collectively inaugurate the ritual 
in a place called Raja Rani located in a small hilltop near by Letang bazar of Morang, and end it 
by organizing the final Shrejat of the year at the Kendra (see Chapter for Raja Rani ritual).  What 
does a national ritual mean for Dhimal? Why did they need to make Dhimal annual village ritual 
into ‘an integrated national ritual?’  In what ways do the making of Shrejat as a national ritual 
become integrated into Dhimal indigenous activism?  Why is the Shrejat the focus of their ritual 
reforms? 
In this chapter, I will address these questions by focusing on Dhimal understanding of the 
Shrejat ritual and how they organize their village ritual.  My focus is on how people organize and 
participate in the ritual and how these practices inform peoples’ sense of their collective identity, 
ethnic history and territorial belonging.  The Kendra and its leaders are the major actors 
enforcing the cultural politics of reforms and the making of a national ritual.  I build on Dhimal 
indigenous notions and practices of ‘village’ to argue that the Kendra must be approached as an 
extended Dhimal village in the making, an integrated “imagined Dhimal community” (cf. 
Anderson, 1983).  By analyzing how Dhimal use their cultural model of village to organize the 
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community under the leadership of their jāti organization, I show how the Kendra exercises its 
moral authority as a Majhi (village head).  Thus the analytical framework of Dhimal indigenous 
notion of village can help us understand how historically constructed practices such as ‘cultural 
reforms’ and historically instituted actors such as Majhi acquire new forms and political 
relevance within contemporary indigenous activism. 
Drawing from my close observation of and participation in three consecutive annual 
Shrejat rituals organized by the Kendra, I will describe the ways in which the making of Shrejat 
as a Dhimal ‘integrated national ritual’ not only forges a collective sense of Dhimal identity and 
culture through public performance but also reinforces the communal power of the Kendra and 
its leaders in this process.  My analysis will also detail how the micropolitics of this Shrejat 
celebration at the Kendra confronts and mediates the divisions that persist among the Dhimal 
indigenous leaders, the ‘senior’ and youths, and different villages.   
During my village-based fieldwork, I observed how the regulations of the Kendra get 
implemented and resisted by local Dhimals in actual practice.  Dhimals’ politics of reforms is not 
a simple story of ‘revitalization’ and resistance to it.  My analysis of Dhimals narratives of why 
and how they celebrate Shrejat ritual illuminate how Dhimal make sense of their history, ethics 
of communal ways of life, conditions of their marginality and the paradoxes of indigenous 
activism centered on such reform.  Thus Dhimal’s efforts to reform their communal ritual ask us 
to examine their cultural politics taking into account both the particularities of the Dhimal 
community and the larger political contexts of indigenous political movements.  The contentious 
and discursive nature of these cultural politics, in which large numbers of Dhimals (of all social 
categories) participate in debates about themselves and their ‘culture,’ both in appreciation and a 
self-critical fashion, contribute in important ways to shaping the fundamental concerns of 
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Dhimal indigenous political activism.  To summarize, this chapter will show that an 
ethnographically informed analysis of these cultural politics helps us discern how the seemingly 
‘abstract’ concepts of indigenous politics such as ‘indigenous culture,’ ‘identity,’ ‘traditional or 
customary institutions, ‘cultural autonomy’ and others, emerge meaningfully in Dhimals’ 
“indigenous analysis” (Kirsch, 2006) of their lived conditions and in their practical actions for 
their community and its future.   
 
The Kendra As A Dhimal Village Writ Large 
!
In the previous chapter I elaborated the Dhimal notion of the ‘village’ and the centrality of 
the Gramthan in the constitution of the village.  The village shrine defines the village boundary in 
terms of specific territorial locations of rivers and other geographical markers (rocks, forests, 
etc.).  Similarly, the Gramthan also encloses the village boundary in terms of its ritual space -- the 
village-specific deities and ancestral priests, who must be worshipped and given material 
offerings during the village ritual.   
The Shrejat ritual is collectively performed at the village shrine, and the ways in which it is 
organized and performed helps to reconstitute the Dhimal village and the reciprocal relationships 
among Dhimal, their ecology, their deities, and other powerful beings.  The village Majhi, Dhami 
and Oja (exorcist, shaman) are important social actors for the continuity of Dhimal as a 
community.  In the past, the village Majhi, who represented the political authority of the village, 
was entrusted with the important responsibilities of maintaining social order, organizing labor for 
communal works and village rituals, and mediating their village relationships with other villages 
and the state.  Each village also has its priest, Dhami, the ritual specialist, who performs the 
annual village ritual Shrejat at the Gramthan for the wellbeing of the villagers, their animals and 
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crops.  Finally, there are many Oja, who have shamanic power to cure people when they become 
sick or when they are afflicted by ‘spiritual force.’ 
 The traditional structure and organization of Dhimal village has been radically altered in 
the decades since the 1950s.  Yet, even as they confronted the conditions affecting them and 
participated in the processes of social change, Dhimal also rebuilt and still continue to re-create 
their customary social organizations and village ways of life in new forms under emerging 
circumstances.  While discussing their past with me, all Dhimal mentioned how their ancestors 
used to live in the malarial forest, where they were daily challenged by the threats of wild 
animals, diseases and epidemics.  So they relied on the ritual power of Dhami and the shamanic 
power of Oja to protect them in such conditions of living.  Later, when Dhimal began to subsist 
by farming, they also relied on the power of Dhami and Oja for growing more food, protecting 
their cattle and their families so that they could continue as a collective.  They still collaborate to 
organize and collectively perform Dhimal annual ritual in the Gramthan for the collective 
wellbeing of the village.   
 
Figure 11:  The Gramthan of Laxmanpur village, Jhapa, 2010.    
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Thus the Gramthan, the village Majhi, Dhami and other customary social actors remain 
pivotal to Dhimal communal social life and their sense of belonging as villagers, and for 
becoming ‘Dhimal’ in emergent conditions of living.  While their primary roles remain the same, 
they are increasingly important as community actors who can reimagine their customary village-
making practices as tools to strengthen Dhimal political mobilization.  In the emerging political 
transformations, beside placating their village deities and other non-human beings, Dhimal 
customary practices of village ritual can also create new possibilities, for example, to reclaim their 
ancestral territories for their political autonomy, hence making their village anew for the village 
(see Chapter 7). 
I argue that Dhimal’s notion of ‘village’ is important to understand how this indigenous 
logic and practice of social organization not only integrates Dhimal villages into the Kendra and 
vice versa but also bestows on the Kendra its moral authority and social legitimacy to act for and 
to represent the whole Dhimal community, integrated as a collective village; this in effect makes 
the Kendra the head of this extended village.  In terms of its organization, it is each Dhimal 
village, and not the administrative unit (the village development committee, VDC) as defined by 
the state, that is the village-level committee of the Kendra.  Thus village Majhi, Dhami and 
community elders are also the village representatives of the Kendra.  Since the village shrine 
constitutes a Dhimal village, the Kendra has built a Gramthan where it organizes the national 
Shrejat on behalf of all Dhimal villages to mark the ending of their annual ritual.  Recognizing the 
important roles of Majhi and Dhami in Dhimal community, Dhimal have formed the central-level 
Majhi-Dhami committee in the Kendra which is entrusted with the responsibilities of carrying out 
Dhimal customary practices, formulating necessary social rules in order to standardize such 
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practices, and organizing the integrated national Shrejat ritual of all Dhimal, on behalf of the 
Kendra.   
Hence by incorporating their indigenous practice of ‘village,’ the Kendra has itself become 
a Dhimal village writ large.  In doing so, Dhimal indigenous activists have creatively used their 
cultural models and practices (for example, Gramthan, the ritual, the Majhi-Dhami) to gather 
moral and social legitimacy to the Kendra as the shared representative jāti sanstha.  The 
representatives of village and regional committees elect the leadership of the Kendra, and this 
electoral politics as well as the cultural politics of structuring the Kendra as a village has 
strengthened the social legitimacy and communal power of the Kendra and its leaders.  Hence the 
particular ways in which the Kendra constitutes itself as a Majhi are important to understand how 
Dhimal activists understand their right to ‘customary governance’ including their rights to decide 
about their ‘culture’ (or to reform their cultural practices). 
 
 
‘Ours is a Prakitik Dharma’: Shrejat and Indigeneity 
 
 Dhimal use the common Nepali term ‘Dharma’ to refer to the beliefs and practices they 
identify as their ‘religion.’  Dhimals believe that the state of their individual and family wellbeing, 
and the wellbeing of their fellow villagers, their animals and crops ais influenced by the power of 
human and non-human agents who inhabit their social worlds.  As I have discussed earlier, the 
Dhimal idea of the ‘village’ recognizes the mutual belonging of human, animals, plants, rivers, 
soils, and other spiritual beings in the village ecology, to which their everyday life and history is 
closely connected.  There are dir or deities who inhabit Dhimal homes, village spaces, forests, 
rivers, soils, roads, and many other locations.  Dhimal ancestors, the Dhami, Oja (shamans), and 
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the Majhi also belong to their pantheon of deities.  Similarly, some deities of the dominant Hindu 
groups, like Devi and Kali, and those from other indigenous groups, particularly the ‘Kiranti’ 
deities, like ‘Budda Subba’ are also recognized and revered.  These deities are agentive beings 
who can protect Dhimal and their village from illness and misfortunes.   
A Dhami, the village priest and ritual practitioner, is needed to placate and propitiate their 
dera dir (village deities) and spiritual agents.  This Dhami and his associates perform the Dhimal 
village ritual, the Shrejat Puja.  They may be also called on to perform the funeral and other 
household rituals, but any Dhimal person who has acquired the knowledge of them can perform 
these rituals.  The rituals for sa dir (the household deities) can be performed by this 
knowledgeable family member.  Similarly, there are de ranghe, evil spirits in the form of witches 
and ghosts (see Diwas, 1984; S. Dhimal, 2009) who inhabit Dhimal social worlds and the forest.  
When these spiritual agents become unhappy or angry, they can inflict on people, their animals 
and crops various illness and misfortunes.   
Dhimals make three major ritual offerings in a year.  The temporality of these rituals closely 
corresponds with their agricultural calendar: Shrejat ritual in the beginning of the paddy 
plantation (April-June); the Parwa ritual during a period of decreased agricultural activity but a 
pre-harvest period of crop vulnerability (September-October) and then Nuwagi ritual, performed 
after the harvest (November) in order to offer the harvested crops to their household deities.  I 
should emphasize here that one of the central practices of all Dhimal rituals is the recognition of 
all the agents and material objects that contribute towards their sustenance and wellbeing 
throughout the year.  For example, during the Parwa, Dhimals recognize and worship their 
various deities, rivers, forests, gardens, soils, roads, cattle, agricultural tools and machines, water-
taps, women’s looms, the grain-storage, cart, and any other objects they use in their everyday life. 
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Many scholars have regarded Dhimal ‘religion’ to be simply a ‘belief in supernatural 
power’ (Regmi, 1985, Panta, 1984).  The hill Hindu who settled in Dhimal villages after 1950 
found Dhimal religious practices to be “primitive.”  Some “armchair” ethnologists like Panta 
(1984), who served as a government employee in Jhapa and then published a book on the 
indigenous peoples of Jhapa, derogatively described Dhimal religious practices as a “religion of 
backward jāti” lacking “a developed philosophical foundation” like Hinduism.  Such a Tylorian 
model of religion also reflects the perpetuation of the caste ideology and its ranking of various 
indigenous groups as impure based on their cultural practices (not their physical features as in 
racial ranking) in the state-imposed caste hierarchy.  Hence the continuity of Dhimal religious 
practices and their claim of distinct, non-Hindu, ādivāsi identity, also need to be seen as 
subversive political practices through which they are also producing themselves in politically 
meaningful cultural forms (Jackson, 1995) such as non-Hindu, ādivāsi, nature worshippers and 
others in the emerging fields of power between them, the state and its dominant groups. 
Scholars of indigenous political movements have highlighted how ritual becomes 
integrated into indigenous activism for myriad political projects such as revitalization 
movements (Wallace, 1956; Kehoe, 1989), claiming indigenous identity (Csordas, 1999; 
Shneiderman, 2009; Hangen, 2010), territoriality and history (Rappaport, 1990; Myers, 1991; 
Hill, 1988; Pettigrew, 1999; Surrallés and Hierro, 2005; Liffmann, 2011), and struggles against 
neoliberal capitalism (Kirsch, 2006).  In the contexts of Nepal, the struggles against the making 
of the nation as a Hindu state and the political, cultural and economic domination of the ruling 
hill Hindus have been the collective agendas of the ādivāsi janjāti movement since the 1990 (see 
Bhattachan, 2003; Bhattachan and Pyakuryal, 1996; Lawoti, 2005; Gellner et.  al.  1997; Hangen, 
2007; Gellner, 2007; Lecomte-Tilouine, 2009).  The category of ‘ādivāsi janjāti’ as a distinct 
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peoplehood is defined in opposition to the Hindu caste groups, thus making religious identity a 
salient feature of indigeneity in Nepal (Bhattachan, 2008).   
Since the 1990s, indigenous people had collectively demanded the establishment of a 
secular nation-state and intensified social movements for de-Hinduization of their cultural 
practices through cultural revival and reforms.  The nationwide impacts of the social movements 
of indigenous peoples and other religious minorities such as Buddhists, Christians and Muslims 
to reclaim their religious identities and to resist the two-century long state-led Hinduization 
project become evident from the falling share of Nepal’s population identifying as ‘Hindus’ and 
addition of non-Hindu religious categories to the national censuses. These new categories 
include indigenous religions such as ‘Kiranti’ in the last two national censuses between 1990 and 
2001 and ‘Prakitik’ (nature worshipper) in 2011.145  
In 2000, the Kendra officially named their religious practices as ‘Prakitik Dharma’ (religion 
of nature) emphasizing the worship of ‘nature’ as the foundation of their religious practices.  The 
decision was made during the Second National Convention of the Kendra in conjunction in the 
indigenous peoples’ movement to record their indigenous religion in the national census.  The 
Kendra decided that Dhimal should record their religion as ‘Prakitik Dharma’ in the 2001 
national census (Interview with the Kendra’s chairperson; December, 2009).  Nepal was a Hindu 
nation until 2006, and the indigenous groups, and other religious minorities (Buddhist, Christians, 
Muslims and others) were demanding that Nepal be declared a secular nation.  The official 
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145!The total of population reporting their religion as ‘Hindu’ declined from 86.5 percentile (1991) to 80.6 
percentile in 2001.  On the other hand, the number of population claiming their religion as Kiranti (that of the hill 
indigenous groups like the Rais, Limbus, Sunuwar, and others) increased from 1.7 percentile (1991) to 3.6 percentile 
(2001); that of Muslim increased from 3.4 percentile (1991) to 4.2 percentile (2001); people claiming Buddhists 
increased from 7.8 percentile (1991) to 10.  7 (2001), and similarly the numbers of Christians increased from 0.2 
percentile (1991) to 0.5 percentile (2001) (see Gurung 2003: 9, table 5).  A new category of indigenous religion 
‘Prakitik’ has been recorded in the 2011 census. 
!
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codification of Dhimal religion as ‘Prakitik Dharma’ by the Kendra was politically significant for 
Dhimal indigenous leaders.  By identifying their religion, they rejected that constitutional 
recognition of Nepal as a Hindu nation.  In doing so, they also exercised indigenous right to ‘self-
determination’ to “freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social 
and cultural development” (UNDRIP, Article 3).146   
 
The impacts of the larger indigenous movement of unmaking Nepal as a Hindu nation and 
the Kendra’s decision in support of it in shaping Dhimals’ assertion of being non-Hindu can be 
discerned in the 2001 census recording as well.  The 2001 census did not categorize religion 
under ‘Prakitik’ but it reports that fifty percent of Dhimal as Hindus, eight percent of them as 
‘Kiranti’ and thirty percent of them as under the ‘Other religious categories,’ which is most likely 
to include other indigenous religious practices (Dahal 2012 in CBS 2012, Annex 3.4: 133-135).  
The 2001 census figure that fifty percent Dhimal are Hindu can be considered important if we 
compare it with other Tarai ādivāsi groups.  For instance, almost ninety-six percent Tharu, the 
largest Tarai ādivāsi group, and eighty-five percent of Rajhbansi, the largest Tarai ādivāsi group 
from Jhapa, overwhelming identified themselves as Hindu.  Similarly, the fact that almost half of 
Dhimal self-identified themselves as ‘non-Hindu’ and that these people overwhelming identified 
themselves with indigenous religious practices such as ‘Kiranti’ and ‘Others’ attest to the impacts 
of the larger indigenous politics and the Kendra’s movement for asserting Dhimal indigeneity as 
non-Hindu groups.   
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146 UN General Assembly, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: resolution / adopted by 
the General Assembly, 2 October 2007, A/RES/61/295, available at: http: 
//www.refworld.org/docid/471355a82.html [accessed 25 April 2013].  Nepal has endorsed the United Nations 






The explanations provided by the chairperson of the Kendra also help us understand how 
Dhimal view the worship of nature to define their religious practices.  In an interview with me, 
the chairperson explained why they declared Dhimal religion as ‘Prakitik Dharma’:  
We're not Hindus.  It is the religion of Chhetri-Bahuns.  We're not Buddhists either.  We are 
not Muslims.  Christianity is the religion of the ‘whites.’  So what is our religion?  We 
debated.  We worship Dharti, (Nep. the mother Earth).  The Dharti is the Prakitik.  
Whatever religious creeds people may claim, but it is the Dharti that we belong to, from the 
birth to the death.  Ours is a practical religion.  We don’t have a concept of heaven and hell.  
We don’t have belief in an afterlife or the past life.  What do we do?  We worship this 
Dharti.  Our lives, lives of all beings, are sustained because of what we get from this dharti.  
We acknowledge this.  We acknowledge that we are bhumiputra (Nep. sons of soil/earth).  
We grow crops from this soil, eat them, and survive.  When we die, we are buried under the 
very same soil.  Thus we recognize, ‘our life is of soil, and we go back to the soil.’  We are 
nature worshippers (Interview, December, 2009, emphasis added). 
 
This excerpt suggests that Dhimal indigenous leaders believe that each distinct social group 
or jāti has its own religion, and that they consider the ‘Hindu religion’ to be the religion of the 
dominant groups.  His use of the notion of ‘bhumiputra,’ a common trope of indigeneity in South 
Asia (see Barnes, Gray and Kingsbury, 1995), along with his emphasis on the worship of ‘dharti’ 
(the earth, soil) suggests that the Kendra’s decision also resonates with the global discourse of 
indigenous movement which emphasizes that the indigenous life world and worldviews are more 
closely related to ‘nature’ (Castree, 2004).  But he also relates the worship of Dharti to Dhimal 
beliefs about life, sustenance, death, and the relationship these have with the earth or Dharti.  His 
explanations also allude to a Dhimal understanding of personhood that is not autonomous but 
exists in embedded relationships not only with their fellow human beings but also with the 
ecology of which they are a constituent part (Descola, 2005, Kirsch, 2006).  The ways in which 
Dhimal perform their Shrejat and the meanings people derive from their ritual practices also show 
why Dhimal indigenous activists categorize their religion as ‘Prakitik Dharma’  
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Shrejat And Sociality With ‘Non-Human’ Beings 
 
Shrejat is the most important, the only village ritual that Dhimals celebrate exuberantly by 
collectively performing the puja (Nep.  ritual) once a year at the village shrine, the Gramthan, 
which is called Dera Dir Than (house of the deity) in Dhimali.147 As I have discussed earlier, the 
Gramthan is central to the constitution of any Dhimal village.  Dhimal village is equally a 
dwelling place of all of the deities that Dhimal worship in their Gramthan; some of these deities 
(Dh.  Sa dir, sa: house, dir: deity) actually co-reside with Dhimal in their homes (see Diwas, 
1982: 75-80).  The Gramthan is generally located in the eastern side of the village, further away 
from the major village settlements, located by a forest or a river.  However, with increasing 
immigration of people, alienation of land, and deforestation, many Gramthan shrines are located 
within the village settlements.  In general, the Gramthan is built of simple design and 
construction.  The Shrine is a triangle-shaped tin-roofed structure usually supported by wooden 
poles (sometimes cemented beams) surrounded by a square-shaped brick or cement wall two to 
three feet high.  The space between the wall and the roof is open.  The southern side is used as the 
entrance, and it is generally open with no wall or door.  The northern corner of the shrine is 
always used for making the altar during the ritual.   
Dhimal deities are named but they lack any specific iconographic forms and 
representations.  During the rituals, the Dhami makes six to nine tiny (three fingers full) piles of 
uncooked rice in circular rows for each individual deity to be worshipped.  These tiny piles of 
uncooked rice represent an altar for each deity who will become ‘visible’ through the specific 
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147!It is also called Ashare puja to emphasize the timing of the ritual i.e.  the ritual ends in the month of Ashad (May-
June).  Shejat is also called Jatri puja in order to emphasize the fair (Jatri mela) that is organized alongside the Shrejat 
ritual.  Other groups, particular Rajbhansi, the largest Tarai adivasi group from Jhapa, also call their village shrine: 
Gramthan (Gram means village in Sanskrit/Hindi and Than is common Nepali word for a scared place with a shrine).   
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offerings and animal sacrifices they ‘consume’ during the rituals.  Small clay figurines of 
elephants and horses, which are offered during the Shrejat rituals, are left in the than (Nep.  
shrine).   
 The Gramthan consist of three to five shrines: the main than, and the biggest, hosts all 
Dhimal deities, which number from fifteen to thirty three across different villages (see Diwas, 
1982; Dhimal, S. et. al. 2010) during the Shrejat ritual.  Deities like Maharaja (male), Budda 
Thakur (male), Rasati (male), Laxmi Berang (female), Konkai mai (female, river), Choumajhi 
(male), Ra Dhami (male), Devi (female), hunting deity (male), and jarwagelai (ancestors, both 
male and female) are the major deities common to all Dhimal Gramthan.  Beside these dir, each 
Gramtham houses its pantheon of village-specific deities during its Shrejat rituals.  These various 
Dhimal dir are related to forest, river, soil, wild animals, ancestors, Dhami, Majhi, and other 
agents associated with spirits (for example, witches).  In 1847, Brian H.  Hodgson recorded that 
“all the rivers between the Cosi [Koshi] and the Torsha [Tista] are chief divinities of the Dhimál” 
(Hodgson [1847], 1880: 127).  And these major rivers which flow through Dhimal village 
territories are still worshipped by Dhimal as their elemental deities in the Gramthan. 
Local rivers are important markers of the boundary of any Dhimal village.  Dhami must 
perform a special ritual if he needs to cross his village rivers.  The head Dhami (Raj Dhami) told 
me that such ritual is necessary to acknowledge the ritual realms of other villages inhabited by 
other deities and spiritual beings with whom he may not have established the required ritual 
relationships.  By performing this ritual, the head Dhami also recognizes the authority of the 
local Dhami as the priest of the village Gramthan.  Thus a village Gramthan also defines the 
ritual territory of the village priest, and other village priests must recognize this ritual territory. 
! 250!
 Forest deities and other (non-human) forest dwellers dominate the ritual space outside the 
main shrine at the Gramthan.  During the Shrejat ritual, a small two-storied shrine is built at the 
northeast side of the Gramthan for the Dhimal ‘hunting deity’ or Shikari (Nep. hunter), the 
representative of the ‘forest deities.’148  Dhimal place an effigy of a bamboo bow and arrow on 
the shrine’s roof for the Shikari deity.  The special allocation of the altar and ritual offering to the 
forest deities signify Dhimal connection with the forest, particularly their history of belonging in 
the fringes of the Tarai’s forest (see Chapters 2 and 3).   
Similarly, another small altar, in the form of an effigy of a cage made of grass is placed on 
the southwest side of the shrine.  In this altar, Dhimal give ritual offerings (rice, incense, betel 
leaves, banana leaf, etc.) to the wild animals, birds, rodents and other forest dwellers which often 
will prey on their crops and thus damage their agricultural yields.  Although it is motivated by 
the prospects of better harvests, Dhimal ritual feeding of these animals also shows that they 
recognize these animals as agentive actors whose needs for food destroy their crops.  “We say to 
these wild animals, birds, rodents – Please, accept our offerings.  Don’t destroy our crops.  Eat 
these foods in return! ” one Dhami explained to me.  Thus, the ritual also facilitates Dhimal 
communication with these wild animals who must be propitiated with food offerings before 
being asked to refrain from preying on their crops.  The ritual emphasizes the mutual coexistence 
of various beings based on an ethnic of reciprocity. 
 Since Dhimal deities ride on elephant and horse, they build a special stable, represented by 
a short wooden pole or tree stem erected on the ground, to feed and care for these two animals.  
People offer the figurines of elephant and horse made of clay or paper (which can be erected on 
the ground) so that their deities can ride on these animals and roam around places.  Hence the 
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148!Shikari is a common deity among other indigenous groups from the hills as well as from the plains.   
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social geography of the Dhimal shrine and the various deities whom they recognize and worship 
during the Shrejat ritual illustrate the ways in which Dhimal social worlds are constituted and 
shaped by their reciprocal relationships with their ancestors, deities, and other beings.  Dhimal 
explanations (to me) regarding why they perform Shrejat ritual further illustrate the nature of 
these relationships. 
 
‘This Ritual Was Like The Doctor In The Past’: Explaining Ritual Practices 
!
!
Dhimal consider their rituals to be one of the means of sustaining their lives by properly 
worshipping and propitiating their household and village deities.  Dhimal generally explain that 
they perform the Shrejat ritual so that their families, animals, and crops will be protected, and no 
calamities will befall them and their village.  They also relate their ritual practices to the past 
ecological conditions their ancestors confronted in order to survive and thrive in the Tarai.  The 
explanations provided by JB Dhimal, a village Majhi and a dedicated Dhimal cultural activist, 
show how Dhimal understand the history of Shrejat ritual. 
How and why did we begin this ritual?  We discussed and inquired about this with our 
elders.  They told us this.  In the beginning, we lived in jungali condition.  We had to fear the 
wild animals; elephants and tigers killed many people.  Dhimal used to die because of 
epidemics and diseases.  Our paddy used to be destroyed by insects and bugs, by birds, by 
rats, and others.  You know that we offer them (these animals and insects) puja (ritual) 
today.  So how do we avoid these things?  Then our ancestors thought of it (pause).  Then 
there were these diseases of biphor and haijaa (small pox and cholera) that came to the 
village.  Many people died.  Some villages were completely eradicated, the whole village!  
What to do then?  There were some jannē manchē (Nep. people who know; knowledgeable 
person).  They used to encircle the whole village with their spiritual power so that such 
diseases would not touch the village.  So in order no to protect the crops from the insects, 
bugs, and wild animals, and to avoid dangers of elephant, tigers and diseases, our ancestors 
began doing this ritual.   
We offer puja to all of them asking them not to harm our crops and us.  This is our 
puja.  Nothing special.  The main thing was our survival.  There were no doctors and 
hospitals then.  This (the ritual) was the one thing that we could rely for our survival.  Now, 
the keta haru (Nep: literally boys, but used as the youths) may ask why do we need this 
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ritual?  That’s a different issue.  But then in the past, the ritual was like the today’s doctor 
who could save us from almost everything.  It could protect us, and our crops from 
everything -- the epidemics and the wild animals.…  Now, of course, there are no wild tigers 
and bears.  They are people everywhere, and they have become like them (dangerous, 
harmful).  But still our crops need protection from diseases, insects and bugs.  So we 
perform this Ashare Puja at the Than of Maharaja (Nep. literally means, the great king 
deity) (Interview with JB Dhimal, April 14, 2008, emphasis added). 
We can see from this passage that Dhimal consider the Shrejat ritual to be a set of 
historically constituted practices their ancestors adopted to overcome the challenges of living and 
surviving in the adversarial conditions of the Tarai.  His vivid descriptions of the ecological 
conditions of the Tarai resonate with Dhimals’ dominant narratives about how their ancestors 
(including their grandparents or parents) once lived in the Tarai (see Chapter 3).  JB repeatedly 
emphasized the protective power of the ritual, which I interpret as Dhimal understanding of their 
culturally mediated capacity to overcome these ecological conditions that threatened their 
survival in the past.  His emphasis on the ritual power also highlights the roles of Dhimal 
ancestors, the jannē manchē or the knowledgeable ancestors, in keeping Dhimal safe and 
prospering in the past.  Dhimal acknowledge their ancestors and pay them ritual tributes during 
the Shrejat.  Thus the Shrejat is also a ritual which commemorates Dhimal ancestors as agentive 
historical actors.  Notice that JB Dhimal also highlighted how the ritual enabled Dhimal to 
establish relationships with other beings with whom they shared the place.  So the Shrejat 
underlines the sociality among various inhabitants of the Tarai since the days of the ancestors.  
Hence the ritual is a historically instituted practice of making an uninhabitable place habitable; it 
is about place-making. 
As becomes evident from the interview excerpts under discussion here, Dhimal connect the 
Shrejat ritual with the practical conditions of everyday life (sickness, illness, success, failure, 
draught, etc.).  They call on their deities to help them overcome these conditions and for that aid 
they pledge to reciprocate with ritual offerings in acknowledgement of the deities.  Such acts of 
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ritual promise, called manta in Dhimali or ‘bhakal’ in Nepali, are a common practice across 
religious-social groups in Nepal.  For Dhimal, the Shrejat is the most appropriate ritual event to 
enact their manta.  The following ethnographic example will show the significance of bhakal and 
its enactment during the Shrejat. 
While returning from the Raja Rani Shrejat puja in 2009, I met a group of six family 
members walking along a graveled road passing through a forest.  Of them, there was a senior 
woman who seemed to be walking with some difficulties.  They had a bicycle on which a small 
boy was seated while being pushed.  I stopped my scooter, introduced myself and told them that 
I lived in Karikosi village with a Dhimal family.  They were from Dhap Goan, a settlement 
nearby where I was staying for my fieldwork.  I offered a ride to the grandmother; she accepted 
my offer happily with a note of blessings.  Knowing that she was not used to riding a scooter, I 
drove the machine very slowly.  The reduced speed enabled us to talk together on the dusty 
graveled road that stretches along the forest located between the highway (Kane Pokhari bazar) 
in the south, and Letang bazar to the north (see Map, 3).  I asked the grandmother if she had 
come to the Raja Rani Gramthan many times.  I remembered her saying:  
No, this was my first time.  I cannot walk uphill.  But we had a bhakal this time.  My 
grandson became very, very ill, when he was thirteen months.  Then I called on (prayed) 
our Raja Rani Gramthan and asked it to cure my grandson.  I made a bhakal saying ‘If my 
grandson is cured, I will offer a bhale (Nep. roaster) during the Shrejat puja.’  My 
grandson recovered later.  That’s why we all came today to do the puja here.  We offered 
one bhale, one pothi (hen) and a pair of parewa (Nep. pigeon)’ (field notes, April 15, 
2009). 
 
 So the grandmother, despite her physical condition, walked up hill to the Raja Rani 
Gramthan because she made a bhakal.  To fail to honor the bhakal would be morally wrong and 
could destabilize their relationship with the deities.  Bhakal is a ritual commitment to abide by 
the reciprocal relationship that one has promised to sustain.  I argue that Dhimal practices of 
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bhakal help us to understand how they mediate their reciprocal relationship with their deities 
through a cultural ethic that permeates their everyday social relations with their fellow villagers 
and kin members.  When they need support from others, it is habitual for Dhimal to call on their 
kin members and fellow villagers.  Such reliance on one another’s support and help, as my 
discussion of Dhimal marriage practices shows, is shaped by their sense of membership in the 
Gramthan and their embedded ethics of reciprocity among villagers and kin members.  It is a 
generalized practice of sociality in Dhimal villages.  In a like manner, Dhimal also call on their 
deities for their help in their personal and family problems.  They must propitiate the deities with 
ritual offerings to get the desired favor from them.  If they cannot make such an offering 
immediately, then they must make a pledge, the bhakal, that they will enact the promised 
offering during the Shrejat or the Parwa ritual.  Ones’ family’s kin members and fellow villagers 
can become upset or angry if the everyday ethic of reciprocity is not followed.  So too, Dhimal 
deities and other powerful non-human agents can become angry and unhappy if people breach 
their promised bhakal.  In such cases, the deities too can afflict people with sickness or 
misfortunes.  Dhimal are very concerned about making and enacting the bhakal. 
For example, if Dhimal consume their first harvest without offering it to their household 
deity, the Sadi Berang (the most revered and feared household deity, a woman deity), they will 
suffer from severe abdominal pain, vomiting, diarrhea, and other inflictions which will ‘take out’ 
the food that was not shared with the household deities who protect them and their crops.  In 
extreme cases, family members can even die due to the breach of reciprocity and because of their 
failure to acknowledge that the productivity of their crops are not solely the product of their 
family labor.  Commensality and sharing of food is a common cultural ethos that shapes Dhimal 
everyday interactions with their fellow villagers.   
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When someone has disputes or conflicts with their kin members and fellow villagers, 
Dhimal try to placate them by offering a bottle of gora (liquor) or some other kind of gift.  They 
can also seek the help of the village Majhi to mediate their disputes or bad feelings with their 
fellow villagers.  Similarly, Dhimal seek the help of Oja and the village priest, Dhami, to 
mediate between them and their deities and other powerful non-human agents.  They propitiate 
them through ritual offerings, the most important being the animal sacrifice.  People’s everyday 
sustenance is also dependent on the wellbeing of the village as a whole.  They must be thankful 
for the help of the other dwellers and spiritual forces that contribute towards their sustenance and 
continuity as a collective social group.  Thus the Shrejat is the most important ritually regulated 
means of expressing Dhimals’ gratitude to their deities and other forces, and of seeking their 
continued support for the protection and wellbeing of all villagers. 
 
 
Shrejat Ritual As Community-Making Practice 
!
 The Shrejat is the only Dhimal village ritual which is collectively organized and 
performed.  And it is made a truly communal ritual through concrete practices and symbolic 
representations.  The village Gramthan becomes the center stage of the Shrejat performance.  
During the Shrejat, the Gramthan not only enshrines its sacredness, it also becomes a place 
where Dhimals show their collective hospitality to their deities by offering food and other ritual 
offerings.  They facilitate the mobility of their deities by bringing them effigies of their favorite 
rides- the elephant and the horse.  The village Dhami, on behalf of the entire village, calls on all 
the village deities and welcomes them to the Gramthan so that villagers can make the ritual 
offerings.  The preparation and organization of the Shrejat reinstitutes Dhimal village and its 
customary social organization.   
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 Dhimal collect some amount of uncooked rice (about one kilogram) and cash (fifty to one 
hundred rupees) from each individual household to finance the ritual.  The rice collected from 
individual households is mixed (collectivized) and used in the Shrejat ritual both as the ritual 
offering and as the Gramthan’s prasad (Nep.  the items offered to the deities that is redistributed 
to devotees as deities’ blessing).  The uncooked rice, the major cereal crop of Dhimal, is also the 
principal ritual object that is used to make the deities’ altars.  The rice so collected from each 
individual families is used as ‘achetta,’ the ritual item that Dhami uses as offering to 
communicate with the deities.  After the ritual, the achetta becomes the Gramthan’s prasad - a 
ritual item possessing the deities’ blessing.  The Dhami puts the uncooked rice as tika (rice mark) 
on devotee’s forehead; people take the achetta back homes as prasad.   
 I argue that the transformation of the value of the uncooked rice into prasad through 
collective contribution of all village households is an important act of community making in the 
Shrejat ritual.  JB Dhimal told me that collected uncooked rice represents the individual 
household’s offering during the Shrejat ritual.  I would further argue that the transformation of 
uncooked rice (an agricultural product) into a ritual object emphasizes the conjoined efforts of 
the villagers and their deities in producing the means of livelihood for the individual family.  
During the Parwa ritual (September-October), Dhimals also pay special ritual offering to the 
farm.149 Dhami or any other knowledgeable person will perform rituals asking their deities to 
protect their ripening crops so that the crop yields will be maximized.  They worship the local 
rivers that irrigate their farms, and bring out some sand from the bottom of one river.  The sand 
is then mixed with soil; the Dhami asks the deities to bless the mixture of soil and sand.  
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149!Parwa is a three-day long ritual.  I did not observe this particular ritual event.  The description is based on 
interviews and discussions.!
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Individual Dhimals take this sand and soil mixture and spread it in their farms in order to protect 
and enhance the vitality of their crops (paddy).   
 After the harvest, the individual family acknowledges the contribution of their deities in 
the process of agricultural production, and they must offer the first harvest to their household 
deities by performing the Nwaugi ritual (November).  The transformation of uncooked rice into 
prasad during the Shrejat ritual emphasizes this collaboration between the individual and his 
deities in producing the means of subsistence.  This also shows that Dhimals recognize that 
production of means of survival (here symbolized by rice) depends not only on peoples’ labor, 
money, technology and knowledge.  The blessing and labor of their deities and the ritual power 
of their village Dhami are equally important. 
 The Majhi, though he is not a ritual practitioner, plays the leadership role in the 
organization of the Shrejat.  The ritual performance of the Shrejat begins at the village Majhi’s 
home the evening before the actual ritual.  On that evening, one representative from each family, 
who are members of the village Gramthan, must gather at the Majhi’s home and participate in 
the ritual of ‘Jagaram’ (Nep.  staying awake).  During the Jagaram puja, the Dhami and his 
associates prepared a ritual altar for the deities who will be worshipped the next day in the 
Gramthan.  The Dhami will pay special ritual offerings to the effigies of an elephant and horses, 
which remain tied to a bamboo stick.  Then a female member of the Majhi family (Majhi’s wife 
or his daughter or daughter-in-law), dressed in new bohna, offers special hospitality to the 
deities, and their rides, the elephant and horses, by offering food and other ritual offerings.  
Hence by hosting the Jagaram ritual through which the villagers offer the deities hospitality, the 
Majhi becomes the sponsor and the host of the ritual and deities.  During the actual Shrejat ritual 
in the Gramthan, the ancestral Majhi of the village is also recognized and worshipped as a deity.  
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Thus unlike the individual villagers, Majhi and Dhami not only mediate with the deities, they 
become deities as well. 
 My discussions so far have shown the pivotal role of Dhami in the Shrejat ritual and how 
it reinforces the importance of Dhami for the continuity of the Dhimal community.  The Shrejat 
ritual at the Gramthan begins first by making offering to the ancestral Dhami, who is the most 
knowledgeable agent at placating the deities and other powerful beings.  “We first to pray our 
ancestor Dhami asking him to bless and guide our ritual offerings.  We ask him to check if our 
ritual offerings are complete.  If we have not made proper offering, then one of us (the ritual 
performers) will be possessed by the power of ancestral Dhami and that person will 
communicate to us through his state of trance” the head Dhami told me in 2009.  The Shrejat 
both signifies and legitimizes the importance Dhimals asign to the social position and role of the 
Dhami.  Once during my participation in the Parwa ritual at his home in Karikoshi, Dai 
explained to me the importance of Dhami:  
The Dhami is very, very important to us.  He has a big responsibility for providing shelter, 
clothing, water and grain in our village.  He carries this responsibility.  If he cannot make our 
deities happy, we will starve and suffer.  We have given him the responsibility of carrying this 
parampara since the ancient time.  We don’t have power like him to make our deities happy 
and satisfy.  Therefore, we need to worship Dhami during Shrejat and during our parwa ritual 
at home (Interview with Dai, October 12, 2009). 
 
 When the Shrejat ritual is completed the next day, Dhami will ritually end the Shrejat by 
thanking the deities followed by the ‘raising of the altar’ i.e. the act of picking up the altar and 
the offerings (animal sacrifices and other prasad).  Then the Dhimal ritual team proceeds 
towards the Majhi’s home.  The procession ends at the Majhi’s home where the ritual offerings 
will be purified with water and then be kept at the Majhi’s home.  The Majhi then hosts the feast 
for the Shrejat ritual team, and the Shrejat prasad, the meat and the uncooked rice, will be 
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equally distributed to all the individual families of the village.  The beginning and ending of the 
Shrejat ritual at the Majhi’s home, and the distribution of the Shrejat prasad to the individual 
village families from his home after the ritual contribute towards the social production of the 
Majhi’s position and his legitimacy.  Similarly, because of his inevitable role in the ritual, the 
significance of Dhami is reinforced through the Shrejat ritual.  Majhi and the Dhami are 
worshipped as one of the Shrejat deities in the Gramthan.   
 The significance of the Shrejat in Dhimal social and religious life, and the ways in which 
Dhimals collectively perform their Shrejat ritual contribute in important ways to reproduce the 
social legitimacy of the traditional social positions of Dhami, hanuwa, Oja and Majhi.  The 
Kendra also derives its social recognition from the fact that the social actors representing Dhimal 
customary institutions like Dhami, Majhi, Oja, and Hanuwa are also respected leaders in the 
Kendra.  Their leadership adds moral authority to the Kendra’s cultural politics of defining and 
reforming ‘Dhimal culture.’  On the other hand, the active roles and the leadership of Majhi, 
Dhami, Hanuwa, Oja and other cultural activists in organizing and executing the performance of 
the Shrejat ritual consolidate their recognition as important ‘cultural activists’ among the 
villagers.   
 
 
The Making Of Shrejat As A ‘Rastriya Puja’  
!
I began this chapter by describing the final Shrejat ritual performance of the year (2007) at 
the Kendra.  This ritual was organized and participated in by thousands of people as the national 
ritual of Dhimal.  The Kendra’s representation of Shrejat as a national ritual can be seen as a 
claim that Dhimal is a distinct Jāti with its definite historical territoriality, ‘culture,’ language and 
a religion, that is, a nation.  This claim of themselves as a nation becomes powerfully visible in 
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the Dhimal political movement for a ‘Dhimal autonomous state’ under the federal restructuring 
of Nepal, which I will discuss in the next chapter.  With the declaration of Nepal as a secular 
republic in 2006, the state recognized many non-Hindu rituals and religious days as ‘national 
holidays.’  In the last few years, Dhimal have been demanding that the day they celebrate the 
final annual Shrejat ritual should be declared a ‘national holiday’ of Nepal as well.  Thus by 
reviving their village ritual and collectively organizing and celebrating it together, the 
transformation of the individual village Shrejat into a national ritual has opened up the possibility 
of claiming new rights within the state in the emerging political contexts.  It also illustrates how 
Dhimal village ritual, as a materiality of Dhimal Jāti identity and culture, has become a 
constituent part of Dhimal indigenous activism, hence an important political practice.   
This remaking of the Shrejat as national ritual shows us how historical constituted village-
making practices can become a political project for claiming indigenous identity and rights.  
There are three important factors that help to establish the Kendra’s Shrejat a ‘truly’ national 
ritual for Dhimal activists.  First, consider the organizer of the ritual.  We can begin by asking, 
could any organization other than the Kendra organize a Shrejat ritual on the scale of a national 
ritual?  Based on my ethnographic observation and analysis, I can claim that the kind of moral 
and communal authority the Kendra has over what Dhimal consider their culture and customary 
practices is unmatched by any other organization such as ethnic associations of Dhimal affiliated 
with political parties.  The Kendra as I have discussed earlier is not only the ‘official’ 
representative jāti organization.  It is an extension of Dhimal village and its customary social-
political organization.   
The second important factor which helps to establish the Shrejat performed by the Kendra 
as a national ritual is the collectivization of its organization and performance.  Each village 
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contributes money, goods, and labor for the ritual and sends its representatives to participate at 
the Jagaram ritual, the ritual of staying awake to welcome the deities.  Hence all Dhimal villages, 
like an individual member of the Kendra’s Gramthan, the collective village shrine, actively 
participate to organize the ritual.  But unlike the village ritual which is performed primarily for 
the well-being of the members of a particular village, the national ritual organized by the Kendra 
is organized for the well-being of all Dhimal villages and all Dhimal including those who are 
living outside the village, such as in Kathmandu, where they do not have Gramthan.  Hence this 
spatial encompassment of the Shrejat ritual organized by the Kendra becomes very important 
distinction for Dhimal. 
In his important work on nation as an “imagined political community,” Anderson (1983: 
26) emphasizes how the rise of print capitalism like the newspaper and the novel made it 
possible for the imagination of people living in distant places nevertheless to imagine themselves 
inhabiting the same discretely measured time (homogeneous empty time), which is somewhat 
analogous to imagining an entire community (the nation) moving together through history.  In 
other words, Anderson emphasizes that the experience of simultaneity mediated by print 
capitalism is fundamental to the creation of the nation as an imagined community.  His notion of 
the experience of simultaneity helps to explain why the Kendra has tried to make the Shrejat into 
a national ritual where Dhimal share the significance of being in the same place, participating in 
the same event on the same day.  The importance of the collective experience of place also asks 
us to reconsider Anderson’s important analytical framework by focusing on the role of 
geographical imagination in creating a nation. 
I argue that the collective organization of the Shrejat at the Kendra, which brings together 
Dhimal from their many villages, and Kathmandu as well, makes it possible for Dhimal to 
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experience the simultaneity which the village-level ritual lacks.  Typically, each village may 
organize its Shrejat on different days between the months of Baishak and Ashar.  On the 
contrary, the collective performance Shrejat at the Kendra is not only for all Dhimal, but it is 
simultaneously participated in by all Dhimal villages on the same day and at the same place.  
Hence it makes the Kendra’s Shrejat a national ritual.  In this way, the sense of collective 
participation, the sense of being in the same place together is equally important for fostering the 
sense of an imagined territorial community.  In Chapter 7, I will discuss how Dhimal tried to 
make the Shrejat their national ritual in order to reclaim their ancestral village in a place where 
no Dhimal currently lives.  Thus by making Shrejat the national ritual of Dhimal jāti, Dhimal 
have innovatively blended their localized ritual practices and historically constituted practices of 
village-making to mediate and act on the emerging political-economic forces that affect them 
and their communities.   
These efforts to give national character to the Shrejat are also prompted by practical 
concerns among dhimal activists about costs and the duration of village Shrejat celebrations.  
Many Dhimal activists, like the chairperson of the Kendra whom I introduced in the beginning of 
this chapter, pointed to escalating ritual spending as ‘bikriti’ or “bad” practices.  In order to 
address these concerns, the Kendra has begun shortening the allowed time during which each 
village must complete its Shrejat ritual.  Thus by instituting new practices of celebrating Shrejat 
collectively by all villages at one central place as a national ritual, the Kendra is also enacting the 
politics of “ritual time compression.” 
.   
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Politics Of Ritual Time Compression 
!
The villagers hosting the Shrejat ritual celebrate the occasion in festive ways.  Kin 
members and friends from other villages come to the village hosting the Shrejat ritual, and they 
will visit their kin members’ homes where they will be offered food and drinks.  Unlike in the 
marriage ritual where the wedding family hosts the feast, each and every individual family in the 
village feast their visiting kin members during the Shrejat ritual.  Pork is the main dish of the 
day, and every family cooks it so that the village becomes scented with the delicious aroma of 
the pork.  Married sisters and daughters come to visit their natal family with their husbands and 
children during the Shrejat.  They are the most expected guests of the family.  The sisters and 
daughters come with special traditional gifts of food, and in return, their natal families send them 
home with meat and food for all of their family members.  Beside ones’ close family members, 
anyone they know can visit them that day, and they will host them with their best hospitality.  
Richer families, the Majhi, political leaders, and other respected community members will have 
more guests during the Shrejat.  Therefore the social celebration of the Shrejat helps to renew 
and connect individual family relations with their kin members and friends across multiple 
villages.   
Some senior Dhimals emphasized that the festive celebration of the Shrejat ritual needs to 
be historicized in terms of the agricultural calendar and its varying demands of time and labor.  
According to this interpretation, once the agricultural work begins, people would become so 
engulfed in their agricultural activities that they would not able to see and meet their kin 
members who live in other villages for many months.  Knowing this, they would meet their kin 
members during the Shrejat ritual before the commencement of the cultivation of paddy.  
“During the malarial time, people did not know if they would see their kin members next season.  
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So they would meet and eat together during the Shrejat,” Babai Dhimal explained to me the 
rationale behind such festive celebrations of Shrejat in the past.  But other Dhimal indigenous 
activists (reformists) claim that Dhimal began celebrating Shrejat in festive ways only after the 
1960s (DJBK, nd).  Whatever might have been the context for the festive celebration of Shrejat, 
it puts additional financial pressure on individual families.  Given the economic marginality of 
Dhimal now that they have to buy almost all the things they need to host the Shrejat celebration, 
the economic challenges of doing Shrejat celebration in the ‘traditional way’ are real and hard 
felt by individual families.   
 Dhimal indigenous activists seemed to be very worried about the economic costs of the 
Shrejat celebration.  They worry that the long duration of Shrejat celebration adds to the 
economic burden borne by the individual families.  They argue, based on their detailed 
calculation, that these ritual costs can further degrade the already impoverished economic 
conditions of the majority of Dhimal families.  Since families go on extended visits from village 
to village during the Shrejat rituals, so Kendra activists argue, many Dhimal school-going 
children have lower school attendance.  In order to address these problems, the Kendra has 
recently shortened the period of Shrejat celebrations by fixing the beginning and ending day of 
the ritual.150  By shortening the duration, the Kendra activists believe that many villages will 
host their ritual on a single day so that the numbers of people visiting other villages will decrease 
(and so lower the individual expenses).  Similarly it will also lower the absentee rate for Dhimal 
students.  Hence the Kendra is intervening to regulate when and also how people should 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
150!When I first participated in the final Shrejat ritual organized by the Kendra in 2007, the last day for any village 
to have their Shrejat was the 15th of Ashar.  I was told that this decision was made with the consent of the all village 
Dhami and Majhi.  In 2007, it was reported that all villages complied with the new end day for the Shrejat.  In 2008, 
the Kendra further shortened the ritual duration requiring all villages to end the Shrejat ritual by the second day of 
Ashar.  Two villages were reported not to have abided by the Kendra’s decision.  I was told that 6 villages did not 
listen to Kendra in 2010, just before I left Nepal. 
!
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celebrate their village rituals by providing a seeming logic of economic rationality, informed by 
the dominant ideologies of modernization and bikas.   
I argue that such concerns with ‘economizing the ritual practices,’ a common practice of 
movements for cultural revival in Nepal (Guneratne, 2002; Fisher, 2001), needs a “thicker 
ethnographic” approach (Geertz 1973: 5-6, 9-10; Ortner, 1995) to indigenous emphasis on 
cultural reforms.151  We need to take into account multiple factors and structural conditions 
which have influenced Kendra’s politics of and justification for ritual time compression.  Dhimal 
in general and those who are economically vulnerable in particular affirmed the economic 
burden of the festive celebrating of Shrejat.  Dai’s family with whom I stayed for my fieldwork 
did not have any stable source of income, and they owned very little land to support their family 
needs.  They told me that they spent about five thousand rupees in 2007 for the Shrejat 
celebration, and this is a substantial amount for the family. 
“Gāro chhā!, it is difficult,” he used to comment on my asking if it were financially 
challenging to celebrate the Shrejat ritual by inviting their extended families, kin members and 
friends across Dhimal villages.  Yet Dai and his family had the greatest zeal for the ritual; they 
seemed to have managed to do it, perhaps by borrowing money or selling whatever paddy they 
may have stored or bhauji (Dh.  elder’s brother wife) may have woven more cloth pieces to be 
sold in the market.  If Dhimal are spending more on celebrating the ritual, then we may ask why 
do they do it? Individual families spend money to host feasts for their married sisters, kin 
members and friends from another villages during Shrejat.  In other words, Dhimal are 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
151!Such concerns with ‘economizing’ the ritual practices and emphasis on “cost-cutting” (Manzardo and Sharma, 
1975) of the cultural practices are common themes raised by other ādivāsi groups in their indigenous organizing 
(Guneratne, 2002; Fisher, 2001) as in the caste associations in India (see Guneratne, 2002, for an excellent 
overview.  These concerns on “reforms” also echo with the dominant ideas of “jāti improvement,” state-led 
modernization discourses, as well as the impacts of the leftist political parties which used the ideas of ‘kuriti.’  See 
my discussions in Chapter 5 on for the political-economic contexts within which ideas of ‘kuriti’ and ‘bikriti’ 
became the focus of their reform efforts.!
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reproducing their social relationships, kinship, and themselves through these ritual celebrations.  
By investing financially in the festive celebration, people are enacting everyday “ordinary 
ethics” (Lambek, 2010) of being and becoming Dhimal and producing honor for their families, 
and the village.  Dai and his family will be equally welcomed and treated with honor when they 
visit other villages during their Shrejat.  Thus people, as moral actors who embedded in the 
localized social worlds of social relations based on ethics of mutual obligation, duty and 
reciprocity, participate in the community-making practice of Shrejat celebration. 
But the structural conditions of economic marginality in which these Dhimal live make 
participating in the prestige economy, the practice of maintaining a family honor through 
enactment of their shared ethos of reciprocity, extremely challenging.  Yet as an individual 
family, Dai cannot initiate any change to shorten the duration of the ritual.  The village Majhi, 
even if he should want to, cannot intervene on his own to regulate the duration of the ritual or the 
individual family expenses.  Any such effort by an individual will risk their being disconnected 
from the village.  On the other hand, the Kendra, as the representative jāti organization, can act 
like a Majhi, when all the village representatives come together to discuss these issues and to 
come up with a tangible solution.  Any intervention by the state or any other non-representative 
entity like political parties or NGOs on this issue would be regarded as unethical and people 
would strongly resist them, particularly in the post-1990 period in Nepal.  The Kendra is a 
representative institution; its moral authority and social legitimacy primarily come from its 
embeddedness in and relationship with Dhimal.  Therefore, the Kendra’s politics of time 
compression also illustrates how Dhimal as a community exercises its sovereign right to deal 
with issues arising from their cultural practices such as Shrejat. 
  
! 267!
Shortening the ritual period is an innovative middle-ground solution which recognizes the 
customary rights of each village to organize its annual ritual, even as it tries to address, to some 
extent, the issues of ritual costs and lower school attendance of Dhimal students during the ritual 
period.  The conflict between Dhimal festival time and the school calendar elucidates how 
Dhimal political marginality can impinge on their collective rights to celebrate their culture.  
Dhimal lack of access to and control over the state policy-making processes, in this case, the 
power to decide the school calendar informed by the local cultural contexts, is an important part 
of this conflict.  It is interesting that schools in the Tarai region close for forty-five days during 
the summer beginning from the month of Ashar, the month when the Kendra ends its annual 
Shrejat ritual.  If Dhimal had rights to participate meaningfully in setting the annual educational 
calendar of the local schools, it is likely that Dhimal students would be able to celebrate their 
cultural festivals without worrying about missing their exams.  Note that the Hindu school 
children have school holidays during which their most important festivals and rituals occur.  
Now many other non-Hindu groups have also been granted similar rights.  In the last few years 
Dhimal have been demanding that Shrejat should also be entitled to be deemed ‘national 
holidays,’ hence the importance of the promoting Shrejat as a national ritual for Dhimal. 
The last Shrejat ritual that I attended was in 2010 at the Kendra’s premises, a month (June) 
before my return to the University.  The majority of Dhimal villages had complied with the new 
date fixed by the Kendra, though the numbers of villages resisting the ritual time compression 
grew from two to six between 2008 and 2010.  This was a clear indication of an emergent 
conflict between the village and the Kendra, still many villages changed the date for their Shrejat 
in order to comply with the new ritual calendar.  I did not directly inquire if the shortened ritual 
time helped in lowering the ritual costs.  My discussion with Dai indicated that the organization 
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of the Shrejat ritual by many villages on a single day had lowered his family’s spending by some 
amount.  He seemed to be in agreement with the logic of these intended reforms. 
In 2010, the chairman of the Kendra, who had visited many villages that year in order to 
observe how people actually celebrated Shrejat, said to us (the participants at the Jagaram 
evening), “people don’t listen to (us) in the matter of spending for the ritual feast.”  He claimed 
that Dhimal were spending more money now.  He was referring to the impact of the remittance 
economy on the festive celebration of Shrejat.  Now more and more Dhimal families have at 
least one family member employed in ‘bidesh’ (Nep.  foreign places), mostly working in labor-
intensive jobs in Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, and also in Iraq, Israel 
and Malaysia.  Cash remittance from a family member employed in bidesh has become an 
important component of the local economy.  I participated in many village-level Shrejat 
celebrations during my fieldwork and observed that the families linked with the bidesh economy 
tended to have more ‘guests’ during the ritual.  There was an indication that the interface 
between the circulation of remittance money and the ritual celebrations seemed to highlight the 
emerging class differentiation and the prestige economy among Dhimals.   
 In 2009, I visited the homes of the two of the central-level Dhimal indigenous leaders 
during their village Shrejat ritual.  Both completely embodied the ritual celebration; their homes 
were full of people- sisters and daughters, kin members, party members (non-Dhimal) and the 
ethnographer.  Contrary to the Kendra’s rhetoric of blame in tagging their own community 
members as “careless spenders in feast and drinking,” these Dhimal leaders highlighted to me the 
significance of Shrejat in strengthening their kin relations, especially between brother and sister.  
The trope of ‘economizing the ritual,’ though it resonates with the concerns of Dhimals in 
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general, is rejected by people for whom Shrejat is more about reanimating their social 
relationships with their kin members and friends than a budgetary calculation of sociality.   
Even though the Shrejat is historically constituted practice, collectively organized and 
performed by villagers, it does not have the ritual template emphasizing collective resistance 
against external forces or dramatization of structural relationships of dominations which 
anthropologists have described for rituals of many other indigenous groups in Nepal (Sagant, 
1985, Holmberg, 2000; Shneiderman, 2005; Pfaff-Czarnecka, 2002).  The Dhimal priests and 
others did not invoke the languages of ‘resistance’ while explaining to me why they perform the 
ritual.  Their emphasis on the mutual sociality, reciprocity and recognition of all the entities and 
beings helping one another to survive and subsist in their ‘village’ does not correspond to their 
lived experiences of being Dhimal in the multiethnic local social worlds governed by the 
extremely exclusionary Hindu state.   
 I argue that the ritual production of their village (cf. Mines, 2002), even as Dhimal were 
progressively becoming landless and marginalized is inherently a political practice.  In the multi-
ethnic social compositions of the Village Development Committee (VDCs), the village-level 
political unit of local government, Dhimal make up less than ten percent of the total population 
in the VDCs of Morang district.  Despite their political-economic marginality and state-led 
assimilative policies, Dhimal have persisted in retaining their religious ways of life and 
traditional social organization even when they were at the same time “modernizing” themselves.  
As Merlan (2009: 18-21) reminds us, “indigeneity” is not a permanent condition that is “simply 
there,” but a historically constructed interaction between parties engaged in unequal power 
relations.  Drawing from Merlan, I contend that the centrality of the Gramthan for the 
constitution of Dhimal village became an important marker of Dhimals’ ādivāsiness and Shrejat 
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as important ritual of Dhimal place-making in the emerging unequal power relationships between 
various groups and the Nepali state after the1950s.   
 The fact the majority of Dhimal villages still have their village shrines shows that those 
who settled in Dhimal villages seemed to have respected the local Gramthan, maybe out of 
mutual recognition, respect and fear.  Non-Dhimal from the local villages have become 
‘members’ of the Gramthan; they contribute money and rice for the ritual and receive blessings 
from the Dhimal priest and deities.  So the village shrine is a powerful maker of Dhimal 
aboriginality in the village that proclaims their historical, religious and social relationships to the 
land in the contexts of their collective experiences of marginality as a Jāti.  Hence by annually 
performing Shrejat ritual, Dhimal also claim their ādivāsi identity and territorial belonging in the 
village.  In the same way, by making Shrejat a national ritual, the Kendra is claiming Dhimal to 
be a nation, a collective people with distinct ways of life and connected to an ancestral 








‘This Is Our Ancestral Place’: Place-making, History and Indigenous Territoriality 
 
 
A Place Called ‘Raja Rani’ 
 Each year, on the first day of the Nepali month of Baisākh (April-May), Dhimal from 
different villages gather at the official premises of the Kendra, around mid-day.152  Then they 
will travel about 20 kilometers to a place called Raja Rani (which literally means ‘king’ and 
‘queen’), a village on a small hilltop (1,558 ft.) located west of Letang bazaar of Morang district 
(see maps 5: 1 and 5: 2).  The village is named after two small ponds located inside a small but 
thick wetland forest that lies further west of the main village settlement; the locals refer to these 
two ponds as ‘Raja’ and ‘Rani.’  This is a special collective journey, a new practice that the 
Kendra initiated in 2001 to mark the beginning of the Shrejat, Dhimal’s most important village 
ritual.  Currently no Dhimal live in Raja Rani; it is predominately a village of Magar, a hill 
indigenous group who are believed to have settled there in the early 20th century. 
In the late 1990s, Dhimal discovered that Raja Rani was one of their ancestral places, 
hence a historical place that holds their jāti itihās (ethnic history) and ancestral spirits.  After its 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
152! It is also the Nepali New Year Day, but the ritual event is not organized to celebrate this temporal calendar.!
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rediscovery, in the year 2000, Dhimal built a Gramthan close by the two ponds inside the village 
forest.  The next year (2001), the Kendra and the representatives of Majhi and Dhami decided  
 







that Dhimal should collectively organize Shrejat ritual in the Raja Rani Gramthan to inaugurate 
the beginning of Shrejat.  Dhimal purchased a small piece of land in Raja Rani village and built a 
hut-styled rest house in the year 2002 to shelter ritual partipants and perform the Jagaram 
ritual.153  Now, as a rule, Dhimal can perform their village ritual only after the completion of 
Shrejat in Raja Rani.  This inaugural Shrejat at Raja Rani, like the final annual Shrejat that 
Dhimal collectively organize at the premise of the Kendra, is the ‘national ritual.’  Hence this 
Shrejat ritual connects all villages and other places where Dhimal live to their ancestral place in 
Raja Rani.   
When I first observed this event in 2008, about one hundred Dhimal from different villages 
and walks of life, men and women across the span of three generations, participated in the 
collective ritual journey from the Kendra to Raja Rani.  Dhimal women, young and old, all came 
dressed up in their beautiful bohna.  The next year, a few Dhimal men, the youth indigenous 
activists, had also put on their ‘traditional’ male garment but they seemed less confident of their 
performative acts.  That year, more than two hundred people had joined the Jagaram ritual, 
almost half of whom were young high school and college students.  On the second day of the 
ritual in the both years, hundreds of Dhimal and non-Dhimal visited Raja Rani in order to make 
ritual offerings to and receive blessing from Dhimal deities.  Many prominent Dhimal political 
leaders and the executive members of the Kendra who did not participate in the Jagaram ritual 
attended the ritual on the second day.   
In 2008, the Raja Rani Shrejat happened to be Dhimal’s first public gathering right after 
the historic election of the Constituent Assembly.  The two Dhimal who were elected in the 
Constituent Assembly that week also attended the ritual event on the second day.  A journalist 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
153!See Chapter 6 for ethnographic discussion on Shrejat ritual.!
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had come all the way from Biratnagar city since the first day of the ritual event to document the 
‘Dhimal culture.’  There were other media representatives and photographers from the local TV 
stations, FM radio and various newspapers.  The presence of these political leaders and the 
media also signified the popularity as well as the significance of this Shrejat ritual event. 
In both years, the locals of Raja Rani had organized a mela (fair) in the village to mark the 
village ritual as well as the Nepali New Year.  Every open corner of this village with less than 
three hundred people had turned into a busy mini-market.  The village was overcrowded with 
people selling and buying foods, drinks and other items that many nomadic vendors from 
elsewhere had brought there in order to earn some profits.  The ritual event seemed to have 
helped the local villagers to earn some income for their household economy.  This small village 
where I had spent a very quiet and peaceful night had turned into a vibrant bazaar next day- filled 
with colorful and cheerful people, some of who were heavily drunk while others were merrily 
enjoying.  At one interval (in 2008), when I looked down on the village from a distance further 
up hill, the enthralling beauty of the village landscape was altered for that day.  I saw people 
moving everywhere.  From up there, the green wetland ground by the forest, which lies at a 
lower elevation than the main settlement areas, had completely changed its outlook with so many 
people in colorful dress walking on it.  Among the crowd that was everywhere, Dhimal women 
were distinctively visible with their bohna.  Hence, on that day, they had also ‘dressed’ Raja 




Figure 14: Dhimal preparing to leave for 
Raja Rani  (2008) 




Figure 16:  A mela (fair) organized at the Raja Rani 
village during the Shrejat ritual (2008) 
Figure 17: Dhimal women waiting to offer ritual in the Raja 
Rani Gramthan (2009) 
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Until recently, Raja Rani did not carry any sense of place for current Dhimal indigenous 
activists.  Dhimal used to live in Raja Rani even as late as the 1940s, but except for a few senior 
individuals, the place had almost been erased from Dhimal collective memory.  After its 
rediscovery in the late 1990s, particularly with the introduction of the new practice of 
inaugurating the Shrejat ritual, Raja Rani has been transformed into a ‘sacred place’ where 
Dhimal’s ancestral spirit and their ethnic history reside.  In the spheres of everyday life, Dhimal 
cite the place name to index many things.  For example, once the during the celebration of 
Dhimal annual ritual Parwa, Dai, my host Dhimal brother, proudly declared:#154  
We do our rituals more like the ways our ancestors had done in the past.  The Dhimal villages 
in the eastern belt don’t do rituals like us.  You can see it.  They have borrowed from 
Rajbhansi (one Tarai ādivāsi group).  Our ancestors came directly from Raja Rani to this 
village.  You know it?  That’s why our chalān (Nep. customary practices) is still like that from 
the past (Field note; October, 18, 2009). 
 
On this particular conversation, our discussions did not focus on Raja Rani per se but Dai 
knew well that I was aware of the significance of the place for Dhimal.  But the ways in which 
he evoked the place name was completely a new narrative that I had not heard before from other 
Dhimal.  A few years ago, this association of ‘Raja Rani’ with one’s village history (ancestral 
genealogy) or with a claim of the authenticity of a ritual (in this case) would not have had much 
meaning to Dhimal in this village or elsewhere.  During the period of my fieldwork (2007-2009), 
I observed that Dhimal frequently mentioned the place in their everyday conversations.  For 
example, Dhimal boys swear on Raja Rani to express their commitment and purity of their love 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
154!Parwa is a three days family ritual in which Dhimal commemorate their ancestors, and family members who 
have passed away the year before, and worship their household deities, rivers, soils, forests, cattle and all utensils 
and objects on which they depend throughout the year.  See Chapter 6. 
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for the girls they are courting, as is illustrated by this stanza of a poem published online.155  In 
his poem, one Dhimal youth writes:  
My heart is good (pure) 
How is your heart?  
Never will I forget you 
I swear to Raja Rani (Dhimal, A, 2009; my translation). 
 
More important, Raja Rani has also entered into Dhimals’ territorial mapping of the 
‘Dhimal autonomous state,’ one of the central demands of the Kendra.  Hence, by performing 
their village ritual in Raja Rani, Dhimal were not only claiming their historical relationship with 
the place.  They were also using this territorial claim to demand their political autonomy in the 
federal restructuring of Nepal, a process then being undertaken through the drafting of a new 
constitution by the Constituent Assembly (2008-2012).  Now many Dhimal activists claim that 
Raja Rani is the abode of their ‘ancient kingdom.’  By 2009, Dhimal had begun calling the two 
ponds in the Raja Rani as ‘Dhimal Pokhari’ (Nep. ponds) Raja Rani’ or simply ‘Dhimal 
Pokhari.’  Increasingly, Dhimal activists and scholars are writing and publishing about their 
ancestral place in the local as well as the national newspapers. 
Why has Raja Rani, where no Dhimal currently lives, acquired such a heightened sense of 
place for them? In this chapter, I focus on this question in order to illustrate the interplay among 
ritual, history, place-making practices, indigenous political movement and political 
transformations in Nepal.  This chapter primarily draws on my ethnographic observations of the 
Dhimal collective ritual journey to Raja Rani (in 2008 and 2009) and interviews/discussions with 
ritual participants.  I propose to locate this particular place-making practice in the contexts of 
Dhimals’ experiences of the Nepali state in the past, the Kendra’s cultural politics of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
155 Source: http: //www.sahityaghar.com/modules/detail.php?ID=4973&modID=13; accessed October 15th, 2010). !
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representing Shrejat as the national ritual, Dhimal search for their ‘jāti itihas’ (ethnic history), 
and the contemporary indigenous articulation of federalism based on ethnic identity, history and 
territory in Nepal (see Bhattachan, 2009).156   
In this chapter, I will focus on the ways in which Dhimal deploy their village ritual to 
invent new understandings of their historical and lived relationships with their territories and the 
ways they integrate these place-making practices into their indigenous political activism.  
Building on my discussions in the chapter 4, this chapter further elaborates the significance of 
cultural politics in Dhimal indigenous political mobilization by focusing on their politics of 
place-making practices. 
I examine Dhimal’s collective ritual performance at Raja Rani as ‘place-making’ practices.  
I draw on the recent approaches to “place” as an anthropological concept to illustrate how 
Dhimal are inscribing meaning, materiality, social relationships, and histories onto the landscape 
of Raja Rani, what I call place-making practices, in order to reclaim it as their ancestral place.  
As an analytical concept, place is more than a physical location or “the setting for action, the 
stage on to which things happen” (Rodman, 1992: 643).  A place, Escobar (2001: 141) argues, is 
the experience of a particular location with some measure of groundedness (however unstable), 
sense of boundaries (however permeable), and some connection to everyday life, even if its 
identity is constructed, traversed by power, and never fixed (emphasis added).  Hence, a place 
has location, materiality, and is invested with meaning or sense of place (Agnew, 1987; Gieyn, 
2000). 
Drawing from this notion of place, I argue that for the present-day Dhimal, Raja Rani is a 
place in the making.  They are rediscovering histories already emplaced in Raja Rani as well as 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
156!Dhimal do not refer to this ritual journey as “pilgrimage,” hence I have not approached this event as a 
pilgrimage.   
!
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incorporating new histories into this place.  By infusing Raja Rani with a collective sense of 
place, Dhimal are reconnecting this newly rediscovered place to their villages as well as to wider 
networks of socio-spatial relations between them, other social groups and the state through 
concrete practices.  This particular place-making practice also needs to be understood as a 
project.  Dhimal indigenous activists are aware of their intentionality in reclaiming Raja Rani as 
their ancestral place.   
My analysis of Dhimal place-making practices with respect to Raja Rani is informed by an 
anthropology of place that combines both the phenomenological approaches of “being-in-place” 
(Casey, 2009[1993], Basso, 1996) and the political-economic approaches to place and production 
of place (Harvey, 1996).157  Peoples’ sense of place and experiences of places are equally 
influenced and shaped by larger political-economic contexts and power relations (Kirsch, 2001, 
2006, Thomas, 2002).  In this regard, the emerging approach that integrates both the ‘being-in-
place’ and the political-economic approach to place, as exemplified by the recent works of Stuart 
Kirsch (2006), Kahn (2011) and Liffman (2011), is more relevant to understanding how practices 
of place-making and experiences of place are always socially and politically organized (Myers, 
2002).  This approach is particularly useful to understand why indigenous peoples’ sense of 
place is at the heart of their political struggles for control over their ancestral territories (Castree, 
2004).   
For example, Kirsch (2006; also 2001) has shown how the environmental pollution caused 
by the Ok Tedi mine company in Papua New Guinea led to some fundamental changes in the 
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157! In the phenomenological approach to place, “being in place” is considered to be the very essence of human self 
(Casey, 2009 [1993]; 1996).  This perspective takes place as a bodily experienced and dwelled space, which has its 
constitutive “operational intentionality” (Casey, 1996) and generates its own fields of meanings (Basso, 1996) out of 




ways in which the Yonggom people make sense of their landscape.  The “enchantment of place” 
that Yonggom experience in their everyday life is deeply embedded in their practical 
engagements for productivity (through magic spells), their indigenous understanding of human-
environmental relations (including the relationship between clan and landscape), and their 
agentive capacity to reveal and predict future events (Kirsch 2006, Chap.  2).  In the aftermath of 
the environmental pollution caused by the mining, the landscape is “no longer site of 
productivity but a scene of loss” (p: 198), and Yonggom expressed their experiences of the 
destructive effects of environmental pollution in terms of their feeling of mimyop, of sorrow and 
loss (Kirsch, 2006: 190-197).  We can say that the environmental pollution caused by this 
extractive capitalist venture ruptured Yonggom’s relationship to their past, present, and future, 
which had been mediated by their landscapes. 
Despite these destructive effects, Yonggom continue to emphasize their relations to place, 
and use their experiences of being in place to respond to new challenges imposed by the state 
and the environmental impact of the mining company (Kirsch, 2006: 201-215).  Thus, it can be 
argued here that Yonggom’s sense of place also became a shared motivation and catalyst to 
struggle against the corporate power of the mining company.  Peoples’ sense of attachment to 
their lived places can be a powerful motivation driving the political actions that people undertake 
to defend and reclaim their places (Kahn, 2011; Liffman, 2011).  We should at the same time 
consider peoples’ sense of place in an analytical framework that focuses on the spatiality of 
power relations (geography of power relations) in examining how places are made, unmade and 
used to structure relations of domination and subjugation.  Therefore, I find the integration of 
phenomenological and political-economic approaches to place productive and insightful. 
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One of my central arguments in this chapter is to underline the collective creative agency 
of indigenous activists in transforming a once ‘forgotten’ place into a place of lived ancestral 
histories.  These activists were the movement actors who not only ‘rediscovered’ but also re-
introduced the place to the Dhimal community and beyond by integrating it into Dhimal’s 
communal practices of Shrejat ritual.158  The collective performance of the ritual has been 
instrumental in investing the place with its qualities of sacredness and in highlighting its 
historical significance.  But this does not imply that the performance of the Shrejat ritual 
inevitably transforms any Gramthan into a politically significant place at the national level.159  I 
argue that it is the particular history of the place, its past as the abode of Dhimal ancestors, that 
has imbued the Raja Rani Gramthan area with its religious, historical and now political 
significance.  The emerging political-economic contexts (2006-2010), particularly indigenous 
people’s heightened political mobilization to influence the federal restructuring of Nepal, had 
imbued people’s historical relationship to their ancestral territories with new meanings and 
political relevance.  Thus the making of Raja Rani as an ancestral place attained further political 
significance for Dhimal. 
Raja Rani, however, was not simply “invented” to achieve certain political outcomes.  
History, as many scholars (Basso, 1996; Rappaport, 1988) have shown, “leaves its traces, both 
conspicuous and subtle, in the landscape” (Kahn, 2011: 31).  Holding a Dhimal ritual event in 
Raja Rani, as my analysis will show, facilitates the uncovering and the making of Dhimal’s 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
158!Put bluntly, because of its appealing scenic beauty, if Raja Rani had been popularized as a picnic spot after its 
rediscovery, it is very likely that the place would not had received the same level of reverence and political 
significance for Dhimal. 
!
159!For instance, the Kendra has itself built a Gramthan in its official premises where Dhimal end their annual 
Shrejat ritual (see Chapter 4).  Based on my three consecutive observations, the ending ceremony of Shrejat at the 
Kendra was attended and participated by thousands of people from all over the places.  Yet this had not transformed 
the Kendra’s Gramthan into the most revered village shrine for Dhimal.   
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ancestral histories in multiple ways, often through increased interactions among ritual 
participants.  Thus in this chapter, I have attempted to illustrate how a forgotten place can 
become a part of lived ancestral history.  For instance, by showing how a seemingly simple 
statement such as “I was here in this place with my grandmother twenty years ago” can become 
part of a powerful history-making narrative in specific historical-political contexts, this chapter 
helps us to understand how ordinary individuals make and inscribe histories in the land by 
physically being at and participating in the Shrejat ritual at Raja Rani.   
In the remaining sections, I will structure my discussions to highlight the key arguments of 
the chapter.  I will first provide a brief overview of the post-1990 period in order to explain why 
indigenous claims of distinct histories emerged as an integral part of indigenous peoples’ 
movements in Nepal.  This historical-political contextualization will help us to understand the 
significance of Dhimal’s place-making practices in Raja Rani.  Then I will outline how Raja 
Rani was rediscovered in order to highlight what made it an impeccable ancestral place for 
Dhimal.  The rest of chapter will then focus on ethnographic cases to illustrate how Dhimal make 
and write history in the land by organizing and participating in the Shrejat ritual at Raja Rani.   
 
Indigenous Claims Of Distinct Histories 
!
In his monograph entitled Jhapa ko ādivāsi (B.S.  2043)/ ‘Indigenous Peoples of Jhapa’ 
(1984), S. Panta, a hill “high” caste government bureaucrat, introduces the Dhimal in the most 
demeaning way that I have encountered in any textual representations so far.  He writes:  
Backward castes (jāti) do not have factual and true history.  We have to speculate about 
their history based on their hearsay and myth (p: 105).  … Dhimal is the most backward 
caste of Nepal.  They are (politically) unconscious and unable to raise their head high.  




This book, published by a state cooperative publishing house called Sajhā, which ironically 
means “common,” substantially reflects how the dominant society thinks of the relationship 
between ādivāsi and ‘history’ in Nepal.  In such representation, ‘history,’ to paraphrase Dirk’s 
(1990) idea, becomes “a sign of modern” in the sense of a group’s position (status of 
“civilization”) in the caste hierarchy such that the perceived lack of “true” or “factual” history is 
taken to be one defining attribute of “backwardness” of that group.   
Such a stigmatizing contrast between ‘history,’ here in the sense of as a factual, scientific 
description of past events undertaken by trained professionals, and ‘myth,’ on which ādivasi 
societies were based (see Hill, 1988), has also led to the resurgence of indigenous claims to 
distinct histories in Nepal since the early 1990s in particular.  With the proliferation of 
indigenous peoples’ movements in the 1990s, “writing one’s own history” has emerged as an 
integral part of the indigenous struggle to reclaim their identity and rights in Nepal (see Hangen, 
2009; Lama, 2006).  In our conversations, Dhimal indigenous activists, scholars and other 
individuals repeatedly expressed to me the urgent need to ‘write’ down Dhimal histories.160  
Their sense of urgency to write their jāti itihas by themselves can also be read as an expression 
of their political agency, by asserting themselves as historical actors against the mainstream 
historiography that represents them as “backward caste without true history.”   
In the past two decades, Dhimal have begun writing and publishing their histories both in 
Nepali and Dhimali (using the Devānagarík-Nepali script).  In 2010, the Kendra itself published 
a book entitled ‘History of Dhimal part 1’ (in Nepali) which focuses on their ethnic history, 
particularly Dhimal’s history of political organizing.  It is relevant to mention here that the book 
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160!Some of them wanted to know if I was writing “Dhimal history.”  One senior Dhimal also asked me to travel to 
a Limbu village (name unknown) in the eastern hill in order to collect an archive that is believed to have contained 
information on how Limbu and Dhimal are brothers.  Some of those who knew my work also introduced me to 
others (new people) as a “researcher studying Dhimal history.” 
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has a section on ‘Places named in Dhimal language’ (Dhimal, S et.  al, 2010: 11-19) which 
documents forty-eight place-names and their meanings in detail in order to highlight how their 
ethnic history and identity are place-based.  The authors conclude the section with a statement of 
the critical urgency to ‘write their history by themselves.’  They write:  
There could be many other places named in Dhimali language.  These places, which were 
named in ādivāsi Dhimali language, have been given new names by the clever and cunning 
people who now live there.  This has endangered the history of territorial and ethnic 
identity of ādivāsi Dhimal and other marginalized and minority communities.  There has 
been a lack of state-led initiations to carry out research on our concerns.  Consequently not 
much historical works have been done for us.  So unless we write our own history, the 
history of our ethnic identity will be in crisis in the near future (Dhimal, S. et. al. 2010: 19; 
my emphasis). 
 
The authors’ arguments lucidly illustrate how place-based historical imaginations have emerged 
as concrete political projects for the Dhimal.  The importance of place-making as a history-
making practice further becomes evident in the Dhimal notion of “history of land,” which was 
increasingly articulated by Dhimal indigenous activists at the time of my fieldwork.  For 
instance, Bāngai Dhimal, one of the influential Dhimal political leaders, argues that the history 
of Tarai ādivāsi needs to be approached from the ‘history of land.’  He writes:  
Ādivāsi’s relation with the Tarai’s land is much older than modern history.  Today, 
political history is considered to be the ultimate history.  But someday when the trend of 
writing the history of land comes into practice, then we will understand that this land is 
made out of our ancestors' labor, blood, sweat, and tears coming out of their bodies when 
they struggled with the wild animals and harsh environment to make this area habitable for 
all of us’ (Dhimal, B, 1998/V.S. 2055; my translation and emphasis). 
  
Thus Bāngai argues that the history of the Tarai begins with the ādivāsi struggle to 
transform the land of the Tarai into a habitable place for all.  His claim that the Tarai’s land is 
made out of “their ancestors' labor, blood and sweats coming out of their bodies,” may sound 
like a “primordialist” argument to his critics, but I argue that Bāngai is not invoking the 
philosopher John Locke’s theory that one acquires permanent property rights in land by mixing 
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one's labor with it.  Instead, his emphasis on the bodily substances of Dhimal ancestors as the 
constituent part of the Tarai’s history closely echoes what the anthropologist Tim Ingold has 
called “ the temporality of the landscape” (Ingold, 1993).  Building on what he calls “dwelling 
perspective,” Ingold argues (1993: 152), “that the landscape is constituted as an enduring record 
of -- and testimony to -- the lives and works of past generations who have dwelt within it, and in 
so doing, have left there something of themselves.”   
In this approach, the temporality of landscape is not the chronological ordering of events 
that had occurred in a space over a period of time, but rather temporality and historicity emerge 
in “the experience of those who, in their activities, carry forward the process of social life” 
(Ingold, 1993: 157).  The arrays of practical activities or what Ingold calls “taskscapes” that 
Dhimal ancestors undertook as “constitutive acts of dwelling” (Ingold, 1993: 158) in the Tarai 
were gathered as embodied forms of the Tarai landscapes; many of them had been altered and 
erased as the Tarai had underwent substantial changes over the last century (Chapter 2).  What 
troubles Dhimal such as Bāngai is that their ancestral pasts, unlike the political history of the 
kings and other ruling groups, have been silenced, made invisible, and gone unrecognized.  
Hence, he draws our attention towards the need for different ways of ‘writing’ and ‘reading’ the 
ādivāsi history.  Bāngai (2010: 35) calls this approach “history of land.”  He explains:  
History has become the story of the winners.  When we focus on the history of land, then 
we will come to understand the unwritten histories of many subjugated jāti groups.  In the 
present-day Limbuwan,161 not a single Dhimal family lives in the areas between the 
Sanguri bhanjyag (Nep. a pass between two hills) and Raja Rani, nearby the historic 
Vijaypur.  But in the land therein, Dhimal ancestors had left many historic markers, which 
have remained as unwritten history (my translation).   
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
161!Refers to the historical political entity- “homeland” of the Limbus located in the present day areas between the 
Arun river and the Mechi river in the eastern Nepal; till the late 1950s, the region, the hill areas in particular, was 
known as Limbuwan, even in the state’s official usage.!
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Thus Bāngai’s emphasis on the history of land and the Kendra’ publication, History of 
Dhimal (2010), illustrate Dhimal’s collective will to ‘write’ place-based ethnic histories.  My 
discussions of Dhimal place-making practices in Raja Rani will further elaborate on Bagmai 
Dhimal’s notion of ‘history of land’ by showing how Dhimals empower their rediscovered 
ancestral land with ethnic history 
 
 
Forgetting And Remembering A Place: The Political Contexts  
!
Like many other villages of Nepal, Raja Rani is an ordinary place, unknown and invisible 
to the larger national and regional population.  Prior to the formation of the present-day state of 
Nepal, the eastern hills were ‘homelands’ or ‘little kingdoms’ of non-Hindus indigenous groups, 
among them the Rais and Limbu, who are also popularly known as the ‘Kirāti people.’  The 
capital of the Kirāti kingdom, Vijaypur, was located in a Siwalik hill (Subedi, 2005; Chemjong, 
1967) within a radius of fifteen miles west of Raja Rani (see Map 3).  This historicity, as I will 
show later, becomes an important reference for Dhimal in their claim of ethnic history.  It is 
interesting that Dhimal actually came to know about their historical connection to Raja Rani in 
the 1970s.  Tulsi Diwas, a Nepali scholar who documented Dhimal ‘folk culture’ in the late 
1970s, reported that:  
It has become known that Dhimal had a settlement in a place called Raja Rani in Letang 
until 1994 V.S. (1937 A.D.).  When the Kirtiman Padhani (a place where forest was 
cleared) opened in the Tarai, they slowly moved towards the south and began to live in 
villages such as Sunpukuwa, Kari Koshi, and other nearby places (Diwas, 1982: 12; my 
translation). 
 
Oddly, despite knowing that there used to be Dhimal villages in Raja Rani, the collective 
act of remembering the place held no significance for Dhimal during the 1970s.  The resurgence 
of the historical consciousness of this very place in the 1990s illustrates how “places are always 
! 287!
filled with a multitude of interactions, and especially with interactions motivated by the power in 
whose grip people are caught” (Kahn, 2011: 19).  The 1970s was the heyday of the Panchayat 
regime (1962-1990) that aggressively promoted the monolithic vision of “one nation, one people, 
and one culture” and suppressed all oppositional politics, including the expressions of diversity 
and ethnic identity.  With the advent of the Panchayat regime, Nepal’s rulers began an active 
program of producing new geographies by erasing the ethno-geographical identities of places 
associated with indigenous communities.  This they achieved through the administrative 
renaming of village panchayats, districts, and zones with seemingly ‘neutral names,’ albeit 
associated with the dominant groups’ identity, and by defining new boundaries to govern these 
regions and peoples.   
This state-led “geographical violence” (Said, 1993: 225, see Kahn, 2011: 31) was 
subsumed under the rubric of ‘modernization,’ ‘bikas’ (development) and ‘national unity.’162  
For example, during this period, many villages, forests, ponds, and other landmarks were 
increasingly named “Raja Rani” (king and queen) as symbols of ‘national identity’ (Chemjong, 
D., 2010) and as “rituals of development” (Adhikari, 1996).  By the 1970s, the Tarai had 
experienced an unprecedented inmigration of hill people that further accelerated and amplified 
Dhimal’s experiences of “losing ground” (see Chapters 2 and 3).  Dhimal were struggling to 
organize their communities in order just to meet the emerging challenges posed to them as a 
community (see Chapter 4).  Not only was the political-social context unfavorable to the 
rediscovery of Dhimal ancestral places, Dhimal themselves lacked the needed resources 
(organizational, cultural and political) to reclaim their ancestral geographies in the 1970s.   
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162!Said (1993: 225) writes, “imperialism after all is an act of geographical violence through which virtually every 
space in the world is explored, charted, and finally brought under control.”  In this sense, from indigenous 
perspective and experiences, the state making processes through ‘development’, ‘modernization’, ‘administrative 
decentralization’ and other means are equally imperialistic in nature that deepened the magnitude of the historical 
continuity of the geographical violence.!
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During the 1990s, by contrast, the Nepali state had constitutionally recognized Nepal as a 
multi-ethnic (yet a Hindu) nation, and had officially made the distinction betweenthe categories 
of ‘caste’ (jāt) and ‘ethnicity’ (janjāti); the latter groups were identified as a “distinct cultural 
group with its own language, religion, history, custom, and a traditional territory” (Bhattachan, 
2008).  Similarly, indigenous peoples’ movement for recognition of their ethnic identity (as 
nationalities or indigenous peoples), indigenous rights, greater inclusion in all aspects of national 
life, and especially, indigenous demands for meaningful and equitable participation in the 
decision-making processes affecting their lives and communities had strengthened nationally as 
well as locally.   
The Dhimal were also resurgent as one of the most organized indigenous communities in 
terms of their mobilization and participation in the pan-national indigenous movement in the 
1990s.  They were reclaiming their distinct cultural identity, reviving their customary ways of 
life and reclaiming their ethnic histories.  “Historical consciousness comes only when people 
become politically conscious,” one senior Dhimal told me when he narrated the story of the 
rediscovery of Raja Rani.163  In other words, he argued that by the 1990s, Dhimal had become 
politically more conscious and aware of the importance of their ethnic history.  These changing 
political-economic contexts of the 1990s and Dhimal’s sense of political empowerment made the 
rediscovery of Raja Rani more relevant and significant.  The making of Raja Rani as an ancestral 
place became politically even more relevant and meaningful in the context of the post-2006 
period when Nepal was to become a ‘New Nepal’ through federal restructuring and the 
promulgation of a new constitution by the Constituent Assembly. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
163!“Rajnaitik Chetanā pachi matrā ithihas ko chetanā aaudo rahechā,” interview with Babai, March 13, 2008. 
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Place-making and Federal Imaginings 
!
In the aftermath of the political transformations following the April 2006 peoples’ 
movement (jān āndolan), indigenous peoples re-emerged as one of the key political actors who 
could envision and affect new directions for the making of ‘New Nepal’ (see Hangen, 2007, 
2009).  They became a strong and influential collective political force at center stage in Nepal’s 
national politics geared toward the peaceful transition to ‘inclusive democracy’ and 
‘restructuring of the state’ through a new constitution-making process.  During the period of my 
fieldwork, the discourses on federal restructuring, particularly debates on the appropriate model 
of federalism for Nepal, intensified to such an extent that, at times, it seemed not only political 
pundits and leaders but everyone and every human settlement in the country had become 
engulfed in the nationwide arguments regarding the making of ‘Naya Nepal’ (New Nepal).   
Indigenous people and their representative organizations demanded that Nepal’s federal 
restructuring be based on ethnic identity, history and territory so that indigenous communities 
can safeguard and exercise their fundamental rights to political autonomy (see Bhattachan, 2005, 
2009; Lawoti, 2005; Mirsha and Gurung, 2012).  Not only did they demand rights to political 
autonomy through ethnic federalism but they also came forward with proposed maps of Nepal 
federated into ethnic autonomous regions.  Similarly, following the April 2006 movement, the 
people of Tarai origin (Madhesi) emerged as the major political force in Nepal through their 
political movement for regional autonomy.  Their demand for “one Madhesh, one Pradhes” (the 
Tarai regions as one federal state) further intensified the national debate and political 
polarization surrounding the modalities of ‘state restructuring’ in Nepal (see Hachhethu, 2007; 
ICG, 2007). 
The demands made by the political movements of ādivāsi, janjāti, and Madhesi for the 
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federal restructuring of Nepal were radical, albeit contested political proposals.  Many groups 
including the mainstream political parties, the dominant scholars (Nepali as well as foreigners) 
and other expressed their fear that the nation would “beak down into pieces” if Nepal’s 
federalization were to be based on ethnic identity and territory.  These debates and movements 
for federalism infused a heightened sense of ‘territorial consciousness’ among indigenous 
communities.  Their belief that there is an inalienable interrelationship between ethnic identity, 
culture, history and territory consolidated into a collective political project, for which there was 
unprecedented support from their communities.  In such political contexts, indigenous claims of 
territoriality (Liffman, 2011) invested new meanings and political relevancy into people’s place-
making practices, such as the Dhimal’s annual ritual journey to their rediscovered ancestral 
place.164  This brief overview of the post-April 2006 political context in Nepal can help us to 
understand the dialectically interlaced relations among national political transformations, global-
national indigenous politics, and Dhimal place-making practices.   
 
Rediscovery Of An Ancestral Place  
 
In the mid-1990s, some Dhimal activists came to know that until recently there had been 
Dhimal villages in Raja Rani.  Then, in 1997, three of them visited Raja Rani and held 
exploratory discussions with the local Magar.  These visiting Dhimal were pleasantly surprised 
to discover that the local Magar not only knew of Dhimal’s historical connection to the place but 
also they had continued to worship Dhimal ancestral deities as their own local deities.  Places, as 
Kahn (2011: 30) writes, “are moments of interacting social relations.”  How a place is made and 
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164!According to Liffman (2011: 19), “territoriality includes formal rights, popular concepts, implicit premises, and 
everyday practices of placemaking and controlling physical and discursive spaces to confer identity, belonging, and 
power.”   
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sustained through social relations becomes evident in the ways in which the local Magar 
established and continued their reciprocal and respectful relationships with Dhimal ancestral 
deities.165   
The grandparents of these local Magar migrated to Raja Rani when they purchased the 
village land from some Kipat owners (Limbus) in the early 20th century.166  When they moved 
into the new place, some Dhimal were still living in the village.  The new Magar settlers 
witnessed and experienced the spiritual power of Dhimal ancestral deities ‘living’ in the the 
forest and around the village.  They realized that the vitality of the place also derived from the 
spiritual power of these Dhimal ancestors.  Thus, in a reciprocal act of acknowledgement, the 
local Magar began worshipping these Dhimal ancestors as their local deities.  Local Magar still 
know and recall many stories their grandparents and parents had told them about Dhimal 
ancestors.  One such popular story that people recount about Raja Rani focuses on why the two 
ponds are named ‘Raja’ and ‘Rani.’  On my first participation in the Raja Rani Shrejat ritual in 
2008, a fifty-five year old local Magar named Mr. Lok Bahadur generously took time to show us 
around the area, and narrated the following story. 
In the long distant past, a king and a queen lived in the current areas of Raja Rani.  There is 
a place called Rani Pani, now called Lamitar.  This is where the king and the queen used to live 
and go for hunting.  Then, the present day Chisang was a very big river.  There used to be a huge 
rock, with a slightly flat surface nearby this place.  People believe that it was the rock where the 
queen used to dry her hair after bathing in the river.  One day, the king heard that the enemy had 
attacked his kingdom in the south.  He had to go there to fight back and defend his land.  So the 
king had to leave the queen by herself.  The king asked his cook, a Brahmin man, to carry a 
white pigeon in a birdcage.!167    
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
165!The discussions on the local Magar in this chapter are based on my interview with the local Magar and 
conversations I had with them in 2008 and 2009. 
 
166!On Kipat and Limbu, see Caplan, 1970.!
167!I am told that some rich Dhimal family, particularly the tax collector family, used to employ Brahmin as cook in 
their families so that that the state officials and other “high” caste Hindus could accept the food offered by them.   
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The king told the queen: ‘If this pigeon comes back to you, then you will know that 
something had happened to me in the battle.’  Then they left for the battle.  While the king joined 
the battleground, the Brahmin cook (Brahmins were not supposed to fight the battle) waited for 
the king.!!But he accidentally let the bird go out of the cage, and the pigeon flew away.  The king 
and his people defeated their enemy. When he came to the Brahmin, then he learned that the bird 
had already been accidentally set free.  Worrying about the queen, he rushed back to his village.  
On his way, he met a blacksmith who was busy preparing a khukuri (a typical Nepali knife).  The 
king asked him if he had seen a white bird flying back to the village.  ‘I don’t know.  I did not 
pay attention.  I’m busy making this khukuri that will be used to kill the king (by his enemy),’ he 
said even without looking at the person asking him about the bird.   
 
The white pigeon had flown back to the queen.  When the queen saw it, she thought the 
king died fighting the battle.  She was so devastated with the grief that she jumped into one of 
the pond and drowned.  By the time, the king reached his place the queen had disappeared into 
the depth of the pond.  The king could not bear the loss of his beloved queen, and he too killed 
himself by drowning into the other pond.  Thus these two ponds are named the king and the 
queen.  Before his death, the king had cursed that no Brahmin and blacksmith could ever live in 
his village.168  
 
 
 This is the most popular story people retell about why the two ponds are named ‘Raja’ 
and ‘Rani.’  Dhimal believe that the king and the queen were their ancestors.  ‘Rasati,’ or ‘Raja 
Sati’ in Nepali, is an elemental deity worshipped by the Dhimal during their Shrejat ritual.169  In 
Dhimali, one meaning of the word Ra is the ‘hill;’ ‘sati’ (Nep./Hindi) means the practice of 
widow immolation on the death of her husband.  Some Dhimal argue that ‘Rasati’ memorialized 
the hilltop where the king and queen committed suicide but that later, because of 
outside influence, it was called ‘Raja Sati.’  Since there is no Dhimali word for ‘king’ they use 
the Nepali (also Hindi) word ‘Raja’ as the title for many of their deities.  The naming of the 
two ponds as ‘Raja’ and ‘Rani’ must have occurred in the period after the encroachment of the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
168!!The story also focuses on social relations between the Brahmin, the black smith, and Dhimal ancestors.  It is 
interesting that the high caste Brahmin who works for the king is indirectly blamed for the suicidal death of the king 
and queen.  The local Magar told me that there are no Brahmin and blacksmiths in their village.  In the past, they 
tried to help many blacksmith families settled in the village, but eventually they left the village after each of them 
encountered some misfortunes. 
 
169!Ra also means a round shaped swifter woven from bamboo that people used to separate grain from other things, 





 In his acclaimed work, Provincializing Europe, Dipesh Chakrabarty (2000), drawing on 
Marx’s analysis of the relationship between ‘capital’ and ‘history’, has formulated a framework 
for understanding the relationship between two kinds of history of capitalism that he calls 
‘History 1’ and ‘History 2’ (Chakrabarty, 2000:47-71).  History 1 is the universal and the 
totalizing history of capitalism, “a past posited by capital itself as its precondition (p: 63)” which 
“leads to the reproduction of capitalist relationships” (Chakrabarty, 2000:64).  In contrast, 
History 2, more precisely History 2s, are the heterogeneous and multiplicity of pasts which exist 
along with History 1 but which do not necessarily contribute to its reproduction.  History 2s are 
“not pasts separate from capital; they inhere in capital and yet interrupt and punctuate the run of 
capital’s own logic” (Chakrabarty, 2006: 66).  Despite the hegemonic rise of the History 1 and its 
efforts to subjugate and destroy the multiple possibilities that belong to History 2, Chakrabarty 
argues that such totalizing history-making projects are never complete.  History 2 “lives in 
intimate and plural relationships to capital, ranging from opposition to neutrality” (Charkrabarty, 
2002:66) and modifies History 1. 
 The focus on the dialogical relationship between these two histories “allows us to make 
room for the politics of human belonging and diversity” and “gives us a ground on which to 
situate our thoughts about multiple ways of being human and their relationship to the global 
logic of capitalism” (Chakrabarty, 2000:66).  The relationship between universal history, which I 
will call ‘official history’ (History 1), and subaltern histories are relevant to my analysis in this 
chapter.  Following Chakrabarty’s analytical framework, I equate History 1 with Nepal’s official 
historiography which is written and promoted by the state as the ‘Rastriya Itihas’ (Onta, 
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1996).  This is the ‘nationalist history,’ that posits the centrality of Hindu monarchs and 
cultural heroes, those from dominant groups, as history-making actors for the nation (see Onta, 
1994, 1996).   In this story of the naming of the two ponds, the significance of the king and 
the queen, the designation of this place as a kingdom, and the king-enemy relationship illustrate 
how this local history of place, along with its ethnic history, are framed in terms of Nepal’s 
dominant state-centric official history (History 1).  This history may be ultimately attributed to 
the history-making agency of the king. 
  At the same time, this story also “interrupts and punctuates” (Chakrabarty, 2000:66) the 
logic of this official history.  The ‘King’ and the ‘Queen’ commemorated by the naming the two 
the ponds are not the historical actors glorified by Nepal’s official historical narratives; they 
belong to the subjugated groups whose kings and territories were conquered by the ruling Hindu 
rulers. Yet, by alluding to the Dhimal king and his battle to defend his territory, the story adds to 
the trope of ‘defending ones’ territory.’ In this guise, it has become an important political 
narrative deployed by some Dhimal indigenous activists in their own articulation of Dhimal 
political history (see Chapter 4). 
 Similarly, the story also focuses on social relations among the “high” caste group, the 
blacksmith, and Dhimal ancestors.  The Brahmin is depicted as the king’s cook, hence the king’s 
servant, but not a trustworthy person as he is implicated in the death of the king and queen.  The 
local Magar told me that there are no Brahmins or blacksmiths in their village.  In the past, 
despite their efforts to settle blacksmith families in the village, all of the families left after each 
of them encountered some misfortune attributed to the spirits of antagonistic Dhimal 
ancestors.  These elements of dislike for the Brahmin and the blacksmiths may be seen as an 
instance of the local history narrative, or History 2, and their retelling by present-day village 
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Magar residents of the village becomes crucial for the Dhimal collective practice of 
claiming Raja Rani as their ancestral place.  Thus, local Magar residents become 
politically significant in that their own historical testimonies that imbue the place with the power 
of Dhimal ancestors. 
 Similarly, in 2009, another Magar, younger brother of Mr. Lok Bahadur (the first 
narrator), added another important layer to the history of place by sharing with us a story about 
Pultung Dhami, the elemental ancestral Dhimal deity and how he used to maintained the 
sacredness of the forest and the two ponds.  He explained that the two ponds used to be bigger 
and cleaners in the past. He cited an example by saying, “You don’t see many tree leaves falling 
into the pond.  In the past, not a single leaf could fall into the pond. Whenever a tree leaf fell, a 
beautiful red bird would come flying from nowhere.  Then the bird would pick up the leaf in the 
air and take it away without letting the leaf reach the pond’s surface.”  Thus he attributed the 
cleanliness of the ponds’ water with the spiritual power and the care of Dhimal’s ancestral 
Dhami.  His introduction of the Dhimal Dhami and his ritual power was very effective in making 
us internalize the sacredness of the place and its relationship with Dhimal.  He told us: 
 There was this powerful Dhimal Dhami named Pultung Dhami.  He was very powerful, 
and he used to help the local people with his power.  He used to worship the ponds and the area 
around by burning incense in a makkāl (Nep. earthen container).  He used to carry a kalash (Nep. 
a water container made of copper or bronze for ritual purpose).  After performing the ritual, he 
used to go into the pond and disappear for a while, sometimes for many hours.  When he used to 
come out of the pond, the fire in his makkāl would still be burning and his body would not be 
wet.  This is how Pultung Dhami used to worship here for many years.  He often used to say to 
others: “I’ve been asked to stay down there (under the pond).  There is a different world down 
below.  There is a big city, full of lights.  I have been asked not to go up (outside of the pond) 
and stay with them.  I have been telling them that I prefer to go up.  Many requests have been 
made to me.  Maybe, I will not return someday.” 
 
 He continued to worship the pond and its area.  People say that he used to come near by 
that area where you people (Dhimal) have built the Gramthan.  This was a Dhimal place in the 
past.  Pultung Dhimal used to live here.  He was the priest of the area and of the ponds.  One day, 
he went inside the pond and did not return.  We have built a small shrine for him inside our 
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village temple.  Even today, people worship Pultung Dhami during our annual ritual.  The locals, 
mainly the Mangol community (read, the indigenous community), must worship Pultung Dhami, 
and the Raja Rani during our important events, for example marriages.170  They offer a pair of 
pigeons and a male goat.  Raja Rani is a religious place for all of these areas (Interview with K. 
Magar, April 14, 2009; emphasis added). 
 
I find this story and its retelling by the local Magar important for several reasons.  The 
narrator firmly stated that Raja Rani was a Dhimal village in the past, and the power of Dhimal 
ancestors like Pultung Dhami had maintained the purity of the areas in and around the present 
day village forest.  Related with the first story, the story of Pultung Dhami also associates the 
two ponds with Dhimal ancestors.  In this story, Raja Rani ponds are depicted as sacred places 
located between the two different worlds: the one inhabited by people outside the pond, and the 
other belonging to the “other powerful beings” beneath the ponds which remain invisible from 
common people.  Only people like Pultung Dhami could travel to and interact with the other 
world because of his spiritual power.   
The story not only sacralizes the place but it also enlivens the power and the ritual 
significance of the Dhami (village priest) in Dhimal society.  Except for a few village priests, 
many Dhimal have not heard or did not know of Pultung Dhami.  He is one of the elemental 
Dhimal deities, the first deity to be worshipped by the present-day priest of the Gramthan during 
the Shrejat ritual in Raja Rani.  Now Pultung Dhami is again remembered and revered by Dhimal 
during the Shrejat ritual in Raja Rani and their villages.  Pultung Dhami who was kept alive in 
Raj Rani by the local Magars has now become a constituent part of the sacredness of the place as 
well as a part of Dhimal’s lived ancestral history.  This story in particular underlines how Raja 
Rani as a shared place anchors the reciprocal relationship between Magar and Dhimal ancestors. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
170!People also use “Mangol” to refer to the various indigenous communities as one “racial” group in order to 
differentiate themselves from the “Aryan”- the caste Hindu groups.  See Hangen (2005a) for the discourse “race” 
and ethnic politics in Nepal.  On the history on the concept of “Aryan” race in the South Asia, see Trautmann 
(2004). 
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These stories and their recollections by the local Magar, and most important, their 
continual recognition of Dhimal’s ancestors through ritual offerings, particularly when the 
present-day Dhimal had forgotten about this place, have contributed in keeping Dhimal’s 
historical relationship with the place alive and socially remembered.  Even though the local 
Magar had made Raja Rani ‘their place,’ they continued to share it with Dhimal ancestors in 
acknowledgement of their power in keeping the place protected and ensuring its vitality.  The 
local Magar exemplifies that mutual recognition and respect for one another’s ancestors can 
make a place hold its multicultural social relations and ethnic histories in mutual coexistence.  
Thus, unlike in the current Dhimal villages where the arrival of new migrants had resulted into 
the progressive loss of Dhimal histories written in the land, the locals in Raja Rani acted as 
custodians of the Dhimal ancestral spirits and stories, and thus kept their version of Dhimal 
ethnic histories emplaced in the place. 
 
 
Place-Names As Living Histories 
 
Besides the testimonies of the local Magar, there are other two kinds of major evidences, 
one linguistic and the other material- that Dhimal claim impeccably prove that Raja Rani is an 
integral part of Dhimal ancestral territories.  Dhimal discovered that the places in and around the 
Raja Rani village are named in Dhimali language.  For example, Leta in Dhimali means ‘down 
below,’ and people can add stressed ‘ā’ sound to emphasize a place which is ‘down down below’ 
from the top.  Hence, Dhimals claim that current settlement of ‘Letang’ is named in Dhimali, as 
it is located right below Raja Rani hilltop.  Similarly, Dhimals claim that place-names like lokrā 
jhar (tiger forest; forest where there is tiger), guwabari (areca nut field), and Bhogetani (hiding 
place) further support that Dhimals used to live in these areas until recently.   
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These place-names, Dhimal argue, are not simply toponymic inscriptions in their 
languages, but they also describe the landscapes in meaningful ways to account the relationship 
between their social life and geography.  For instance, Dhimal claim that the place-names of the 
present day Chisang river (see map 5.2) that flows between Letang and Raja Rani, and Lokrā 
jhar are connected to convey particular information about the landscape for their ancestors.  
Since wild tigers used to live in the forest (hence the name, Lokrā jhar) people were scared of 
crossing that particular part of the Chisang river in order to reach villages in the other side.  
Hence, Dhimal used to caution travelers “Odopar Maparasu lokrā Chisangko” which means 
“don’t cross from this side, the tiger will eat you” (Dhimal, S. et. al. 2010: 13).  And hence, the 
river came to be known as Chisang with reference to Lokrā Jhar.  Similarly, Dhimal claim that 
when their ancestors fought with the invading Gorkhali army (in the 18th century), they used to 
hide inside the caves of the hills around Raja Rani, and so they began to call these areas 
‘Bhogethalmi,’ which later became Bhogeteni, the present day place-name (Dhimal, S. et. al.,  
2010: 15).  Hence, the place-name Bhogeteni also underlines the political history of Dhimal, in 
particular, their resistance to the Gorkhali state in “defending their territory.” 
During my fieldwork, I observed that the present-day Dhimal indigenous activists were 
increasingly taking place-names seriously in reclaiming their historical relationship to and 
underlining their sense of belonging in their ancestral territories.  They actually began 
documenting and publishing Dhimal place-names of villages, rivers, districts and forests in 
Morang and Jhapa (their ancestral territories).  For Dhimal, these place-names, to paraphrase 
Basso (1996: 37), are  “stalked with histories,” their ancestral wisdom and political agency.  
While some place-names still persist, many of them have disappeared as the result of their 
political marginalization, thus erasing their ethnic histories associated with these places.  Like 
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anthropologists and geographers who approached place-names to study the relations between 
spatial practices and power relations,171 Dhimal indigenous activists also articulate the 
importance of place-names for their ethnic histories, and the erasure of those histories by state-
mandated changes in place-names.  For example, in the Kendra’s book History of Dhimal Part 1 
(2010) Dhimal clearly express their understanding of state-led spatial politics of place naming:  
The various geographical areas of Nepal were named reflecting the language, culture, 
history and identities of various communities, caste, and ethnic groups who have been 
living in them since the ancient period.  But because those clever and cunning people 
controlling the state and state power had changed these place-names for their convenience, 
the history of ādivāsi, the aboriginal inhabitants of these areas, have been erased (Dhimal, 
S. et. al. 2010: 11-12). 
 
 
Thus Dhimal assert that the place-names in the area around Raja Rani support their claim 
that this place is embued with their ancestral histories.  They assert that, as ‘indigenous people,’ 
they have the right to reclaim these places so that they can continue their customary ways of life 
and “protect” their histories from further erasure.172  
 
 
Place-Making Through Ritual Objects 
!
The other important material evidence that helped Dhimal to reclaim Raja Rani as their 
ancestral place is the ritual object they discovered in the forest where they have now built their 
Gramthan.  In 1998, the visiting Dhimal team that I have introduced earlier found many clay 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
171!Place-names have been a key focus in anthropological studies of “native peoples” in American Anthropology 
from its earliest beginnings, particularly with the important works of Franz Boas (Thornton, 1997) who emphasized 
the “structural relationship between geographical names, culture and language” (Boas, 1934: 14 cited by Thornton, 
1997).!
172!Dhimal indigenous activists cite the ILO 169 to claim their right to unrestricted access and ownership over their 
historical and sacred sites.  Nepal is one of the two nation-states in Asia that has ratified the legally binding 
International Labor Organization Convention-ILO No 169 concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent 
Countries.  It is the only international convention that specifically recognizes indigenous peoples’ relationship to 
their traditional land and territories including “the right of the peoples concerned to use lands not exclusively 
occupied by them, but to which they have traditionally had access for their subsistence and traditional activities” 
(ILO, 169; Article 14 (1).  See http: //www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000: 12100: 0: : NO: : 
P12100_ILO_CODE: C169.  January 30, 2013). 
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idols of elephants and horses scattered here and there in the village forest (see figure 18).  
Dhimal offer these clay idols to their village shrines during Shrejat.  Since, they claim, no groups 
other than Dhimal use these types of idols as ritual offerings, these discoveries must mean that 
their Dhimal ancestors used to live and perform their rituals in the Raja Rani area until recently.  
How can Dhimal claim their historical relationship to a place based on a single ritual item?  





Figure 18:  Clay figurines of elephant and horse 
found in Raja Rani forest (ritual objects offered by 




In order to understand the place-making power of these ritual objects in investing a 
landscape with Dhimal’s ethnic identity in culturally meaningful ways, I propose that we 
consider the relations between these ritual offerings, the village shrine (Gramthan), and the 
Shrejat ritual in producing the Dhimal village (see Chapter 6).  Dhimal believe that their 
elemental deities and ancestral Dhami (village priest) ride on nāriya (elephant) and wayā (horse) 
to travel here and there.  During the Shrejat ritual, these deities need to be brought into the 
Gramthan so that Dhimal can perform the ritual.  During the Jagaram ritual that takes place the 
night before the Shrejat, Dhimal take care of the elephant and horse idols by “feeding” them 
grass and water.  They present ritual offerings (called nāriya wayā puja) to these deities’ rides in 
order to “make them happy so that they will take care of the deities” (Interview with the Dhimal 
head priest, April 15, 2008). 
These ritual offerings are made only in the village Gramthan.  So the piles of these clay 
idols that Dhimal found in the Raja Rani forest affirm that a Gramthan must have existed there in 
the past.  As I have described earlier, the Gramthan is so foundational to the constitution of any 
Dhimal village that there can be no Dhimal village without its Gramthan.  The village shrine also 
defines its ritual and territorial boundary.  For Dhimals, then, the discovery of these ritual 
offerings confirmed that Raja Rani was once a Dhimal village.  So when Dhimal indigenous 
leaders decided to build a Gramthan in Raja Rani, it was a powerful place-making act designed 
to reconstitute the area as a ‘Dhimal village’ in culturally meaningful ways that ratified the sense 
for all Dhimal their connection with their rediscovered ancestral place.   
Hence the Kendra’s decision to build the Gramthan earned moral and widespread financial 
support from all Dhimal villages.  When the construction of Gramthan was completed, the news 
of the discovery of “an ancient Dhimal place” had reached all Dhimal villages in Morang and 
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Jhapa.  In the first Shrejat ritual after its rediscovery, Dhimal from every village flocked to Raja 
Rani to see the place and offer worship to their ancestral deities in the new Gramthan.  
According to Ganesh Dhimal, the central committee member who lived in Raja Rani village for 
seven months (1998/1999) in order to supervise the building of the Gramthan, “thousands of 
Dhimal came to this hill turning it black (referring to the color of the bohna Dhimal women 
wore on that event” that year.  The huge participation of huge numbers of Dhimals in the first 
Shrejat motivated the Kendra to continue their ritual performance at the Raja Rani Gramthan. 
The Kendra has been successful in ‘nationalizing’ the Shrejat by collectivizing the organization 
and undertaking of this annual ritual event whereby all villages equally contribute in the 
preparation of the ritual and participate in the annual ritual journey and the performance of 
Jagaram ritual.  
The Raj Dhami (head priest) told me in 2008: “This puja (ritual/worship) is done for the 
wellbeing of all Dhimal living in the four districts (Kathmandu, Morang, Jhapa and Sunsari).”  I 
understood him to be implying that the collective ritual performed at Raja Rani connects 
spatially dispersed and socially diverse Dhimal as one jāti or even as a nation.  If a nation is an 
“imagined community” (Anderson, 1983), then it must also be imagined geographically, 
particularly for indigenous people who see their ‘differential geography of belonging’ (Castree, 
2004) as a legitimate ground for demanding their indigenous rights, including the right to an 
autonomous federal state based on their ethnic identity, history, and territory.  Thus, by 
inaugurating this collective ritual at Raja Rani, the ancestral place where no Dhimal currently 
lives, the Kendra is integrating this place into their imagined community, and at the same time, 
“re-territorializing” the nation by grounding it within Dhimal’s ancestral geographies.  This 
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territorialization becomes necessary for Dhimal’s political movement for federal restructuring 
that I have discussed in the previous chapters.173 
At the village Shrejat ritual, each family, as a member of the village Gramthan, must 
contribute (in kind and cash) to the ritual, and then partake in the evening Jagaram ritual.  In 
other words, each individual family participates in the village ritual for the wellbeing of the 
entire village as well as of her/his family (chapter 4).  This moral way of becoming a social actor 
in producing the community is reinforced in the organization and undertaking of Raja Rani 
Shrejat in which every village acts to produce the collective well being of the entire Dhimal Jāti.  
During the Shrejat performance at Ranai Rani, each Dhimal individual who joins the collective 
ritual journey from the Kendra and participates at the Jagaram ritual the evening before 
represents her/his village.  Each individual thus brings and connects his/her village to their 
ancestral place.  Each village through the village level committee of the Kendra must contribute 
some cash for the Raja Rani Shrejat ritual and send its village representatives to participate in the 
Jagaram ritual.  Dhimal village Manjhi and Dhami also represent their respective villages.  In the 
remaking of the village Shrejat into a national ritual, moreover, only the Kendra, out of all the 
different Dhimal organizations that existed during the period of my fieldwork, has the moral 
authority and communal legitimacy, because of its inclusiveness and its acceptance by Dhimal as 
their jāti sanstha (ethnic organization), to organize an event like the Shrejat ritual at this scale.  
Thus by organizing and performing the Shrejat ritual at Raja Rani, the Kendra and its indigenous 
activists also reproduce themselves as the representative indigenous organization, and thus 
representative activists of their community. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
173!I am using “territorialization” to describe the processes of ascribing “boundaries” and claiming a bounded 
territory order to enclose it as an “autonomous federal unit.” 
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Place-making and ‘Writing History in the Land’ 
!
As a collective place-making practice, this new tradition of inaugurating the Shrejat ritual 
at Raja Rani has invested the place with a new historical consciousness for Dhimals.  Since there 
are no “official” historical sources (no prior published historical texts, more precisely) about 
Dhimal that could lend support to their claim for a historical connection to the place, I became 
interested in exploring how Dhimal come to understand their ethnic histories during the Shrejat 
ritual.  My ethnographic participations in the Dhimal annual ritual journey and Shrejat 
performance helped me to understand how the ritual event, by bringing Dhimal from different 
age groups, historical backgrounds, social positions, gender and villages together, contributes to 
“writing history into the landscape” (Santos-Granero, 1998).   
In his study of the notions of space and territoriality among Yanesha of the Peruvian 
Central Andes, Santos-Granero (1998) has proposed the notion of “topographic writing” to 
describe the Yanesha people’s practices of inscribing historical significance and memories in the 
landscape (see Stewart and Starthern, 2003; Feld and Basso, 1996; Schama, 1996; Hill, 1989, 
Merlan, 1998; Rappaport, 1998; Kirsch, 2006).  Related to Santos-Granero’s concept of 
topographic writing are his concepts of “topograms” and “topographs.” 174  Topograms “are 
elements of the landscape that have acquired their present configuration as a result of the past 
transformative activities of human or superhuman beings” (Santos-Granero, 1998: 140).  As 
such, topograms constitute signs that recall past events or become part of a wider semiotic 
system in combination with or in opposition to other similar signs, and thus become 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
174 Santos-Granero characterizes topographic writing as "identifying-mnemonic device" and attributes it to be 
“protowriting systems” but he emphasizes that topographic writing is not confined to “nonliterate societies,” and the 
advent of “true writing system” does not necessarily result into the total displacement of topographic writing 
(Santos-Granero, 1998: 142-143).  But emphasis on ‘topographic writing’ as “prototype writing” not like the “true 
writing systems” can potentially contribute in maintaining the hierarchy of “written histories” over other forms of 
historiographical practices including ‘topographic writing.’!
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“topographs” (Santos-Granero, 1998: 140).  The clay effigies discovered by Dhimal in Raja Rani 
constitute important topograms for Dhimal, but when Dhimal use these objects along with the 
place-names, the Gramthan, and other features of landscape signs, they become topographs 
which convey a variety of meanings to Dhimal and others.   
For the Yanesha people, topograms such as personal reminiscences, collective oral 
traditions, and mythical narratives which infuse the landscape with historical significance can 
become powerful mnemonic devices only when they become the subject of mythical narratives 
and ritual activities (Santos-Ganero, 1998: 140-141).  In other words, it is through the 
legitimizing power of the mythical narratives and ritual activity that Yanesha’s landscape 
becomes “true topograms and topographs in permanent manner” (ibid).  Santos-Granero’s notion 
of ‘topographic writing’ can be applied to Dhimal place-making practices as history making 
practice at Raja Rani.  During the Shrejat event in Raja Rani, personal reminiscences and 
retelling of what people know about the place to others during the ritual period become 
important acts of topogram making. 
All places, because of their interactions with human and other non-human beings, are filled 
with stories (Jackson, 1995; Basso, 1996; Ingold, 2000; Kirsch, 2006).  These place-stories are 
important cultural means through which places and experience of places become meaningful.  In 
his classic ethnography Wisdom Sits in Places: Landscape and Language Among the Western 
Apache (2006), Keith Basso shows how the landscapes of the Western Apache are filled with 
stories that constitute and guide their moral worlds.  The local Apache use these stories to self-
discipline themselves and to influence the moral actions of their fellow community members.  
“All these places have stories.  We shoot each other with them, like arrows,” Nick Thomson, a 
senior Apache man, Basso’s teacher, tells the anthropologist (1996: 48).  And Basso learns that 
! 306!
Apache use the historical tales, which are stories about what actually happened when some 
named individual acted improperly, to “criticize social delinquents (or, as the Apaches say, to 
“shoot them,” p. 50) in order to alert them about the potential consequences of their 
misbehaviors.  When these stories are embodied by individual Apache and enacted in their 
everyday practice, the landscapes that generate these stories also become meaningful and revered 
places for the Western Apache people.  Basso’s (1996) ethnography is relevant to understanding 
how place-stories become integral to the process of place-making, for example, in the context of 
Dhimal ritual participant’s experiences of their ancestral place in Nepal.   
But for the present-day Dhimal, unlike the Apache, Raja Rani is not a lived space of their 
everyday life; rather it is a place in the making, to which people are rediscovering and adding 
many historical and mythical narratives.  So the ritual event itself becomes an important social 
process through which people come to uncover and understand past events, and thus transform 
these features of landscape into historical topographs.  Thus for Dhimals, the Shrejat ritual 
becomes a collective act of remembering the place and its histories.  The role of personal 
reminiscences, an individual’s capacity to remember their family histories or what their ancestors 
have told them about the place, and their agency to share these recollections with other people 
become important practices of topographic writing for Dhimal. 
 
 
Moral Geography As History 
!
On the morning of the second day of my first participation in the Dhimal ritual at Raja 
Rani in 2008, I followed a group of young Dhimal with the purpose of navigating the 
surrounding landscapes of the village on my way to the Gramthan, located at a twenty-minute 
walking distance from the Dhimal rest house.  This was the first time I met Puja, a fourteen-year 
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student from Rajghat village, Morang.  It was her third consecutive participation in the annual 
ritual trip.  She had come here with her mother and other relatives.  “Why do you come here 
every year?”  I asked her.  “I like the place.  It’s a place of our ancestors (mamro purkhā ko thāu 
ho),” Puja responded, somewhat uninterested.  Since Puja and many other Dhimal women wore 
their ethnic dress for the event, I asked her after a while, “Why do you wear your bohna here? Is 
this some kind of rule that the Kendra imposes?”  Puja said hurriedly, “No.  It’s not a niyam 
(Nep. rule).  I just like to wear it,” and she disappeared for a while.   
On our way to the Gramthan, we walked farther up hill for ten minutes.  As I walked 
uphill, the cold breeze refreshed me again, and it did not feel like the month of Baisākh at all.  It 
was impossible not be captivated by the mesmerizing panoramic view of the surrounding 
landscape.  While walking, I stopped for a while and took some photographs of the landscape.  
After a few minutes, Puja’s calling distracted me.  “Isn’t it a beautiful place, uncle?” She asked 
me.175  “Oh, indeed!” I replied without thinking, while focusing on my camera’s lens.  “Our 
ancestors lived in such a beautiful place! Why did they have to leave to the plains?” she 
pondered with an expression of seriousness.  I paused for a while; I did not have any answers for 
her then (and I don’t have one for her now).  “You should buy some land here and come to stay,” 
I said jokingly.  Puja said nothing; may be she did not like my comment.  It was obvious that the 
ways in which she felt the landscape were different from my experience of the place.  I lacked 
the embedded connection to the place; I did not think of Dhimal ancestors when I was captivated 
by the panoramic view of the place.  I did not experience ‘history’ as Puja seemed to have felt it 
there (Field note, April 15, 2008). 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
175!!In Nepal, it is expected that people refer to other (even “stranger” or someone who is not a kin or friend) with 
some kin terms.  Young ones often use the English term “uncle” to refer to elders who they do not know much and 
whom they have to call them with some kin terms.  See Turin (2001) for an excellent discussion on the use of the 
term “uncle” in Nepal. 
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Basso (1996: 4) argues that place-making is a universal tool of the historical imagination, 
and it is “a way of constructing the past, a venerable means of doing history” (p: 7).  Following 
Basso (1996) and Santos-Granero (1998), I suggest that the query, “why did they (our ancestors) 
have to leave to the plains?” asked by a fourteen year old Dhimal girl, provides substantive 
evidence that shows how the new practice of the collective ritual performance at Raja Rani is 
shaping historical consciousness of its ritual participants.176  The place not only mesmerizes Puja 
with its beauty but it also animates (Basso, 1996: 55) her with much curiosity about her Dhimal 
ancestors.  Her inquiry affirms an achievement for the Kendra, the organizer of the collective 
ritual journey and the Shrejat ritual at Raja Rani.  “We want to bring more Dhimals here because 
we want them to know about this place and our history,” the chairperson of the Kendra explained 
to me in the 2008 Raja Rani Shrejat ritual.   
Later Puja directed my attention toward a narrow pass by the sides of the two ponds, and 
she asked me “Uncle, tapai lai thaha chhā? (Nep. Uncle, Do you [in honorific term] know it?).  
Down there is a place, Dhimal grandmother’s place.”  I did not see anything down below except 
a rocky steep and narrow pass covered with thick bushes.  Then Puja narrated to me the story of 
the great Dhimal grandmother who used to provide Dhimal beautiful bohna and jewelry when 
they came here during the mela and ritual in the ancient past.  Dhimal were required to return the 
bohna and jewelry at the end of the event.  At one such ritual-mela (fair), some people, who had 
grown greedy, did not return these items to the grandmother but instead, took these items home.  
The grandmother got very angry for this greed and breach of trust and so punished the entire 
village with death.   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
176 Dhimals do not have a definitive explanation to conclude why Dhimals left Raja Rani.  The senior Dhimals from 
the village of Karikoshi where I did my fieldwork said that the great grandfather of the village’s then landlord (he 
was the third generation in the village) had migrated from Raja Rani around the mid 19th century (cr.  1950 A.D.).  
Some Dhimals argue that Dhimals were evicted from Raja Rani when some Limbus claimed that Raja Rani was 
under their kipat (land under communal ownership). 
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When Puja ended her narration, she looked at me and said, “That’s why we have to wear 
bohna when we come here.  It’s the place of our ancestor.”  I had heard this story before, but this 
particular storytelling by a young ritual participant at the very place where Dhimal’s ancestral 
grandmother, the powerful deity, is believed to be living, was a completely different chronotopic 
experience.  More than that, it helped me to understand how Puja experienced the particular 
landscape as a moral geography.  By her third participation, Puja seemed to have learned a 
deeper understanding of her ancestral place, and she was definitely very effective in teaching me 
one important meaning associated with the place.  Dhimal often refer to this landmark, the 
dwelling place of the Dhimal ancestral grandmother, as “the place that gives away jewelry” 
(Nep. gar gahanā dine thāu).   
This particular Dhimal ancestral grandmother, a berang (Dhi. senior woman), who is 
believed to be the creator of Dhimal bohna, the original keeper of the knowledge and skill of 
weaving, is revered for her kindness and love (as exemplified in her sharing of bohna and 
jewelry to anyone visiting her place).  But she is equally feared for her anger and the stiff 
punishments she metes out to those who commit sins or violate her trust.   
In my second participation (2009) in the Shrejat, I was again reminded of the significance 
of this Dhimal ancestral grandmother and her power by none other than the Raj Dhami, the head 
Dhimal priest himself.  On the morning of the Shrejat ritual, I along with few other ritual 
participants followed the head priest and his assistants to observe their ritual offering at the place 
of their ancestral grandmother, whom the Raj Dhami called “Dhobini budi” (Nep.  cloth washer 
old woman).177  On our way back, the Raj Dhami narrated to us his personal experiences of the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
177!I was unable to find out why she was called “dhobini budi.”  Many Dhimal simply called her “Dhimal 
Grandmother” or “deity who gives away bohna and jewelry). 
!
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power of the ancestral grandmother in order to emphasize that Dhimal must pay ritual offering to 
her during the Shrejat ritual.  He told us:  
She is our grandmother deity.  She is kind and giving, but also she can get angry.  A few 
years before Dhimals began coming here for the Shrejat puja (Nep. worship), I came to the 
forest in order to worship the place and our deities.!178  I forgot to worship this shrine, and 
returned back home.  Oh, then I became so sick for many days.  My head was bumping; 
my stomach pained so much.  I felt I was turning crazy.  Everyone was so worried.  Then 
one night, the Dhobini budi came to my dream and complained that I did not worship her.  
The next day, I performed a ritual at my home.  I begged for forgiveness and promised that 
I would offer her the puja from next time.  Then I recovered.  Since then, I never forgot to 
worship this place and the Dhobini budi”(Field notes, April 16 2008) 
 
When the Raj Dhami narrated the story, all of us (the ritual participants) were literally 
spellbound.  The seeming ‘empty place’ located beneath the side of a ridge, we realized, is a 
living territory of the Dhimal ancestral grandmother.  For the Raj Dhami, “Dhobini Budi” is as 
real as her power to punish if she is not offered the due respect she deserves as the Dhimal 
berang (senior women, also female deity).  Raj Dhami’s personal experience of the power of the 
ancestral deities who live in the vicinity of Raja Rani Gramthan, and his retelling of this story 
during the Shrejat ritual, a story known only to few people in the past, effectively reinforced the 
sacredness of the place.  But the place is also a “topographical referent” (Rappaport, 1989: 89) to 
one of Dhimal’s key cultural symbols (Ortner, 1973) that emphasize the appropriate moral 
conduct between Dhimal and their elder members, who are called Warang Berang (senior men 
and senior women).  As my discussions of Dhimal marriage ritual and the village Shrejat ritual 
show, Dhimal are expected to respect their senior warang berang like their deities in their 
everyday life.  Because this place, like the landscape of the Western Apache people described by 
Basso (1996), gathers and tells moral stories for Dhimals, it is also a moral geography.   
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178!Note that he claimed that he was coming here by himself to perform the ritual since many years before the 
Kendra began inaugurating the new practices of Shrejat at Raja Rani.  When I asked him about it, he affirmed that 
his ancestors were the “priest” of this Gramthan.  Hence, he is also called the Raj Dhami- the head priest.   
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I argue that Dhimal ritual participants come to understand the relationship between the 
place, ancestral power, and appropriate moral conduct by physically participating in the ritual 
and by bodily experiencing the place interlaced with moral stories about their ancestors.  Recall 
that Puja narrated to me the story of the Dhimal ancestral grandmother a year ago at the ritual 
event.  The Raj Dhami and the fourteen-year young ritual participant both emphasized the 
significance of the ancestral deity and the sacredness of the place.  But Puja also positioned 
herself as a ‘Dhimal woman’ in order to relate to the place and the ancestral grandmother, the 
creator of bohna, which is an integral part of Dhimal’s everyday life and now a major marker of 
their ethnic identity (see Chapter 5).  By narrating the story of the ancestral grandmother, Puja 
wanted me to realize that she had worn her bohna, both as a respect for her ancestral deity and 
also to reclaim Raja Rani as her ancestor’s place.  Recall that she had told me, “That’s why we 
have to wear bohna when we come here.  It’s the place of our ancestor.”   
Hence by their collective performative act of wearing bohna in Raja Rani, Dhimal women 
like Puja “integrate the place with their bodies” (Casey, 1996: 22) and further invest the place 
with moral meanings for Dhimal and others (for example, a visitor like me).  While the Raj 
Dhami was using his ritual knowledge to acknowledge and offer his respect to the ancestral 
deity, Puja wore cloth and jewelry for the same purpose.  Hence, in the context of Shrejat ritual 
at Raja Rani, it is not just the act of ritual performance, but also the bodily habits of wearing 
bohna which become an important collective act of place-making, through which Dhimal women 
add materiality (ethnic identity, ritual objects, material referent to the story of the ancestral deity, 
etc.), and sense of connection to their ancestral-moral landscape.  Hence, these bodily habits also 
become embodiment of history of land, to paraphrase Bāngai Dhimal. 
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In the ethnographic cases discussed above, I have attempted to show how the performance 
of ritual, people’s experiences of Raja Rani as a sacred and moral geography, and stories Dhimal 
and Magar tell others about the landscape around the Raja Rani Gramthan as being imbued with 
the spiritual power of Dhimal’s ancestors become important generative place-making practices 
during the Shrejat event.  The local Magar, Puja and the Raj Dhami -- all of them -- experience 
Raja Rani as a sacred and moral geography, yet they also relate to the place in different ways: as 
the local residents, as the priest, and as a woman.  Hence my discussions also highlight what the 
anthropologist Margaret Rodam (1992) has called “multilocality” of a place i.e. Raja Rani 
tenders polysemic meanings for different people depending upon their social positions, gender, 
age, and their historicity of engagements with the place (and its other non-human residents).  In 
the next section, I will discuss how these differently positioned ritual participants become 
history-making social actors, who collectivize their individual memories about Raja Rani for the 
production of the social history of the Dhimal’s ancestral place. 
 
 
Kurā Kāni (Chitchat) As Ways Of Making Histories179 
!
When I participated in the Raja Rani Shrejat ritual in 2008 and 2009, I observed how the 
ritual participants produced historical knowledge about the place and its relationship with 
Dhimal by engaging in discussions among themselves and with others.  Each year, Dhimal ritual 
participants gathered on the ground in front of the Raja Rani Gramthan after the completion of 
the ritual in the morning of the second day of the Shrejat.  The gathering was well attended by 
the old and young ritual participants, mostly men but also women, and by the indigenous 
activists as well as the general participants.  Youth Dhimal, Puja and her friends, were among the 
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179 It means light discussion, talk or chitchat.  I use it here to describe the ethnographic event I observed as well as 
to emphasize that ethnographic information is heavily based on Kura Kani.  See, Desjarlais (2003) for his brilliant 
discussion on ethnography as “kura-graphy.” 
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keen ‘audience’ participants in these two years.  These discussions were not planned activities, 
but rather had more the air of informal conversational gatherings when Dhimal rested after the 
hectic ritual activities that had began the night before; many of them had stayed awake 
throughout the night for the Jagaram ritual.   
Personal reminiscences and their retelling are important aspects of place-making practices, 
which can infuse the land with historical significance (Basso, 1996; Santos-Granero, 1998).  For 
example, in 2008, a group about thirty Dhimals gathered outside the Raja Rani Gramthan, and 
they openly discussed the same issue that Puja raised that morning: when and why Dhimal left 
the place.  After discussing this for about an hour, Dhimal participants reached the consensus 
that their ancestors had lived in Raja Rani till the early 20th century (1940s A.D).  There is no 
written historical text that can help Dhimal to deduce when and why their ancestors left Raja 
Rani.  However the lack of written or other forms of documentary evidence did not prevent these 
Dhimal from arriving at this temporal understanding of their ancestral presence in Raja Rani.  
This was achieved primarily through individual Dhimal who convincingly shared with the group 
what their parents and grandparents had told them about the place.  Some of them had even come 
here when they were very young with their elders. 
For example, one participant, Daya, a 52 year old Dhimal man belonging to Lembang clan, 
from Kharkare village of Damak Municipality used his knowledge of his family genealogy to 
periodize Dhimals’ migration out of Raja Rani by citing exact years and the events that happened 
in those years.  In 1995, Daya and other Lembang Dhimal prepared a clan genealogy to record 
their clan history, which had helped them to trace their ancestral connection to Raja Rani.  But 
they neither paid any special attention to the place nor did they visit here to explore the place 
until the Kendra began the new practice of Shrejat ritual.  Daya told us that his father was born in 
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Raja Rani village in the Nepali year 1984 B.S.  (1927 A.D.), and left the village at the age of 
thirteen when his grandfather’s younger brother by the name of Kirtiman cleared a tract of forest 
in the lowland plains around 1942 A.D.  The place is still called Kirtiman Padhani (Nep.  
Padhani means a place cleared from a forest).  He added:  
By 1999 B.S. (1942 A.D.), Dhimals had completely left the area; so even if we exclude the 
last two or three years before their final move away, Dhimals must have performed the 
Shrejat ritual here until the year 1994/1995 (B.S.)….  But we (the later generation) did not 
ask about these things to our grandfathers and fathers.  We did not come here to visit.  When 
we wrote the genealogy of our Lembang clan, we did not come here to study.  This has been 
a major weakness of our generation.  Our father and his brothers used to say the names of 
each settlement of this area.  There is a history in this place.  It is about our parampara (Nep. 
custom-tradition), (transcript of the Dhimal group discussion, April 14, 2008). 
 
 
Other participants who provided their personal experiences of having visited Raja with 
their parents or grandparents also corroborated Daya’s claim that Raja Rani was a ritual 
geography of Dhimal till the early 1940s.  The assistant of the Raj Dhami, a man in his mid-
forties, told us that once when he was ten years old, his mother introduced him to Raja Rani 
hilltop as the place “where their ancestors once used to live” when they walked pass Letang 
bazar on their way to Dharan (see Map 3).  His mother also showed him the mango trees along 
the trail, which were planted by her ancestors when they used to live there.  “I was like ten years 
old, and then I really did not pay attention as to why my mother was telling me these things.  
Now I realize that she was telling me important things about our ancestors,” he told the group. 
Similarly, there was a Dhimal man in his early thirties, a soldier in the Nepal Army who 
was on a brief leave that month, who told the group that he was revisiting the place after twenty-
two years.  He had also come here with his mother to perform a puja (Nep. ritual) when he was 
eleven or twelve years old.  “There was no shrine here, and the ritual spot was near where there 
the new temple (the Hindu; not the Gramthan) is now.  There were not many people then.  The 
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forest was much bigger, and I was bit scared inside the forest,’ he remembered.  He also 
emphasized that his grandmother had told him that her father came from that place, but there 
were no Dhimal living in that area when they visited the place then.  “I had forgotten about this 
place.  Then I came to know that now Dhimal come to this place to worship.  So I have come this 
time,” he said, indicating that his return visit to the place after a period of two decades was the 
result of the Kendra’s initiative of bringing people to Raja Rani for the ritual.  His recollections 
also informed us that Dhimal had not totally forgotten about this place.  Even after Dhimal had 
completely migrated out of Raja Rani, some of them continued to visit their ancestral village and 
to reconnect with their ancestors by performing ritual in the shrine, most likely on individual 
basis.  These ritual participants were also self-reflexive about how they had forgotten about the 
place, while the last two recollections I have discussed here also inform us that these two 
narrators were brought and introduced to Raja Rani as their ancestral place by their mother and 
grandmother; the act of remembering the place and its history was not confined to Dhimal men. 
All three narrators shared with the group what they had heard about or their personal 
experiences of the place in the past.  It is important that we take into consideration the 
chronotopic phenomenology of this group discussion to understand how these collective acts of 
remembering through storytelling in front of the Gramthan during the ritual period become 
important and effective history-making practices.  Personal reminiscences of any kind that 
involved the place were valued and they gained differential significance in this particular 
storytelling setting.  These narrators were not trying to be “historians.”  Yet, by physically being 
in the place and participating in the ritual, this very act of gathering and discussing their ancestral 
past, I argue, is an active practice of doing and making history.  During the ritual settings, when 
Dhimals shared their personal recollections of the place, they are also re-inscribing these stories 
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in the place, and producing a shared memory among the ritual participants. 
The recent re-appearance of the place and the relatively limited knowledge of its histories 
and its connection to Dhimal ancestors had sparked an interest among ritual participants to know 
about this ancestral place.  During my two consecutive participations in the Shrejat, I observed 
that many of the ritual participants, particularly those who attended the Jagaram ritual, were 
keenly interested in knowing more about the place and its histories.  During the ritual event, they 
were involved in the collective act of remembering stories and histories of the place by sharing 
and learning from one another.  Anyone with prior knowledge and experiences of the place, 
irrespective of their ages and social backgrounds, could become a “resource person,” hence a 
legitimate narrator of his/her personnel reminiscences or stories they know about the place.   
For Dhimal activists and others, the act of sharing these stories was as important as the 
stories themselves.  In fact, I was not only person who was taking notes, my journalist Dhimal 
friend and other members of the Kendra were also ‘writing down’ information gathered during 
these discussions.  In these discussion settings, historical knowledge was not confined to one or 
few individuals, but it was rather diffused and unevenly circulated, albeit in fragments, among 
individuals.  Any seemingly mundane information about the history of the place, when shared in 
such discussions during the ritual event, could become an important part of Dhimal’s new 
collective social memory and the history of land.  And the ways in which Dhimal attempted to 
collectivize this historical knowledge through chitchat, group discussion, individual storytelling, 
documenting, and seeking help from other non-Dhimal were simple yet powerful collective acts 
of history making and history writing.  As these stories circulate and are retold to others, people 
can add their personal recollection and knowledge about the place to these stories.   
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I observed that each year, Dhimal were accumulating new pieces of historical information 
to add to what they already knew.  For example, during a similar group discussion in the 2009, 
the Raj Dhami and other Dhami from different villages discussed and traced a genealogy of 
those Dhimal priests, who in the past used to officiate at the ritual in the forest where the present-
day Raja Rani Gramthan stands now.  And, they were able to recollect the names of nine priests 
which in their estimation roughly corresponded to nine generation of Dhimal priests, the current 
Raj Dhami being the ninth priest in the order.180  I argue that the importance of this genealogical 
reckoning lies in “the temporality of landscape” (Ingold, 1993) that can incorporate further 
meaningful textures and stories to the finding that ritual knowledge, spiritual power, character 
and morality, bodily substance, and material products belonging to the span of nine generations 
of Dhimal Dhami have become constitutive parts of the landscape, and “in doing so, have left 
there something of themselves” (Ingold, 1993: 152).  Recall that local Magar’s retelling of the 
stories of Phultung Dhami (the 5th generation Dhami), which supports and enlivens the place-
based histories of Dhimal ancestral Dhami in Raja Rani.   
From a chronological viewpoint, this finding locates Dhimal’s ethnic history in Raja Rani 
to a time predating the rise of the present day state of Nepal, as was emphasized by one of the 
participant activists when he exclaimed triumphantly by saying, “This is very, very important 
information on our history which proves that Dhimal Dhami have been performing ritual here 
long before Nepal was formed.  Now we can guess that these clay idols must have been as old as 
three hundred years old, maybe older” (M. Dhimal, April 15, 2009).  That Dhimal Dhami 
themselves claimed that they have been officiating for the ritual at Raja Rani for at least nine 
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180!!These Dhami included (in the order): Karam Dhami, Arjun Dhami, Ran Singh Dhami, Bahadur Chaudhari 
Dhami Pultung Dhami, Name unknown (Father of Rambou and Bhambou), Sudai Dhami, Saharman Dhami and 
Kasiram Dhami (source: Mohan Dhimal, indigenous activist; former executive member of NEFIN).  They claimed 
that this genealogy evidenced that they were offering ritual at Raja Rani at least for the last 300 years or more. 
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generations, in their genealogical reckoning, carried credible legitimizing power and authority.  
Within two weeks of its revelation, the names of these nine ancestral Dhami were published 
(May 1, 2009) in the state-owned national daily newspaper, the Gorkhapatra.181   
The immediate publication of these names in the national daily substantiates the 
recognition of the historical authority of the ritual specialists by Dhimal, the indigenous activists 
in particular.  It also shows how the historical knowledge produced from acts of seemingly 
informal discussion during the Shrejat ritual event in Raja Rani becomes part of Dhimal’s wider 
discourses of their ethnic history and territorial belonging in Nepal.  During the Shrejat ritual 
celebration in Raja Rani, I also observed how Dhimal and non-Dhimal ritual participants actually 
used this space and the activities of ‘small talks’ to debate, to challenge, and also to reconstitute 
some of the ‘established’ historical understandings about Dhimal and their relationships with 
other indigenous groups, particularly the hill indigenous groups: the Limbus and the Rai.  In 
doing so, they also connected Raja Rani to regional and national history and emphasized how the 
place gathers kinship and history between Dhimal and other indigenous groups.   
 
 
Raja Rani And The Geography Of Kinship 
 
In the 2008 Raja Rani Shrejat ritual, as the ritual participants were engaged in discussing 
histories, a senior man with a strong physical posture, dressed up in a well-pressed white daura 
suruwal (the ‘national dress’) underneath a black coat, and a Nepali Dhaka topi (hat) on his head, 
greeted the Dhimal participants, ‘Namaste! (Nepali greeting, hello), my Dhimal brothers!’ It 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
181!Gorkhapatra is Nepal’s oldest daily national newspaper (in Nepali language).  It is a state owned newspaper.  
As a symbolic practice of inclusive and representative journalism, since the late 2007, this national daily has 
initiated a regular two-page feature series under the title Naya Nepal (New Nepal).  Each feature is guest edited by 
the writers from different linguistic groups (other than the Nepali) belonging to Nepal’s various indigenous and 
other minority communities.  This feature has provided an important access for Dhimal to write on issues pertaining 
to their community and as well as to voice their concerns, most importantly by themselves in their own mother 
tongue (though in Devanagarik script).  The first feature in Dhimali language was published on December 4, 2007. 
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seemed none of the Dhimal participants had known or seen the gentleman before; he joined the 
group and sat down on the plastic sheet that was used to cover the ground on which we all were 
sitting.  He introduced himself as Lakhman Rai, an 82 years old resident of a village adjacent to 
Raja Rani.  At the age of five, he came to his current village when their grandparents and parents 
moved here from Ilam, a hill district in Nepal’s easternmost border.   
Mr. Lakhman Rai was a knowledgeable person.  According to him, there were clay idols of 
elephant and horses scattered all over the place.  As Dhimals used to offer copper coins as bheti 
(Nep. money as ritual offering) to their deities, Mr. Lakhman Rai remembered that one could see 
and find these coins scattered all over the forest.  “We were too scared to pick up and use these 
coins for the fear of being troubled by Dhimal deities.  Later, the Army people collected and took 
away all these coins,” he disclosed to the group.  His disclosure that the army had taken away 
these coins also echoed the claims made by some Dhimal activists (not present at this particular 
group discussion) that the palace’s army (the state) had taken away “important material archival 
remains” from Raja Rani areas in the early 1960s.  However, none of the ritual participants had 
heard of it and they seemed rather uninterested in this revelation.  Not all information that came out of 
the discussion equally intrigued the discussant Dhimal; they were selective about which concerns 
would make their way into the accumulative processes of history-making.  For these Dhimal 
participants, the 82 years old knowledgeable Mr. Rai was a living history; they would not stop 
but kept asking him questions about their ancestral past.  They seemed more interested in finding 
out if Mr. Rai had met any Dhimals who lived in the Raja Rani village when he visited the place 
in the past.  For his part, Mr. Lakhman Rai had his own preferences for what reminiscences he 
wanted to share with the Dhimal.   
! 320!
Mr. Lakhman Rai claimed that Dhimal deities had come to him in his dreams when he was 
the Pradhan Pancha (the chairperson of the village level government body) in 1972.  He realized 
then that the local people needed to offer ritual worship to these Dhimal deities.  So he brought a 
black goat and a hen as ritual offerings and asked the local Magar to perform a ritual for the 
Dhimal deities, near the ponds.  We learned that Mr. Rai helped to build the current (Hindu) 
temple located by the side of the two ponds in 1975.  He also asserted that the water level of the 
two ponds increased after people began worshipping in the temple.  “Yes, the water level of these 
ponds also increased when we began to worship here in 2001,” some Dhimal corroborated how 
the level of water in the ponds indicates whether or not people acknowledge and recognize their 
ancestors through ritual performance. 
Mr. Lakhman’s emphasis on the story of building a temple for a Dhimal deity at Raja Rani, 
like the story of local Magar I have discussed earlier, also foregrounds the making of Raja Rani as 
Dhimal’s ancestral place in the inter-ethnic relationships between Dhimal and other indigenous 
groups.  I cannot rule out the possibility that by claiming he helped to construct the temple, Mr. 
Rai was also narrating a self-aggrandizing story of his being “a man of power” in the past.  Still, I 
sensed there were other more important motivating factors that had encouraged Mr. Lakhman to 
participate in the discussion.  The stories he shared with the ritual participants emanated out of 
his embodiment of what Lakhman Rai emphasized as ‘satya’ (Nep. truth, duty) or the moral 
responsibility and obligation towards one’s ancestral (or others’ ancestral) beings, and his strong 
belief that he shares a ‘genealogical’ relatedness with Dhimal.  The Dhimal deity came to his 
dreams, not because he was man of power but because he is a man of good morality and virtue.  
He said:  
You, Dhimal people, have been worshipping the Satya Raja and the Satya Rani here since 
the time of your ancestors.  Hami Kirāti vansa haun! (Nep. we are Kirāti clan), and we 
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have our Satya and our Dharma.  People had stopped doing puja here.  When the Dhimal 
deity came to my dream, I helped to build the temple.  We cannot leave our Satya. 
 
Thus his beliefs in ‘satya’ and in his genealogical relatedness with Dhimal motivated Mr.  
Rai to build a temple by the two ponds.#182  There is a ‘popular’ belief that Dhimal and the 
Limbus (and also Rai) are ‘daju-bhai’ (Nep.  brothers), and this view is widely shared by both the 
Limbus and Dhimals in the plains.  Lakhman Rai repeatedly emphasized that Rais, Limbus and 
Dhimals are daju-bhai, descendants of the three sons from the same Kiranti mother.  Many of the 
Dhimal discussants supported his claim and added their versions of how the two brothers (Rai 
and Limbu) settled in the hills while their ancestors lived in the plains.  Other Dhimal, citing the 
political-economic differences between three groups and the story that Limbu had chased away 
Dhimal ancestors from Raja Rani, discredited this “mythic fraternal unity,” to use Gaenszle’s 
(1997) apt characterization, among these groups.  However, all of them agreed that Dhimal are 
Kirāti people.  The old Rai man was firm in his conviction, and when asked if these three groups 
were brothers then why had Limbu chased Dhimal ancestors from Raja Rani, he told them:  
Brothers do quarrel, don’t they?  But we’re all the three sons of the same Kirti mother.  
Brothers!  Yes, we were the kings of these regions.  Then, the Bahun-Chhetri (the Hill 
“high” caste Hindus) their king came disguised as a jogi and took away our land and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
182!Mr. Lakhman’s use of the concept of ‘Satya’ is close to the idea of Dharma (Nep.  duty, moral 
responsibility, religion).  This is evident in the story he narrated about a Tamang man, who because of his 
good ‘Satya,’ was escorted by the Dhimal deity, into the palace located in the other world deep beneath 
the Raja Rani ponds.  According to the story:  
One young Tamang man was returning to his village from Letang bazar in the evening.  It had already 
turned very dark.  Then on the way, he met a very old man coming towards Raja Rani hill.  The old man 
asked the Tamang man where he was going and if he could help the old man to reach his place.  The 
Tamang man willingly agreed and helped the old man to walk to his place.  That old man was actually 
Dhimal deity.  He was very happy with the Tamang man for his help and kindness.  Then the deity took 
the Tamang man into the pond and showed him the palace and other places inside the pond.  The place, 
the Tamang man said, is magnificent- full of lights.  The next morning, he was escorted out to the bank 
of the Chisang river down there. 
 
This story of Tamang man being invited to tour the ‘worlds’ of the Dhimal deities located somewhere 
inside the ponds is similar to the story of Pultung Dhami narrated to me by the local Magar. 
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kingdoms.#183  That is true. 
 
Mr. Lakhman Rai man not only asserted that Rai, Limbu and Dhimal are real fraternal 
brothers, but they were also the “kings of these regions.”  According to him, these three Kirāti 
sons, ruled the three different areas in what are now the eastern regions of Nepal.  And all these 
brothers became dispossessed of their power and land after the arrival of the ancestors of the 
present-day dominant Hindu groups.  The image of the Hindu king disguised as a ‘jogi’ 
reinforces the dominant indigenous narrative of the indigenous people being cheated by the Hindu 
groups in the unfair exchange of land (also see Caplan, 1972; Guneratne, 2001).   
This ethnographic anecdote shows how the “myth of fraternal unity” (Gaenszle, 1997) is 
also “strengthened by the specific historical experience of being subjugated for the past two 
centuries, and so this comprehensive kind of traditional ethnic identity (Kirāti) is of special 
political significance” (Gaenszle, 1997: 364).   It also illustrates how ritual participants discussed 
the relevance of Raja Rani by linking it with the regional and political history of Nepal, and 
emphasized that this particular ancestral place is not only a ritual geography but also a historical 
geography of their political autonomy.   
 
 
Conclusion: Indigenous Territoriality and Place-Making 
!
After the rediscovery of Raja Rani and the ritual reclaiming of the place as their ancestral 
place, Dhimal now claim these Raja Rani areas to be ‘historic sites’ of a Dhimal kingdom in the 
past.  They consider the material remains rediscovered in and around the Raja Rani areas, which 
are located within a radius of ten miles of the fort of the historic Vijayapur kingdom (see Map 
5.1) to be the relics of their ‘ancestral kingdom’-- evidence of their political autonomy in the past 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
183!(Nep: a hermit who has denounced the social life, and gets daily food sustenance by “begging”- visiting 
door to door)!
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(B, Dhimal, 2009).184  If the telling of the past is shaped by peoples’ experiences and sense of the 
present then how can we understand Dhimals’ claim of the existence of their ‘kingdom’ in the 
past, particularly in the context of the post April 2006 indigenous resurgence in Nepal?  
I argue that Dhimal’s claim of “ancestral kingdom” helps us to understand how historically 
marginalized groups use their historical imaginations to influence the emerging political-
economic processes with which they creatively engage to assert their ethnic identity, territorial 
belonging, and political benefits such as autonomy and indigenous rights.  During the period of 
my fieldwork (2007-2009), Dhimal also asserted their desire for political autonomy and the right 
to govern themselves by demanding a “Dhimal autonomous state” based on their indigenous 
identity and historical territory.  Since various indigenous groups were claiming the same 
geographic region under their ethnic autonomy, and there were also overlapping geographical 
claims, for example, regarding the proposed federal states in the eastern regions, Dhimal further 
needed to discredit the claims of others and explain why their proposed federal state represents 
their ancestral territories and history of belonging as the ādivāsi of the region.  In their proposed 
territorial mapping of the future autonomous region of Dhimal, ‘Raja Rani’ prominently featured 
as the historical landmark for their ancestral territories, and thus a “political boundary” of their 
proposed federal state.   
The new practice of collective ritual performance by the Dhimal, the construction of the 
Gramthan, and their periodic organization of various cultural activities
 
at Raja Rani under the 
leadership of the Kendra have substantially contributed to making Raja Rani the Dhimals’ 
ancestral place, and even their “ancestral kingdom.”  In the last decade, like many other 
indigenous groups without written documents of their own, Dhimal have begun to “scripturalize” 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
184!According to some Dhimals, the local residents of Raja Rani had told them that some of these material remains 
(for example, an idol believed to be an effigy of a Dhimal warrior) are believed to have been stolen by the state 
authorities in the recent past.  However, I did not follow up this information with the local residents of the village. 
! 324!
(Gaenszle, 1997: 364) their histories in the forms of books, pamphlets, articles, and in online 
media like weblogs, and Facebook.  The dialogical shaping between the scripturalized mode of 
history writing and the ‘topographic writing,’ I argue, has further magnified the political 
significance of ‘Raja Rani’ not only as the ancestral place of the Dhimal, but also as the political 
boundary of the future “Dhimal autonomous state” in the new federal republic of Nepal.  But it is 
important, as my ethnographic observations suggest, to note that if we focus only on these more 
organized public events organized by the Kendra or the published historical narratives, we can 
potentially miss out on the contributions that ordinary individuals like Daya, the village priest, 
the soldier on leave, Puja and many other Dhimal women and men make in ‘writing’ their ethnic 
history in the land.   
The place-making practices that I have discussed here are constitutive practices of 
Dhimal’s indigenous activism, but they are not “invented” to respond to larger political-
economic forces.  Drawing from my ethnographic discussions in this chapter, I argue that these 
place-making practices are part of Dhimal’s collective efforts to reproduce themselves and their 
social life in culturally meaningful ways (Holmberg, 2012; Turner, 1997).  By performing the 
Shrejat ritual at Raja Rani, the Dhimal are reestablishing their relationships with their ancestors 
through their customary practices (Nep. parampara) in culturally meaningful ways so that people 
can experience how that place connects Dhimal, their villages, histories and ‘culture’ together as 
a collective people or a nation.  This is inherently a political process, which is embedded in 
Dhimal’s everyday cultural practices in dialogical interactions with the larger political-economic 
contexts of their emplacements.  For Dhimal, to build a Gramthan is also a political act of 
producing a village in a culturally meaningful way, and thus it is an act of producing their 
collective self.  Thus, when Dhimal indigenous activists deploy the cultural politics of such 
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place-making practices in their political activism, they are doing more than just responding to the 
emerging political-economic conditions and changes.  As historically located agentive social 
actors, these indigenous activists are dialogically transforming the national-global discourses into 
their culturally meaningful ideas and locally relevant political projects.  Thus, this chapter also 
illustrates the creative agency of these indigenous activists in engaging their localized cultural 
politics to counter those political changes that can powerfully and negatively affect the Dhimal 





Envisioning An Indigenous Future 
 
 On December 21, 2009, as Dada recounted the history of his village to me, especially 
how its original name Charakpada was altered to Chiyapasal (teashop), his heartfelt and rich 
stories completely seized my mind.  In particular, his remark that “many Dhimal do not know its 
(the village’s) original name” made me ask myself how Dhimal would remember their ethnic 
histories in the future.  I then asked Dada what could be done in order to make the new 
generation aware of their ethnic history, their historical relationship to the place in particular.  
Dada repeated my question, “What can we do?”  But after a moment’s thought, he went on:  
In order to make our children know our history, first they should learn it in school, in our 
language.  For that to happen, Dhimal should  (be allowed to) write the school history 
textbooks.  There should be Dhimal teachers to teach this history to our kids.  But the 
question is: will they (the state) give us the rights to do so?  Up to now, it does not seem like 
they will give us such rights (Interview with Dada, December 21, 2009). 
 
 
For Dada and many other Dhimal activists, the ‘history of land’ and their jāti itihās (ethnic 
history) are mutually constituted.  But Dhimal collective experiences of losing ground not only 
led to their political-economical marginality but also silenced their ethnic histories and severely 
weakened their collective ability to reproduce themselves as ‘Dhimal’.  In the interview excerpts 
cited here, Dada underlined the need for the formal teaching and learning of one’s ethnic history 
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in school.  His compelling emphasis on Dhimal control over the education of their youth 
encapsulates the central issues that I have addressed in this dissertation.  
Here, Dada strongly asserted indigenous peoples’ firm experiential conviction that access 
to and control over the state power can have lasting effects on the collective act of remembering 
or of forgetting one’s ethnic history (Schlemmer, 2004; Tamang, 2008).  I take Dada’s claim that 
their children should have rights to learn their ethnic history in school, in their own language, 
and that Dhimal should be the ones writing these history textbooks, to be an example of his 
political vision for the indigenous future of Nepal.  It also reflects Dhimals’ collective hope that 
in the ‘New Nepal’, the making of which had begun with the peoples’ movement of April, 2006, 
indigenous peoples will have a sovereign right to “freely determine their political status and 
freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development” (UNDRIP, Article 3).  Since 
Dhimals’ experiences of the Nepali state so far have been too exclusionary, Dada questioned 
whether they could imagine such an indigenous future.  However, such denials of indigenous 
rights from the state also compel people like Dada, who has dedicated more than three decades to 
ethnic organizing, to continue their involvement in indigenous organizing and to work with new 
generations in crafting a collective future in a nation which, after the political changes of 2006, 
aspires to become inclusive, egalitarian, and respectful of its own diversity. 
Dhimal youths in particular champion and characterize their activism as a movement for 
claiming Dhimals’ ‘history of land.’  Coming from various villages and urban centers in Nepal, 
these Dhimal youths connect with one another despite their differences of class, gender, regional 
location, and educational attainment.  Moreover, these youths are equally ‘modern’ in terms of 
their experience of ‘modernity’ (Appadurai, 1996a: 27-47), which the anthropologist Mark 
Liechty (2003) has described in his ethnographic account of the making of middle class culture 
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in the consumer society of Kathmandu, Nepal’s capital city.  Yet, unlike the Kathmandu youths 
whom Liechty studied a decade ago and who seemed less interested in their ‘ethnic identity’ than 
in their middle-class status, these Dhimal youths are deeply concerned with their ethnic identity 
as ‘ādivāsi’. 
These youths are emerging as a major political actor in Nepal’s indigenous political 
movement.  They are expanding their political mobilization by forming alliances with other 
indigenous groups in order to collectivize their political strengths in claiming their rights with the 
state as ādivasi janajāti (indigenous peoples).  For instance, these Dhimal youths have politically 
expressed their solidarity with the Limbus by forming a single political party- the Federal 
Limbuwan State Council (FLSC)- of which Dhimal Sanghiya Parishad is one of the constitutive 
political councils.  Furthermore, the FLSC is an affiliate political state council of the umbrella 
national ethnic party of various ethnic groups registered as a single political party called Federal 
Democratic National Forum (FDNF) that contested the national election for the Constituent 
Assembly in 2008.  Thus, the indigenous activism of these Dhimal youths also underlines an 
important emerging trend in Nepal’s indigenous political movements - the process of 
transformation of indigenous social movements into ethnic political parties (Lawoti, 2012; 
Hangen, 2010; see Van Cott, 2005 for a similar process in Latin America).   
The formation of an ethnic political party by the Dhimal youths was a nascent movement 
during my fieldwork period.  Nevertheless, it had led to an overwhelming participation of 
Dhimal youths in indigenous activism and political mobilization.  These Dhimal youths believe 
that the mainstream political parties use indigenous peoples and their issues only to advance the 
party interests and to perpetuate the domination of the traditional ruling groups within the parties 
as well as in the state.  They argue that it is only by organizing and mobilizing themselves and 
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their communities through ‘ethnic political parties’ of their own that they can achieve substantial 
positive change for indigenous peoples in Nepal.  Their sense of political empowerment was 
expressed by the general-secretary of the Sanghiya Parishad, an MA-level student of English at 
the Tribhuvan University in Kathmandu, when he told me, “Now other political parties and the 
local administration cannot simply ignore us and hāmro rajnaitik shākti (Nep. our political 
force).  They have realized that we are also a political force here in Morang.”  Once I asked him 
to explain to me how they would write a ‘history of land.’  Without any elaboration, he gave me 
a very succinct one-line answer by saying, “Dai, (Nep. elder brother), in order to write the 
history of land, we must first have and achieve political power.”  In other worlds, this youth 
leader wanted me to understand that they are engaged in indigenous activism to contribute 
towards the political empowerment of their community so that Dhimal can meaningfully claim 
their history.  For these Dhimal youths, ‘history of land’ is not only about knowing one’s past but 
also about making their collective future.  The shared conviction of Dada and the Dhimal youth 
regarding indigenous politics and their imagined future offers us an important perspective into 
how political struggles are continued over time through activism by bringing together people 
across generations and social backgrounds, and by building social relations of responsibility and 
duty towards their community. 
Throughout this dissertation, I have sought to highlight indigenous activism as one of the 
many ways through which historically marginalized communities such as Dhimal are striving to 
subvert the political construction of their collective marginality so that they can socially 
reproduce themselves as a distinct people (jāti) with a distinct culture and history emplaced in 
their ancestral places.  In this dissertation, I have examined Dhimals’ indigenous activism at two 
levels: (a) at the level of localized community politics that involve multiple Dhimal activists and 
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Dhimal community members engaged in defining and refining their ideas about Dhimal culture, 
customary practices, history, and their relationship with their territory, and (b) at the level of 
national politics where they align in solidarity with other indigenous groups in the pan-national 
indigenous movement as well as at the regional level to ensure their collective indigenous rights 
in the ongoing political transformation of Nepal as a federal and inclusive nation-state.  These 
two levels are analytical constructs that do not operate as distinct and bounded domains in 
practice.  I used them to examine the relations between political changes, indigenous activism 
and cultural politics in order to highlight how people, located in specific historical-political 
contexts, transform the global-national discourses of indigeneity and indigenous rights into 
locally meaningful and relevant political projects through their embedded everyday practices.  
As the central premise of this dissertation, I have drawn on the formulation advanced by 
the anthropologist Terence Turner that the essence of indigenous activism is “the struggle for the 
continued production of collective life, the self-production of the social group, with its values 
and forms of personhood” (Turner, 1999:132).  With the Dhimal case, I have expanded Turner’s 
emphasis on the social production of collectives to argue that indigenous activism needs also to 
be considered as a moral practice which people enact out of their felt sense of responsibility and 
duty towards their community.  Central to this notion of activism is peoples’ understanding of 
themselves as moral actors, and their political agency to act on the structural conditions and 
relations of power that “disempower peoples’ ability to socially reproduce their social 
collectives” (Turner, 1992:132).  I have sought to provide substantive illustrations of how 
approaching indigenous activism as a moral practice offers a valuable analytical framework to 
examine the inseparability of activism from peoples’ sense of self, political agency, and their 
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historical experiences of the nation-state.  In what follows, I will highlight the major arguments 
of this dissertation and the contributions it makes to the anthropology of indigenous movements.  
 
 
Indigeneity And The Political Transformations in Nepal 
 
In Nepal, political transformations towards democracy have positively influenced the 
resurgence and relevance of indigeneity and the rights of indigenous peoples.185  This 
dissertation shows how Dhimal self-identify as ‘ādivāsi’ people in order to assert their distinctive 
cultural identity and historical-territorial belonging in the Tarai, and how this sense of 
indigeneity becomes politically salient in their collective struggles for the recognition by the 
state of their indigenous rights.  The Dhimal indigenous political mobilization discussed in this 
dissertation was shaped both by the strong resurgence of the pan-national indigenous movement 
following the political-historical transformations in the early 1990s, the post-April 2006 period 
in particular, as well as by the specific struggles of the Dhimal community for the reproduction 
of their collective peoplehood.  From their organized efforts of the early 1980s under the rubric 
of ‘jāti bikās’ to the present day movements for ‘ethnic federalism’, Dhimals’ indigenous 
political mobilizations also show how what it means to be ādivāsi and the kinds of political rights 
people can possibly attain by virtue of being recognized as ‘indigenous peoples’ by the state 
have been substantially transformed during the last four decades in Nepal.   
In his study of the transformation of indigenous social movements into ethnic political 
parties in Latin America, Van Cott (2001) argues that indigenous peoples’ organizations were 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
185!Some scholars have argued that the transnational concept of ‘indigenous peoples’ do not apply or is a misfit in 
the case of Asia, the South Asian contexts in particular (Beteille, 1998; Li, 2000).  Such views have been completely 
rejected by the people through their everyday and organized political practices by showing how the concept of 
‘indigenous peoples’ resonates well with their political struggles, everyday practices and their sense of peoplehood. 
!
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successful when “they could raise claims in a forum that was part of larger regime bargain, 
allowing them to insert claims in a discussion of fundamental regime issues” (Van Cott, 
2001:32).  Similarly, indigenous organizations in Latin America were “more likely to extend 
their activities in electoral arena after they had secured significant and substantive policy 
advancements as social movements” (Van Cott, 2005:213).  From a comparative perspective, 
Van Cott’s observations are relevant in contextualizing the strong resurgence of indigenous 
political mobilizations, including that of the Dhimal community, particularly in the post-2006 
period.  In the last two decades, the political transformation toward an inclusive nation-state and 
the important roles played by indigenous peoples and their representatives in these historic 
changes were instrumental in establishing indigenous peoples’ issues as the core national 
agendas for meaningful restructuring of the nation-state (Bhattachan, 2009; Lawoti, 2013). 
In the early 1990s, indigenous peoples in Nepal strove for the recognition of their 
indigenous identity and they mobilized their movements to ensure social equality and justice by 
demanding recognition of their distinct social, political, cultural and linguistic identities and 
rights and to increase their equitable representation in every aspect of national life (Bhattachan, 
2013).  Indigenous peoples expanded their movement organizations across the nation as well as 
at the transnational level to pressure the state and mainstream political parties to endorse and 
commit to international agreements on the human rights of indigenous peoples, like the ILO 169.  
Indigenous peoples’ organizations became instrumental in redefining cultural identities and 
practices of indigenous communities through their organized politics of cultural reforms and 
revivals (Lawoti and Hangen, 2013:20).  
The decade-long (1996-2006) Maoist insurgency and its successful mobilization of 
Nepal’s historically oppressed classes and social groups for political transformations through an 
! 333!
armed revolution made it clear that, along with class inequality, the issues of discrimination and 
exclusion based on caste, ethnicity, gender and regional identities are fundamental to the 
establishment of an egalitarian and inclusive democratic polity in Nepal (Bhattachan, 2013:53-
54).  In particular, the Maoists’ promises of “upholding the right to self-determination, ethnic, 
linguistic and regional autonomy and self-rule, equality and equity based on the basis of gender, 
caste and ethnicity, language, religion and region” (Bhattachan, 2013: 49) supported indigenous 
peoples’ struggles for their rights.  It endorsed indigenous peoples’ demands for a radical 
restructuring of Nepal’s polity in order to embrace its cultural diversity by ending the hegemonic 
dominance of the hill Hindu groups and ensuring the equitable political participation and 
representation of all social groups. 
Following the peoples’ movement of April 2006 for the inclusive remaking of the nation, 
the abolition of the two-century long monarchy, and the state’s ratification of ILO 169 and its 
endorsement of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of the Indigenous Peoples 
(UNDRIP), indigenous peoples and their representative organizations were successful in 
transforming the transnational notions of indigeneity and indigenous rights, the most important 
being the idea of political-territorial autonomy, into a collective political project for a federal 
restructuring of Nepal (Bhattachan, 2009; Lawoti, 2013).  Similarly, the historic election of the 
Constitution Assembly (CA) in 2008 and the strong presence of indigenous representatives in the 
CA and of other political parties who supported many of indigenous peoples’ political agendas 
stirred new hopes among indigenous and other historically marginalized communities that their 
political aspirations would be meaningfully addressed in the new constitution.186  At the time of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
186!Of the 601 CA members, 240 representatives were elected through direct electoral system, and 335 were elected 
through proportional representative system while 26 were nominated by the council of ministers.  219 of the CA 
members (36% of the total members, drawn from all parties represented in the CA), were from indigenous 
communities.  The 2008 CA was the most representative and inclusive national political institutions in Nepal’s 
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my fieldwork, the pan-national ādivāsi janjāti (indigenous peoples) movement emerged as one of 
the most influential social movements to effect Nepal’s political transformations (see Hangen, 
2007; Lawoti and Hangen, 2013; Gurung and Mishra, 2012), and indigenous peoples were 
successful in establishing their political demands as fundamental to the inclusive restructuring of 
the nation-state into the ‘New Nepal’ (cf. Van Cott, 2001:32).    
Therefore, the indigenous activism of Dhimal that I have described in this dissertation was 
not an isolated phenomenon.  As historically constituted political practices, Dhimals’ 
articulations of indigeneity and indigenous consciousness, and their envisioning of an indigenous 
future were intricately tied with and influenced by larger political transformations and 
mobilizations at the local, regional, national and global levels.   
But, how should we approach the study of indigenous activism in a period of such radical 
political transformation?  This was both a methodological and an analytical challenge that I 
confronted during the initial phase of my research period.  In this regard, the anthropologist B.G. 
Karlsson (2000, 2001) provides an insightful perspective.  In his study of the ethnic mobilization 
of the indigenous Rabha people living in the states of West Bengal and Assam, India, the former 
group having a localized community-based ethnic activism which is less confrontational than 
that of the Rabha people of Assam with their strong organized movement for ethnic autonomy, 
he writes:   
One needs, as argued earlier, to take a closer look at what takes place on the ground, in the 
spheres of everyday life. The problem is that most studies of ethnic conflict or ethnic 
movements start with situations where people are out in the streets shouting slogans, 
raising political demands, and, at worst, taking to violence, and thus they tend to miss the 
more subtle or invisible processes of community formation taking place outside the visible 
domain of ethnic politics (Karlsson, 2001:29) 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
history till today.  There were two Dhimal CA members are affiliated with the United Communist Party of Nepal, 
Maoist (UCPNM) ((http://www.can.gov.np, accessed February 28, 2013).!
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 Karlsson’s emphasis on the need to focus on everyday practices and community 
formation processes is relevant to the ethnographic focus of this dissertation.  During my 
fieldwork, there were many sporadic and organized indigenous movements, periodic protests, 
public demonstrations, strikes or ‘Nepal shutdowns,’ and other contentious activist events both in 
Kathmandu and in Morang which Dhimal and other indigenous groups both organized and took 
part in.  Besides such organized and overt political activism, there were other spheres of activism 
which were more focused on organizing the Dhimal community than on confronting the state.  
Activists and their indigenous organizations were actively engaged in these locally embedded 
cultural politics related to the reforms and revival of what they consider to be Dhimal customary 
practices such as marriage and wedding ceremonials, the village rituals, and traditional ethnic 
dresses.  These cultural politics, as this dissertation has demonstrated, are central to Dhimal 
indigenous activism.  Throughout this dissertation, I sought to explain that if we limit our 
analysis of indigenous political movements only to overtly organized and contentious 
mobilizations, then we will miss how people enact and engage in indigenous activism through 
the everyday politics of community making.   
 
Land and the Ādivāsi-State Relations In Nepal: A Regional Approach 
!
A major focus of this dissertation has been to illustrate how issues of land and landlessness 
become fundamental to Dhimals’ sense of who they are, what had happened to them in the past, 
what is happening to them now as Dhimal, and their vision of the future as ādivāsi in Nepal.  
With a historical analysis, this dissertation shows that Dhimals’ emphasis on land and 
landlessness crystallizes their concrete subjective experience of the Nepali state and their 
resistance to it.  I have argued that state colonization of Tarai land since the early 19th century 
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was a colonial project of resource extraction and of maintaining the political domination of the 
ruling groups (cf. Regmi, 1999), similar to the British colonial rule in the Tarai regions of 
Western Bengal (see Karlsson, 2000).  This dissertation shows that the ways in which the 
aboriginal groups of the Tarai experienced, resisted and mediated such colonial encounters, and 
how they bring out these historical experiences in their political mobilizations powerfully shape 
their understanding of what it means to be Tarai ādivāsi in Nepal.  Specifically, I have shown 
how Dhimal understanding of the ways in which their ancestors survived the malarial 
environment in the past and thereby sustained their traditional ways of life and political 
autonomy by evading the state strongly shapes their sense of territorial belonging and indigeneity.  
In the study of indigenous relationships to land and indigenous advocacy of land rights in 
Nepal, ādivāsi’s communal ownership of land, exemplified by the Kipat system of the Limbu 
(see Caplan, 1970), has become a generic model and the dominant analytical framework.  Such a 
model is less applicable to the case of Dhimal who were compelled to settle into farming 
communities after the state-led land colonization in the mid-19th century.  This dissertation 
illustrates how the particular history of state-led land colonization in the Tarai, the extractive 
land tenure relations based on the dominance of the hill Hindu groups in particular, and the 
interplay among the politics of regional geographical imaginations, caste hierarchy, Dhimals’ 
reliance on non-farming subsistence to adapt to the ecology of the densely forested and malarial 
Tarai, and their different notions of land (without permanent individual or collective ownership) 
placed Dhimal at such a distinct disadvantage in their relations with the encroaching landlord 
Nepali state until the early 20th century that many Dhimal later became landless in their own 
ancestral territories.  This regional approach, a Tarai-centric regional-historical analysis, is 
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necessary to understand the experiences of territorial dispossession, landlessness and political-
economic marginalization of the Tarai ādivāsi (Guneratne, 2002; Karlsson, 2000).   
Like the Arjun Guneratne’s work (1996, 2002) on the Tharus, my research brings new 
approaches to the study of the relationship of Tarai ādivāsi with the land by focusing on the 
interplay among the territorial sovereignty of the state, the role of malaria in mediating relations 
among ādivāsi, the state, and other social groups, and Dhimals’ historical agency in resisting the 
extractive Hindu state.  In doing so, this dissertation also highlights the critical need for a 
historically informed social history of malaria to understand the changing relations among the 
state, indigenous groups and other social groups in Nepal’s Tarai.  With this focus on the issues 
of land and landlessness, I have also emphasized that an anthropology of the state informed by 
indigenous peoples’ politics must center on the dialogical relationship among geography, labor, 
history and power. 
 
Place-Making, Indigeneity and Indigenous Territoriality 
!
Since land is a central analytic in studying the relationship between the state and 
indigenous peoples, this dissertation shows the relevance of ‘place’ as an analytical framework 
for understanding indigenous politics.  Drawing from theoretical perspectives on place and 
place-making, this dissertation demonstrates that a place-based approach is necessary to account 
ethnographically for the variegated ways in which people enact the cultural politics of making 
and claiming a differential geography of belonging.  Such place-based approaches offer greater 
scope to understand indigenous activism by centering on how people, place, history, and politics 
are produced in mutually dialectical relationships (Feeley-Harnik, 1991; Leach, 2003; Kirsch, 
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2006; Kahn, 2011).  My focus on place-making as an integral part of Dhimal indigenous 
activism has important implications for understanding indigenous politics in Nepal.   
The demand for rights to indigenous territoriality is fundamental to the global indigenous 
political mobilization (Niezen, 2003; Castree, 2004; Karlsson, 2003), and now it has become one 
of the most important demands of indigenous movements in Nepal.  At the time of my fieldwork 
period, indigenous demands for territorial based political autonomy in the federal restructuring of 
the nation was one of the most important and contested national political agendas in Nepal.  
During this period, Dhimals’ experiences of landlessness that began in the early 19th century and 
their embedded belonging in their ancestral places, hence their understanding of indigeneity, also 
became an important political project in order to claim their collective aspirations for political 
autonomy.  Dhimal and other indigenous groups not only demanded that Nepal should be 
federated in terms of autonomous states based on ethnic identity, history and geography.  They 
also came up with their own propositions for the federal restructuring and delineations of 
territorial boundaries, for example, that of the proposed ‘Dhimal autonomous state’ in the new 
Nepal (see Bhattachan, 2009).  
In Nepal, this indigenous articulation of territorial-based political autonomy in the form of 
ethnic federalism is an emergent indigenous political project that radically challenges the 
dominant ideals of multi-party democracy (see Bhattachan, 2009; Lawoti, 2005).   Some scholars, 
political leaders, intellectuals, media personalities and commentators have warned so strenuously 
that federalism, particularly ethnic federalism, will cause the nation to disintegrate the nation that 
this fear seems to have caught the imagination of some sectors of the public (Lawoti, 2010).187  
The forces driving these fears about indigenous claims of territorial autonomy are important 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
187!!See Mishra and Gurung 2012 for an overview of the debate; also see Lawoti, 2009; Bhattachan, 2013 for 
critiques of such views.!
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political issues that merit serious scholarly discussion (see Rycroft and Dasgupta, 2011).  At the 
same time, we also need to question critically how the dominant political parties and the 
mainstream media widely use and circulate this politics of fear that ‘ethnic federalism will 
disintegrate the nation’ in order to mute and marginalize the multiple indigenous federal 
imaginations from meaningful public debates in Nepal. 
The prospects and perils of ethnic federalism were beyond the scope of this dissertation.  I 
was interested in exploring how people make sense of those federal imaginings that had 
captivated people from all walks of life and places during the time of my fieldwork.  By focusing 
on the centrality of place and place-making practices in understanding peoples’ sense of ethnic 




Figure 19:  “Welcome to Dhimal autonomous region under Limbuwan autonomous state”: a signboard by the 




power relations affecting their lived worlds, my ethnographic discussions of Dhimals’ place-
making practices elucidate how people craft and draw meanings from such federal envisioning 
by relating them to their historical experiences, the global-national discourses of indigeneity, and 
their everyday practices.   
The anthropologist Mukta S. Tamang (2009:286) succinctly argues that “indigenous 
activism through assertions of relative autonomy and identity cannot be separated from the 
struggle against political-economic exploitation in a situation where the land, labour, and 
resources of the relatively marginal and powerless groups are being exploited with impunity by 
market and dominant social forces.”  He shows how Tamang indigenous activists work to 
produce territorial consciousness through place-making practices at two levels.  On the one level, 
Tamang activists produce a social solidarity across diverse local communities of Tamang 
through symbolic invocation of Tamasaling (homeland of Tamang).  On the other level, “by 
constructing an alternative indigenous history, activists assert that the established order and the 
histories associated with it are arbitrary human construction, thereby pointing the ways for 
radical changes in order to empower the disempowered” (Tamang, 2009:286).    
As with the place-making politics of Tamang activists, Dhimal indigenous activists also 
creatively use their village ritual Shrejat to forge a collective sense of peoplehood by promoting 
it as their ‘national ritual’.   Drawing on theoretical approaches that combine phenomenological 
and political-economic approaches to place-making and experiences of place (Kirsch, 2001, 
2006; Escobar, 2001; Meyers, 2001; Kahn, 2011), I have examined how Dhimal are reclaiming a 
new historical relationship with their lived geographies through rituals, history writing, and 
undertaking collective journeys to their ancestral places and how they are using these place-
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making practices to produced new territorial and historical consciousness in the Dhimal 
community through indigenous activism.    
The relationship between land and history is a recurring focus in the anthropology of place 
(Basso, 1996; Ingold, 1993, 2000; Santos-Garnero, 1998; Kirsch, 2006; Kahn, 2011).   My 
ethnographic discussions of how ordinary individuals make and write history in the land by 
participating in ritual and by being physically present in their ancestral places through seemingly 
mundane practices of chitchat and informal group discussions adds new ethnographic insights to 
understand the practice of “topographic writing” (Santos-Garnero, 1998), i.e. how people 
inscribe histories in the land.  Furthermore, this dissertation provides a grounded ethnographic 
example to illuminate the dialogical interplay among global-national discourses of indigeneity, 
political transformations, and peoples’ everyday practices by showing how ordinary people 
imbue a place with historical significance and how such history making can become a powerful 
source for the indigenous articulation of territorial claims in their specific political struggles, for 
example, in the movements for a ‘Dhimal autonomous state.’  
Throughout this dissertation, I have sought to explain that the centrality of land, territorial 
claims and place-making in Dhimal indigenous activism are moral and political projects aimed at 
making “their own places rather than have them made for them” (Castree, 2004:161) so that they 
could reverse their long history of state-led dispossessions of their indigenous territories.  My 
historical and ethnographic data show the severity of territorial dispossessions, and the political, 
economic and cultural marginalization Dhimal suffered for generations as a result of the state 
colonization of the Tarai and the impositions of assimilative cultural polices in the past.  After 
the 1950s, the escalation of the state-led geography of violence in indigenous territories under 
the politics of land reforms, administrative divisions of the nation, and other modernizing 
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schemes forcibly erased the Dhimal’s own history of land in their ancestral territories.  Despite 
the devastating impact of these state-making projects, Dhimal continued to reconstitute 
themselves as a people, albeit in new forms, primarily by their grounding their communal life in 
the place and connecting to their collective social life through their indigenous notion and 
practices of ‘village.’   Thus I contend that Dhimals’ place-making practices also need to be 
understood as the collective efforts to remake their village and its social organization.  Hence, 
with its focus on place-making, this dissertation also contributes towards the rethinking of the 
concept of ‘village’ in the study of South Asian societies (see Mines and Yazgi, 2010; Mines, 
2005).  I argue that the interplay among place-making, the social production of the village or the 
process of community formation (Karlsson, 2001), and indigenous activism also helps to explain 
how people become morally motivated to become involved in indigenous activism.  I will return 
to this point in the final section of this chapter. 
While Dhimal reclaim their indigenous territoriality and indigeneity, their place-making 
practices are not exclusionary and do not deny the mutual belonging and existence of other social 
groups.  As my ethnographic discussions of the Shrejat ritual performance in the village of Raja 
Rani evidence, Dhimal place-making practices recognize the inter-ethnic belongings and 
reciprocal relationships between various social groups.  Dhimal themselves are acutely aware of 
the multiethnic character of the ancestral territories which they seek to make their autonomous 
region.  Yet they also know from experience that such a multiethnic coexistence, when it is 
mediated by unequal power relations, always works to disadvantage them.  For the historically 
marginalized ādivāsi who have become sukumbasi in their own ancestral lands, the politics of 
place-making and their ability to make their own places or their ‘villages’ entail political 
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possibilities for the continued social production of collectivities possessing their own values, 
forms of personhood, and history (Turner, 1999; Holmberg, 2011).   
As expressed by Dada and the youth leader, the secretary of the Sangihaya Parishad, in the 
beginning of this chapter, Dhimal seek to expand their hold on political power through their 
indigenous mobilization so that they can subvert the political construction of their marginality.  
Thus their claims of indigenous rights to political autonomy, for example in the form of ‘Dhimal 
autonomous state’ in the present-day political context of the federal restructuring of Nepal, 
reflect Dhimal political envisioning of a ‘New Nepal’ in which they will be politically 
empowered to make decisions for themselves.  Dhimal indigenous activists and others 
understand that their vision of a Dhimal autonomous region is fraught with complexities and 
challenges, and they are fully cognizant of the fact that they must recognize the rightful 
belonging and autonomy of others groups as well.188   Drawing on my discussions with Dhimal 
indigenous leaders, observations of their political activism, and analysis of their published and 
unpublished position papers on ‘Dhimal autonomy’ in the proposed federal restructuring of 
Nepal, I confidently infer that Dhimals’ political projects of place-making are about making their 
‘villages’ and for the remaking, not for the breaking up, of the nation.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
188!The preamble of the constitution of the Sanghiya Parishad - the Dhimal Federal Autonomous Council, 2066 V.S. 
(2011 A.D.) makes it explicit that “ In keeping view with the historical responsibility of institutionalizing the 
complete peoples’ federal democratic (loktrantik) republic state system, the restructuring of the nation towards a just 
and prosperous society should be based on the ethnic historical territoriality without comprising the national 
sovereignty, territorial integrity, independence, national autonomy, freedom and national unity.  Dhimal autonomous 
region would be committed to the principles and values of inclusive democratic governance, freedom of citizens, 
secularism, fundamental human rights, rights to voting, complete press freedom, free and able federal judiciary, 
legitimate and law abiding governance, and values of the complete peoples’ democracy.  The proportional and total 
representations of all caste and ethnicities, class, region and genders will be ensured in the Dhimal autonomous 
region (Sunsari, Morang and Jhapa).” 
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Indigenous Activism as Locally Embedded Moral Practices 
!
In recent years, ethnographic attention to indigenous political movements has increasingly 
focused on transnational spaces (Muehlebach, 2001; 2003), the global circulation of indigeneity 
and indigenous discourses (Brysk, 2000; Niezen, 2003) and the interface between neoliberal 
regimes and indigenous politics (Li, 2000, 2007; Postero, 2006).  We now know more about how 
the global discourses of ‘indigenous rights’ circulate and translate across cultural, political and 
geographical boundaries creating both potential and limitations for inclusive democracy.  
However, we still understand very little about the ways in which such global-national indigenous 
politics become meaningful part of the locally embedded everyday practices.  To this 
understanding, this dissertation makes an important contribution. 
The centrality of cultural politics in Dhimal indigenous activism is a major focus of this 
dissertation.  I was interested in exploring why Dhimal emphasize certain cultural practices such 
as marriage, village ritual, and traditional dress as sites of reform and preservation, and how 
these reforms inform their indigenous politics.   I have sought to highlight how indigenous 
activists and their ethnic organizations derive their moral authority from these cultural politics 
and how they creatively interweave marriage, ritual, and place-making practices into the political 
project of demanding their rights from the state and for the revival of Dhimal customary 
practices and institutions. Thus, I call these cultural politics constitutive practices of activism.  
With my ethnographic cases, I have emphasized the importance of understanding indigenous 
activism as a locally embedded cultural practice.  By demonstrating how marriage (hence 
kinship), village ritual and place-making activities can become constitutive practices of 
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indigenous activism, this dissertation makes an important contribution in foregrounding 
indigenous activism as a locally embedded practice.   
I have argued that this analytical focus on community making practices helps us to 
understand what motivates people to become activists and how activism becomes embedded in 
everyday life in its specific political-historical settings.  For instance, when I asked senior 
Dhimal activists why they became involved and continue to engage in activism, they explained 
that activism was like a nashā or an addiction – an embodied practice integral to their sense of 
self.  For them, activism is something they wear (lagāunu) and walk with (hindu) as a moral 
person, not by choice, but out of their felt sense of temporal urgency and their embodied duty to 
act on the political-economic conditions that disempower them and their community.  This sense 
of embodiment is vital to understanding the explanations that Dhimal give for their becoming 
involved in indigenous activism, explanations that call to mind embodied moral practice and felt 
sentiments of responsibility and duty.   
 In looking for a way to fully convey what Dhimal mean when the use words like lāgnu 
and hidnu, it becomes evident that the difficulty derives in part from the differing notions of 
personhood that characterize Euro-American and Dhimal (and other Nepali Tibeto-Burman 
peoples) notions of the self.   Scholars drawing attention to these differences include Ernestine 
McHugh (2001) and Robert Desjarlais (1992, 2003) who point out that the Gurung and Yomo 
Wa with whom they worked experience a world in which the boundaries of the self are more 
permeable than those conceived by Westerners – where motivation, the qualities of the good, and 
elements of virtue involve an integration of what we might think of as substance.  Dhimal 
activists’ use of words like lāgnu and hidnu emphasize the practical processes of embodiment 
that so transform the person that they cannot conceptualize their sense of self without being 
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involved in the practice of activism.  A part of that transformation is embodiment and what may 
be embodied has to do with virtue and moral practice (McHugh 2001, Fricke, 2008).   
 In my analysis of the Dhimal history of ethnic organizing and the life histories of senior 
Dhimal activists, I have focused on the political-historical contexts that compelled these Dhimal 
to become activists.   All the senior activists explained that the Dhimal collective experience of 
landlessness and the resulting marginalization compelled them to become activists.  Their 
emphasis on activism as an obligatory moral duty not only illustrates how people embody 
activism in their everyday life, but also points to the need to account for the larger historical-
political contexts and structural relations of power within which people derive such meanings of 
activism.  In other words, for Dhimal activists, activism is a historically constituted embodied 
moral practice through which their political struggles are continued and reproduced across 
generations.  Such an understanding of activism has important implications for how we represent 
indigenous activism and activists.  
 Many scholarly works on ethnic and identity politics in Nepal and South Asia describe 
ethnic activists as educated and middle class individuals whose urban experiences are detached 
from the reality of the rural people for whom they claim to speak.  Or they are the ‘elite’ 
members of their community, who, with supports from the state, international donor community, 
and mainstream political parties, set the movement agenda in order to reap economic and 
political opportunities for themselves.  My ethnography challenges such a narrow economic and 
class-based approach and offers an alternative perspective on indigenous activism as a locally 
embedded moral practice through which people engage with the larger social worlds and 
reproduce their collective selves.   
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Appendix 
Appendix 1: Summary Of Dhimal’s Marriage Rit 
Before Wedding 




Groom’s side: 2 bottles of raksi, betel nut, 
cigarette/tobacco 
 
Bride’s side: one earthen pot of 
Ghangsing (brewed beer) and one bottle 
raksi (brewed alcohol) for the whole 
village (representative) in 
acknowledgement of their presence  
• Representatives of the village elders 
from the two sides.  They determine if 
the proposed marriage is permissible 
(clan exogamy; cross cousins beyond 
the third generation).   
• In-laws are formally introduced and 
greeting exchanged 
• Commitments to the marriage from 
the two sides 
• Fixing of the wedding date 
During the Wedding (at the bride’s home) 
Rit Rit Items exchanged Significance 
(Before entering the bride’s home) 
Dhana Kawari rit 
(rit for the male 
youths of the 
bride’s village) 
Groom family gives:  
7 supari (beetle nut), 7 paisa (coins) and 
one bottle of raksi 
• Recognition of the bride’s friends (male) 
and village youths 
• Seeking apology for taking their friends 
away 
  •  
Warang-berang rit 
(Village elders 
block the way) 
The groom’s side pays Rs.  5 to the 
elders.  One earthen pot of Ghangsing and 
one bottle of raksi is exchanged between 
the two sides 
• Recognition of the village elders 
 
Rit for the girls  The groom side pays Rs.  10 to the groups 
of girls standing on the entrance.  
Ghangsing and one bottle of raksi is 
exchanged 
• To welcome the janti (procession) 
• Recognition of the bride’s girl friends 
and her sisters. 
 
Wedding rit exchange 
   
Dhudhauli rit 
(Milk payment) 
• one tokara (dried squash used as 
container) gora and Rs.  2. 
• Recognition of the bride’s mother for 
nurturing (milk feeding), caring and 
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bringing up the bride 
Kanataka 
Chukaika rit 
(rit for the bride’s 
family and the 
bride’s village) 
 
• an oil lamp is lit and placed on the 
banana leaf.  The fire is placed as a 
sacred object to which h the two sides 
can pledge the exchange processes. 
• The bride’s side offers a bottle of raksi 
and two rupees to the bride’s father.  
The bride and groom’s father greet the 
community people. 
• The bride’s family reciprocate the rit by 
offering a bottle of raksi and a pot of 
Ghangsing to the groom’s janti 
• Important rit: recognition of the bride’s 
father and bride’s kin groups 
• The two sides exchange greetings and 
offer respect to the community 
• Exchange of jari sona (wedding songs) 
as ways of making the bride’s families 
and relatives ensure that their daughter 
will be loved and treated well in her 
husband’s family (Moral commitment). 
Dhami Manjhi rit • The groom side offers one bottle raksi 
each to Dhami and Manjhi.  One bottle 
brewed beer (Ghangsing) for Dhami 
Manjhi 
• Recognition and respect to the village 
Dhami and the Manjhi 




• The groom side gives five rupees and a 
bottle of raksi to the community 
members of the bride village 
• Respect and recognition of the 
community members 
 
Both the bride and the groom’ s family will offer special recognition to all the people who had helped 
them in preparing the food. 
When the bride is brought to the groom’s home, the groom’s family and relatives will bless her.  Her 
mother in law and other female kin members of the groom gift her the bohna, the traditional dress for 
Dhimal women. Then a special ritual will be held in the courtyard of the groom’s home This ritual is 
performed in order to avoid ‘sins’ of eating the wedding food if the groom and bride are kin groups 
(incestuous marriage).  Then the bride serves them cooked rice and lentils on a banana leaf.  The 
acceptance of food by the village Manjhi, groom’s kin members and other community elders symbolizes 
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